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Deadlock in Delhi & After: Rising Powers remain entrenched in their positions post Delhi G20 and Quad meetings

Policy Alert #253 | March 16, 2023

While the G20 Summit in New Delhi is only set to take place in September, it was already in the spotlight as of March, and not in the way that host country India had hoped. The Foreign Ministers’ Meeting on March 1^st and 2^nd in Delhi succeeded a joint G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors (FMCBG), and a Finance & Central Bank Deputies (FCBD) Meeting in Bengaluru in late February, with an ambitious agenda focused on multilateralism. However, the Foreign Ministers’ Meeting especially showcased divergences among G20 members despite an introductory speech by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi urging unity. Indeed, after one year of fighting in Ukraine, Rising Powers are still entrenched in their positions despite the fluctuations of the war. In fact, there seems to be less consensus as the war has gone on, as Russia’s military setbacks no longer elicit the same reactions from observers than the expected onslaught and initially rapid gains. While in Bali emerging powers seemed to side with the US, in Delhi they seemed to expect more about “seeking peace” rather than “defending Ukraine”.

The end result was that the acrimonious talks over Ukraine and whether the G20 was the appropriate venue to discuss security concerns overshadowed attempts to find consensus on multilateralism and development. Overall, the Foreign Minister’s Meeting appeared as a first major test for India ahead of the Summit in September, with pressure mounting as Russian President Vladimir Putin may attend the Summit in New Delhi. Similar turmoil at the Summit this September would be a disappointment to Modi, and a “chair’s summary will not do” for Indian diplomacy vying for international recognition.

CHINA

China decried the lack of unity at the Foreign Minister’s Meeting as the result of the US and European countries “using geopolitics to hijack the development agenda that G20 is supposed to focus on”. At the same time, China was careful to not blame India for this, or even downplay the event. Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Mao Ning deflected such concerns by stating that it was “an important event”, and Chinese media reported on the side talks between the foreign ministers of China and India where both “expressed their firm attitude to support multilateralism, oppose confrontation”. Chinese media praised Indian preparations and accused US and Western media of exaggerating the “divergences” between China and India.

At the same time, “Chinese experts” were quoted by the Global Times as questioning “whether India could really play a leading role”. In describing the event as a “test for India”, and then deploring the lack of success of the event, Chinese media also indirectly considered that India failed to lead the discussions towards its stated goals.

The China Daily, owned by the CPC, published an article by Swaran Singh, an Indian Professor of international relations, who shared an optimistic perspective about the meeting between China’s new foreign affairs minister Qin Gang and Indian minister of external affairs Jaishankar.
The South China Morning Post also reported on the bilateral talks between India and China, but concluded that while the event was symbolically important, it did not bring significant progress to the border dispute.
The Global Times, a Chinese nationalist newspaper run under the official newspaper of the Communist Party of China, featured the series of meetings in Delhi prominently. It anticipated the lack of consensus, considered the meetings to be a test for India, and deplored that US and some EU foreign ministers “instrumentalized and weaponized G20”.

INDIA

Indian media as a whole presented the meetings in a better light. Articles published before the Foreign Ministers Meeting disputed the apparent international consensus that it would follow in the footsteps of the FMCBG and FCBD meetings. After the meeting, Indian media highlighted limited progress rather than characterizing the event as a failure. At most, Indian newspapers suggested the event was “derailed by Western countries, and Russia-China”, while noting that Indian leadership was praised by both Russia and the US.

When it comes to the negotiations themselves, India voted in favor of the inclusion of paragraphs mentioning Ukraine in the joint statement, even though it avoided the term “war” and used the terms “crisis” or “challenge” instead. Despite appealing to both sides, Indian diplomats were not able to obtain concessions from Russia and China which refused to vote for these inclusions, while appeals to focus on development went unheeded by US and European diplomats.

Another element that was noted by the Indian Press before the meeting was the announced absence of Japanese foreign minister Yoshimasa Hayashi. His absence at the G20 was deplored and may have “cast some shadows over New Delhi-Tokyo ties”, though Foreign Secretary Vinay Kwatra said he “understood” that Hayashi was “not able to come because of his domestic compulsions” and looked “forward to a very active participation”. According to the Times of India, “Indian officials strongly denied that Hayashi’s likely absence was an intended snub”, adding that “Japan is sending one of the largest delegations to the meeting”. Hayashi’s presence a day later for the Quad meeting and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s visit to Delhi on March 20 served to reaffirm Japan’s commitment to its relationship with India.

The Economic Times noted Hayashi’s absence at the G20 meeting, in contrast to his presence at the Quad meeting, which reinforced the notion that Japan was prioritizing its G7 presidency and more exclusive groups such as the Quad.
The left-leaning The Hindu remarked that India had more success in finding consensus on Ukraine at the Quad meeting it hosted the day after the G20 Foreign Minister’s meeting, while also noting China’s “criticism of the Quad Grouping” objecting to its exclusivity.
The Pioneer, a pro-BJP newspaper, voiced Jaishankar’s comments on the success of the meeting, as there was “a large number of issues where there was agreement”

JAPAN

Japan’s participation in the G20 meeting was eclipsed by the debate about Hayashi’s absence from the Foreign Ministers meeting. Japanese Liberal Democratic officials said the sessions attended by Hayashi instead of the G20 were “extremely important” and “many lawmakers and citizens want to hear directly from the foreign minister“. Even members of the opposition Constitutional Democrats said it would be “unthinkable for the foreign minister not to be there”.

Japanese newspapers were not all fully supportive though as some gave voice to Japanese critics from the Constitutional Party of Japan while others wrote their own critical editorials on the topic. However, critics took issue with the Diet’s pressure and scheduling rigidity rather than with Hayashi himself. Interestingly, newspapers from both countries amplified critical voices from the other. Indian media had cited harsher Japanese critics, while the few pessimistic Indian outlooks about Hayasahi’s absence were cited in stronger terms than in Indian media. While the content of the G20 meetings were not delved into deeply, Hayashi’s participation to the Quad meeting was noted, and his “rare direct reference” to China was noticed.

The conservative Yomiuri Shimbun published the strongest criticism of Hayashi’s absence, arguing that it had “undermined Japan’s standing” and that the Diet needed to adapt to allow ministers to travel rather than tying them up in parliamentary debates.
The Japan Times, a centrist newspaper, provided a balanced take citing both supporters and critics of Hayashi’s absence, while also voicing slightly out of context Indian concerns.
The progressive-leaning Asahi covered the G20 meetings with a strong focus on the US-China relationship and also reported on Chinese criticism of the Quad.

RUSSIA

Russia stood firm against the recriminations of the rest of the G20 members, with the exception of China which backed Russia in voting against adopting language on Ukraine. Russian statements mirrored China’s, pinpointing the “bullying from US-led Western nations over the Ukraine situation” as the reason for the lack of consensus.

Russian media was careful with not blaming India for the G20’s deadlock, even praising India as a “credible global leader”, though it did not fully consider India to be on Russia’s side either, instead considering India as “caught in a diplomatic balancing act”.

Sputnik News, funded by the state, reached out to Indian observers who generally agreed that India is neutral before anything else, had divergent interests with the West, and blamed food and fuel shortages on sanctions rather than on the war itself.
The Pravda Report, a nationalist newspaper, did not cover the G20 meetings at all except to mention that side discussions in which “Indian officials discussed anti-Russian sanctions with their colleagues from the G7” led to India deciding to comply with Western-imposed oil price caps, a loss for Russia as the article also noted that “oil deals between Russia and India have threatened the dominance of the US dollar”
The Moscow Times, an independent publication, noted the meeting between U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on the sidelines of the G20 meeting, though the meeting was described as of little significance.

By Gabriel Savagner, M.A. candidate in Security Policy Studies, Elliott School of International Affairs at GW. Research Assistant, Rising Powers Initiative.

Japan’s Rising Role as an Indian Ocean Actor: What Do Port Stories Tell Us?

February 14, 2023

In January 2023, a little-noticed naval exercise took place between the U.S. and Sri Lanka in the strategically located Trincomalee port and Mullikulam base in the Indian Ocean. The annual bilateral CARAT Sri Lanka exercises have been long-standing, but this year, Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force joined them for the second time after its initial participation in 2021. This came right on the heels of India sending the INS Delhi to dock at Trincomalee and providing training for the Sri Lankan Navy. These actions come four months after the controversial Chinese docking of a surveillance ship at Hambantota port in the midst of Sri Lanka’s historic economic and political meltdown in 2022.

Japan’s increasing involvement in the Indian Ocean will have a deep impact on the interests of its Quad partners, especially India. While Japan has been a traditional development aid partner in the region, its newest role suggests a leading strategic edge. What does Japan’s strategic edge in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) look like? And to what extent is it characterized by a partnership with India versus a more unilateral approach?

The Race for Ports in the Indian Ocean

Sri Lanka

Japan’s strategic outlook on the Indian Ocean may be best reflected in how it participates in port and port infrastructure development. China took an early lead in constructing ports in the Indian Ocean Region ahead of both Japan and India. The latter two have been playing catch-up since 2010. Given Japan’s greater capital, resources and a better reputation for building and delivering quality infrastructure, Tokyo is in a more advantageous position to compete than India. India, however, brings strong historical experience working closely with key states like Sri Lanka and Bangladesh that could add value for Japan.

Tokyo’s sweeping new National Security Strategy, released in December 2022, points to China’s rising assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific as Japan’s “greatest strategic challenge.” In turn, Japan’s National Defense Strategy further notes that it must “deepen bilateral and multilateral defense exchanges” and will prioritize “the importance of stable use of sea lane and an energy and economic perspective” with coastal Indian Ocean states. Japan has been increasing its port investment portfolios across the Indian Ocean in recent years. Its major investments include Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Myanmar. Sri Lanka is where Japan is poised to gain the most, with unexpected opportunities since the economic and political crises hit the island nation last year.

That said, the way forward in Sri Lanka has not been easy for Japan. After receiving approval for the Colombo Port East Container Terminal (ECT) project in 2019, Japan and India were dismissed two years later in what amounted to a high-profile rebuke. The government of President Maithripala Sirisena-Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe had signed an MOU with Japan and India to develop the Colombo terminal jointly. The operating company was to be 51% owned by the government, with the remainder held by Japan and India. When a new government led by the China-friendly Gotabaya Rajapaksa unceremoniously took over in 2021, the decision was reversed, allowing the state-run China Harbor Engineering to develop the East Container Terminal. Initially, Rajapaksa had indicated that there would be no change, only to change his mind. Caught by surprise, this unilateral move was decried by Japan and India but without effect, even though nearly 70% of the transshipment business through ECT is linked to India. This setback came on the heels of the handover of Hambantota Port to China in 2017 and the construction of the Colombo International Container Terminal (CICT) by China in 2011, where China Merchants Port Holdings has majority stakes.

The dramatic fall of Rajapaksa in 2022 and the political turbulence saw the return of a more even-handed government under Wickremesinghe. This government has wasted little time firming up another contract to Japan and India, this time for a new Colombo West Terminal project. This project will involve a yet-to-be-announced Japanese investor and India’s Adani Ports and Special Economic Zones (APSEZ). It will allow India and Japan to hold an 85% stake in this project under a build-operate-transfer schema for 35 years. While not generally viewed as strategic as the ECT, it is next to China’s activity in Colombo port. It was at the Colombo International Container Terminal that China docked a submarine in 2014, causing much consternation in India.

Japan’s willingness to persist and ride the waves to acquire a port project in Sri Lanka points to the high level of commitment to gain a stronger foothold in the IOR. Apart from Colombo and Hambantota ports in Sri Lanka’s southwest and south, respectively, is the even more strategic Port of Trincomalee located in the northeast of the country within the Bay of Bengal. Trincomalee is the world’s fifth-largest natural harbor and one of the few natural harbors deep enough to easily accommodate submarines. Some view it as the second-best natural harbor in the world after Sydney.

The Bay of Bengal holds significance as the link between the Indian and Pacific Oceans; it is the fulcrum of the Indo-Pacific. More than 80 percent of Japan’s oil imports pass through the Bay of Bengal. If there is a priority for Japan (and India) in Sri Lanka, it would be to prevent China from establishing a permanent presence elsewhere on the island, especially Trincomalee. Trincomalee has a major Sri Lankan naval base and an air base. Still, given its low population, distance from the capital, and proximity to areas in conflict during the decades-long civil war, it has remained underdeveloped. In mid-2022 however, the Chairman of Sri Lanka Ports Authority announced plans to develop Trincomalee as an industrial port and to call for an “Expression of Interest” from investors to utilize the port premises and up to 2,400 hectares of surrounding land.

While plans to develop Trincomalee have surfaced from time to time, it was apparently only in December 2021, after a Japanese company established a ship repair and rebuilding facility there, that Colombo got serious. In joint operations with Japanese Onomichi Dockyard, Colombo Dockyard founded a rapid response afloat service in Trincomalee Port to cover a gap in Sri Lanka’s coverage. Another Japanese company, Tokyo Cement, had already built a state-of-the-art cement manufacturing facility which began commercial operations in 2017. Tokyo Cement’s products, trusted for decades for their superior strength and quality, also incorporated sophisticated equipment from India and Germany in this project. Given Hambantota port’s poor performance, the idea of developing Trincomalee has been met with some skepticism. However, supporters can point to a 2020 Asian Development Bank study commissioned by the Japanese which concluded that the Trincomalee harbor had substantial benefits to offer, including catering to increasing maritime cargo trade from India’s eastern seaboard and Bangladesh and Myanmar.

Bangladesh, Myanmar, and the Greater Indian Ocean

Bangladesh’s primary port is the Port of Chittagong. Problems have long plagued Chittagong, with the World Bank ranking it the least efficient major port in Asia. It handles nearly 98% of Bangladesh’s containerized trade with the rest of the world. Japan has recognized this problem and has invested in the construction of Matarbari Port to alleviate the burden from Chittagong. Estimated to be completed in 2026, Matarbari port is also envisioned as a transport option for Indian goods from India’s sensitive northeast. “Key infrastructure projects funded by Japan like the Matarbari port in Bangladesh are expected to provide an entry point for Indian business to establish a foothold in Southeast Asia,” says VP of Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Nakazawa Keiichiro. Matarbari port, although not an Indian investment, is indicative of India and Japan’s close cooperation and shared goals.

In Myanmar, both Japan and India had planned major projects, despite the country’s troubled politics. India’s APSEZ had plans to build and operate an international container terminal in Yangon port, and Japan had planned to invest in the Thilawa SEZ surrounding Yangon port. While Japan’s SEZ in Thilawa and investments into Yangon port have come through, they have encountered delays and an increased investment risk due to sanctions on the Tatmadaw government. These sanctions have led to the cancellation of Indian APSEZ’s Yangon investment. Japan remains susceptible to Myanmar’s political instability.

Meanwhile, Japan continues to be a leader in developing critical Southeast Asian infrastructure, especially in Indonesia, which lies astride the strategically important Strait of Malacca. Japanese companies have been awarded contracts for the construction and operation of Patimban Port in Java. Indonesia’s primary port in Jakarta, Tanjung Priok Port, handles more than 50% of Indonesia’s transshipments. As President Joko Widodo looks to reevaluate Jakarta’s centrality in Indonesia, Japan has started construction in Patimban, which is expected to be completed in 2027. JICA extended Official Development Assistance (ODA) loans to Indonesia for this project in 2017 and again in 2022, making it Japan’s largest port investment project in ASEAN.

