Japan’s Rising Role as an Indian Ocean Actor: What Do Port Stories Tell Us?

February 14, 2023

In January 2023, a little-noticed naval exercise took place between the U.S. and Sri Lanka in the strategically located Trincomalee port and Mullikulam base in the Indian Ocean. The annual bilateral CARAT Sri Lanka exercises have been long-standing, but this year, Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force joined them for the second time after its initial participation in 2021. This came right on the heels of India sending the INS Delhi to dock at Trincomalee and providing training for the Sri Lankan Navy. These actions come four months after the controversial Chinese docking of a surveillance ship at Hambantota port in the midst of Sri Lanka’s historic economic and political meltdown in 2022.

Japan’s increasing involvement in the Indian Ocean will have a deep impact on the interests of its Quad partners, especially India. While Japan has been a traditional development aid partner in the region, its newest role suggests a leading strategic edge. What does Japan’s strategic edge in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) look like? And to what extent is it characterized by a partnership with India versus a more unilateral approach?

 

The Race for Ports in the Indian Ocean

            Sri Lanka

Japan’s strategic outlook on the Indian Ocean may be best reflected in how it participates in port and port infrastructure development. China took an early lead in constructing ports in the Indian Ocean Region ahead of both Japan and India. The latter two have been playing catch-up since 2010. Given Japan’s greater capital, resources and a better reputation for building and delivering quality infrastructure, Tokyo is in a more advantageous position to compete than India. India, however, brings strong historical experience working closely with key states like Sri Lanka and Bangladesh that could add value for Japan.

Tokyo’s sweeping new National Security Strategy, released in December 2022, points to China’s rising assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific as Japan’s “greatest strategic challenge.” In turn, Japan’s National Defense Strategy further notes that it must “deepen bilateral and multilateral defense exchanges” and will prioritize “the importance of stable use of sea lane and an energy and economic perspective” with coastal Indian Ocean states. Japan has been increasing its port investment portfolios across the Indian Ocean in recent years. Its major investments include Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Myanmar. Sri Lanka is where Japan is poised to gain the most, with unexpected opportunities since the economic and political crises hit the island nation last year.

That said, the way forward in Sri Lanka has not been easy for Japan. After receiving approval for the Colombo Port East Container Terminal (ECT) project in 2019, Japan and India were dismissed two years later in what amounted to a high-profile rebuke. The government of President Maithripala Sirisena-Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe had signed an MOU with Japan and India to develop the Colombo terminal jointly. The operating company was to be 51% owned by the government, with the remainder held by Japan and India. When a new government led by the China-friendly Gotabaya Rajapaksa unceremoniously took over in 2021, the decision was reversed, allowing the state-run China Harbor Engineering to develop the East Container Terminal. Initially, Rajapaksa had indicated that there would be no change, only to change his mind. Caught by surprise, this unilateral move was decried by Japan and India but without effect, even though nearly 70% of the transshipment business through ECT is linked to India.  This setback came on the heels of the handover of Hambantota Port to China in 2017 and the construction of the Colombo International Container Terminal (CICT) by China in 2011, where China Merchants Port Holdings has majority stakes.

The dramatic fall of Rajapaksa in 2022 and the political turbulence saw the return of a more even-handed government under Wickremesinghe. This government has wasted little time firming up another contract to Japan and India, this time for a new Colombo West Terminal project. This project will involve a yet-to-be-announced Japanese investor and India’s Adani Ports and Special Economic Zones (APSEZ). It will allow India and Japan to hold an 85% stake in this project under a build-operate-transfer schema for 35 years. While not generally viewed as strategic as the ECT, it is next to China’s activity in Colombo port.  It was at the Colombo International Container Terminal that China docked a submarine in 2014, causing much consternation in India.

Japan’s willingness to persist and ride the waves to acquire a port project in Sri Lanka points to the high level of commitment to gain a stronger foothold in the IOR. Apart from Colombo and Hambantota ports in Sri Lanka’s southwest and south, respectively, is the even more strategic Port of Trincomalee located in the northeast of the country within the Bay of Bengal. Trincomalee is the world’s fifth-largest natural harbor and one of the few natural harbors deep enough to easily accommodate submarines. Some view it as the second-best natural harbor in the world after Sydney.

The Bay of Bengal holds significance as the link between the Indian and Pacific Oceans; it is the fulcrum of the Indo-Pacific. More than 80 percent of Japan’s oil imports pass through the Bay of Bengal. If there is a priority for Japan (and India) in Sri Lanka, it would be to prevent China from establishing a permanent presence elsewhere on the island, especially Trincomalee. Trincomalee has a major Sri Lankan naval base and an air base. Still, given its low population, distance from the capital, and proximity to areas in conflict during the decades-long civil war, it has remained underdeveloped. In mid-2022 however, the Chairman of Sri Lanka Ports Authority announced plans to develop Trincomalee as an industrial port and to call for an “Expression of Interest” from investors to utilize the port premises and up to 2,400 hectares of surrounding land.

While plans to develop Trincomalee have surfaced from time to time, it was apparently only in December 2021, after a Japanese company established a ship repair and rebuilding facility there, that Colombo got serious. In joint operations with Japanese Onomichi Dockyard, Colombo Dockyard founded a rapid response afloat service in Trincomalee Port to cover a gap in Sri Lanka’s coverage. Another Japanese company, Tokyo Cement, had already built a state-of-the-art cement manufacturing facility which began commercial operations in 2017. Tokyo Cement’s products, trusted for decades for their superior strength and quality, also incorporated sophisticated equipment from India and Germany in this project. Given Hambantota port’s poor performance, the idea of developing Trincomalee has been met with some skepticism. However, supporters can point to a 2020 Asian Development Bank study commissioned by the Japanese which concluded that the Trincomalee harbor had substantial benefits to offer, including catering to increasing maritime cargo trade from India’s eastern seaboard and Bangladesh and Myanmar.

            Bangladesh, Myanmar, and the Greater Indian Ocean

Bangladesh’s primary port is the Port of Chittagong. Problems have long plagued Chittagong, with the World Bank ranking it the least efficient major port in Asia. It handles nearly 98% of Bangladesh’s containerized trade with the rest of the world. Japan has recognized this problem and has invested in the construction of Matarbari Port to alleviate the burden from Chittagong. Estimated to be completed in 2026, Matarbari port is also envisioned as a transport option for Indian goods from India’s sensitive northeast. “Key infrastructure projects funded by Japan like the Matarbari port in Bangladesh are expected to provide an entry point for Indian business to establish a foothold in Southeast Asia,” says VP of Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Nakazawa Keiichiro. Matarbari port, although not an Indian investment, is indicative of India and Japan’s close cooperation and shared goals.

In Myanmar, both Japan and India had planned major projects, despite the country’s troubled politics. India’s APSEZ had plans to build and operate an international container terminal in Yangon port, and Japan had planned to invest in the Thilawa SEZ surrounding Yangon port. While Japan’s SEZ in Thilawa and investments into Yangon port have come through, they have encountered delays and an increased investment risk due to sanctions on the Tatmadaw government. These sanctions have led to the cancellation of Indian APSEZ’s Yangon investment. Japan remains susceptible to Myanmar’s political instability.

Meanwhile, Japan continues to be a leader in developing critical Southeast Asian infrastructure, especially in Indonesia, which lies astride the strategically important Strait of Malacca. Japanese companies have been awarded contracts for the construction and operation of Patimban Port in Java. Indonesia’s primary port in Jakarta, Tanjung Priok Port, handles more than 50% of Indonesia’s transshipments. As President Joko Widodo looks to reevaluate Jakarta’s centrality in Indonesia, Japan has started construction in Patimban, which is expected to be completed in 2027. JICA extended Official Development Assistance (ODA) loans to Indonesia for this project in 2017 and again in 2022, making it Japan’s largest port investment project in ASEAN.

In November 2022, in the small town of Saumlaki in the Maluku Islands, construction on a Japanese-funded fishing port began. Saumlaki has a small port and is not used for containerized traffic but is close to major fishing spots and Japan intends to turn it into a regional fishing hub. In 2018, Japan financed the improvement of Saumlaki and five other minor fishing ports throughout Indonesia’s peripheral islands. Through developing fishing ports in Indonesia, Japan also seeks to combat persistent issues such as illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing and the lack of coastal infrastructure on smaller islands in the littoral waters of Southeast Asia. That Japan finds it necessary to invest in projects as big as Patimban and as small as Saumlaki, indicates a thorough investment portfolio in Indonesia and across the Indian Ocean.

Further away, Japan has provided Madagascar with ODA loans worth more than $340 million to expand its largest port, Toamasina Port. JICA has also no doubt considered the strategic location of Madagascar in the Indian Ocean. Near the islands of Comoros, Mauritius, and the Seychelles and close to the African coast, Toamasina port can serve as a regional hub for the Southern Indian Ocean.

 

The Strategic Shadow

Taken in isolation, Japan’s forays into port infrastructure in the Indian Ocean are unremarkable. After all, economic connectivity in the Indo-Pacific is a priority for the region and major powers. However, the backdrop to Japan’s stepped-up port development activity is increasingly strategic and cannot be easily delinked from the broader competition for influence with China. Japan’s growing joint projects with India in the Indian Ocean region indicate convergent strategic challenges and responses.