In November 2022, in the small town of Saumlaki in the Maluku Islands, construction on a Japanese-funded fishing port began. Saumlaki has a small port and is not used for containerized traffic but is close to major fishing spots and Japan intends to turn it into a regional fishing hub. In 2018, Japan financed the improvement of Saumlaki and five other minor fishing ports throughout Indonesia’s peripheral islands. Through developing fishing ports in Indonesia, Japan also seeks to combat persistent issues such as illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing and the lack of coastal infrastructure on smaller islands in the littoral waters of Southeast Asia. That Japan finds it necessary to invest in projects as big as Patimban and as small as Saumlaki, indicates a thorough investment portfolio in Indonesia and across the Indian Ocean.

Further away, Japan has provided Madagascar with ODA loans worth more than $340 million to expand its largest port, Toamasina Port. JICA has also no doubt considered the strategic location of Madagascar in the Indian Ocean. Near the islands of Comoros, Mauritius, and the Seychelles and close to the African coast, Toamasina port can serve as a regional hub for the Southern Indian Ocean.

The Strategic Shadow

Taken in isolation, Japan’s forays into port infrastructure in the Indian Ocean are unremarkable. After all, economic connectivity in the Indo-Pacific is a priority for the region and major powers. However, the backdrop to Japan’s stepped-up port development activity is increasingly strategic and cannot be easily delinked from the broader competition for influence with China. Japan’s growing joint projects with India in the Indian Ocean region indicate convergent strategic challenges and responses.

Indeed, we can see Japan as a critical linchpin for the Quad and the Indo-Pacific partnerships: working closely with its Quad partners often minus India in the Western Pacific and aligning closer and closer with India in the Indian Ocean. Together with India or separately, Japan’s significantly rising profile in critical port development is adding new momentum to the politics of the Indian Ocean. Whether this will lead to strengthening a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” or more great power rivalry is likely to depend on how China’s ambitions take shape in the Indian Ocean.

By Deepa M. Ollapally, Research Professor of International Affairs and Director, Rising Powers Initiative and Satvik Pendyala, Research Assistant, Rising Powers Initiative, Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University.

Rising Powers in 2022: a Year Under the “Sign” of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine

Policy Alert #252 | January 26, 2023

The relationships and power dynamics between China, India, Japan and Russia in 2022 were shaped by the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The proximity between the Japanese and American stances towards the invasion was expected, and confirmed during Japanese Prime Minister Kishida’s meeting with U.S. President Biden on January 13. However, the way that India’s government under Prime Minister Modi would react was unknown. As such, his interactions with Russian President Putin were heavily scrutinized and the initial Indian declarations regarding the war carried a lot of weight. On the other side of the spectrum, China was not widely expected to side with the US. Instead, the interrogation resided in the level of support that Chinese President Xi Jinping would show towards Putin.

Another important factor in the quadrilateral balance, in addition to the evolution of each rising power’s relationship with Russia, was the state of the China-India relationship, in the midst of bloody border skirmishes in Ladakh. As such, a worsening relationship between China and India could prevent the two countries from aligning on a common position and presenting a united front. This was reinforced by domestic encouragement in both China and India for aggressive posturing and provocations, such as the invitation of border commander Qi Fabao at the NCPCC to celebrate his involvement in the June 15, 2020 skirmish in which 20 Indian soldiers were killed. In parallel, Japan announced a strengthening of Japan India military ties, which was seen by China as being encouraged by the U.S. as it tries to isolate Russia and China.

This policy alert will focus on media coverage of international meetings where heads of state met, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit, the COP 27, and G20. Coverage of other events, such as the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (NCPCC), Vostok 2022 military exercises in Russia, or ASEAN forums, also provided information and context to understand internal and external perceptions of each of these rising powers’ current stance towards the war in Ukraine, as well as the fluctuations of their relationships with each other.

RUSSIA

After February 2022, Russia looked for support among its neighbors and rising powers. Putin publicly advocated for a strengthening of the SCO during the Summit in Samarkand, pitting an aggressive and sanction-prone West against the developing countries of the Middle East and Central Asia. Russia also held the Vostok 2022 military exercises, in which Chinese, Indian, Laotian, Mongolian, and Syrian troops participated. Putin personally attended the exercises, highlighting their symbolic importance, and the importance he attached to presenting the appearance of a united front against the West. When covering the COP 27 meeting in Sharm el-Sheikh, Russian state media emphasized the divide between Asian and African developing countries and Western “rich countries”. Russia has been trying to build support against Western condemnations of the war in Ukraine by building coalitions or criticizing the West.

In particular, Russia is prioritizing the Russia-China relationship. Russia has issued strong statements in support of China over Taiwan and Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov has stressed that Russia and China are aligned and that there were “no discrepancies at all” between them. To push this point further, Xi and Putin closed the year 2022 by having a virtual meeting on December 30th, in which Xi emphasized BRICs cooperation against “hegemony and power politics” and Putin invited Xi to a state visit in Russia in early 2023.

Government-funded Russia Today published several articles and podcasts about the COP 27, stressing how developing countries diverge with the West over climate issues.
According to the Moscow Times, an independent publication, Russia was “pitiful and cynical” at the COP 27, ignoring the environment to focus on pushing other interests.
The Pravda Report, a nationalist newspaper, covered the SCO Summit by noting Putin’s support of China, and did not mention Chinese concerns about the war in Ukraine.

CHINA

Xi and his foreign policy towards Russia have remained ambiguous throughout 2022, despite their “no limit” partnership announced in 2021. Xi provided overt support for Russia in some settings, and slight admonition is others. Specifically, Xi’s uncharacteristic expression of concerns during the SCO Summit was the only rebuke of Russia and it was not confirmed during subsequent meetings. Indeed, during the latest meeting in date, Xi endorsed a Russian statement and commended Russia for trying to “resolve the conflict through diplomatic negotiations”.

Despite the context of the Covid-19 pandemic and unusual pressure on the CPC government from its own population. Xi won a decisive victory at the NCPCC. This cemented his “complete control” over Chinese foreign policy, setting aside concerns of diverging voices within China. However, it did not offer a clear idea of how strongly Xi, and by extent China, would support Putin. In 2022, various events and official declarations have led to media characterizations about the Chinese-Russia relationship either improving or deteriorating, depending on the circumstances, with some diverging interpretations over the same events.

One of the most commonly identified areas of friction is the competition for influence in Central Asia. While these seemingly competing efforts do not signify a shift in relationship, they did come at a time where Central Asian countries seemed to tun away from Russia. Simultaneously, Xi visited Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan and signed several deals, which with zero-sum thinking would indicate China is gaining influence to Russia’s detriment. Political posturing aside, China remains crucial to the survival of the Russian economy, and the war in Ukraine has at most tempered their partnership.

The China Daily a state-supported and CPC-owned newspaper, highlighted Lavrov’s support over Taiwan
The independent South China Morning Post devoted several articles to the China-Russia relationship, with conclusions ranging from faltering to a renewed partnership.

INDIA

Modi and his government also played a delicate exercise in diplomacy, being courted by Russia and the US, and showing overtures to both. Prime Minister Modi spoke out in a rare public rebuke of Russia at the SCO Summit, but then External Affairs Minister Jaishankar almost immediately walked back those remarks. In similar fashion, India participated in the Russian Vostok exercises and showcased the routine nature of the drills while acknowledging US concerns, and then planned to participate in exercises alongside the US.

India’s position towards Russia is different than China’s, despite its shared intentional ambiguity. India has shown less support to Russia than China and crucially, has played both sides, whereas China has remained staunchly critical of the US and the West. Coherently, the India-China relationship is inscrutable as China cannot condone Indian steps towards the US but will support India elsewhere, such as India hosting the 2023 SCO summit. At the COP 27, both countries shared a common position over the issue of loss and damage funding or opposing the carbon border tax. But after a brief détente, China contrasted these statements with actions seen by Indian media as “rubbing salt on wounds” or controversially sending a “spy ship” to Sri Lanka.

In contrast, India has made notable efforts to improve its relationship with Japan. It avoided tensions with Japan over Indian participation in the Russian Vostok exercises by electing not to participate in maritime drills, which were close enough to Japan to cause an issue. In late 2022, India and Japan also agreed to hold joint exercises of their own. Despite these clear steps towards a stronger relationship however, it cannot be ascertained that India is turning towards the West or here again playing all sides, only that India is determined to play a major role.

The left leaning The Hindu looked at India’s participation at the Vostok exercises through the lens of regional power competition, observing that India was placating Japan.
The Daily Pioneer took a strong position against China, whether over the removal of Hu Jintao at the NCPCC or China’s sending of a spy ship to Hambantota.

JAPAN

Japan has condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine repeatedly and in much stronger terms than either China or India. Its relationship with Russia was strained even before the war as both countries claim the Kuril Islands, and tensions have only increased as Russia deployed missile to them. Japan closed out 2022 by announcing a visit by Kishida to Washington, one of several stops of a diplomatic trip to several European partners, to which he reiterated Japan’s condemnation of Russia and also acknowledging tensions with China. In the span of a decade, China has gone from a strategic partner of Japan to “an unprecedented and the greatest strategic challenge in ensuring the peace and security of Japan”. Kishida has made reforming Japanese defense key to his administration, and this effort is targeted in large part towards deterring China.

This position is popular but not unanimous in Japan, as opposition parties and newspapers have called for accountability and criticized what is seen as a step away from diplomacy despite Japanese and US interest not always being aligned exactly. Japan has also improved its relationship with India, reinforcing links with a major regional partner which is not strictly aligned with the US.

The Japan Times, a centrist newspaper, soberly reported that Former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev suggested Kishida should kill himself for his subservience to the US.
The business focused Nikkei published an opinion article noting Japan’s strong economic ties to Russian companies, despite talks of sanctions and diplomatic condemnation.

By Gabriel Savagner, M.A. candidate in Security Policy Studies, Elliott School of International Affairs at GW. Research Assistant, Rising Powers Initiative.

Can Regional Architecture for the Global Commons Catch Up in the Indo-Pacific with US and Indian Cooperation?

December 12, 2022

Introduction

India and the U.S. have become a significant part of the Indo-Pacific’s security framework with their active participation in regional groupings. This makes them indispensable member states in structuring the architecture for partnerships in the Indo-Pacific.

The Rising Powers Initiative at The George Washington University and Christ (Deemed to be University) in Bangalore recently held a joint Conference on Regional Architecture for Partnerships in the Indo-Pacific: The Role of US and India in Security and the Commons. The first session sought to explore important aspects of the security dynamics in the region, focusing on how joint contributions may help in upholding a ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ and promoting a rules-based order. See the Security Policy Brief here. This Policy Brief considers a spectrum of commons issues that the two countries can cooperate on, from climate refugees to the blue economy. Watch the Commons session here.

There is an urgent need for the US and India to go beyond their traditional cooperation in maritime security and address pressing challenges in oceanic ecosystems, international maritime law, and fishing disputes. These are areas which have a direct impact on the lives and livelihood of local and larger populations of the Indo-Pacific. Successful collaboration would thus meet both foreign policy and domestic objectives.

Experts on the commons consisted of Jason Donofrio, External Affairs Officer at The Ocean Foundation, Cornell Overfield, Analyst at CNA Corporation, and Abhijit Singh, Senior Fellow at Observer Research Foundation’s Maritime Policy Initiative. The session was moderated by Deepa Ollapally, Director of the Rising Powers Initiative and Research Professor of International Affairs at George Washington University.

How Can India and the US Catch Up in the Commons?

The viability of a long-term partnership between India and the US in non-traditional maritime security will depend on commons issues getting higher priority on their joint agenda. Panelists acknowledged that the commons have been under-explored despite its growing significance in the Indo-Pacific. With climate change threatening smaller island nations in the Indo-Pacific and the posturing of the Chinese navy in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean, the merger of non-conventional and conventional maritime issues has now created a complexity requiring nonbinary approaches. US-India cooperation is essential as it would be a precursor to establishing clearer laws for governance and an architecture for the development of global commons in the Indo-Pacific.

According to Donofrio, the global commons have come to represent an arena of increasing importance, especially in the Indo-Pacific region, as it supports the rhetoric of a “free, open and inclusive” region. Donofrio also highlighted the significance of maritime laws against the backdrop of continuing disputes and confrontations in the high seas by China. Though certain historical ideological differences have emerged between India and the US concerning the blue economy sector, there is general consensus that comprehensive collaboration between the countries would benefit the region.

The blue economy is a rapidly developing arena in the Indo-Pacific region, with opportunities to invest in fuel-efficient vessels, waste energy technology, greenification of shipping ports, and large-scale recycling, among other initiatives. There has been an increase in government investments in this sector with the influx of new sub-areas like blue carbon technology, which uses oceanic ecosystems to sequester carbon. These concepts have become crucial to the Indo-Pacific to safeguard biodiversity, counter the disproportionate impact on local coastal communities and prevent mass migration from becoming a security crisis.

Additionally, non-governmental institutions and private sector organizations can come together to contribute to the timely implementation of these types of sustainable projects. The Paris Agreement’s Nationally Determined Contribution mandate on climate adaption as well as the corporate sector’s Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) mandate offer opportunities in this regard. American private sector ESG funds may be utilized for restoration, preservation, and conservation projects in the blue economy and marine development areas. These resources can be further harnessed with local level expertise of researchers and scientists in India and the broader Indo-Pacific for multiple projects.

One sticking point has been India’s use of subsidies for deep sea fishing to promote livelihoods which in turn is resulting in a restricted flow of ESG funds. Clarifications and guidelines that balance the domestic and international interests in Exclusive Economic Zones for example, need priority discussion. Moreover, Donofrio argues that unnecessary and excessive accountability requirements have prevented optimal usage of ESG funds, making conservation projects unviable.

Overcoming Divergences: Challenges for US, India and the Indo-Pacific on UNCLOS

Overfield acknowledged that the lack of UNCLOS ratification by the United States has prevented more consensus building and impactful cooperation. Overlapping zones and resource division disputes caused by confusing regulations in the Indian Ocean are another set of issues that needs to be addressed. This requires India and the US to engage in dialogue and create a comprehensive framework for optimally harnessing blue economy resources such as fish.

Fisheries are a major source of livelihood for nations in the Indian Ocean. However, disputes arising from the EEZ and deep-sea fishing mandates of the various UNCLOS subsidiary bodies and Indian Ocean fishing agreements have hampered growth. Moreover, unregulated fishing activities have been causing environmental damage in the Indo-Pacific. Overfield notes the importance of India and US collaboration in resolving these disputes in favor of sustainable fishing practices. An additional area for further joint work is in anti-pirate drills in the region. In this regard, the jurisdictional issues with patrolling and countering pirate attacks require consensus building by India and the US with other regional powers.

Singh agreed that marine governance has not been taken up comprehensively in South Asia due to the limitations of UNCLOS and contrasting national interests. Limited legality combined with a lack of regulation and law enforcement has led to irregularities in governance. Most Indo-Pacific countries have not been able to reconcile interstate differences over EEZ governance as national governance clashes with international maritime laws. He notes that for India, the high seas are usually viewed as an arena of contestation, while diplomacy in the Indian Ocean is seen mainly through the lens of UNCLOS.

The issue faced by the US regarding ratification of UNCLOS is similar to India and other South Asian nations concerning their national blue economy policies. UNCLOS is restrictive in favor of sustainability, whereas India emphasizes holistic maritime development, with sustainability as a secondary parameter. Singh suggests that rebalancing within marine governance must provide equitable importance to non-traditional security factors. Discussions concerning maritime governance in multilateral partnerships need to shift towards more bilateral cooperation. For example, greater clarity on maritime law and various limitations and disagreements on issues like military operations in EEZs need to be addressed bilaterally. Singh proposes capacity-building initiatives between India and the US to combat natural disasters in the Indo-Pacific through green technology, smart tourism structures, and shallow ports for evacuation. He also proposes the construction of protected marine spatial zones for planning and conservation.

Looking Ahead

Optimistically, Singh finds that there has been a change in the Indian government’s mindset towards marine development and sustainability, as well as holistic maritime security, including human security, that was previously absent from significant maritime security debates.

For the US and India, partnership and cooperation in the Indo-Pacific is essential for governance related issues, especially regarding Chinese illegal fishing. Speakers also note that China can undertake activities such as building islands in the South China Sea due to a lack of opposition from other regional powers and the questionable legal status of submerged islands.

Given the immediacy of the climate change crisis, there are rising expectations with respect to the exchange of technical expertise and new initiatives between the US and India in the maritime domain. The role of shared values in both countries’ foreign policies, despite sometimes diverging individual national interests, is a driver that may provide further impetus for both countries to take the lead toward more resilient regional cooperative architecture.

By Kriti Chopra, Doctoral Scholar, Department of International Studies, Political Science & History, Christ (Deemed to be University).

This Policy Brief is a part of the ‘Shared Values and Worldviews in U.S.-India Relations’ project of the United States Government, George Washington University and Christ University. The opinions expressed here are solely of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Government, George Washington University or Christ University.

Assessing Taiwan’s New Military Security: Cross Strait, Defense and US-Taiwan Relations

Asia Report #59 | November 21, 2022

A high-tension visit by U.S. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan in early August 2022 led to the People’s Liberation Army Navy holding exercises near Taiwan and firing live missiles near the island. Chinese military escalation and stern diplomatic warnings to the U.S. came in the midst of final deliberations of the Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors and Science Act of 2022 (CHIPS act) in Washington. A week after Speaker Pelosi’s visit, President Biden signed the measure into law, providing over $50 billion to help develop and produce semiconductors while encouraging U.S. companies to cut China out of their semiconductor supply chains.

To explore these issues and how heightened tensions are likely to affect Taiwan and its economy and security, the Sigur Center for Asian Studies hosted a conference on Taiwan’s New Security Challenges: Economic Security and Military Security. The Asia Report from the first panel on economic and high-tech security may be found here. This Asia Report focuses on Taiwan’s changing military security challenges and assesses how cross strait, defense and US-Taiwan relations factor into possible responses. The video of the entire conference may be found here.

The speakers included Elbridge Colby, Co-Founder and Principal of the Marathon Initiative, Robert Sutter, Professor of Practice of International Affairs at the Elliott School of George Washington University, and Jacob Stokes, Fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). The panel was moderated by Deepa Ollapally, Associate Director of the Sigur Center for Asian Studies at George Washington University.

Responses to a Pressing Threat Scenario

Elbridge Colby led off the discussion by noting the graveness and immediacy of the threat to Taiwan’s continued survival posed by an increasingly assertive China. Broad and sustained economic prosperity permitted China to engage in an unprecedented buildup of its conventional military forces over the previous twenty-five years, with major importance being placed on what has been termed the “primary planning scenario,” which calls for a cross strait invasion of Taiwan. As Colby noted, in addition to considerable investment in Anti-Access/Area Denial capabilities designed to blunt the United States’ ability to project power into the Western Pacific, Chinese policymakers have placed increased importance on military assets such as aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines, and a large space architecture, thus exhibiting global ambitions beyond a favorable resolution of the Taiwan question.

Nevertheless, Colby presented three principal reasons why a cross strait invasion remains the most plausible employment of Chinese military force in the near term. First, the CCP continues to put forth its irredentist claim that Taiwan has historically lain within the Chinese state, and thus should be a constituent part of the People’s Republic. Second, China must subordinate Taiwan in order to achieve its goal of establishing a dominant position in Asia, both because it lies within the First Island Chain and is increasingly seen as being tied to American credibility within the region. Lastly, Chinese attempts to use non-military forms of coercion over the past three decades were not only unsuccessful, but drove the island in the opposite direction with regard to independence.

Shifting to a discussion of the operational aspects of a Taiwan contingency, Colby rejected the prevailing view that a military solution would begin with Chinese actions such as the seizure of offshore islands or cyber-attacks. This “gradual approach,” in his view, fails to account for the fact that China would effectively be telegraphing its goals to the international community, specifically the United States, which would provide both time and reason for American forces to prepare, thus diminishing China’s ability to exercise “higher echelon options.” Rather, an aggressor must possess the ability to deploy and sustain dominant force such that they are able to seize and hold key enemy territories.

Colby then put forth three factors that make such a scenario increasingly likely, though not probable. First, China must employ military force to achieve its objective. Second, it is increasingly clear that the United States and Japan will take part in the conflict, with the latter providing bases for American forces and JSDF support for a defensive effort. Third, China’s willingness to pay the political cost associated with its nuclear buildup suggests that it is expecting a large war with the United States under the nuclear shadow. Moreover, Colby contended that the coming decade presents a uniquely dangerous window for Chinese action against Taiwan. This is due to the dichotomy of disinvestment in defense capabilities on the part of the United States, while China has begun to reap the full benefits of investments begun in the 1990s. Additionally, Xi Jinping has linked the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation with the resolution of the Taiwan question in Beijing’s favor. With this in mind, coupled with the likelihood of little warning prior to an attack, Colby implored the Taiwanese government to raise defense spending to ten percent of GDP in order to prevent a swift and decisive defeat.

What Does Heightened Bipartisan US Support for Taiwan Mean?

Robert Sutter sought to explain the unprecedented increase in American support for Taiwan under the Trump and Biden administrations, and the significance of the debate surrounding the military crisis following Speaker Pelosi’s visit.

The main driver, in Sutter’s view, is Congress’ steady, bipartisan and whole of government approach to the challenges presented by China’s increasingly aggressive behavior and rhetoric. He dubbed the unity of purpose across party lines and branches of government, begun in earnest in 2018, as the “Washington Consensus.” Sutter then presented three fundamental challenges being confronted by American policymakers in the deepening strategic competition with China: governance, the security threat, and a high technology competition, with the latter two posing existential threats. More specifically, Beijing’s attempts to alter the status quo through sustained pressure on the government in Taipei since 2016, Taiwan’s outsized importance in the nascent high technology competition, its strategic location, as well as the island’s potential as a useful lever in engaging in both dialogue as well as competition with China, has yielded a sharp increase in American support due to its determination to prevent China from supplanting it as the dominant regional and global power.

Sutter then presented four “brakes” on the hardening of American foreign policy towards China. First, and most broadly, it presents the potential for a rift in Sino-US relations. Second, the United States does not want to harm relations with Japan as well as the vast majority of Southeast Asian nations, who have a vested interest in a healthy US-China relationship. Third, American policymakers do not want to provide governments in Taiwan with the means to provoke Beijing. While all three have been overtaken by events, Sutter argued that China’s military power, and its willingness to employ it, continues to serve as a final brake.

Sutter then went on to note that while the August military exercises heightened tensions considerably, they also served to clarify the contours of the domestic debate. On one side, the vast majority of elected officials and senior members of the Biden administration, embracing the “Washington Consensus,” have made clear that they will not be intimidated into decreasing verbal and material support for Taiwan. On the other side, business and investment professionals, university professors and administrators, and a fair amount of China specialists within the broader foreign policy community, contend that the portrayal of the threat is excessive, economically harmful, and will lead to armed conflict. While the latter camp argued for seeking a stable relationship with China through reassurances regarding American policy towards Taiwan, those in the former prioritized the defense of American interests, pointing to previous attempts at reassurance that gave way to China’s militarization of the South China Sea.

More broadly, Sutter believes that tension in the US-China relationship is inevitable going forward, and America’s task is to place it into perspective while preparing adequately and avoiding unnecessarily “overhyping” it.

Figuring Taiwan Into the US’s Indo-Pacific Strategy Going Forward

Jacob Stokes rounded out the panel through situating Taiwan and cross strait issues in the United States’ Indo-Pacific strategy more broadly. As Stokes notes, Taiwan has a direct link to all five pillars of the Biden administration’s approach to the region, which include advancing a free and open Indo-Pacific, building connections within and beyond the region, driving regional prosperity, bolstering regional security, and building resistance to twenty-first century transnational threats. Moreover, as tensions in the Taiwan Strait have gradually heightened, U.S. allies’ posture towards China has trended towards a policy of competition and rivalry.

Specifically addressing the potential for a conflict over Taiwan, Stokes made clear that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 lent an immediacy to what was previously considered an abstract and long-term challenge by regional and global powers. This is seen most acutely in Japan, as the government in Tokyo undertakes the first comprehensive review of its national security strategy since 2013, and recently announced plans to double defense spending over the next five years. Australia, having inked a trilateral security pact with the United States and the United Kingdom in 2021 known colloquially as AUKUS, sought to acquire capabilities that are tailored to contingencies far from its shores and at the higher end of the combat spectrum. South Korea, ever-mindful of the fragility of peace on the Peninsula, has begun to formally discuss the potential for “simultaneous aggression” from the North in the event of a Taiwan contingency, as well as the likely expectations of their American ally in such a scenario. The Philippines, while also considering the appropriate level of military support to the United States in a conflict over Taiwan, must consider the proximity of the island of Luzon to Taiwan’s south as well as its claims in the South China Sea. India, wary of an increasingly belligerent China following a violent border clash in the summer of 2020 despite a recent thaw in relations, increasingly identifies with Taiwan’s predicament as it relates to Chinese military pressure. Lastly, Europe, while not a significant actor within the Indo-Pacific region, has begun to seriously consider plausible diplomatic and economic countermeasures in the event of a cross strait invasion.

Stokes then put forth three key questions that must govern discussions about the shifting regional order given the rift in cross strait relations. First, what steps are necessary for integrating deterrence across the joint forces of the United States, Taiwan, and their mutual allies and partners? Second, how can a similar spirit of collaboration drive efforts to strengthen economic and technological security amid regional trade integration? Third, to what extent should democratic values serve as a factor in such discussions given the variety of regime types throughout the region?

Stokes then addressed these concerns by presenting four principal recommendations. First, the United States must fully commit itself to implementing a truly asymmetric defense posture, while making clear that Taiwan must shoulder an even greater share of the burden. Second, the economic costs of a cross strait invasion must be made clear not only with regard to sanctions and other direct punishments, but also by mapping the broader regional and global economic fallout. For Stokes, such actions can prove effective in a strategy of deterrence by denial if the United States broadens its understanding of China’s aims to include gaining control over Taiwan without provoking a regime threatening economic crisis. Third, American policymakers must engage in more realistic and detailed contingency planning with a wide range of partners, specifically with regard to gray-zone challenges from Beijing. Lastly, the United States must continue to internationalize the issue of cross strait peace and stability, while simultaneously practicing political steadiness and restraint. More specifically with regard to the latter, Stokes advocated for maintaining both strategic ambiguity as well as the One China Policy. Rather than serving as a concession to Beijing, such an approach, in his view, will ensure that the United States’ commitment to upholding the status quo remains credible with regional partners, thus allowing for a continued focus on China’s destabilizing actions.

By Ben Briedman, Rising Powers Initiative Research Affiliate.

Regional Architecture For Security In The Indo-Pacific

November 14, 2022

Introduction

India and the U.S. have become a significant part of Indo-Pacific’s security framework with their active participation in regional groupings. This makes them indispensable member states in structuring the architecture for partnerships in the Indo-Pacific.

The Rising Powers Initiative at The George Washington University and Christ (Deemed to be University) recently held a joint Conference on Regional Architecture for Partnerships in the Indo-Pacific: The Role of US and India in Security and the Commons. The first session on Security sought to explore important aspects of the security dynamics in the region, focusing on how joint contribution may help in upholding ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ and promoting a rules-based order. This Policy Brief is based on the first session on Security, with a second report forthcoming on the Commons. Watch the first session here.

Primarily to counter Chinese assertiveness, speakers noted that key countries in the region can come together on multiple security dimensions ranging from non-traditional security and intelligence sharing to climate resilience and disaster management. This would help to evolve the existing group frameworks in the region which are currently informal and exclusive in nature. American involvement in the region’s security framework could serve to counter other security concerns including North Korean nuclear proliferation. And in collaboration with India, an emerging regional leader, it could help to foster and solidify more lasting security relations in the Indo-Pacific.

N. Manoharan, Director of the Centre of East Asian Studies, Christ (Deemed To Be University), gave a welcome note, which was followed by a keynote address by Alyssa Ayres, Dean of the Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University. Deepa Ollapally, Director of the Rising Powers Initiative and Research Professor of International Affairs at George Washington University, moderated the session. The panelists were Jeff Smith, Research Fellow at Asia Studies Center, Heritage Foundation; Lisa Curtis, Senior Fellow & Director of the Indo-Pacific Security Program at Center for a New American Security; and Admiral Arun Prakash, former Chief of Naval Staff (India).

The Indo-Pacific Region at the Center Stage of Global Geopolitics

The Indo-Pacific region has emerged as an area of geopolitical focus on the world stage. Not only does it harbor the world’s largest economies, but it also constitutes half the world’s population with an ever-expanding market. In addition, approximately 60 percent of the maritime trade passes through the region, comprising nine out of ten of the world’s busiest seaports. But the region’s prominence primarily stems from the rise of China’s assertive ambitions in the form of expansionist maritime tendencies and increasing influence in its neighboring states in the region.

To counter the Chinese assertions, multiple countries in the Indo-Pacific have come together, giving rise to the phenomena of ‘mini-lateral partnerships’ with no ‘one’ cohesive grouping. These partnerships underscore the motto of a ‘free, open and inclusive’ Indo-Pacific with a clear preference for multi-polar regional order. From trade to security, these groupings have been gradually developing, but yet to take a concrete and coherent form. India and the U.S., being a vital part of the region’s strategic security forum – Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, hold significant responsibility in structuring the regional architecture for partnerships in the Indo-Pacific.

Towards A Free & Open Indo-Pacific

The session sought to answer the primary questions – which common areas (particularly in security) could serve as a foundation stone for U.S.-India collaboration in the Indo-Pacific and thus pave the way for a concrete framework for regional institutions in the region.

It was unanimously agreed that the U.S.-India collaboration in the Indo-Pacific caters to the broader aim of maintaining a rules-based order in the region and promoting a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. Speakers called on the two countries to come together and form regional groupings with other states in the region by coordinating on a variety of security issues- human trafficking, refugee crisis, maritime security, counterterrorism, cyber-security, intelligence sharing, national and sub-national law enforcement engagement, connecting land and sea ports, climate resilience, and disaster management. Curtis highlighted the economic aspects of the cooperation, primarily in the form of transparent and accountable infrastructure finance, safeguarding developing countries’ sovereignty in statecraft. This alludes to the ‘debt trap’ effects of China’s policy in the region, demonstrated most vividly in the case of Sri Lanka this year.

The existing regional architectures in the Indo-Pacific were termed as “informal” and “flexible, rather than “all encompassing” of the regional states. According to Smith, small groupings characterize the region, giving rise to the phenomenon of “minilateralism,” wherein states can coordinate in diverse ways and across multiple architectures. But at the same time, they fall far short of a cohesive grouping, like the European Union. This gap was termed the probable reason for the rise in Chinese assertiveness in multiple ways – from the South China Sea conflict, contention with Taiwan, border clashes with India, to trade conflicts with Australia. Thus, it can be said that the region is essentially led by countries first, followed by their respective bilateral and multilateral relations.