Indeed, we can see Japan as a critical linchpin for the Quad and the Indo-Pacific partnerships: working closely with its Quad partners often minus India in the Western Pacific and aligning closer and closer with India in the Indian Ocean. Together with India or separately, Japan’s significantly rising profile in critical port development is adding new momentum to the politics of the Indian Ocean. Whether this will lead to strengthening a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” or more great power rivalry is likely to depend on how China’s ambitions take shape in the Indian Ocean.

 

By Deepa M. Ollapally, Research Professor of International Affairs and Director, Rising Powers Initiative and Satvik Pendyala, Research Assistant, Rising Powers Initiative, Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University.

 

 

 

 

Can Regional Architecture for the Global Commons Catch Up in the Indo-Pacific with US and Indian Cooperation?

December 12, 2022

Introduction

India and the U.S. have become a significant part of the Indo-Pacific’s security framework with their active participation in regional groupings. This makes them indispensable member states in structuring the architecture for partnerships in the Indo-Pacific.

The Rising Powers Initiative at The George Washington University and Christ (Deemed to be University) in Bangalore recently held a joint Conference on Regional Architecture for Partnerships in the Indo-Pacific: The Role of US and India in Security and the Commons. The first session sought to explore important aspects of the security dynamics in the region, focusing on how joint contributions may help in upholding a ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ and promoting a rules-based order. See the Security Policy Brief here. This Policy Brief considers a spectrum of commons issues that the two countries can cooperate on, from climate refugees to the blue economy. Watch the Commons session here.

There is an urgent need for the US and India to go beyond their traditional cooperation in maritime security and address pressing challenges in oceanic ecosystems, international maritime law, and fishing disputes. These are areas which have a direct impact on the lives and livelihood of local and larger populations of the Indo-Pacific. Successful collaboration would thus meet both foreign policy and domestic objectives.

Experts on the commons consisted of Jason Donofrio, External Affairs Officer at The Ocean Foundation, Cornell Overfield, Analyst at CNA Corporation, and Abhijit Singh, Senior Fellow at Observer Research Foundation’s Maritime Policy Initiative. The session was moderated by Deepa Ollapally, Director of the Rising Powers Initiative and Research Professor of International Affairs at George Washington University.

How Can India and the US Catch Up in the Commons?

The viability of a long-term partnership between India and the US in non-traditional maritime security will depend on commons issues getting higher priority on their joint agenda. Panelists acknowledged that the commons have been under-explored despite its growing significance in the Indo-Pacific. With climate change threatening smaller island nations in the Indo-Pacific and the posturing of the Chinese navy in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean, the merger of non-conventional and conventional maritime issues has now created a complexity requiring nonbinary approaches. US-India cooperation is essential as it would be a precursor to establishing clearer laws for governance and an architecture for the development of global commons in the Indo-Pacific.

According to Donofrio, the global commons have come to represent an arena of increasing importance, especially in the Indo-Pacific region, as it supports the rhetoric of a “free, open and inclusive” region. Donofrio also highlighted the significance of maritime laws against the backdrop of continuing disputes and confrontations in the high seas by China. Though certain historical ideological differences have emerged between India and the US concerning the blue economy sector, there is general consensus that comprehensive collaboration between the countries would benefit the region.

The blue economy is a rapidly developing arena in the Indo-Pacific region, with opportunities to invest in fuel-efficient vessels, waste energy technology, greenification of shipping ports, and large-scale recycling, among other initiatives. There has been an increase in government investments in this sector with the influx of new sub-areas like blue carbon technology, which uses oceanic ecosystems to sequester carbon. These concepts have become crucial to the Indo-Pacific to safeguard biodiversity, counter the disproportionate impact on local coastal communities and prevent mass migration from becoming a security crisis.

Additionally, non-governmental institutions and private sector organizations can come together to contribute to the timely implementation of these types of sustainable projects. The Paris Agreement’s Nationally Determined Contribution mandate on climate adaption as well as the corporate sector’s Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) mandate offer opportunities in this regard. American private sector ESG funds may be utilized for restoration, preservation, and conservation projects in the blue economy and marine development areas. These resources can be further harnessed with local level expertise of researchers and scientists in India and the broader Indo-Pacific for multiple projects.

One sticking point has been India’s use of subsidies for deep sea fishing to promote livelihoods which in turn is resulting in a restricted flow of ESG funds. Clarifications and guidelines that balance the domestic and international interests in Exclusive Economic Zones for example, need priority discussion. Moreover, Donofrio argues that unnecessary and excessive accountability requirements have prevented optimal usage of ESG funds, making conservation projects unviable.

Overcoming Divergences: Challenges for US, India and the Indo-Pacific on UNCLOS

Overfield acknowledged that the lack of UNCLOS ratification by the United States has prevented more consensus building and impactful cooperation. Overlapping zones and resource division disputes caused by confusing regulations in the Indian Ocean are another set of issues that needs to be addressed. This requires India and the US to engage in dialogue and create a comprehensive framework for optimally harnessing blue economy resources such as fish.

Fisheries are a major source of livelihood for nations in the Indian Ocean. However, disputes arising from the EEZ and deep-sea fishing mandates of the various UNCLOS subsidiary bodies and Indian Ocean fishing agreements have hampered growth. Moreover, unregulated fishing activities have been causing environmental damage in the Indo-Pacific. Overfield notes the importance of India and US collaboration in resolving these disputes in favor of sustainable fishing practices. An additional area for further joint work is in anti-pirate drills in the region. In this regard, the jurisdictional issues with patrolling and countering pirate attacks require consensus building by India and the US with other regional powers.

Singh agreed that marine governance has not been taken up comprehensively in South Asia due to the limitations of UNCLOS and contrasting national interests. Limited legality combined with a lack of regulation and law enforcement has led to irregularities in governance. Most Indo-Pacific countries have not been able to reconcile interstate differences over EEZ governance as national governance clashes with international maritime laws. He notes that for India, the high seas are usually viewed as an arena of contestation, while diplomacy in the Indian Ocean is seen mainly through the lens of UNCLOS.

The issue faced by the US regarding ratification of UNCLOS is similar to India and other South Asian nations concerning their national blue economy policies. UNCLOS is restrictive in favor of sustainability, whereas India emphasizes holistic maritime development, with sustainability as a secondary parameter. Singh suggests that rebalancing within marine governance must provide equitable importance to non-traditional security factors. Discussions concerning maritime governance in multilateral partnerships need to shift towards more bilateral cooperation. For example, greater clarity on maritime law and various limitations and disagreements on issues like military operations in EEZs need to be addressed bilaterally. Singh proposes capacity-building initiatives between India and the US to combat natural disasters in the Indo-Pacific through green technology, smart tourism structures, and shallow ports for evacuation. He also proposes the construction of protected marine spatial zones for planning and conservation.

Looking Ahead

Optimistically, Singh finds that there has been a change in the Indian government’s mindset towards marine development and sustainability, as well as holistic maritime security, including human security, that was previously absent from significant maritime security debates.

For the US and India, partnership and cooperation in the Indo-Pacific is essential for governance related issues, especially regarding Chinese illegal fishing. Speakers also note that China can undertake activities such as building islands in the South China Sea due to a lack of opposition from other regional powers and the questionable legal status of submerged islands.

Given the immediacy of the climate change crisis, there are rising expectations with respect to the exchange of technical expertise and new initiatives between the US and India in the maritime domain. The role of shared values in both countries’ foreign policies, despite sometimes diverging individual national interests, is a driver that may provide further impetus for both countries to take the lead toward more resilient regional cooperative architecture.

 

By Kriti Chopra, Doctoral Scholar, Department of International Studies, Political Science & History, Christ (Deemed to be University).

This Policy Brief is a part of the ‘Shared Values and Worldviews in U.S.-India Relations’ project of the United States Government, George Washington University and Christ University. The opinions expressed here are solely of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Government, George Washington University or Christ University.

Regional Architecture For Security In The Indo-Pacific

November 14, 2022

Introduction

India and the U.S. have become a significant part of Indo-Pacific’s security framework with their active participation in regional groupings. This makes them indispensable member states in structuring the architecture for partnerships in the Indo-Pacific.

The Rising Powers Initiative at The George Washington University and Christ (Deemed to be University) recently held a joint Conference on Regional Architecture for Partnerships in the Indo-Pacific: The Role of US and India in Security and the Commons. The first session on Security sought to explore important aspects of the security dynamics in the region, focusing on how joint contribution may help in upholding ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ and promoting a rules-based order. This Policy Brief is based on the first session on Security, with a second report forthcoming on the Commons. Watch the first session here.

Primarily to counter Chinese assertiveness, speakers noted that key countries in the region can come together on multiple security dimensions ranging from non-traditional security and intelligence sharing to climate resilience and disaster management. This would help to evolve the existing group frameworks in the region which are currently informal and exclusive in nature. American involvement in the region’s security framework could serve to counter other security concerns including North Korean nuclear proliferation. And in collaboration with India, an emerging regional leader, it could help to foster and solidify more lasting security relations in the Indo-Pacific.