India and the U.S.: Challenges and Cooperative Prospects

For India, the Indo-Pacific presents itself as an opportunity to further the country’s foreign presence at a global level starting with countries in its neighborhood. This strengthens its position against China, which has frequently been employing border conflicts with India as a means to assert power. Recently, India has taken to improve its bilateral relations and ramp up security arrangements with its like-minded partners in the Indo-Pacific – the U.S., Australia, Japan, and France. However, Prakash pointed out that the Indian Ocean region lacks any form of regional security organizations. According to him, this stems from contentious relations between the regional powers: Pakistan – India – China, thus hindering India’s role as the net security provider in the Indian Ocean region. However, as per other panelists, it opens alternative paths for Indian-American collaboration, enabling India to fulfill its regional role.

The U.S. role retains critical value for the region that others cannot substitute. It could play an instrumental role in countering various security concerns of the region, such as North Korean nuclear weapon proliferation, the South China Sea conflict, repercussions of climate change in the form of melting glaciers in South Asia and rising water levels around Pacific Islands and Southeast Asian states. Active American participation in the security architecture of the region is apparent from the QUAD, Five Eyes Alliance and the recently formed AUKUS.

Although not perfect, according to Curtis, the QUAD can be called the American lynchpin in the region, challenging Chinese assertion. With no direct focus on security, the four-nation grouping aims to further coordination and collaboration among themselves and regional partners in other spheres. These areas cater to maritime domain awareness, cyber security, vaccine distribution, crisis management, and maintenance of sovereignty, extending to North Asian, South Asian, Southeast Asian, and Pacific countries. In addition, the bilateral defense ties between U.S-Japan, U.S-Australia, and U.S-India serves to strengthen the defense cooperation between QUAD members. Curtis also opined that ASEAN and other regional groupings had become more accepting of the QUAD against the rising tide of China. Along similar lines, AUKUS too has emerged as a strong bulwark against Beijing.

The bilateral security relations between India and the U.S. were also extensively discussed by Smith and Prakash. The progress was charted as impressive (in the form of arms sales, defense exercises, bilateral dialogues, and intelligence sharing); however, there is room for improvement. This is explicitly aimed at increasing technology transfer from the American side with a simultaneous effort by India to reduce its dependency on Russia for its defense needs. As Curtis put it, this comes at a crucial time as Russia has been increasingly collaborating with China, which has ongoing hostile border relations with India.

Thus, all the panelists agreed that for India and the U.S., followed by subsequent regional collaborations, the building blocks of cooperation could range from humanitarian aid and disaster relief assistance to maritime domain awareness. It could further be extended to a transparent and accountable network of infrastructure collaboration. In addition, establishing crisis management groups, and expanding joint naval patrols and naval coast guard patrols, medical task force, and maritime fusion centers would act as stepping stones towards more robust security arrangements among the countries in the Indo-Pacific. This type of pathway would ensure convergence in areas provoking minimal domestic political opposition across the countries in the region.

Conclusion

In sum, India’s role in the Indo-Pacific region shall ultimately determine its position at the global level. Hence, the country needs to expand its diplomatic presence in Indo-Pacific and improve its security framework by leveraging initiatives with the regional states. On that note, it can work together with the U.S. in the Indo-Pacific to ensure regional stability as well as promote collaboration in new security dimensions. India and the U.S. share a similar ideology in their approach to the region. For India, the U.S. serves as a strong driving force it can partner with, especially with rival China. And for the U.S., India is a leading power in the Indian Ocean region, with linkages in South and Southeast Asia, actively contributing to security partnerships of the region.

By Tanvi Kaur, Research Affiliate, Centre for East Asian Studies, Christ University.

Drilling Down into Views in Japan and India on the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China

Policy Alert #251 | November 10, 2022

The 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (NCCPC) was heavily scrutinized in international media given the symbolic importance Chinese leadership has given it. Newly reelected President Xi Jinping was “long expected to secure a third term,” but the decisiveness of Xi’s victory, the manner in which the NCCPC “cemented Xi Jinping’s iron grip on the party” and the sometimes contentious tone of the event were revealing of a more resolutely assertive stance than anticipated by experts and observers. From former president Hu Jintao being physically removed to the importance Xi dedicated to military modernization, the 20^th NCCPC projected an image of a more dominant Xi in China, and a more hawkish China in the world.

India and Japan, two countries which have had increasingly fraught relations with China in the five last years since the 19^th NCCPC, observed with heightened interest, and their respective national media and commentators focused on how specific issues were addressed during the NCCPC, particularly border clashes and Xi’s “complete control” over Chinese foreign policy.

INDIA
As the Communist Party of China held its National 20^th Congress, India announced plans to participate in a series of military drills alongside the US, in proximity of Chinese borders. Indian committed to send a considerably larger force to these US led drills than it did in the Vostok 2022 drills in Russia. (See Policy Alert #249 for more on India’s participation in Vostok 2022.) Fittingly, Indian media and experts focused on the state of India-China relations and how they had deteriorated as of late.

Overall, the 20^th NCCPC was perceived negatively by Indian media, notably as a consequence of the public outcry over the appearance of border commander Qi Fabao at the NCPCC. Qi had been a part of the skirmish of June 15, 2020, in which 20 Indian soldiers were killed and dozens wounded, and his presence at such a high-profile event was seen as a provocation.

Far from a diplomatic faux pas, Qi’s presence at the Congress was deliberate and was anticipated as early as August 2022, as he was publicly announced to be one of 304 delegates from the PLA and People’s Armed Police Force. China could only anticipate this would cause tensions with India as Qi’s selection as an Olympic torchbearer had already caused an outcry in February 2022.

Despite this perceived provocation, Indian media and experts also showcased Chinese diplomatic efforts to play down tensions and appease India. Former Indian Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale pushed back on the enemy rhetoric, and instead identified that to China, India is a “significant neighbour with a troubled relationship that needs to be managed correctly.”

Despite tensions, the Times of India, a center-right publication, had a neutral description of the role the CPC gave to commander Qi, while the left leaning The Hindunoted the political significance of the move. Only the pro-BJP Pioneer had a stronger rebuttal of China’s symbolic provocation, characterizing Qi’s presence as “rubbing salt on wounds.”
The liberal Indian Expressand the left leaning The Hindu both commented on an exchange of conciliatory remarks made by Chinese Ambassador Li Jiming and Indian external affairs minister S Jaishankar, choosing to highlight instances of appeasement post-NCCPC.

JAPAN

A few weeks prior to the 20^th NCCPC, Chinese coast guard ships impinged on Japanese waters near the disputed Senkaku Islands, which tinted the perspective of Japanese media and experts who picked up on the recurring theme of militarization throughout Xi’s speeches. As Indian perspectives showed, Xi’s victory was not a surprise, though the amplitude of it was. For instance, Bonji Ohara, a Senior Fellow at the, Sasakawa Peace Foundation in Tokyo, “expected to see the concentration of power, but did not expect it to be done in such a forceful manner.”

Associate Professor Suzuki Takashi, from Aichi Prefectural University, pointed out that Xi’s decisive victory entails that Xi will “tighten his grip on power and exercise strong leadership to confront the international community.” At the same time, Xi’s victory may also mean that certain bellicose refrains may be dropped as they are no longer necessary as electoral motivators.

Indeed, according to Takashi Kawakami, a Professor at Takushoku University in Tokyo, Xi’s consecration at the 20th NCCPC may signal a decrease in the probability of an invasion of Taiwan as: “Xi had to keep talking about the goal of Taiwan’s unification in order to strengthen his own power.” Having achieved that, Kawakami assesses that “the possibility that he will attempt to take Taiwan by force has probably receded.”

The Japan Times, a centrist newspaper, summarized the intricacies of Xi’s power play, and the left leaning Manichi was precise and detailed about the specific individuals who were removed from senior leadership.
The progressive leaning Asahi noted the US reaction to the NCCPC while The Japan Times framed tensions as being between the US and China rather than Japan and China. It also echoed dissident voices in Japan that opposed espousing the US hardline policy, and supposed that a surge in China-US tensions could lead to “distancing Japan from the United States and its attempts to isolate China.”
The conservative Yomiuri Shimbun, the business-focused Nikkei, and The Japan Times all highlighted Hu’s departure, how it broke with the otherwise unified front that was displayed and choreographed at the event, and the resulting “speculation his departure was a political power play.”

“RPI acknowledges support from the MacArthur Foundation and the Carnegie Corporation of New York for its activities.”

Taiwan’s New Economic Security : Supply Chain Resilience, Cybersecurity & US-Taiwan Ties

Asia Report #58 | October 24, 2022

To explore these issues and how heightened tensions are likely to affect Taiwan and its economy and security, the Sigur Center for Asian Studies hosted a two panel Taiwan’s New Security Challenges: Economic Security and Military Security. The first panel focused on Economic Security: Supply Chain Resilience, Cybersecurity & US-Taiwan Ties. This Asia Report covers the deliberations on these topics, to be followed by another report on the military equation. The video of the conference may be found here.

The featured speakers on were Rupert Hammond-Chambers, President of the US-Taiwan Business Council since 2000, Fiona Cunningham, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania and Faculty Fellow at Perry World House, and Emily Weinstein, Research Fellow at Georgetown’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology and Nonresident Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub and the National Bureau of Asian Research. The panel was moderated by the Director of the Sigur Center for Asian Studies at George Washington University, Professor Gregg Brazinsky.

Supply Chain Resilience

Rupert Hammond-Chambers started the panel by introducing the US-Taiwan Business Council he presides, noting that it represents mostly tech companies, though its defense portfolio often captures the most attention. This was a theme throughout the conference as all speakers pointed out that economic considerations are often eclipsed by the needs of national security. Hammond-Chambers described Donald Trump’s presidential inauguration as a turning point in the US-China supply chain relationship: the Trump administration’s shift from its predecessors’ accommodationist attitude to assessing more realistically how to address the ongoing challenge from China. This position has now become bipartisan as both sides of the aisle view China as a challenge, especially in view of its aggressive reaction to Speaker Pelosi’s visit.

This shift in U.S. policy had a ripple effect in the supply chain. While large multinational companies were initially taken aback, their experience in engaging governments and lobbying enabled them to weigh in on the process of reassessment and readjustment of the China-U.S. economic relationship. However, this was not the case for their Taiwanese supply chain partners, who lack such experience and had more difficulty in assessing the situation.

Less than two years later, COVID rattled the supply chain as demand of certain products spiked while there was a dearth of availability of other products, especially semiconductor chips. This increased pressure on the supply chain as it tried to adjust by attempting to diversify partners rather than relying solely on China. However, considering the way that the global supply chain is structured around China, radical change is unlikely to happen quickly, especially for companies that have invested heavily in production in China and that cannot simply displace entire factories overnight. Long term however, Hammond-Chambers observed a dramatic shift in companies no longer investing capital in China to build production capacity. Instead, he noted a historically high FDI flow to Taiwan as a function of this pressure in the supply chain.

These limitations, conjoined with a general effort to spread out of the supply chain have led to more investments being made in Vietnam, India, Indonesia, and Eastern Europe. Neo-industrialist policies in the U.S. have also contributed to the expansion of manufacturing capabilities within the U.S. Hammond-Chambers mentioned that over the next 10 years the footprint of Taiwanese company Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company Limited (TSMC) in Arizona will grow, though it will probably only manufacture commodity products and not its most advanced chips. The overall effect of these multiple trends is to push investment away from China, and while Taiwan has several issues working against it as a place for more investment, in addition to a wish to mitigate risks by not having too many economic interests embedded in one part of the world, Taiwan will remain a critical component of the supply chain and is still getting a large share of capital flow for semiconductors.

Cybersecurity Challenges and Vulnerabilities

For Fiona Cunningham, Taiwan is a “highly networked, technologically sophisticated open society”, but it is dependent on digital technology, making it vulnerable to malicious cyber activity. As the PRC’s goal is to absorb Taiwan without destroying it, the cyber domain has some novel advantages to enable the PRC to do so. Cunningham summed up the PRC’s strategy of reunification to three main endeavors: exerting leverage, presenting a united front, and persuasion. The PRC’s reunification strategy is more than just a military strategy, and as such, it uses cyber tools in ways other than military as well. Cunningham then highlighted ways that China exerts leverage on Taiwan through the use of cyber tools.

First, by investing in cyber capabilities, the PLA bolstered its capabilities to coerce Taiwan. The PLA originally invested in offensive cyber operations after the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999. Their goal was to make it too risky for the U.S. to intervene in a conflict with Taiwan, which makes Taiwan more vulnerable and thus less likely to take steps towards its independence. Second, the PRC could also attack Taiwan’s critical infrastructure directly using these cyber capabilities it has developed in the last twenty years, giving leverage to the PRC. PLA cyber operators have already targeted Taipei’s city government networks as well as transport and logistics networks, actively reminding of the potential of full-scale offensives. Third, PLA operational plans in the event of a conventional invasion of Taiwan include gaining information dominance, in addition to air and sea superiority. Cyber plays an important role in that effort. While these cyber capabilities are often thought of as being targeted at the U.S. Navy, they can also affect the Taiwanese military, again exerting pressure. Fourth, in addition to these uses of cyber in a conflict, the PRC can execute a strategic blockade campaign, in which information blockades play a role as cyber tools could help seal off Taiwan. Fifth, cyber espionage enhances effectiveness of all military operations as they can lead the PLA to gaining information about Taiwan’s defenses and intentions.

Echoing Hammond-Chamber’s point about military concerns taking over cyber, Cunningham noted that cyber issues are multidimensional. For instance, as a result of its diplomatic isolation, Taiwan is often excluded from the international organizations shaping the rules of cyber governance internationally, removing its ability to shape regulations that affect it.

Cunningham also remarked that the PRC did not use cyber in its demonstration of force following Speaker Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan. Some DDS attacks on Taiwanese government websites were observed, but they may have come from individual netizens or unofficial groups rather than the PLA given their small scale and unimpressive nature. This entails that either China has never conducted cyber operations, unlike most powers with cyber capacity, or it is facing the challenge of figuring out how to use cyber to signal effectively in crises. Outside of crises, Cunningham suggested that Taiwanese semiconductor companies are not at a particular risk from China as sabotage would be counterproductive given China’s reliance on importing Taiwanese chips.

U.S.-China Tech Competition and Implications for Taiwan

Emily Weinstein rounded out the panel by focusing on export controls, which are key in the context of decoupling. To support her presentation, Weinstein referred to a historical case study, the Loral-Hughes incident, which occurred in the context of US-China normalization of relations post-1979. Talks about collaboration in space emerged from this normalization, in particular in the context of satellites. Despite the events of Tiananmen and a degradation of U.S.-China relations, collaboration in satellite technology continued until the mid-1990s.

The Loral-Hughes incident led to a U.S. Congressional Committee which commissioned an in-depth study of the issue of tech transfer related to China and drove a unilateral decision from Congress to move satellites from dual-use to be deemed a munition, making the export process of satellite and rocket parts much more difficult. The geographic concentration of satellite makers in the U.S. meant this change of policy affected the sector worldwide. Despite these delaying efforts, China has still emerged as a leading player in space because key components and expertise can come from outside the U.S. Worse, according to Weinstein, this unilateral U.S policy inhibited U.S. progress as it isolated the U.S. satellite industry from partners and markets and reduced the U.S.’ previously dominant share of the market. Indeed, European companies that emerged with the development of the European Space Agency produced ITAR (International Traffic in Arms Regulations) free satellites, with no limitations on exports, and those were easier to purchase or incorporate into satellites for non-U.S. based companies. As such, Weinstein sees export controls as a tool that can slow the development of a certain product or technology, but not necessarily stop it.