N. Manoharan, Director of the Centre of East Asian Studies, Christ (Deemed To Be University), gave a welcome note, which was followed by a keynote address by Alyssa Ayres, Dean of the Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University. Deepa Ollapally, Director of the Rising Powers Initiative and Research Professor of International Affairs at George Washington University, moderated the session. The panelists were Jeff Smith, Research Fellow at Asia Studies Center, Heritage Foundation; Lisa Curtis, Senior Fellow & Director of the Indo-Pacific Security Program at Center for a New American Security; and Admiral Arun Prakash, former Chief of Naval Staff (India).

The Indo-Pacific Region at the Center Stage of Global Geopolitics

The Indo-Pacific region has emerged as an area of geopolitical focus on the world stage. Not only does it harbor the world’s largest economies, but it also constitutes half the world’s population with an ever-expanding market. In addition, approximately 60 percent of the maritime trade passes through the region, comprising nine out of ten of the world’s busiest seaports. But the region’s prominence primarily stems from the rise of China’s assertive ambitions in the form of expansionist maritime tendencies and increasing influence in its neighboring states in the region.

To counter the Chinese assertions, multiple countries in the Indo-Pacific have come together, giving rise to the phenomena of ‘mini-lateral partnerships’ with no ‘one’ cohesive grouping. These partnerships underscore the motto of a ‘free, open and inclusive’ Indo-Pacific with a clear preference for multi-polar regional order. From trade to security, these groupings have been gradually developing, but yet to take a concrete and coherent form. India and the U.S., being a vital part of the region’s strategic security forum – Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, hold significant responsibility in structuring the regional architecture for partnerships in the Indo-Pacific.

Towards A Free & Open Indo-Pacific

The session sought to answer the primary questions – which common areas (particularly in security) could serve as a foundation stone for U.S.-India collaboration in the Indo-Pacific and thus pave the way for a concrete framework for regional institutions in the region.

It was unanimously agreed that the U.S.-India collaboration in the Indo-Pacific caters to the broader aim of maintaining a rules-based order in the region and promoting a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. Speakers called on the two countries to come together and form regional groupings with other states in the region by coordinating on a variety of security issues- human trafficking, refugee crisis, maritime security, counterterrorism, cyber-security, intelligence sharing, national and sub-national law enforcement engagement, connecting land and sea ports, climate resilience, and disaster management. Curtis highlighted the economic aspects of the cooperation, primarily in the form of transparent and accountable infrastructure finance, safeguarding developing countries’ sovereignty in statecraft. This alludes to the ‘debt trap’ effects of China’s policy in the region, demonstrated most vividly in the case of Sri Lanka this year.

The existing regional architectures in the Indo-Pacific were termed as “informal” and “flexible, rather than “all encompassing” of the regional states. According to Smith, small groupings characterize the region, giving rise to the phenomenon of “minilateralism,” wherein states can coordinate in diverse ways and across multiple architectures. But at the same time, they fall far short of a cohesive grouping, like the European Union. This gap was termed the probable reason for the rise in Chinese assertiveness in multiple ways – from the South China Sea conflict, contention with Taiwan, border clashes with India, to trade conflicts with Australia. Thus, it can be said that the region is essentially led by countries first, followed by their respective bilateral and multilateral relations.

India and the U.S.: Challenges and Cooperative Prospects

For India, the Indo-Pacific presents itself as an opportunity to further the country’s foreign presence at a global level starting with countries in its neighborhood. This strengthens its position against China, which has frequently been employing border conflicts with India as a means to assert power. Recently, India has taken to improve its bilateral relations and ramp up security arrangements with its like-minded partners in the Indo-Pacific – the U.S., Australia, Japan, and France. However, Prakash pointed out that the Indian Ocean region lacks any form of regional security organizations. According to him, this stems from contentious relations between the regional powers: Pakistan – India – China, thus hindering India’s role as the net security provider in the Indian Ocean region. However, as per other panelists, it opens alternative paths for Indian-American collaboration, enabling India to fulfill its regional role.

The U.S. role retains critical value for the region that others cannot substitute. It could play an instrumental role in countering various security concerns of the region, such as North Korean nuclear weapon proliferation, the South China Sea conflict, repercussions of climate change in the form of melting glaciers in South Asia and rising water levels around Pacific Islands and Southeast Asian states. Active American participation in the security architecture of the region is apparent from the QUAD, Five Eyes Alliance and the recently formed AUKUS.

Although not perfect, according to Curtis, the QUAD can be called the American lynchpin in the region, challenging Chinese assertion. With no direct focus on security, the four-nation grouping aims to further coordination and collaboration among themselves and regional partners in other spheres. These areas cater to maritime domain awareness, cyber security, vaccine distribution, crisis management, and maintenance of sovereignty, extending to North Asian, South Asian, Southeast Asian, and Pacific countries. In addition, the bilateral defense ties between U.S-Japan, U.S-Australia, and U.S-India serves to strengthen the defense cooperation between QUAD members. Curtis also opined that ASEAN and other regional groupings had become more accepting of the QUAD against the rising tide of China. Along similar lines, AUKUS too has emerged as a strong bulwark against Beijing.

The bilateral security relations between India and the U.S. were also extensively discussed by Smith and Prakash. The progress was charted as impressive (in the form of arms sales, defense exercises, bilateral dialogues, and intelligence sharing); however, there is room for improvement. This is explicitly aimed at increasing technology transfer from the American side with a simultaneous effort by India to reduce its dependency on Russia for its defense needs. As Curtis put it, this comes at a crucial time as Russia has been increasingly collaborating with China, which has ongoing hostile border relations with India.

Thus, all the panelists agreed that for India and the U.S., followed by subsequent regional collaborations, the building blocks of cooperation could range from humanitarian aid and disaster relief assistance to maritime domain awareness. It could further be extended to a transparent and accountable network of infrastructure collaboration. In addition, establishing crisis management groups, and expanding joint naval patrols and naval coast guard patrols, medical task force, and maritime fusion centers would act as stepping stones towards more robust security arrangements among the countries in the Indo-Pacific. This type of pathway would ensure convergence in areas provoking minimal domestic political opposition across the countries in the region.

Conclusion

In sum, India’s role in the Indo-Pacific region shall ultimately determine its position at the global level. Hence, the country needs to expand its diplomatic presence in Indo-Pacific and improve its security framework by leveraging initiatives with the regional states. On that note, it can work together with the U.S. in the Indo-Pacific to ensure regional stability as well as promote collaboration in new security dimensions. India and the U.S. share a similar ideology in their approach to the region. For India, the U.S. serves as a strong driving force it can partner with, especially with rival China. And for the U.S., India is a leading power in the Indian Ocean region, with linkages in South and Southeast Asia, actively contributing to security partnerships of the region.

By Tanvi Kaur, Research Affiliate, Centre for East Asian Studies, Christ University.

This Policy Brief is a part of the ‘Shared Values and Worldviews in U.S.-India Relations’ project of the United States Government, George Washington University and Christ University. The opinions expressed here are solely of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Government, George Washington University or Christ University.

Maritime Security Challenges in the Indo-Pacific: American and Indian Views on Threats and Responses

June 2, 2022

With the looming presence of an authoritarian China and its deepening footprint in the Indo-Pacific, the U.S. and India are aligning on how they equally value the importance of a free and open Indo-Pacific. Challenges in this maritime region come from a variety of sources, and the two democracies have their connects and disconnects while combating them. What are the key traditional and non-traditional maritime security threats facing the Indo-Pacific? How do Indian and American priorities compare, and what are the prospects for working jointly to secure their interests and objectives bilaterally and otherwise?    

To address these questions, the Rising Powers Initiative (RPI) at the Sigur Center for Asian Studies, George Washington University and the Department of International Studies, Political Science, and History, Christ University in Bangalore, invited a panel of leading experts, including Michael Kugelman, Deputy Director, Asia Program and Senior Associate for South Asia at the Woodrow Wilson Center, Nilanthi Samaranayake, Director, the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA)’s Strategy and Policy Analysis Program, with commentator Gurpreet Singh Khurana, missile warfare specialist of the Indian Navy and author, currently a Visiting Professor at Naval War College (NWC), Goa. In addition, there were brief interventions by two other specialists, P.K. Ghosh, a former Senior Fellow at IDSA and Indian Navy veteran, and Subramanyam Raju, Head of the Center for Maritime Studies at Pondicherry University. Deepa Ollapally, Research Professor of International Affairs and Director of RPI, moderated the event. This Roundtable is the fourth segment in the project that commenced last year on U.S.-India relations between Christ University and George Washington University. See event recording on YouTube

The first session of the Roundtable covers traditional military maritime security concerns and responses. The second session concentrates on non-traditional security, which does not get as much attention despite its direct impact on Indo-Pacific populations. It covers human security issues or soft security such as climate change and ocean pollution. The purpose of the Roundtable was to draw out the top priorities of the U.S. and India and consider how they intersect, according to U.S. and Indian experts, respectively. 