Weinstein then shifted to discussing these concepts in the context of artificial intelligence (AI), with a focus on data, algorithms, and computing. Her assessment is that when applied to AI, export control is impossible as data is ubiquitous and readily accessible. This is the case because algorithms and software are often developed open source, which makes efforts to control them ineffective. On the hardware side, Weinstein notes that export controls can be used for advanced chips (a specific subset can be controlled), and that will have some effect, but overall, it cannot stop China from innovating.

With the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, there have been conversations about how sanctions and export controls to Russia could work against China. For Weinstein, multilateral export control over Russia could be built into something more durable and be applied to China, but more importantly, they would have to be modernized as current export control agreements were set up for the Cold War to limit the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, not technologies. In addition, they are not set up to use export controls for end users, they can only control specific types of technology. Unilateral regimes do have a place, but are often ineffective and sometimes counterproductive, as seen in the satellite example, which is why Weinstein recommends constructing a multilateral regime. To have an impact, such an arrangement must be set up earlier than later, to help as a deterrent, as well as a capacity limiting tool in the event of an invasion.

By Gabriel Savagner, Research Assistant, Rising Powers Initiative and M.A. Candidate, Elliott School of International Affairs, The George Washington University.

Tricky Summitry as Rising Powers Meet at Shanghai Cooperation Organization in Samarkand

Policy Alert #250 | September 21, 2022

The 2022 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Samarkand, which took place from September 15^th to 16^th, was much anticipated by international media, as it would provide the opportunity for Russian President Vladimir Putin to meet with Chinese President Xi Jinping, as well as with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, for the first time since the beginning of the Russian war in Ukraine. As such, their encounters were heavily scrutinized, especially to assess the extent to which China and India would support Russia. Both China and India shared circumspection about the war and did not provide unconditional assurances of support. In fact, Prime Minister Modi spoke out in a rare public rebuke of Russia, while President Xi shared his concerns. Both China and India played a balancing act of not endorsing Russian actions while also not outwardly condemning them, with Chinese media criticizing the US for trying to seed dissent within the SCO while some Indian media saw this as a premise to nurturing India’s “growing ties with the US.” Russian media minimized the dissent within the SCO, and President Putin deflected criticism about the war in Ukraine, blaming continued hostilities on Ukrainian intransigeance. The most striking contrast in analysis of the SCO summit was between Russian and Chinese officials. Indeed, while Russian officials and state media argued that the SCO gave its member states tools to resist Western sanctions as a united bloc, and that the Samarkand summit contributed to building a new world architecture, Chinese officials resisted the notion of “China and Russia as a political and military bloc.”

CHINA

Chinese State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi described President Xi’s attendance as a “strategic move to break US’ “encirclement” of China.” President Xi himself warned of “interference in internal affairs” by “external forces.” Despite this open criticism of the US, Chinese officials were wary of fully embracing Russia and refuted the notion that China, Russia and the SCO as a whole were forming an anti-Western block. To that effect, Chinese official media put out very nuanced statements about the state of the Russia China relationship. “China-Russia relations are at their best in history” according to Yang Jin, an associate research fellow at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, but at the same time, “China has many friends in the world in addition to Russia.” Another round of negotiations this time only with Russia, the 17th China-Russia strategic security consultation, may yield more details about the Chinese-Russian security relationship in the context of the Ukrainian war.

Chinese media also addressed China-India relations, noting that while China supports India hosting the next SCO meeting, India is taking economic decoupling measures from China. Chinese social media users however, as well as the Chinese public, expressed support for India about its participation in the SCO as an independent power and lauded Modi for his successful balancing act.

The Global Times, a Chinese nationalist newspaper run under the official newspaper of the Communist Party of China (CPC), repeatedly introduced US-China tensions when discussing the SCO meeting, putting forward official criticism of the US and its policies, shortly before lambasting US president Biden for his statement in support of defending Taiwan.
The independent South China Morning Post also castigated “Anglo-American mainstream media” for its tendency to lump together China and Russia, ignoring the nuances of Chinese diplomacy. The SCMP also pointed out that the summit was not just about Russia and China, but provided indicators of the poor state of the India-China relationship as well.
The China Daily, owned by the CPC, deemed China the “undisputed leader of the region,” and the People’s Daily, (the CPC official newspaper) lauded the SCO meeting as a remarkable success for China, and echoed positive press from Pakistan.

INDIA

Indian Prime Minister Modi made a declaration rebuking Russia in public, asserting that the “era of war” is no more. India’s Foreign Secretary Vinay Kwatra clarified this statement and explained that it was India’s view that “hostilities should cease and the path to resolution is through diplomacy and dialogue.” Shortly after these statements, India voted in favor of “allowing Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to address the United Nations virtually” next week, reinforcing the perception that India refused to enter a firm alliance with Russia. Some Indian media also considered this a refusal to join a Chinese and Russian bid to challenge world order. In this, Indian media went further than Modi who did not denounce China, which itself shared with Russia its concern about the Russian war in Ukraine.

Modi’s rebuttal of Russia and balancing act is supported by Indian media, the absence of criticism from opposition media a tacit endorsement of Modi’s position, though the unimpeachable nature of the statements made by Modi against war in general made criticism inopportune. Indian media also highlighted news related to the India-Pakistan relationship, such as Pakistan’s reluctance to have India host the next SCO meeting or difficult transit trade access negotiations. Indian media also derided Pakistan Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif for an earphone malfunction. Though the mishap itself was unimportant, the attention it was given is telling of tensions with Pakistan, while also contributing to it.

The center-right newspaper Times of India placed the summit back in the context of China-India border tensions in Ladakh, and also remarked that “significantly”, Putin met in private with Prime Minister Sharif of Pakistan after Modi put pressure on Russia to cease hostilities. The newspaper interpreted Modi’s remarks as a strong condemnation of Russia’s war against Ukraine and as a “wrench in Putin’s plan to rally Asian leaders.”
The Hindustan Times, a liberal publication, noted China’s support for India’s hosting of the 2023 SCO summit, and the Indian Express, another liberal publication, highlighted the positive reactions from the Chinese public, impressed that “India could pull-off such an intricate diplomatic manoeuvre in a heightened international crisis situation.”
The Pioneer, a pro-BJP newspaper, kept tabs on security talks held between China and Russia after the SCO summit ended, downplaying dissensions between the two states.

JAPAN

Japan is the only country in this policy alert that is not a part of the SCO, which is why there were no major statements by the Japanese government on the issue. Japanese media however considered the event to be significant and viewed speeches and declarations in the context of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and China-US tensions.

The conservative Yomiuri Shimbun saw the divide between China and Russia as a sign of the SCO’s weakness, and pointed out Russia’s struggle to keep its central Asia allies in its orbit.
The left-leaning Manichi saw Chinese and Indian declarations at the SCO as rebukes of Putin’s war in Ukraine, despite originally seeing the promotion of the Global Security Initiative as supportive of Moscow’s attack on Ukraine.
The business-focused Nikkei Asia Report found that China was placing itself in a position of strength within the SCO, as Russia’s prestige and international credibility was tarnished by the war in Ukraine, by both courting Kazakhstan and expressing “concerns” about Russia’s involvement in Ukraine. The newspaper also noted the slight rebuke from Indian Prime Minister Modi to Russian President Putin.
The Japan Times, a centrist newspaper, pointed out that while China had not made clear and explicit declarations of support of Russia over Ukraine, Russia made strong statements in support of China over tensions in the Taiwan Straits.

RUSSIA

Russian President Vladimir Putin acknowledged concern from China and India over the Russian-Ukrainian war, though he downplayed the opposition, stating that Russia will do “everything to ensure that this all stops as quickly as possible”. However, he blamed the Ukrainian government for the lack of negotiations, threatening to escalate Russian action against Ukraine, which indicates that a lack of support from China, India, and other SCO members are not enough to sway Russian strategy.

Putin made a point of advocating for a bigger and stronger SCO, for it to become a “platform for constructive and productive interaction.” Russian presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov deflected Western media criticism of the SCO and of Sino-Russian cooperation especially by declaring that “cooperation agreements between Russia and China are not aimed at world domination.” Russian state-owned media, provided support to this narrative, presenting the SCO as a potential shield which could develop “mechanisms to act calmly and withstand […] pressure” from aggressive and illegitimate Western sanctions.

Russia Today, a government-funded outlet, noted that Turkey announced it would apply to join the SCO, marking the potential unprecedented arrival of a NATO country in the SCO. Russia Today kept with that theme and also published articles about SCO expansion both in terms of confirmed new member states and in terms of scope.
Sputnik News, funded by the state, echoed Putin and considered the summit to have led to significant decisions which will reinforce “irreversible” and ”fundamental transformations“ in the world’s architecture.
The Pravda Report, a nationalist newspaper, mentioned only the support Putin extended to China, omitting the concerns China expressed in return about the war in Ukraine.

A Tale of Two Indias? China and India from Hambantota to Vostok

Policy Alert #249 | September 8, 2022

On August 16 at 8:20 am local time, the Yuan Wang 5, a Chinese ship, docked in Hambantota port in Sri Lanka. It left after six days on August 22nd, but not without causing an international stir. Its docking had been delayed for a few days by Sri Lankan authorities as the ship came embroiled in controversy. Indeed, the ship arrived in Sri Lanka as India was testing new missiles, raising suspicions that the ship, which has the capacity to track ballistic missile and satellites, had been sent to collect data on Indian missile launches.

This incident comes in the context of the extended standoff between China and India along the Line of Actual Control in Eastern Ladakh. Weeks before the Yuan Wang 5 was scheduled to dock, India denounced it as a “dual-use spy ship,” an assessment that was shared by the US Department of Defense. China pushed back against this narrative, asserting that the ship was solely docking for replenishment and was a research ship, conducting marine scientific research, and that its docking was part of “normal exchanges and cooperation between China and Sri Lanka.”

However, the Chinese ship had barely left Sri Lanka before India joined the Vostok 2022 military exercises in Russia held September 1-7. These exercises are hosted by Russia but China is the second largest participant, having sent a 2,000 strong contingent from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). As part of these exercises, around 200 Indian troops drilled with contingents from other participant countries, and thus collaborated and trained with the Chinese military even as the controversy over the Yuan Wang 5’s docking near India was still fresh. India seems to be playing a delicate balancing act, drawing concern for different reasons from both the US and China.

What are the opinions in the region on these developments from Hambantota to Vostok?

CHINA

China has defended its use of Hambantota Port, with Chinese Ambassador to Sri Lanka Qi Zhenhong writing an article published in the Sri Lanka Guardian on August 26^th, in which he argues that “all the scientific research activities of “Yuan Wang 5” comply with the international law and common international practice.” Ambassador Qi was subsequently heavily criticized by Indian media and by the Indian High Commission in Colombo. Wang Wenbin, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson, highlighted that “China has always exercised the freedom of the high seas legally and fully respects the jurisdiction of coastal states for scientific research activities in the waters under their jurisdiction.”

Similarly, Zhang Xuefeng, a military deputy to the past 13th National People’s Congress, has stressed that Chinese PLA Navy ships in the Vostok 2022 exercises operate in waters allowed by international law. The Vostok exercises may lead to more regular visible military cooperation endeavors between China and Russia, with joint patrols expected to follow after the exercise is over.

The Global Times, a Chinese nationalist newspaper run under the official newspaper of the Communist Party of China, has published several articles critical of India and Indian media over this affair, characterizing Indian media as “firing unsubstantiated accusations on the scientific research vessel.” Articles heavily cite Chinese Ambassador Qi and journalists interviewed Chinese experts who see “no reason to make a fuss out of a lawful and reasonable port call by a Chinese ship.”The Global Times also denounces Western reactions to the Vostok exercises, predicting that Western media is likely “hype the matter again” to do the same once the joint patrol is formalized.

On the other hand, the independent South China Morning Post notes the “added significance” of Vostok 2022, held while war rages in Ukraine, and acknowledges that the exercises are meant, at least by some parties, as a direct and defiant message to the US and US allies.

INDIA

India pointed out the Chinese ship’s technical capabilities and expressed concern over the purpose of its docking in Sri Lanka. External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar conveyed India’s concerns about the announced docking to Sri Lanka’s foreign minister Ali Sabry as early as August 3rd during the 55th ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. The main concern was the risk of “the ship’s tracking systems attempting to snoop on Indian installations.” The Indian government put pressure on the Sri Lankan government, resulting in a delayed docking, but avoided direct confrontation with China on the issue. However, Chinese statements critical of the way India handled the situation were strongly rebuked by the Indian High Commission in Colombo, which targeted Chinese Ambassador to Sri Lanka Qi Zhenhong for his violation of “basic diplomatic etiquette.”

India downplayed the significance of its participation in Vostok 2022. The Indian Army issued a statement narrowing the exercise’s aim to ”interaction and coordination amongst other participating military contingents and observers”, though this was not enough to fully assuage US concerns. India has been a participant of Russian exercises since it sent a contingent to Tsentr 2019, alongside other Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) members. Following remarks by White House Press Secretary Karine Jean Pierre, this is what Arindam Bagchi, the spokesperson of the Ministry of External Affairs chose to emphasize, declaring that “India has been regularly participating in multilateral exercises in Russia along with a number of other countries”.

Indian media in general viewed the Yuan Wang 5’s docking in Sri Lanka unfavorably, with the center-right newspaper Times of India pushing back against Chinese criticism, while the liberal Indian Express called the Yuan Wang 5 a “spy ship”, and focused on the more controversial statements by Ambassador Qi.
However, the recipient of this hostility was mainly China or Chinese diplomats, whereas Sri Lanka has been spared this ire, with Sri Lankan Tourism Minister Harin Fernado given a platform by the left leaning The Hindu to explain the situation Sri Lanka was put in.
Indian media overwhelmingly defended Indian participation in Vostok 2022, with the liberal Hindustan Times pointing out that India elected not to participate in maritime drills as to not cause tensions with Japan, while The Hindu highlighted the routine nature of the drills, while acknowledging US concerns.

JAPAN

Japanese media, from the left leaning Manichi to the conservative Yomiuri Shimbun, mirrored the Indian and American assertions that the Yuan Wang 5 is a “spy ship,” a “military ship” part of the “Chinese navy.” However, Japanese media was overall not overtly critical of China, and also pointed out the responsibility of Sri Lanka in fanning the flames of Sino-Indian tensions.

The Vostok exercises on the other hand present a larger to threat to Japanese interests, as a maritime component of Vostok 2022, including live fire exercises, was conducted in disputed territory. Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Hirokazu Matsuno expressed serious concern, noting that Japan would “take all possible measures to conduct warning and surveillance activities in the waters surrounding Japan.”

Departing from Indian media’s sparing of Sri Lanka, the Manichi considers that “Sri Lanka is playing with two fires at a diplomatic level.”
As The Japan Times, a centrist newspaper, points out, Vostok 2022 naval exercises were conducted in Etorofu and Kunashiri islands, as known in Japan, which are disputed territory.
The business focused Nikkei highlighted the incongruity of India participating alongside Chinese troops despite the “Himalayan standoff.”

RUSSIA

Russian media has covered the tensions that have stemmed from the Yuan Wang 5 docking in Hambantota superficially and without criticizing any of the states involved in the affair. Given the scope of the Vostok 2022 exercises, and their symbolic importance, Russia has been more vocal covering the exercises and defending their legitimacy. Putin attended the drills in person, and Russian Deputy Defense Minister Alexander Fomin stated that “The exercise is not directed against any specific states or military alliances and is purely defensive in nature,” anticipating the US reservations that came the next day.