 

Session I: Traditional Maritime Security Threats

Top Three Challenges: An American View

Michael Kugelman highlighted traditional maritime security challenges in the Indo-Pacific under three areas of concern. First is the growing presence and power of China. Kugelman comprehensively discussed how countries in the region and outside the area viewed China as a strategic competitor or a strategic threat. He explained that China is “deepening its coastal region footprint and increasing its power projections in the regional seas, creating a significant maritime security challenge.” China is also expanding its economic presence rapidly through infrastructure investment in the port development of several littoral states. Speculating on China’s military plans in the maritime domain of the Indo-Pacific, he pointed to Djibouti and the Solomon Islands as testaments to China’s growing maritime presence. 

This growing presence of China, Kugelman argues, is a significant intensifier of geopolitical competition, mainly with the U.S. and India. “Given that the Andaman Sea is such a key strategic space linking the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean near the Malacca Strait, and with the geographies at play, China’s growing maritime power in the Indo-Pacific is such a strategic concern for both the U.S. and India. It’s not just the strategic competitors scaling up their role there. But China’s presence in the region has major implications for trade, for Indian energy imports from the Arab Gulf, for instance, and for U.S. trade imports from East Asia. And for the U.S., China’s power has obvious implications for the security of its defense allies, namely South Korea and Japan”.

The second main challenge is territorial disputes in the region. China’s souring relations with Japan, Australia, and South Korea have reached a new low in recent years. Kugelman suggests this is due to China’s increasing provocative and muscular behavior to assert claims over disputed territories. While countries have been trying to muster a response, the nature of China’s provocations has made it challenging to hold Beijing accountable. China uses grey zone tactics, which fall short of acts that constitute belligèrent actions. Thus, Beijing capitalizes on these tactics to continue staging provocations and laying claims on disputed territories.  

Thirdly, he turned to maritime terrorism, which is viewed as a longer-term threat. Attacks on coastal targets and ships have rapidly increased, according to Kugelman. Sensitive targets such as busy ports, crowded checkpoints, or large vessels on the high seas could be attacked to have devastating impacts on trade. The 2011 attack on the Pakistani naval air base PNS Mehran and the 2015 terrorist attacks on a naval base in the Bangladeshi port city of Chittagong indicates how maritime terrorism is an added concern for states in the region.  

Additionally, Kugelman claims the significant presence of Chinese naval forces in the South China Sea has discouraged other Southeast Asian states from bringing in more of their security forces. This has encouraged terrorists to gain influence in the region. Terrorists have also started eliciting the help of pirates for illicit acts like robbery; for example, Abu Sayyaf, a militant organization, is benefiting from the partnership between terrorists and pirates. 

 

Possible Counter-Measures: Together and Separately 

“The long legacy of maritime cooperation between the U.S. and India is a good place to start,” Kugelman suggested. Joint naval exercises between the two biggest democracies in the Indian Ocean go back to the 1990s. In 2006, the two governments produced a short document called “The India-U.S Framework for Maritime Security Cooperation,” which set out bureaucratic structures for cooperation. Kugelman further talked about the various forms of bilateral dialogues on maritime issues and trade.  He describes how the recent two plus two meetings in Washington culminated with an agreement for India to join the Combined Maritime Forces and be a participant in efforts with the U.S. and others to strengthen security partnerships in the Western Indian Ocean region. These are creating enough precedent and scope for U.S.-India maritime cooperation.

Despite the U.S. and India having some differences in threat perceptions regarding the three aforementioned maritime challenges, the two countries are strategically aligned on China’s naval power and presence in the Indo-Pacific. Of particular convergence is the value both place on being proponents of a free and open Indo-Pacific. However, one “disconnect relates to what path India should follow to strengthen its capacity to play the type of net security provider that the U.S. wants it to, or would like to see it play.” 

Kugelman points out a divergence of interests regarding the geographical focus in the Indo-Pacific, with the U.S. being more focused on the Eastern areas and India on the Indian Ocean region. This creates a challenge for U.S. and India to align and approach the broader maritime security challenges in the Indo Pacific. Nonetheless, he concludes on the note of “reconciliation on this, and with the QUAD taking off, India, over time, would start shifting its interest towards the East in the Indo-Pacific as China nears the Andaman Sea region.”

 

Indian Side Weighs in on the Challenges and Cooperative Prospects

As discussant, Gurpreet Khurana took off from Kugelman’s comprehensive overview of the traditional threats in the Indo-Pacific and discussed the interlinkages, namely, how China’s emergence caused a shift in maritime security for the West from non-traditional to traditional. He identified the instances of Pakistani state support for the Mumbai terror attacks and the Houthi rebels attacking ships in the Red Sea from the shore; this type of threat could be a potential convergence of U.S. and India cooperation. In the context of China, Khurana agreed with Kugelman’s assertions about the increasing danger from Beijing. He points to the Chinese narrative about the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and how they view it as an unfair imposition on Asian values. He finds the maritime order in the Indo Pacific has established a new “modicum of order” which needs to be protected. 

On the different interpretations of net security by India and the U.S., Khurana explained how the Indian Navy’s former chief chose not to use “net security provider” and instead used the term “preferred security provider” because the Indian Navy was not comfortable with the concept of “net provider of security.” Thus, in the Indian Maritime Security Strategy document of 2015, there were clarifications that India was not only a net security provider but also well-positioned to become a net provider of security. Khurana also drew attention to freedom of navigation (FONOPS) and the differences between India and the U.S. regarding how to interpret UNCLOS. The U.S. has not yet ratified UNCLOS, which he says gives impetus to China “to drive a wedge between India, the U.S, and the other countries in the region.”

Further, Khurana addressed how India concentrates on groups like the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA). The U.S. on the other hand focuses on the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) and AUKUS. India’s preferred forums are based on the concept of plurilateralism, which he argues gives a sense of security to smaller countries.

P.K. Ghosh dwells on crucial questions about our perception of the Indo-Pacific and what are India’s reach and sustainability on these issues. He appreciated how Kugelman addressed China, the elephant in the room. Concerning U.S.-India perceptions, he agrees with Khurana on the interpretation of UNCLOS and how there is a difference in understanding regarding FONOPS. Ghosh recommended studying the use of the maritime dimension to conduct terrorist attacks on land and maritime terrorism. He also proposed looking at chokepoints of the Strait of Hormuz, Bab al-Mandab, and others as important traditional threats.

 

Additional Key Discussion Points  

Key questions that emerged concerned QUAD or AUKUS as a possible framework to respond to maritime terrorism threats; the possibility for QUAD to become an Asian NATO; and Russia’s ambitions in the Indo-Pacific.

Kugelman believes that maritime terrorism would not qualify as a major focus for QUAD. This is because public concerns such as emerging technologies, pandemics, and climate change, are more critical areas of focus. QUAD, additionally, is likely to focus on public goods delivery to try and counter Chinese efforts. He emphasized that the QUAD was not a security grouping and is not headed toward an Asian NATO. It would counter the increasing Chinese power, though not overtly.

Regarding Russia’s role in the Indo-Pacific, Khurana explained how Moscow had its “hands full as its economy was in bad shape due to the situation in the Black Sea region.” He also noted how India has been pushing for the QUAD to have a softer focus and a more holistic approach to security.

 

Session II: Non-Traditional Maritime Security

Top Challenges: An American View

The holistic notion of security and the need to look beyond the traditional military strategies was taken up by Nilanthi Samaranayake in the second session on Non-traditional Maritime Security Challenges. Samaranayake highlighted two top challenges: Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated fishing or IUU fishing, natural disasters, and human-made disasters. 

At the U.S-India two plus two ministerial dialogue held on 11 April, the term fishing” was mentioned, even if only once in a scientific context. Although it is a significant development, it simultaneously represents the limited interaction on this topic. But with QUAD as a trending topic, Samaranayake says one cannot dismiss the potential area for growth in terms of bilateral cooperation” because IUU fishing was also explicitly mentioned in the QUAD ministerial statement in February in the broader context of international law, maritime security, and China. 

Samaranayake stated three points as to why this is important. Firstly, India plays a significant role in fishing in the Indian Ocean. It is the second-largest fish-producing country globally, accounting for more than six percent of global fish production. Secondly, many tuna supplies are sourced in the Indian Ocean. And there is a growing awareness that Indian Ocean yellowfin tuna stock has been overfished and subjected to fishing since 2015. Thirdly, there is some concern about European countries fishing activity in the Indian Ocean, particularly in the Western Indian Ocean. It is estimated that 40 percent of the European Union’s tuna catch comes from the Western Indian Ocean. This comes as the European Union-controlled ships have hauled a greater share of the regions yellowfin tuna in the region for the last three decades, leading to concerns about these fish stock levels.

Despite this indication of the statistics, Samaranayake pointed out how India remains non-signatory to the U.N. Port State Measures Agreement to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing. She describes India as a vital actor and stakeholder in fishing, and given the sector’s role in bolstering regional food security and economic security, it may be a worthwhile topic for greater U.S.-India coordination and possibly for the QUAD at some point, considering the attention paid to China’s fishing activities in the Pacific waters.” Furthermore, with Australia, the United States, and very recently Japan being the signatories of this agreement, she recommends India to sign on to demonstrate QUAD unity on the topic.  