Government-funded Russia Today presented the Hambantota issue chronologically, introduced India’s concerns and laid out the Chinese rebukes, without making a case for either antagonist. Its treatment of Vostok was similarly balanced, noting US concerns, especially over Indian participation, and highlighting the multinational nature of the exercises.
Sputnik News, funded by the state, remarked that the initial authorization for the ship to dock was given by President Gotabaya Rajapaksa only a day before he was forced to flee to Singapore by massive protests.
The Pravda Report, a nationalist newspaper, went another route. Rather than defending the Vostok 2022 exercises, it criticized the US for holding military drills with countries which are members of the SCO, while also addressing thinly veiled threats to Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan.

RPI acknowledges support from the MacArthur Foundation and the Carnegie Corporation of New York for its activities.

Maritime Security Challenges in the Indo-Pacific: American and Indian Views on Threats and Responses

June 2, 2022

With the looming presence of an authoritarian China and its deepening footprint in the Indo-Pacific, the U.S. and India are aligning on how they equally value the importance of a free and open Indo-Pacific. Challenges in this maritime region come from a variety of sources, and the two democracies have their connects and disconnects while combating them. What are the key traditional and non-traditional maritime security threats facing the Indo-Pacific? How do Indian and American priorities compare, and what are the prospects for working jointly to secure their interests and objectives bilaterally and otherwise?

To address these questions, the Rising Powers Initiative (RPI) at the Sigur Center for Asian Studies, George Washington University and the Department of International Studies, Political Science, and History, Christ University in Bangalore, invited a panel of leading experts, including Michael Kugelman, Deputy Director, Asia Program and Senior Associate for South Asia at the Woodrow Wilson Center, Nilanthi Samaranayake, Director, the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA)’s Strategy and Policy Analysis Program, with commentator Gurpreet Singh Khurana, missile warfare specialist of the Indian Navy and author, currently a Visiting Professor at Naval War College (NWC), Goa. In addition, there were brief interventions by two other specialists, P.K. Ghosh, a former Senior Fellow at IDSA and Indian Navy veteran, and Subramanyam Raju, Head of the Center for Maritime Studies at Pondicherry University. Deepa Ollapally, Research Professor of International Affairs and Director of RPI, moderated the event. This Roundtable is the fourth segment in the project that commenced last year on U.S.-India relations between Christ University and George Washington University. See event recording on YouTube.

The first session of the Roundtable covers traditional military maritime security concerns and responses. The second session concentrates on non-traditional security, which does not get as much attention despite its direct impact on Indo-Pacific populations. It covers human security issues or soft security such as climate change and ocean pollution. The purpose of the Roundtable was to draw out the top priorities of the U.S. and India and consider how they intersect, according to U.S. and Indian experts, respectively.

Session I: Traditional Maritime Security Threats

Top Three Challenges: An American View

Michael Kugelman highlighted traditional maritime security challenges in the Indo-Pacific under three areas of concern. First is the growing presence and power of China. Kugelman comprehensively discussed how countries in the region and outside the area viewed China as a strategic competitor or a strategic threat. He explained that China is “deepening its coastal region footprint and increasing its power projections in the regional seas, creating a significant maritime security challenge.” China is also expanding its economic presence rapidly through infrastructure investment in the port development of several littoral states. Speculating on China’s military plans in the maritime domain of the Indo-Pacific, he pointed to Djibouti and the Solomon Islands as testaments to China’s growing maritime presence.

This growing presence of China, Kugelman argues, is a significant intensifier of geopolitical competition, mainly with the U.S. and India. “Given that the Andaman Sea is such a key strategic space linking the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean near the Malacca Strait, and with the geographies at play, China’s growing maritime power in the Indo-Pacific is such a strategic concern for both the U.S. and India. It’s not just the strategic competitors scaling up their role there. But China’s presence in the region has major implications for trade, for Indian energy imports from the Arab Gulf, for instance, and for U.S. trade imports from East Asia. And for the U.S., China’s power has obvious implications for the security of its defense allies, namely South Korea and Japan”.

The second main challenge is territorial disputes in the region. China’s souring relations with Japan, Australia, and South Korea have reached a new low in recent years. Kugelman suggests this is due to China’s increasing provocative and muscular behavior to assert claims over disputed territories. While countries have been trying to muster a response, the nature of China’s provocations has made it challenging to hold Beijing accountable. China uses grey zone tactics, which fall short of acts that constitute belligèrent actions. Thus, Beijing capitalizes on these tactics to continue staging provocations and laying claims on disputed territories.

Thirdly, he turned to maritime terrorism, which is viewed as a longer-term threat. Attacks on coastal targets and ships have rapidly increased, according to Kugelman. Sensitive targets such as busy ports, crowded checkpoints, or large vessels on the high seas could be attacked to have devastating impacts on trade. The 2011 attack on the Pakistani naval air base PNS Mehran and the 2015 terrorist attacks on a naval base in the Bangladeshi port city of Chittagong indicates how maritime terrorism is an added concern for states in the region.

Additionally, Kugelman claims the significant presence of Chinese naval forces in the South China Sea has discouraged other Southeast Asian states from bringing in more of their security forces. This has encouraged terrorists to gain influence in the region. Terrorists have also started eliciting the help of pirates for illicit acts like robbery; for example, Abu Sayyaf, a militant organization, is benefiting from the partnership between terrorists and pirates.

Possible Counter-Measures: Together and Separately

“The long legacy of maritime cooperation between the U.S. and India is a good place to start,” Kugelman suggested. Joint naval exercises between the two biggest democracies in the Indian Ocean go back to the 1990s. In 2006, the two governments produced a short document called “The India-U.S Framework for Maritime Security Cooperation,” which set out bureaucratic structures for cooperation. Kugelman further talked about the various forms of bilateral dialogues on maritime issues and trade. He describes how the recent two plus two meetings in Washington culminated with an agreement for India to join the Combined Maritime Forces and be a participant in efforts with the U.S. and others to strengthen security partnerships in the Western Indian Ocean region. These are creating enough precedent and scope for U.S.-India maritime cooperation.

Despite the U.S. and India having some differences in threat perceptions regarding the three aforementioned maritime challenges, the two countries are strategically aligned on China’s naval power and presence in the Indo-Pacific. Of particular convergence is the value both place on being proponents of a free and open Indo-Pacific. However, one “disconnect relates to what path India should follow to strengthen its capacity to play the type of net security provider that the U.S. wants it to, or would like to see it play.”

Kugelman points out a divergence of interests regarding the geographical focus in the Indo-Pacific, with the U.S. being more focused on the Eastern areas and India on the Indian Ocean region. This creates a challenge for U.S. and India to align and approach the broader maritime security challenges in the Indo Pacific. Nonetheless, he concludes on the note of “reconciliation on this, and with the QUAD taking off, India, over time, would start shifting its interest towards the East in the Indo-Pacific as China nears the Andaman Sea region.”

Indian Side Weighs in on the Challenges and Cooperative Prospects

As discussant, Gurpreet Khurana took off from Kugelman’s comprehensive overview of the traditional threats in the Indo-Pacific and discussed the interlinkages, namely, how China’s emergence caused a shift in maritime security for the West from non-traditional to traditional. He identified the instances of Pakistani state support for the Mumbai terror attacks and the Houthi rebels attacking ships in the Red Sea from the shore; this type of threat could be a potential convergence of U.S. and India cooperation. In the context of China, Khurana agreed with Kugelman’s assertions about the increasing danger from Beijing. He points to the Chinese narrative about the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and how they view it as an unfair imposition on Asian values. He finds the maritime order in the Indo Pacific has established a new “modicum of order” which needs to be protected.

On the different interpretations of net security by India and the U.S., Khurana explained how the Indian Navy’s former chief chose not to use “net security provider” and instead used the term “preferred security provider” because the Indian Navy was not comfortable with the concept of “net provider of security.” Thus, in the Indian Maritime Security Strategy document of 2015, there were clarifications that India was not only a net security provider but also well-positioned to become a net provider of security. Khurana also drew attention to freedom of navigation (FONOPS) and the differences between India and the U.S. regarding how to interpret UNCLOS. The U.S. has not yet ratified UNCLOS, which he says gives impetus to China “to drive a wedge between India, the U.S, and the other countries in the region.”

Further, Khurana addressed how India concentrates on groups like the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA). The U.S. on the other hand focuses on the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) and AUKUS. India’s preferred forums are based on the concept of plurilateralism, which he argues gives a sense of security to smaller countries.

P.K. Ghosh dwells on crucial questions about our perception of the Indo-Pacific and what are India’s reach and sustainability on these issues. He appreciated how Kugelman addressed China, the elephant in the room. Concerning U.S.-India perceptions, he agrees with Khurana on the interpretation of UNCLOS and how there is a difference in understanding regarding FONOPS. Ghosh recommended studying the use of the maritime dimension to conduct terrorist attacks on land and maritime terrorism. He also proposed looking at chokepoints of the Strait of Hormuz, Bab al-Mandab, and others as important traditional threats.

Additional Key Discussion Points

Key questions that emerged concerned QUAD or AUKUS as a possible framework to respond to maritime terrorism threats; the possibility for QUAD to become an Asian NATO; and Russia’s ambitions in the Indo-Pacific.

Kugelman believes that maritime terrorism would not qualify as a major focus for QUAD. This is because public concerns such as emerging technologies, pandemics, and climate change, are more critical areas of focus. QUAD, additionally, is likely to focus on public goods delivery to try and counter Chinese efforts. He emphasized that the QUAD was not a security grouping and is not headed toward an Asian NATO. It would counter the increasing Chinese power, though not overtly.

Regarding Russia’s role in the Indo-Pacific, Khurana explained how Moscow had its “hands full as its economy was in bad shape due to the situation in the Black Sea region.” He also noted how India has been pushing for the QUAD to have a softer focus and a more holistic approach to security.

Session II: Non-Traditional Maritime Security

Top Challenges: An American View

The holistic notion of security and the need to look beyond the traditional military strategies was taken up by Nilanthi Samaranayake in the second session on Non-traditional Maritime Security Challenges. Samaranayake highlighted two top challenges: Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated fishing or IUU fishing, natural disasters, and human-made disasters.

At the U.S-India two plus two ministerial dialogue held on 11 April, the term “fishing” was mentioned, even if only once in a scientific context. Although it is a significant development, it simultaneously represents the limited interaction on this topic. But with QUAD as a trending topic, Samaranayake says one cannot dismiss “the potential area for growth in terms of bilateral cooperation” because IUU fishing was also explicitly mentioned in the QUAD ministerial statement in February in the broader context of international law, maritime security, and China.

Samaranayake stated three points as to why this is important. Firstly, India plays a significant role in fishing in the Indian Ocean. It is the second-largest fish-producing country globally, accounting for more than six percent of global fish production. Secondly, many tuna supplies are sourced in the Indian Ocean. And there is a growing awareness that Indian Ocean yellowfin tuna stock has been overfished and subjected to fishing since 2015. Thirdly, there is some concern about European countries’ fishing activity in the Indian Ocean, particularly in the Western Indian Ocean. It is estimated that 40 percent of the European Union’s tuna catch comes from the Western Indian Ocean. This comes as the European Union-controlled ships have hauled a greater share of the region’s yellowfin tuna in the region for the last three decades, leading to concerns about these fish stock levels.

Despite this indication of the statistics, Samaranayake pointed out how India remains non-signatory to the U.N. Port State Measures Agreement to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing. She describes India as a “vital actor and stakeholder in fishing, and given the sector’s role in bolstering regional food security and economic security, it may be a worthwhile topic for greater U.S.-India coordination and possibly for the QUAD at some point, considering the attention paid to China’s fishing activities in the Pacific waters.” Furthermore, with Australia, the United States, and very recently Japan being the signatories of this agreement, she recommends India to sign on to demonstrate QUAD unity on the topic.

Regarding natural disasters and human-made disasters, Samaranayake described cooperation between India and the U.S. as more built-up than in fishing. Ranging from natural disasters such as cyclones and floods to human-made disasters, such as oil spills off Mauritius and Sri Lanka in 2020, the population living along the coastal areas in the Indo-Pacific is undoubtedly affected the most. Fortunately, the U.S. and India both have a significant history of conducting disaster relief operations in the region, both jointly and independently, taking the instances of the 2004 tsunami relief operations and the Mozambique cyclone in 2019.

At the ministerial talks in April, the U.S. and India discussed the need for cooperation on climate and disaster management, resilience goals, and monsoon prediction and forecasting in the context of the Coalition for Disaster Resilient infrastructure. Samaranayake identified this as an important “way forward for cooperation.”

Outlook for Collaboration

Some smaller Indian Ocean countries hold the view that E.U. states exploit their fishing resources. But on the positive side, one can draw a connection between the U.S. working with its European allies and India building ties with E.U. countries through the EU India Strategic Partnership roadmap, with France being a key partner for both the U.S. and India in a traditional security sense. Samaranayake shed light on how this is paving the way for formulating greater collaboration and cooperation in the non-traditional security realm as well.

The shared vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific can be built on foundations like the Humanitarian Assistance Disaster Relief (HADR). Samaranayake agrees with Ghosh and emphasized that India’s leadership is becoming prominent through the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) and how this can foster multilateral cooperation across the region and coordinate with the United States to a much greater extent. She added that balance between navy-to-navy collaboration and non-military Coast Guard cooperation could be considered a more concerted and holistic approach.

The Indian View: Layers of Complexity

In Khurana’s commentary, he adds that one of the issues is that the U.S. is neither a member of IONS nor an observer. The U.S. has not been able to participate due to objections from Iran. However, the U.S. is a dialogue partner of the IORA as it works on HADR programs. Khurana pointed out that if India signs the Ports State Measures Agreement, it would have to follow stringent standards applied to Europe and the U.S. exporters; he proposes an open market policy that would enhance production standards and supply to increase competitiveness. He is however concerned about Indian producers and manufacturers competing in a global market because Indian producers lack the technology for deep-sea fishing and processing onboard. Khurana says, “If the U.S. said that it wanted to make India a great country, it would have to share technology, and we all rise with the rising tide.”

Raju centered his comments on ocean governance as it encompasses the topics of non-traditional security issues in the Indo-Pacific apart from terrorism, piracy, climate change, illegal fishing or disasters. Along with ocean governance, he concentrated on ocean health versus ocean wealth. Discussing the sustainability of resources from the seas, he argues how the concept of a blue economy is crucial as an alternative to access vital ocean resources. He also suggests that India and the U.S. cooperate to create a blue economy while addressing non-traditional security issues from the maritime domain. He further appealed to using the idea of India’s “Samudra Manthan,” suggesting that the two look at the state versus maritime threats rather than state versus state.

Additional Key Discussion Points

Several key questions related to how to raise topics such as fishing and climate change to top-level diplomatic discourse, the role of civil society groups, and the impact of arms racing on the region’s non-traditional security priorities.

According to Samaranayake, “civil society is a critical sector when we are thinking about agents of change that can result in effects at the national level of policy in both the United States and India.” She addressed the failure of the U.S. to ratify UNCLOS due to congressional dysfunction, U.S. domestic level challenges, and politics. She agrees that non-traditional security issues are getting less attention than traditional security issues. But, China’s active involvement in illegal fishing issues would bring greater awareness to IUU fishing. Therefore, she adds: “sometimes it needs the traditional security driver to help raise attention.”