Regarding natural disasters and human-made disasters, Samaranayake described cooperation between India and the U.S. as more built-up than in fishing. Ranging from natural disasters such as cyclones and floods to human-made disasters, such as oil spills off Mauritius and Sri Lanka in 2020, the population living along the coastal areas in the Indo-Pacific is undoubtedly affected the most. Fortunately, the U.S. and India both have a significant history of conducting disaster relief operations in the region, both jointly and independently, taking the instances of the 2004 tsunami relief operations and the Mozambique cyclone in 2019. 

At the ministerial talks in April, the U.S. and India discussed the need for cooperation on climate and disaster management, resilience goals, and monsoon prediction and forecasting in the context of the Coalition for Disaster Resilient infrastructure. Samaranayake identified this as an important “way forward for cooperation.”

 

Outlook for Collaboration 

Some smaller Indian Ocean countries hold the view that E.U. states exploit their fishing resources. But on the positive side, one can draw a connection between the U.S. working with its European allies and India building ties with E.U. countries through the EU India Strategic Partnership roadmap, with France being a key partner for both the U.S. and India in a traditional security sense. Samaranayake shed light on how this is paving the way for formulating greater collaboration and cooperation in the non-traditional security realm as well. 

The shared vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific can be built on foundations like the Humanitarian Assistance Disaster Relief (HADR). Samaranayake agrees with Ghosh and emphasized that Indias leadership is becoming prominent through the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) and how this can foster multilateral cooperation across the region and coordinate with the United States to a much greater extent. She added that balance between navy-to-navy collaboration and non-military Coast Guard cooperation could be considered a more concerted and holistic approach.

 

The Indian View: Layers of Complexity

In Khurana’s commentary, he adds that one of the issues is that the U.S. is neither a member of IONS nor an observer. The U.S. has not been able to participate due to objections from Iran. However, the U.S. is a dialogue partner of the IORA as it works on HADR programs. Khurana pointed out that if India signs the Ports State Measures Agreement, it would have to follow stringent standards applied to Europe and the U.S. exporters; he proposes an open market policy that would enhance production standards and supply to increase competitiveness. He is however concerned about Indian producers and manufacturers competing in a global market because Indian producers lack the technology for deep-sea fishing and processing onboard. Khurana says, “If the U.S. said that it wanted to make India a great country, it would have to share technology, and we all rise with the rising tide.”

Raju centered his comments on ocean governance as it encompasses the topics of non-traditional security issues in the Indo-Pacific apart from terrorism, piracy, climate change, illegal fishing or disasters. Along with ocean governance, he concentrated on ocean health versus ocean wealth. Discussing the sustainability of resources from the seas, he argues how the concept of a blue economy is crucial as an alternative to access vital ocean resources. He also suggests that India and the U.S. cooperate to create a blue economy while addressing non-traditional security issues from the maritime domain. He further appealed to using the idea of India’s “Samudra Manthan,” suggesting that the two look at the state versus maritime threats rather than state versus state. 

 

Additional Key Discussion Points

Several key questions related to how to raise topics such as fishing and climate change to top-level diplomatic discourse, the role of civil society groups, and the impact of arms racing on the region’s non-traditional security priorities. 

According to Samaranayake, “civil society is a critical sector when we are thinking about agents of change that can result in effects at the national level of policy in both the United States and India.” She addressed the failure of the U.S. to ratify UNCLOS due to congressional dysfunction, U.S. domestic level challenges, and politics. She agrees that non-traditional security issues are getting less attention than traditional security issues. But, China’s active involvement in illegal fishing issues would bring greater awareness to IUU fishing. Therefore, she adds: “sometimes it needs the traditional security driver to help raise attention.”

Kugelman states that getting the attention of policymakers toward non-traditional issues was difficult until they realized how serious these issues were. But, because U.S. and India’s relations had significantly developed, there are many different dialogue mechanisms in place to collaborate on non-traditional security threats. He adds that he would “like to be optimistic even though it’s true that it will be tough to get these issues on the radar.” 

Overall, whether from a traditional or non-traditional maritime security viewpoint, the prospects for closer U.S.-India cooperation in the Indo-Pacific have never been better. Their bilateral efforts are only being strengthened via the growing number of minilateral and multilateral groupings in the Indo-Pacific, where the two countries remain at the forefront. Most importantly, their shared interests are going well beyond a common concern about China’s growing presence in the Indo-Pacific neighborhood to address the tangible needs of the populations of the region. 

 

By Drorima Chatterjee and Ashwin Immanuel Dhanabalan, Post Graduate Scholars in International Studies at Christ University. 

 

This Policy Brief is a part of the ‘Shared Values and Worldviews in U.S.-India Relations’ project of the United States Government, George Washington University and Christ University. The opinions expressed here are solely of the  authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Government, George Washington University or Christ University.

Digital Media and Cybersecurity Debates in U.S.-India Relations: Prospects for Cooperation

April 27, 2022

As the United States and India construct a comprehensive relationship covering a wide range issues going beyond traditional security or economics, two emerging sectors stand out in increasing importance: cybersecurity and digital media. Both are uniquely complicated by a combination of technical, political and economic undertones.

To unravel the debates over cybersecurity and digital media, the Rising Powers Initiative at the Sigur Center for Asian Studies, George Washington University in Washington D.C. and CHRIST (Deemed to be University) in Bangalore, recently convened a group of experts from the U.S. and India as part of their ongoing joint project since 2021 to engage Indian millennials and Gen-Z on critical issues in U.S.-India relations. (Click here to view the agenda and recording of this event. To view earlier events, see project on ‘Shared Values and Worldviews in US-India Relations: Prospects for Cooperation‘.)

How aligned are the two democratic partners on cybersecurity and digital media and where do prospects for cooperation lie? What do the experts have to say about the convergences and divergences and what are the perceptions of rising young Indian international relations scholars and professionals?

 

CYBERSECURITY 

More Agreement than Disagreement

The American perspective was offered by Christopher Painter, President of Global Forum on Cyber Expertise Foundation, while the Indian views were given by Ambassador Latha Reddy, Co-Chair of the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace and former Indian Deputy National Security Advisor. These experts suggest that thinking on cybersecurity issues tend to fall along a spectrum of convergences and divergences rather than stark binaries. Ransomware and critical information infrastructure were most clearly categorized by Painter and Reddy as areas of convergence for India and the U.S. Both these issues are new and the space for policy making is growing. India and the U.S. are victims of ransomware attacks and a future of cooperation against this new threat was echoed in the high level White House summit on ransomware where India participated and endorsed a joint statement. The Computer Emergency Readiness Team (CERT) was also recognized as another forum of mutual cooperation and benefit despite some friction.

The panelists differ somewhat on divergences. Reddy argues that the linchpin of divergences is data localization. India recognizes that storing, processing and transfer of data affects consumer privacy, economic growth and national security, making this divergence weigh heavily on the relationship. The existing cooperation mechanisms like Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) does not work well and law enforcement has not been getting ready access to data. Painter views the issue as an important one, but not in the long term. He admits that the Budapest cybercrime convention did not have India at the table and U.S. data privacy laws have been a huge obstacle to data localization. However, the divergence according to him is likely to be short lived in light of the U.N. cybercrime negotiations, and the Cloud Act, both of which are currently underway. Instead, he argues that supply chain and 5G issues plague the relationship most. Despite matching concerns on 5G and Chinese companies, India had been reticent to endorse a U.S.-led ban on Huawei given the importance of 5G as an economic driver critical for catching up with developed countries. However, India pointedly left out Chinese companies Huawei and ZTE from its 5G six-month trials. Painter also pointed to the lack of consensus on recognition of China and Russia as cyber threat actors, resulting in the lack of attribution and collective action against cybercrimes committed.

Key Discussion Points

Questions and commentary from the younger demographic audience revolved around the extent to which India and the U.S. converged on international norms on cyber sovereignty, concerns about ransomware and cryptocurrency, combatting information warfare, impact of geopolitics on global supply chains and possible role of the QUAD.

Global Norms vs. Absolute Sovereignty

In the interactive discussions with Reddy and Painter moderated by Deepa Ollapally, Director of the Rising Powers Initiative, there emerged considerable agreement that India and the U.S. are very much aligned on international norms and norm-based approaches to cyber sovereignty, with the Sino-Russian model of cyber sovereignty posited by some as the alternative. One caveat here is that India would like to treat China and Russia as separate entities given that Russia has been a trusted defense partner whereas China is an adversary. An obvious disadvantage of the model of absolute sovereignty with its control of information, and the use of information as a threat is that there no space for human rights or other economic concerns which are important considerations for liberal democracies such as India and the U.S. Moreover, India’s well-informed younger populace and thriving civil society are also unlikely to stomach such a model. The U.N. Charter, international law, and norms-based approach offer more options while offering the same protections such as not attacking critical infrastructure and resources in another country during peacetime.

Supply Chains, Geopolitics and Future Strategies          

There was a clear consensus that India and the U.S. must not depend solely on China for supply chain demands. The diversification of supply chains is essential since it is directly linked to the geopolitics of the region. To decrease the dependence on China, India and the U.S. should collaborate particularly on R&D to create new supply chains. The example of Scandinavia on these issues was offered as instructive for finding solutions. India could also use the QUAD to ease its supply chain and cyber cooperation issues.

The ability to deter cyber threats using new-age technology and economic tools is another key convergence. Technologies such as artificial intelligence, machine learning, and quantum computing could help countries prevent cyber-attacks. The U.S. and India being regular victims of ransomware attacks, could use sanctions to deter cross-border cyberattacks, particularly from states like North Korea. Both countries also need to bring in robust regulatory frameworks such as Know Your Customer protocols and anti-money laundering measures to control cryptocurrencies, which are key enablers of ransomware attacks. No country is going to ban cryptocurrency or wholeheartedly endorse it. Joint attribution strategies between India and the U.S. could be a possible point of convergence in the future. The Quad is presented as a particularly suitable forum for taking this forward, especially as India already has cyber cooperation with all of the Quad members.

 

DIGITAL MEDIA 

Searching for Common Ground in a Difficult Terrain    

Jay Gullish, lead for U.S.-India Business Council’s Digital Economy and Media & Entertainment Committees, emphasized that the room for greater U.S.- India cooperation is vast and critical to capitalize on because otherwise both economies stand to lose so much. He notes that we are at a critical moment where there are dramatic changes in technology regulations. If these regulations do not represent both Indian and American interests, there could be disruptive consequences to both economies. Any decoupling of the U.S. and Indian tech industries could have serious adverse outcomes because of the extent of interaction and integration.

Cooperation has been difficult so far because India and the U.S. have some structural differences, so there is some misalignment in discussing these issues. India has at least three digital ministries that have no counterpart in the United States. The U.S. does not have an IT Ministry, a Telecom ministry or a Broadcasting Ministry. Gullish suggests that the cultural      aspect of the digital age is often missed and that in addition to digital experts, psychologists and trend setters need to be a part of the bilateral conversation.

Joyojeet Pal, Associate Professor, School of Information, University of Michigan and former Senior Principal Researcher at Microsoft Research India, addressed the regulation standards of social media and  emphasized the need for differentiation of regulation/censorship standards in different local settings. So far the U.S. free speech discourse, disinformation identification, and categorization of bad actors on social media has shaped global discourses and responses. He points out that the consequences of censorship can be very different in different places, especially when members of the government are challenged, citing a Twitter office being raided in India as an example. While curbing disinformation and hate speech on the internet is important, social media platforms should develop different strategies and mechanism for different contexts. This is especially true given that India ranks highest in the number of users on social media platforms. The main points of friction seem to be between national law and the governance of corporate policy, political management of crises, and managing the global and local gap in free speech approaches.

Key Discussion Points

Queries and comments revolved around the rise of fake news including the new “infodemic” in relation to the pandemic, what the U.S. and India can do to limit their impact on policymaking and political communication, and how to deal with information and digital warfare that has gone from traditional media to the online world in a way that has caught governments and tech companies off guard. Other points were raised on the role of Big Tech companies and appropriate regulations to curb their power and influence and how to balance Indian and U.S. interests in this regard, especially given the disproportionate power of American information sources.

Governance of Digital Media/Economy

On the issue of how to address what many Indians view as monopolistic practices of western Big Tech, several explanations were given by the experts. First, new technologies expand rapidly and while they have concentrated power to start with, competition sets in and creates a much larger pool of technology companies. A diversity of platforms should be expected from various regions of the world, and this itself will regulate content and power of western tech companies. Instead of looking at the top 5 platforms that now cover 90-95% of interactions, we should expect to see hundreds in the future that could control 40% or more content under new dynamics yet to be seen.

Secondly, it was asserted that the real issue was not local versus global but how interesting any give platform or application happens to be. Whether it is Instagram, Snapchat or the highly innovative Tiktok, the challenge is to create something exciting that will catch on. There is no reason that local Indian platforms like Koo and Share Chat cannot find a place among Big Tech. With this, many of today’s challenges will find more traditional channels of regulation whether it is      conventional competition regulation or traditional libel regulation. At the same time, it will likely be a very different way of management and a much more diverse set of information exchange.

Influence of Social Media    

Noting that digital warfare is now rampant across the globe, the idea that American media has overweening influence may need to be modified. It was pointed out that which media posts people rely on depends on the information seekers’ cultural proclivity. American media houses are not monolithic and therefore, one can decide for example to watch BBC or CNN. Broadly speaking on digital warfare, it was pointed out that this type of campaign was happening not just across states, but within states that produces the kind of polarization that we are now witnessing. Indeed, it is suggested that foreign governments at some point have to present their information as reasonable in order for it to be an effective propaganda tool for outsiders, whereas internal channels have a much freer hand.

The rise of an infodemic during the pandemic has made it more urgent than ever for countries to validate information and prevent misinformation on social media. One problem noted is the tradeoff for any government between what may be politically expedient and what is the correct path for public health protection. Both India and the U.S. were given fairly good marks on this although the latter faltered in the beginning of the pandemic. As to whether differing norms of digital censorship between India and the U.S. is an obstacle to their cooperation evidenced by the case of Twitter in 2021, it was suggested that Big Tech companies will likely sidestep the question of free speech and fall in line given the enormous profits to be made in India.

Looking ahead, some changes in perceptions seem to be occurring. Initially, there was an assumption in the internet age that all information provided was accurate and since the fallacy of this is becoming increasingly clear, we may be entering a second phase of more critical interpretation and a healthy skepticism.

 

Prepared by Judith Blessy B (M.A. Candidate) Christ University, Medha Prasanna (M.A. Candidate) George Washington University and Jeshil Samuel J (M.A. Candidate) Christ University.

 

STUDENT DISCUSSANTS

M.A. Candidates, Christ University

Hanspreet Kaur

Jagritee Senapati

Jairam R Prabhu

Jeshil Samuel J.

Johann M Cherian

Judith Blessy B

Kalpana Pandey

Sakshi

Salkar Gaurang

Shivam Tiwary

Tejusvi Shukla

Unnamalai Lakshmann

Vineeth Daniel Vinoy

Vishnu Prasad E

 

This Policy Brief is a part of the ‘Shared Values and Worldviews in U.S.-India Relations’ project of the United States Government, George Washington University and Christ University. The opinions expressed here are solely of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Government, George Washington University or Christ University.

Indian Millennials/Gen-Z’s Top Three Picks of Opportunities & Challenges in U.S.-India Relations: By the Numbers

February 15, 2022

When asked to give the top three convergences and top three divergences they see in U.S.-India relations, here is what a group of next generation Indian thought leaders in South India offered.

Workshop and Survey

A survey was conducted following an interactive workshop  on Convergences and Divergences in U.S.-India Perspectives held by The George Washington University (Washington D.C.)  and Christ University (Bangalore) in Fall 2021. Discussions between Indian students/scholars and U.S. based experts at the workshop showed that the younger demographic wants more openness, engagement and cooperation on all fronts of the U.S.- India relationship. These areas include the China question, the aftermath of the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, digital tech and e-commerce. 

Now we look to the results of the rich survey data to gain a more precise understanding of what Indian millennials and Gen-Z think of the relationship and how it compares to the workshop discussion. The survey reflected many of the points discussed during the student-expert exchanges, but also had some surprises.

Takeaways from the Survey

Convergences

graph of survey

From the graph above, we can see that the standout point of convergence is China’s Rise, with over half of the participants citing it as one of three main points. Further, participants tended to give two specific strategies for India and U.S. with respect to countering China’s rising power:  ‘Move Away From Chinese Imports’ and ‘Keep the Indo-Pacific Free and Open’. 

graph of survey results

Surprisingly, Climate Change tied with Defense Cooperation as the second largest point of convergence. This finding is interesting because the topic seems to rank high for Indian Millennials and Gen Z in a bilateral relationship that is usually dominated by economic and security concerns. 

Counter Terrorism, in another surprise, ranked low on convergences, whereas Pakistan and Afghanistan ranked high in divergences. This likely harks back to discussions on the precipitous exit by the U.S. from Afghanistan and how it may hamper counter terrorism cooperation. 

Not surprisingly, participants seem to believe that despite the defense cooperation suffering in the past as a result of Indo-Russian cooperation, there is a significantly positive defense relationship between India and the U.S. 

Low-Cost Innovation is a seemingly new convergence. Although ranking low on the scale, it could be a newer point of convergence that is slowly gaining prominence. 

Divergences

Compared to convergences, the divergences identified by respondents revealed no overwhelmingly clear point of contention in the relationship. 

graph of survey results

Among many equally weighted divergences, concerns about Pharma Patents ranked the highest. To extrapolate from the workshop exchanges, it can be discerned that the ongoing pandemic and the rush for vaccines has brought the younger Indians’ attention towards an ongoing point of bilateral friction between high-cost innovation and low-cost production and supply of medication to economically marginalized  populations.  

Pharma Patents are closely followed by Regulation Rigidity and Data Flows. This points towards a reverse problem as compared to pharma patents—of a lack of implementation of data privacy protections by the U.S. government whereas the Indian government pushes for more. But on the regulatory issue, the U.S. regulates much more than India which wants greater flexibility to grow. 