Kugelman states that getting the attention of policymakers toward non-traditional issues was difficult until they realized how serious these issues were. But, because U.S. and India’s relations had significantly developed, there are many different dialogue mechanisms in place to collaborate on non-traditional security threats. He adds that he would “like to be optimistic even though it’s true that it will be tough to get these issues on the radar.”

Overall, whether from a traditional or non-traditional maritime security viewpoint, the prospects for closer U.S.-India cooperation in the Indo-Pacific have never been better. Their bilateral efforts are only being strengthened via the growing number of minilateral and multilateral groupings in the Indo-Pacific, where the two countries remain at the forefront. Most importantly, their shared interests are going well beyond a common concern about China’s growing presence in the Indo-Pacific neighborhood to address the tangible needs of the populations of the region.

By Drorima Chatterjee and Ashwin Immanuel Dhanabalan, Post Graduate Scholars in International Studies at Christ University.

Digital Media and Cybersecurity Debates in U.S.-India Relations: Prospects for Cooperation

April 27, 2022

As the United States and India construct a comprehensive relationship covering a wide range issues going beyond traditional security or economics, two emerging sectors stand out in increasing importance: cybersecurity and digital media. Both are uniquely complicated by a combination of technical, political and economic undertones.

To unravel the debates over cybersecurity and digital media, the Rising Powers Initiative at the Sigur Center for Asian Studies, George Washington University in Washington D.C. and CHRIST (Deemed to be University) in Bangalore, recently convened a group of experts from the U.S. and India as part of their ongoing joint project since 2021 to engage Indian millennials and Gen-Z on critical issues in U.S.-India relations. (Click here to view the agenda and recording of this event. To view earlier events, see project on ‘Shared Values and Worldviews in US-India Relations: Prospects for Cooperation‘.)

How aligned are the two democratic partners on cybersecurity and digital media and where do prospects for cooperation lie? What do the experts have to say about the convergences and divergences and what are the perceptions of rising young Indian international relations scholars and professionals?

CYBERSECURITY

More Agreement than Disagreement

The American perspective was offered by Christopher Painter, President of Global Forum on Cyber Expertise Foundation, while the Indian views were given by Ambassador Latha Reddy, Co-Chair of the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace and former Indian Deputy National Security Advisor. These experts suggest that thinking on cybersecurity issues tend to fall along a spectrum of convergences and divergences rather than stark binaries. Ransomware and critical information infrastructure were most clearly categorized by Painter and Reddy as areas of convergence for India and the U.S. Both these issues are new and the space for policy making is growing. India and the U.S. are victims of ransomware attacks and a future of cooperation against this new threat was echoed in the high level White House summit on ransomware where India participated and endorsed a joint statement. The Computer Emergency Readiness Team (CERT) was also recognized as another forum of mutual cooperation and benefit despite some friction.

The panelists differ somewhat on divergences. Reddy argues that the linchpin of divergences is data localization. India recognizes that storing, processing and transfer of data affects consumer privacy, economic growth and national security, making this divergence weigh heavily on the relationship. The existing cooperation mechanisms like Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) does not work well and law enforcement has not been getting ready access to data. Painter views the issue as an important one, but not in the long term. He admits that the Budapest cybercrime convention did not have India at the table and U.S. data privacy laws have been a huge obstacle to data localization. However, the divergence according to him is likely to be short lived in light of the U.N. cybercrime negotiations, and the Cloud Act, both of which are currently underway. Instead, he argues that supply chain and 5G issues plague the relationship most. Despite matching concerns on 5G and Chinese companies, India had been reticent to endorse a U.S.-led ban on Huawei given the importance of 5G as an economic driver critical for catching up with developed countries. However, India pointedly left out Chinese companies Huawei and ZTE from its 5G six-month trials. Painter also pointed to the lack of consensus on recognition of China and Russia as cyber threat actors, resulting in the lack of attribution and collective action against cybercrimes committed.

Key Discussion Points

Questions and commentary from the younger demographic audience revolved around the extent to which India and the U.S. converged on international norms on cyber sovereignty, concerns about ransomware and cryptocurrency, combatting information warfare, impact of geopolitics on global supply chains and possible role of the QUAD.

Global Norms vs. Absolute Sovereignty

In the interactive discussions with Reddy and Painter moderated by Deepa Ollapally, Director of the Rising Powers Initiative, there emerged considerable agreement that India and the U.S. are very much aligned on international norms and norm-based approaches to cyber sovereignty, with the Sino-Russian model of cyber sovereignty posited by some as the alternative. One caveat here is that India would like to treat China and Russia as separate entities given that Russia has been a trusted defense partner whereas China is an adversary. An obvious disadvantage of the model of absolute sovereignty with its control of information, and the use of information as a threat is that there no space for human rights or other economic concerns which are important considerations for liberal democracies such as India and the U.S. Moreover, India’s well-informed younger populace and thriving civil society are also unlikely to stomach such a model. The U.N. Charter, international law, and norms-based approach offer more options while offering the same protections such as not attacking critical infrastructure and resources in another country during peacetime.

Supply Chains, Geopolitics and Future Strategies

There was a clear consensus that India and the U.S. must not depend solely on China for supply chain demands. The diversification of supply chains is essential since it is directly linked to the geopolitics of the region. To decrease the dependence on China, India and the U.S. should collaborate particularly on R&D to create new supply chains. The example of Scandinavia on these issues was offered as instructive for finding solutions. India could also use the QUAD to ease its supply chain and cyber cooperation issues.

The ability to deter cyber threats using new-age technology and economic tools is another key convergence. Technologies such as artificial intelligence, machine learning, and quantum computing could help countries prevent cyber-attacks. The U.S. and India being regular victims of ransomware attacks, could use sanctions to deter cross-border cyberattacks, particularly from states like North Korea. Both countries also need to bring in robust regulatory frameworks such as Know Your Customer protocols and anti-money laundering measures to control cryptocurrencies, which are key enablers of ransomware attacks. No country is going to ban cryptocurrency or wholeheartedly endorse it. Joint attribution strategies between India and the U.S. could be a possible point of convergence in the future. The Quad is presented as a particularly suitable forum for taking this forward, especially as India already has cyber cooperation with all of the Quad members.

DIGITAL MEDIA

Searching for Common Ground in a Difficult Terrain

Jay Gullish, lead for U.S.-India Business Council’s Digital Economy and Media & Entertainment Committees, emphasized that the room for greater U.S.- India cooperation is vast and critical to capitalize on because otherwise both economies stand to lose so much. He notes that we are at a critical moment where there are dramatic changes in technology regulations. If these regulations do not represent both Indian and American interests, there could be disruptive consequences to both economies. Any decoupling of the U.S. and Indian tech industries could have serious adverse outcomes because of the extent of interaction and integration.

Cooperation has been difficult so far because India and the U.S. have some structural differences, so there is some misalignment in discussing these issues. India has at least three digital ministries that have no counterpart in the United States. The U.S. does not have an IT Ministry, a Telecom ministry or a Broadcasting Ministry. Gullish suggests that the cultural aspect of the digital age is often missed and that in addition to digital experts, psychologists and trend setters need to be a part of the bilateral conversation.

Joyojeet Pal, Associate Professor, School of Information, University of Michigan and former Senior Principal Researcher at Microsoft Research India, addressed the regulation standards of social media and emphasized the need for differentiation of regulation/censorship standards in different local settings. So far the U.S. free speech discourse, disinformation identification, and categorization of bad actors on social media has shaped global discourses and responses. He points out that the consequences of censorship can be very different in different places, especially when members of the government are challenged, citing a Twitter office being raided in India as an example. While curbing disinformation and hate speech on the internet is important, social media platforms should develop different strategies and mechanism for different contexts. This is especially true given that India ranks highest in the number of users on social media platforms. The main points of friction seem to be between national law and the governance of corporate policy, political management of crises, and managing the global and local gap in free speech approaches.

Key Discussion Points

Queries and comments revolved around the rise of fake news including the new “infodemic” in relation to the pandemic, what the U.S. and India can do to limit their impact on policymaking and political communication, and how to deal with information and digital warfare that has gone from traditional media to the online world in a way that has caught governments and tech companies off guard. Other points were raised on the role of Big Tech companies and appropriate regulations to curb their power and influence and how to balance Indian and U.S. interests in this regard, especially given the disproportionate power of American information sources.

Governance of Digital Media/Economy

On the issue of how to address what many Indians view as monopolistic practices of western Big Tech, several explanations were given by the experts. First, new technologies expand rapidly and while they have concentrated power to start with, competition sets in and creates a much larger pool of technology companies. A diversity of platforms should be expected from various regions of the world, and this itself will regulate content and power of western tech companies. Instead of looking at the top 5 platforms that now cover 90-95% of interactions, we should expect to see hundreds in the future that could control 40% or more content under new dynamics yet to be seen.

Secondly, it was asserted that the real issue was not local versus global but how interesting any give platform or application happens to be. Whether it is Instagram, Snapchat or the highly innovative Tiktok, the challenge is to create something exciting that will catch on. There is no reason that local Indian platforms like Koo and Share Chat cannot find a place among Big Tech. With this, many of today’s challenges will find more traditional channels of regulation whether it is conventional competition regulation or traditional libel regulation. At the same time, it will likely be a very different way of management and a much more diverse set of information exchange.

Influence of Social Media

Noting that digital warfare is now rampant across the globe, the idea that American media has overweening influence may need to be modified. It was pointed out that which media posts people rely on depends on the information seekers’ cultural proclivity. American media houses are not monolithic and therefore, one can decide for example to watch BBC or CNN. Broadly speaking on digital warfare, it was pointed out that this type of campaign was happening not just across states, but within states that produces the kind of polarization that we are now witnessing. Indeed, it is suggested that foreign governments at some point have to present their information as reasonable in order for it to be an effective propaganda tool for outsiders, whereas internal channels have a much freer hand.

The rise of an infodemic during the pandemic has made it more urgent than ever for countries to validate information and prevent misinformation on social media. One problem noted is the tradeoff for any government between what may be politically expedient and what is the correct path for public health protection. Both India and the U.S. were given fairly good marks on this although the latter faltered in the beginning of the pandemic. As to whether differing norms of digital censorship between India and the U.S. is an obstacle to their cooperation evidenced by the case of Twitter in 2021, it was suggested that Big Tech companies will likely sidestep the question of free speech and fall in line given the enormous profits to be made in India.

Looking ahead, some changes in perceptions seem to be occurring. Initially, there was an assumption in the internet age that all information provided was accurate and since the fallacy of this is becoming increasingly clear, we may be entering a second phase of more critical interpretation and a healthy skepticism.

Prepared by Judith Blessy B (M.A. Candidate) Christ University, Medha Prasanna (M.A. Candidate) George Washington University and Jeshil Samuel J (M.A. Candidate) Christ University.

STUDENT DISCUSSANTS

M.A. Candidates, Christ University

Hanspreet Kaur

Jagritee Senapati

Jairam R Prabhu

Jeshil Samuel J.

Johann M Cherian

Judith Blessy B

Kalpana Pandey

Sakshi

Salkar Gaurang

Shivam Tiwary

Tejusvi Shukla

Unnamalai Lakshmann

Vineeth Daniel Vinoy

Vishnu Prasad E

Russia’s Suspension from UN HRC: Voting Becomes More Mixed

Policy Alert #248 | April 11, 2022

On April 7, after graphic images emerged of civilian killings in the city of Bucha just outside Kyiv, the United Nations General Assembly voted to suspend Russia from the Human Rights Council over “gross and systematic violations and abuses of human rights.” Ukraine accused Russia of killing more than 300 civilians in Bucha, leading to an even greater condemnation of Russia from the international community, albeit with varying intensity across non-western rising powers. The resolution to eject Russia passed with 93 countries voting in favor, 24 voting against, and 58 abstaining. Notably, this represented a shift in Russia’s favor since the first UNGA vote to condemn Russia on March 2. The Ukraine-Russia conflict appears to be entering a new phase: Russia is preparing to launch another offensive, this time concentrating its attacks on the eastern part of Ukraine. Russia’s offensive is now proceeding on two primary fronts, according to Ukrainian officials, after forces shifted initial efforts to take Kyiv: against the southeastern port city of Mariupol and in Ukraine’s far east, especially the contested Luhansk region. Meanwhile, Russia and Ukraine have reportedly made significant progress on a tentative 15-point peace plan, according to five people briefed on the talks. The plan would involve Ukraine dropping its aspiration to join NATO and declaring neutrality, in return for a ceasefire and Russia’s army withdrawing. However, in a televised statement, Mykhailo Podolyak, one of Ukraine’s peace negotiators, claimed the tone of peace talks had forever changed after evidence of the mass killings in Bucha. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy claimed he is committed to pressing for peace despite Russian attacks on civilians but he renewed his plea for more weapons ahead of an expected surge in fighting in the country’s east.

Russia

Russia has denied Ukrainian allegations that it killed civilians in the Ukrainian town of Bucha, describing footage and photographs of dead bodies as a “provocation” and a “staged performance” by Kyiv. “All the photos and videos published by the Kyiv regime, allegedly testifying to the ‘crimes’ of Russian servicemen in the city of Bucha, Kyiv region, are another provocation,” Russia’s defense ministry said in a statement. It called the footage “another staged performance by the Kyiv regime for the Western media.” This comes after Russia claimed it would reduce the intensity of attacks against Ukraine in its northern regions in order to “boost mutual trust” and facilitate further negotiations. “Due to the fact that negotiations over an agreement on Ukraine’s neutrality and non-nuclear status and security guarantees are moving into a practical stage…the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation has taken the decision to drastically reduce combat operations in the Kyiv and Chernihiv areas,” a statement by Russian Deputy Defense Minister Alexander Fomin stated.

China

Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian claimed the decision to suspend Russia from the UN Human Rights Council “will only exacerbate the division among member states … and set a dangerous new precedent.” Explaining the reason for China’s abstention, China’s UN Ambassador Zhang Jun wrote, “Regrettably, the draft resolution… has not undergone full consultations within the whole membership… nor does it take full consideration the history and complexity of the current crisis…It does not highlight the importance of the principle of indivisible security, or the urgency of promoting political settlement and stepping up diplomatic efforts. These are not in line with China’s consistent positions.” Following an EU-China summit via video conference on April 1, when pressed about sanctions on Russia, Wang Lutong, Director-General of European Affairs at China’s Foreign Ministry, told reporters that China is contributing to the global economy by conducting normal trade with Russia. “China is not a related party on the crisis of Ukraine… We don’t think our normal trade with any other country should be affected,” Lutong conveyed. China has also denied being asked for, or supplying, any military support for Russia.

In an op-ed for the nationalist Global Times, Yi Xin outlines the ‘seven sins’ of the US in the Ukraine crisis, including its ‘double standards’ on human rights: “Self-portrayed as a human rights ‘defender,’ the US has, in reality, played a part in wars and chaos in… Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Syria.”
In an op-ed for the independent South China Morning Post, Lijia Zhang describes how the Ukraine crisis is hurting China’s soft power ambitions: “Its stance on Ukraine hasn’t helped and Beijing must now distance itself from Moscow, and seek to negotiate a peace deal, to avoid further damaging its reputation.”

India

Following the widely documented killing of civilians in Bucha, India, for the first time, has “unequivocally condemned” the killings and supported the call for an “independent probe.” On the resolution to suspend Russia from the UN Human Rights Council, this was India’s 11th vote at the UN where it abstained since Russia invaded Ukraine. India questioned the process by which the move to suspend Russia took place given that it happened before the international probe into the massacre. India also believed that it should have been brought before the Human Rights Council, not the UNGA.