While participants clearly agreed that there was much convergence in combatting the rise of China, they identified the strategies pursued to counter China as a point of divergence. This could be because they believe that both countries are pursuing strategies that are currently proving counterproductive. It calls for discussions on how India and the U.S. can better cooperate in achieving a shared goal. 

Somewhat surprisingly, students noted Exceptionalism, Democratic Values and Soft Power, as points of divergence. However, the divergence seems to boil down to one main issue—how India and the U.S. use political values to achieve their strategic goals. During the workshop discussion it was clear that there was some agreement that both countries perceive themselves to be exceptional in their own right. Instead of being an easy point of convergence, this has caused misunderstanding between the two as they assert their own exceptionalisms. This is also reflected in the convergence chart where Democracy Promotion per se ranked low. It is an interesting area for future researchers to explore.

Overall, it may be surmised that the younger Indian demographic sees more immediate and stronger areas of convergence between the U.S. and India, whereas as the divergences are rather more ambiguous and diffuse. 

Note on Methodology

Findings are from an informal survey conducted in partnership between the Rising Powers Initiative, Elliott School of International Affairs, The George Washington University in Washington D.C. and CHRIST (Deemed to be University) in Bangalore during Fall 2021. A survey was sent to 350 attendees of a workshop on the topic of U.S.-India relations. Of these, 187 unique responses were received. This rate of 53% for an external survey is very high; the average rate for an external survey is 10-15%. The survey was in two parts: multiple choice and open ended. The findings reported in this Policy Commentary is based on the open-ended questions which amounted to 125 useable responses for convergences and 115 for divergences. The open-ended questions asked the respondents to list their top three convergences in the US-India relationship in order of priority and likewise for divergences. For more details, please contact gsigur@gwu.edu

By Medha Prasanna, Research Assistant, Rising Powers Initiative and M.A. Candidate in International Affairs, Elliott School of International Affairs, The George Washington University. 

This Policy Brief is a part of the ‘Shared Values and Worldviews in U.S.-India Relations’ project of the United States Government, George Washington University and Christ University. The opinions expressed here are solely of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Government, George Washington University or Christ University.

Convergence and Divergence in U.S.-India Perspectives: What are Indian Millennials and Gen-Z in International Relations Saying About Bridging the Gap?

November 2021

Event Program and Recording from Convergence and Divergence in U.S.-Indian Perspectives: Towards Bridging the Gap

How do Indian Gen-Z and millennials studying internationals and coming of age in a post-liberalization India perceive India-U.S. ties? Given nearly 15 years of increasingly strong strategic relations between the two countries, we might expect that millennials and G-Z would take close India-U.S. ties almost for granted. Or do they share a more complex view like earlier generations who witnessed a rockier bilateral relationship? Looking ahead, what do these budding IR scholars see as the key issues that bind India and the U.S. and what do they think needs to be done for even stronger bonds? 

A recent Workshop held by George Washington University in Washington, D.C. and Christ University in Bangalore gave graduate and undergraduate university students studying international relations across South India the chance to weigh in with their views and questions on the topic of “Convergence and Divergence in US-India Perspectives: Towards Bridging the Gap.” Nearly four hundred students had the opportunity to engage with several leading U.S. based experts on issues ranging from economics and security to political values and soft power. 

The Workshop sought to elicit student reactions to experts who put forth what they saw as the top three convergences and divergences. Across three panels, a lead U.S. foreign policy speaker was followed by two advanced graduate students who served as respondents. The first panel focused on Economics and Technology, the second on Security and Strategy, with the final one on Political Values and Soft Power. 

What did the experts offer as their top picks for U.S-India convergences and divergences and what did the younger demographic have to say about it? What conclusions can we draw about perspectives on future relations? 

Economics and Technology

The Expert: Growing Good Story But Not Without Friction Points 

The main story in Indo-U.S. economic and tech area according to Rick Rossow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, is one of some friction in policy due to protectionism but very good numbers in actual trade and investment. India’s domestic market is large and promising, but it is still not pulling in the lion’s share of capital. Yet, commercial deals are breaking records despite the Covid disruption. 

He identifies three growing convergences: diversifying imports away from China; promoting clean energy; and investing in low-cost “frugal innovation.” China’s dominance in manufacturing (via quasi-illegal ways), pharma ingredients, rare earths, and renewable energy products, which has been on full display thanks to the pandemic, is of major concern to both India and the U.S.  While the two have common ground on clean energy, they are motivated by different reasons: India for more energy independence and leverage for domestic production; the U.S. due to climate change impact. Rossow sees great complementarity in frugal innovation (re-engineering products and services to suit consumers at the bottom of the pyramid) which Indian firms are good at and U.S. firms need. 

The main divergences that Rossow points to lie in pharma patents, data flows, e-commerce, and regulatory precision. On pharma, Americans want long term protection to monetize and recoup investments whereas Indians want lower cost and greater access. On data, the U.S. has less regulations than India and takes a light touch on privacy with basic consumer protections. 

The Student Exchange: Why Is the Relationship Still Too Transactional?

Post-graduate students Harini Madhusudhan and Johan Cherian led the broader student exchanges. In general students in India wanted greater support and mutual cooperation across the board—in technology, defense and economics.  They wondered if the relationship was still too transactional. Within the private tech sector there seems to be plenty of cooperation, however students found the inability to elevate that to a stronger bilateral relationship confounding. 

Importantly, students identified the need for scientific communities to interact in order to share advanced technologies.  Students believe that the defence tech relationship suffers from mistrust as a result of past India-Russia defense cooperation. An important question for New Delhi and Washington is what will it take to get past this mistrust? Rossow and Washington colleagues suggested  there is only so much the U.S. government can do to share strategic technology. With private sector ownership of these specialised technologies, the main option for India is to buy them. However, he noted that India and the US have cooperated on defence before even at low points in relations, pointing to the India Defense Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI) and recent agreement on the development of drones. Indeed, Pentagon created the first ever,  India Rapid Reaction Cell to speed up co-development and co-production of high tech equipment in the country, a privilege no other country enjoys. 

Other areas in the tech sector on students’ minds were largely concerning intellectual property rights protocol, nuclear deals, and data sharing agreements. Rossow agreed that new moves need to be made in all these spaces, especially the latter. Some highlighted the need for digital rights and equality by big tech and having a more inclusive digital development. Rossow pointed out that the divergence was because in general, America regulates more heavily and ahead of time to avoid legal challenges later, whereas Indian regulations are more loosely worded for flexibility which is inconvenient for big US investors. 

On the economy, one big concern for students was cancellation of India’s developing country status under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) by the Donald Trump administration. Will the Joe Biden team reverse this? Students worried that any trade or other sanctions on India imposes a heavy cost, with long recovery time. On e-commerce, it was pointed out that while the Indian government gains a lot in revenues, this sector is still in the developmental stage, while the U.S. had longer lead time, so India needs to catch up. They also raised the question as to why more industries were not being redirected to India as part of the global supply chain restructuring. Why is India not becoming the “go to” for global manufacturing and why are U.S. automobile manufacturers leaving the Indian market? 

Rossow  and others  responded that India has been applying new tariffs where there can be growth, thus restricting trade. He does not see any India specific deals or exemptions given the outlook of the chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Ultimately the two countries are locked in a ‘low intensity trade war’ and neither knows how to escape from the tailspin according to Rossow. As for India becoming the global manufacturing choice in the post-pandemic era, regulatory concerns, obstructions by state governments, and continuing infrastructure deficiencies are standing in the way. Still, the U.S. and India remain on strong common ground in trying to diversify imports away a dominant China. 

Security and Strategic Issues

Expert: Aligner Not Ally, And Not Zero Sum 

The strategic cooperation between India and the U.S. is going steadily upwards, but continues to face stalls and hiccups along the way, according to Satu Limaye of the East-West Center, who set the stage for security and strategy. For Limaye, an important positive factor is that the relationship is not zero-sum, leaving room for flexibility. Indeed, some of the divergences also come with convergence (and vice versa). 

The biggest convergences Limaye identifies are India’s Act East and American’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific concepts; trends in defense cooperation; and increasing overlapping friends and partners. This latter development makes up in part for the two countries not being treaty allies which he views as a possible divergence. The lack of a formal alliance does place some systemic limits which could manifest as differences. Delhi’s preference for India to be a pole in a multipolar world is also not entirely in concordance with an American view that does not see the benefits of multipolarity in the same way. Rather, U.S. global leadership and American primacy are Washington’s objectives. Limaye notes that given the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, counter-terrorism cooperation between India and the U.S. may become more difficult.

The Student Exchange: Regional Concerns,  Global Cooperation

Student scholars Granth Vanaik and J. Varalini led off the wider student exchanges in this session.  Students were encouraged by the signing of the four cornerstone bilateral strategic and defense agreements in recent years, and found American support in the Indo-Pacific against Chinese assertiveness reassuring. Some wondered why the Quad could not go further in cooperation in the realm of non-traditional security such as trafficking and piracy. Students were worried about American sanctions via CAATSA as India takes possession of Russian S-400 air defense missile systems. Any sanctions in turn could not only hamper Quad cooperation, but significantly reduce trust, which they felt would be deeply unfortunate. 