In an op-ed for the liberal Indian Express, Shubhajit Roy claimed that despite India’s abstention, its evolution towards Ukraine has been gradual: “New Delhi sharpened its criticism of Russia by flagging three concerns: respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of states, UN Charter, and international law. This was the first time India was invoking these three red lines.”
The business focused The Economic Times pointed out that India in its Explanation of Vote had no mention of the issue of territorial integrity and sovereignty: “This is the first time in the last two months that India has omitted this part.”

Japan

Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida lambasted what he called “brutal and inhumane acts” carried out in Bucha. Japan’s Foreign Ministry summoned the Russian ambassador and cited the killings of civilians in large numbers, calling them war crimes, the ministry said in a statement. During his visit to India on March 19, Kishida urged Narendra Modi to take a tougher line on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, but a joint statement after talks in New Delhi fell short of condemning Moscow’s actions. On April 8, Kishida announced that Japan will phase out Russian coal imports, in a major shift toward cutting its reliance on Russia following renewed condemnation for its alleged atrocities.

One Month In, Rising Powers Tested as Ukraine Crisis Escalates

Policy Alert #247 | March 24, 2022

Today marks one month since Russia ordered a “special military operation” and advanced into Ukraine on February 24, 2022. At least ten million Ukrainians have been displaced internally or have fled abroad as refugees. Thousands more people were able to escape cities under attack this week, but many remain trapped as humanitarian corridors keep failing. Intense fighting continues over several key places, including the capital of Kyiv and the strategic southern port city of Mariupol. If Russian troops took control of Mariupol, they would hold most of the stretch between the Donbas region in the east and Crimea in the south.

NATO has rejected Kyiv’s request for a no-fly zone, reasoning that the step would provoke Russia into a waging a larger war that could pit the U.S. and its allies against the nuclear-armed country. In a video posted on social media, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy slammed NATO over the decision.

US President Biden arrived in Brussels on March 23 ahead of emergency meetings with NATO allies aimed at presenting a united front against Russia. The US and its European allies plan to announce new sanctions for Russia and new humanitarian aid for Ukraine. Biden also plans to talk to European partners about China’s ties to Russia. The US is concerned Beijing will provide economic or military aid to Moscow. Biden discussed this concern with Chinese President Xi Jinping in a virtual meeting on March 18. European Union leaders are planning their own summit with Xi on April 1.

Ukrainian and Russian negotiators discussed a proposed deal in full for the first time on March 14. The two sides have made significant progress on a tentative peace plan including a ceasefire and Russian withdrawal if Kyiv declares neutrality and accepts limits on its armed forces. Russian President Vladimir Putin conveyed some progress has been made, while the Kremlin stressed the conflict would end when the West took action to address Moscow’s security concerns. President Zelenskyy has raised hopes with recent statements that seem to accept that Ukraine will not be a part of NATO. But even a negotiated cease-fire seems a distant prospect, let alone a lasting peace.

Russia

In his latest comments, Putin sought to justify the war in Ukraine, repeating his assertion that he was seeking to defend Russian speaking communities there through “demilitarization and de-Nazification.” Responding to Western defense analysts’ allegations that the Russian military campaign was going less well than expected, Putin asserted, “Our army will fulfil all the tasks. I don’t doubt that at all. Everything is going to plan.”

Putin claimed the financial penalties imposed on Russia by the West amount to a “declaration of war.” “But thank God, we haven’t got there yet,” Putin added. The Russian President also stated that any attempt to install a no-fly zone in Ukraine would cause catastrophic consequences for Europe and the world: “The current leadership needs to understand that if they continue doing what they are doing, they risk the future of Ukrainian statehood.”

On March 21, in response to Japanese sanctions, Russia announced it was withdrawing from negotiations with Japan aimed at signing a formal World War II peace treaty. According to the Russian Ministry, Russia would not continue negotiations with Japan on a peace treaty “under current conditions,” citing Japan’s “openly unfriendly positions and attempts to damage the interests of our country.”

China

In response to news outlets purporting that China had signaled willingness to provide military assistance to Russia, the Chinese Foreign Ministry accused the US of spreading disinformation. Chinese Spokesperson Zhao Lijian underscored China’s commitment to provide humanitarian supplies to Ukraine, contrasting that with the actions of the US in providing weapons: “Which do the civilians in Ukraine need more, food and sleeping bags or machine guns and mortar rounds?” Russia has also denied asking Beijing for military help.

On March 18, President Biden and President Xi spoke over a two-hour video call, where both sides stressed the need for a diplomatic solution in Ukraine. Xi stated, “The top priorities now are to continue dialogue and negotiations, avoid civilian casualties, prevent a humanitarian crisis, and end the war as soon as possible.” In addition, Xi advocated for Russia-Ukraine dialogue and negotiations, and suggested Washington and NATO conduct talks with Russia to solve the “crux” of the Ukraine crisis and resolve the security concerns of both Russia and Ukraine.

Xi also warned against sanctions: “Sweeping and indiscriminate sanctions would only make the people suffer. If further escalated, they could trigger serious crises in global economy and trade, finance, energy, food, and industrial and supply chains, crippling the already languishing world economy and causing irrevocable losses.”

In an op-ed for the independent South China Morning Post, Maria Siow and Su-Lin Tan explain why the Quad’s is OK with India, not China, giving Russia economic support: “This is more than just a double standard… It reflects a desire among the US and its allies to preserve India’s position in the regional security framework and prevent Moscow getting closer to Beijing.”
In an op-ed for the nationalist Global Times, Zheng Yongnian, Research Professor at the National University of Singapore, believes we can regard the Russia-Ukraine conflict as a ‘preview’ of the US’ possible acts in Asia: “NATO will not stop its expansion in Europe, but will likely expand to Asia… unless there is another bloc that forms as a check and balance.”

India

India is the only Quad member not to have condemned Russia’s military actions in Ukraine. In a meeting with Japan on March 19, Modi refrained from commenting directly on Ukraine but noted that geopolitical incidents were “presenting new challenges.” At a virtual summit between India and Australia on March 21, Modi also avoided talking about the issue. India has abstained five times from condemning Russia at the UN.

India, the world’s biggest oil importer behind China and the US, has agreed to purchase 3 million barrels of Russian oil at a heavy discount. The Indian government is also exploring ways to maintain trade with Russia by reviving the rupee-ruble trade, which would let Indian and Russian firms do business while bypassing the need to use US dollars, and lowering the risk of potential US sanctions.

In the business focused The Economic Times, Sreeram Chaulia, Dean of the Jindal School of International Affairs, highlights India’s complicated history and relationship with Russia: “The scale and breadth of Indo-Russian ties have a long history and, despite India’s geopolitical recalibrations over the last 15-odd years, especially vis-à-vis the US and China, it still bears momentum.”
In an op-ed for the pro-ruling party Daily Pioneer, Bhopinder Singh, former Lt Governor of Andaman & Nicobar Islands and Puducherry, attests that the situation in Ukraine validates India’s mistrust of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT): “As Kyiv desperately beseeches Delhi to intervene, memories of Ukraine condemning India’s nuclear re-testing in 1998 is conveniently forgotten… India has delivered far more responsible outcomes than those of most NPT signatories.”
In an op-ed for the liberal Indian Express, Pratap Bhanu Mehta, Contributing Editor, claims that the self-serving stances of all the great powers make it more likely that the world will be marked by conflict: “Europe is now caught between its desire to send a strong message to Russia and sanctimonious moralizing… its credibility is impugned because it is not willing to pay even the minimal economic price for a strong stand.”
In the business focused The Economic Times, Swaminathan Aiyar, Consulting Editor, argues that the war gives India a golden chance to export record quantities of wheat: “Ukraine and Russia are among the world’s largest exporters of wheat. The war has sent global wheat prices soaring. If India acts quickly, Ukraine could hand it a $8 billion bonanza.”

Japan

On March 19, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida told Indian Prime Minister Modi that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine had shaken the “foundation of international order” and required a clear response. Japan’s Press Secretary Hikariko Ono informed the media that Kishida asked Modi to impress upon Putin the need to maintain free and open international order.

As Japan follows other countries’ lead in sanctioning Russia, ties between Russia and Japan have worsened. Japan reacted angrily after Russia withdrew from peace treaty talks with Japan and froze joint economic projects related to the disputed Kuril islands because of Japanese sanctions. Kishida strongly opposed Russia’s decision: “This entire situation has been created by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and Russia’s response to push this onto Japan-Russia relations is extremely unfair and completely unacceptable.”

Rising Powers React to Russian Military Actions in Ukraine

Policy Alert #246 | February 28, 2022

On February 21, Russian President Vladimir Putin formally recognized the independence of the southeastern Ukrainian regions of Donetsk and Luhansk. Known collectively as Donbas, the two territories have been led by pro-Russia separatists for nearly a decade. On February 24, Putin ordered a “special military operation” in Ukraine based on request from the heads of the Donbas regions to carry out what he called “peacekeeping functions.” Putin has invoked the idea of Donbas’s distinctive regional identity as a basis to “defend” its Russian-speaking people from a supposedly intolerant Ukraine. However, Russian forces continued to advance beyond Donbas into some of Ukraine’s largest cities.

Ukraine’s Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba declared Putin had “launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine.” Russia’s actions have been swiftly condemned by several nations, which have imposed devastating packages of sanctions and other economic measures to punish Moscow. The European Union for the first time will finance the purchase and delivery of weapons, in a show of support for Ukraine. The EU is also banning Russian planes from its airspace. Following pressure from the UK government, British energy giant BP said it would exit its nearly 20% stake in Russian government-controlled oil producer Rosneft. Western governments joined by Japan said they would cut off a number of Russian banks from the SWIFT network, an international payment system.

Citing “aggressive statements” by NATO and tough financial sanctions, Putin announced that he had put his nuclear deterrence forces into high alert. On February 27, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky revealed Ukraine and Russia would conduct the first diplomatic talks, with delegations from both countries meeting at the Ukrainian border with Belarus. The two countries would meet near the Pripyat River “without preconditions.”

Russia

Putin has made clear that Russia would never accept Ukraine’s membership of NATO, calling this a direct threat to Russian security and rejecting Western assurances that there were no plans for this anytime soon. In a televised speech on February 21, Putin claimed “Ukraine has never had its own authentic statehood.” Putin warned that Ukraine could develop its own nuclear weapons, calling this a “real threat,” claiming that the West was using Ukraine as a “theater of potential warfare” against Russia.

According to Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, Moscow is ready to hold talks at any moment once the Ukrainian Armed Forces lay down their arms. “No one plans to attack and oppress them, let them return to their families, and let us give the Ukrainian people a chance to decide their future,” Lavrov stated. At the same time, he emphasized that Russia had always called for negotiations. “There is no shortage of talks…,” Lavrov stressed, “But this time, it just went beyond all limits because it was accompanied by a continuous deterioration of the Russian-speaking population’s situation in Ukraine.”

Russia’s Defense Ministry reported that the Russian Armed Forces were not delivering strikes against Ukrainian cities. The ministry emphasized that the Ukrainian military infrastructure was being destroyed by precision weapons and there was no threat to civilians.

An editorial for The Moscow Times, an independent newspaper based in Moscow, highlights Russia’s praise for India’s “independent and balanced” position after Delhi abstained from a UN Security Council vote that condemned Moscow’s “aggression” against Ukraine. India, along with China and the UAE, did not vote on the resolution.

China

Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying called the US the “culprit” of current tensions surrounding Ukraine. According to Chunying, “the US has been sending weapons to Ukraine… creating panic” while, in stark contrast, “China has all along called on all parties… to resolve issues through negotiation and consultation.”

Chunying underscored the necessity of understanding “the whole story” on the Ukraine issue and the need to properly address each other’s legitimate security concerns. “Certain countries should ask themselves,” Chunying stated, “When the US drove five waves of NATO expansion eastward all the way to Russia’s doorstep and deployed advanced offensive strategic weapons in breach of its assurances to Russia, did it ever think about the consequences of pushing a big country to the wall?”

When asked if China would impose sanctions against Russia, Chunying responded: “Our position is that sanctions are never fundamentally effective means to solve problems. We consistently oppose all illegal unilateral sanctions.”

The state directed China Daily emphasized the Chinese Ministry’s warnings to Taiwan politicians against using the Ukraine crisis to draw attention to the Taiwan question and make provocations for “independence.”
In an op-ed for the nationalist Global Times, Zhang Hong, associate research fellow at the Institute of Russian, Eastern European & Central Asian Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, calls the West’s diplomacy towards Russia a failure: “The West decided to treat some of Russia’s concerns with indifference, neglect, and even arrogance.”

India

India has refused to publicly condemn Russia’s military actions and has downplayed “sovereignty” and “territorial integrity” rhetoric it usually adopts to criticize China’s actions in the Indo-Pacific. India abstained from voting on a UN Security Council resolution demanding that Russia cease its actions in Ukraine. “We have not supported what Russia has done. We have abstained. It is the right thing to do under the circumstances,” reasoned G. Parthasarthy, a retired Indian diplomat. India’s abstention does not mean support for Moscow but reflects New Delhi’s reliance on its Cold War partner for energy, weapons and support in conflicts with neighbors.

Notably, more than 50% of India’s arms imports is Russian and it remains a key strategic partner to India. India is also exploring ways to set up a rupee payment mechanism for trade with Russia to soften the blow on New Delhi of Western sanctions imposed on Russia. For example, Indian officials are concerned that vital supplies of fertilizer from Russia could be disrupted as sanctions intensify, threatening India’s vast farm sector.

In the business focused The Economic Times, Sriparna Pathak, assistant professor at the Jindal School of International Affairs, India, writes that India is caught between a rock and a hard place on Ukraine: “While US and Indian interests are the same in the Indo-Pacific, India will have to balance the diplomatic tightrope between Washington and Moscow and seek a resolution by diplomatic means to the conflict now escalated to war.”

An editorial by the liberal Indian Express emphasizes the need for the US and Europe to scale down the conflict through diplomacy: “Putin’s concerns about the expansion of NATO and the lop-sided security architecture of Europe are not without basis. It is both unreasonable and irresponsible of the Western alliance to dismiss these concerns.”
In an op-ed for the liberal Indian Express, Pratap Mehta, president of Centre Policy Research, New Delhi, believes that the world must do more to put pressure on Russia: “The brutal truth is that despite outrage in the West, the appetite for doing what it takes to put pressure on Putin is not yet in evidence.”

Japan

Japan condemned Russia’s military actions “in the strongest terms,” according to an official statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Foreign Minister Hayashi Yoshimasa claimed Russia’s actions “clearly infringe upon the Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, constitute a serious violation of international law prohibiting use of force, and are a grave breach of the UN Charter.”

Japan said it would join the US and European Union in plans to cut off Russian banks from the SWIFT financial network and in sanctions on Russian officials including President Putin. Japan was the last member of the G7 nations to join the SWIFT sanctions.

Japan’s relations with Moscow have been shaped by its reliance on Russia for its energy needs. For Japan, the most immediate impact of the crisis is likely to be seen in rising fuel prices. Japan has about 240 days’ worth of crude oil reserves and reserves of liquefied natural gas (LNG) to last two to three weeks. Russia accounted for 9% of Japan’s total LNG imports in 2021 and 4% of total crude imports. President Kishida said Japan would do the utmost to limit the economic impact to its resource-poor nation, including by ensuring a stable supply of energy.