Limaye pointed out that any waiver agreement customised for India through CAATSA was difficult, requiring the U.S. President and Congress for approval. India’s moves away from Russian arms purchases and towards acquisitions from the U.S. is being taken into account according to him, but any movement backwards may trigger secondary sanctions under section 231 of CAATSA (like Turkey). 

Another immediate concern on the minds of many students was the destabilizing situation in Afghanistan with the return of the Taliban. Relatedly, students flagged the U.S.- Pakistan relationship as a major concern since a stronger alliance between the two during this time could mean a bolder Pakistan on Indian borders. Limaye urged students not to look at the relationships as a zero sum game, especially because India is set to face more complex pressures on the Himalayan region as a result of developments in Afghanistan. This means India and the U.S. need to cooperate even more, but the issues are only going to get more complicated, especially on counter terrorism where the “rubber meets the road” and granular details have to be hammered out. Expert and students agreed on the need to have much more discussion on this topic going forward.  

Political Values and Soft Power

Expert: Are India and the U.S. ‘Natural Allies’?

There has been a sea change in U.S.-India relations when it comes to soft power and shared values from the days of the cold war, but there remains some specific gaps in each other’s understanding and expectations of the other, as Manjari Miller at the Council on Foreign Relations explains. The two countries now strongly converge as long standing democracies committed to free and fair elections, with the U.S. additionally fully behind the idea of India increasing its soft power and influence, and ready to facilitate India’s rise in a liberal world order. Both seek to counter an assertive China in the Indo-Pacific that threatens their interests. This is a far cry from the period of Indian non-alignment and U.S. apprehensions. 

At the same time, Miller pointed out that there are some differences between India and the U.S. about just when and how to exercise soft power, and particular strategies to meet China’s growing influence. She also noted the emergence of populist nationalism in India and the U.S. which could impact their respective democracies, and in turn their foreign policies. Miller identified a key driver of divergence embedded in national identities—both India and the U.S. see themselves as “exceptional” but do not view the other as such. Their view of what constitutes exceptionalism also differs, with the U.S. emphasising its uniqueness and position as a global beacon for liberal democracy, whereas India stresses its anti-colonial nationalism and ensuing moral authority. 

The Student Exchange: How to Translate Shared Values into Action?

Research scholar Saagar Kote and post-graduate student Simron Tandi, led the student interaction with comments regarding Indian perceptions on how U.S. handles exceptionalism, culture exchanges, and questions of democracy at home and abroad. It was pointed out that American exceptionalism has been used to intervene in global conflicts, whereas India has not gone beyond its regional limits using its version of exceptionalism. Likewise, a question is whether the U.S. tries to assimilate rather than accommodate Indian values and culture by westernizing them such as International Yoga Day.  

There is also some concern about the Biden administration’s criticism (veiled or not) on the current state of Indian democracy.  It was pointed that out that Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar rebuked western critics on March 13 as “self-appointed custodians of the world who find it very difficult to stomach that somebody in India is not looking for their approval, is not willing to play the game they want to play.” These kind of exchanges between U.S. and India were considered undesirable and unproductive by students. There was worry that the  rise of populist nationalism in both countries has the potential to add more fuel.  

Miller emphasized that America backs India’s use of soft power internationally, even if it does not always agree with the manner it is deployed. She gives the example of Indian companies being better received in Africa than Chinese companies which the U.S. clearly welcomes. But Africa is more receptive to India thanks to shared anti-colonial nationalist identity, something on which India and the U.S. do not have a meeting of the minds. As for the impact of populism on bilateral relations, Miller cautions that no one knows just how nationalism will play out in India and the U.S. going forward, so this remains an open question. 

Conclusion: Go Faster and Go Deeper

Across the sessions, concern over China’s challenge was strong, even as India’s immediate attention is trained on developments in Afghanistan and its western border in the aftermath of American withdrawal. Students want greater openness from the United States to cooperation and understanding of Indian needs in emerging areas such as digital tech and e-commerce. They wonder why more Indian tech labor cannot work in industries in the U.S. that need these skills. They are looking for deeper appreciation of Indian values that emanate from India’s own unique history and politics. Addressing these issues will ensure that the ideal of India and the U.S. being ‘natural allies’ would be reached faster and go deeper. 

By Deepa Ollapally, Workshop Moderator, Research Professor of International Affairs & Director, Rising Powers Initiative, and Medha Prasanna, M.A. Candidate in International Affairs, Elliott School of International Affairs, The George Washington University. 

 

This Policy Brief is a part of the ‘Shared Values and Worldviews in U.S.-India Relations’ project of the United States Government, George Washington University and Christ University. The opinions expressed here are solely of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Government, George Washington University or Christ University.

New US Administration and New Hope? Views from the Prism of Indo-US Relations

December 2020

Event Report from IMPRI Event: “New US Administration and New Hope? Views from the Prism of Indo-US Relations”

Indo-US Relations have played a major role in International Politics for both the countries and even to the world. Historically, since the Nehru-Truman talk in 1949, there has been no looking back for both countries. Despite a few bumps on the road, both countries share common interests in fighting terrorism, enhancing Human Rights, increased trade networks among many others.

In 2020, the US politics witnessed a very different dynamic. First, the country successfully conducted an election during a pandemic and second heralded the possibility of electing a female vice-president for the very first time in the history of American politics and executive leadership.

To study how the new US administration under President-elect Joe Biden and discuss the impact of it on the Indo-US relations a panel discussion was conducted by the Center for International Relations and Strategic Studies (CIRSS), Impact and Policy Research Institute (IMPRI), India and the Rising Powers Initiative, Sigur Center for Asian Studies at the George Washington University, Washington DC, USA on December 11, 2020.

Prof Deepa M. Ollapally, Research Professor of International Affairs and the Associate Director of the Sigur Center for Asian Studies, spoke about the strategic relations between India and US and the possible changes and modifications that it can witness under President elect Biden’s administration. She stressed upon the important point out here that regardless of the leadership in America, India would continue to be a significant strategic partner for the country. Primarily because it shares common interests in the Chinese aggression on the Indian frontiers and Indo-Pacific.

Biden administration would seek to have cordial relations with China as opposed to Trump, because none of the parties would want any form of confrontation. At present, it would be interesting to witness how both Prime Minister Modi and President–elect Biden form a network to combat the pandemic and how the politics over the vaccine would unfold.

The idea behind the strategic Indo-US partnership was pushed by the Obama-Biden administration very proactively. It was primarily to secure democracy and rule of law in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), as was firmed up in the Pacific region. In the Biden-Modi administration, they would have rather little worries carrying forward the already existing regulations and understanding. Biden also inherits a large amount of Agreements like the foundational defence arrangements like Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA), that would be an added advantage in pushing for continued positivity in the bilateral relations between India and US.

Prof Ollapally pointed out the opportunities and challenges for the Biden administration which may or may not be beneficial to India. For example, if Biden re-enters the Iran nuclear deal it could be a major opportunity for Biden to reset the US understanding with other countries: China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, and Germany who are part of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. It will be a matter of time to determine how these opportunities have had an impact on India. Major challenges that remain matters of concern include: domestic economic recovery and the post-pandemic nation building, Trump-era immigration policies etc.

She concluded her remarks by saying that it would also be interesting to see whether US and China would be signatories to the the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), despite being two large countries of the world.

According to Mr Richard Rossow, Senior Adviser and Wadhwani Chair in US-India Policy Studies at Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), in the pre-COVID period, India and US had a very successful and cordial relationship as compared to any other country when it came to trade. The figures showed a very high profit for both countries regardless of the claims made by both New Delhi and Washington.

Therefore, the numbers project a good and satisfactory approach towards the economic ties between the two countries. This is aided by the fact that Prime Minister Modi has been a pro-investment leader all throughout his term. He has significantly cut down on FDI’s and has constantly encouraged foreign companies to invest in India and look for opportunities here. This definitely has had an impact on the US-India relations.

In the prevailing COVID-era there has been a slight change in the dynamics of trade between the two countries. India’s rank has fallen from being the 9th largest trading partner of the US to rank 12. He pointed out that there was still time in the future to decide whether or not India could potentially be a top trading country, however, at present that dream is farfetched. It will only depend on how the foreign companies/investors do their business in India.

China is looking forward to expanding its global domination. This definitely poses a great threat to India in Asia and to the USA in the world. It is here that the countries need to adopt the steps that China has been undertaking to achieve its goal. The focus should not be on how much a country is importing or exporting, rather what one needs to constantly monitor is its manufacturing patterns and its modern techniques and resources.

These are some of the Chinese guidelines for 2025; therefore, in order to prevent Chinese domination, India and the USA need to adopt such policies. Data flow remains another key aspect of concern with China. But it has to be understood that in order to prevent domination, data flow needs to be open and more transparent between India and the USA. It is undoubtedly the most important aspect, and at the core of Indo-US relations.

Mr Rossow concluded by saying that in the first half of the Biden administration there is an urgent need for India to roll back the stringent barriers, come closer in the trading sector and mend the existing gaps between India and the USA.

“India matters” has been a very prevalent phrase for the longest time. The country is a rising power in Asia. With its advancement in technology, knowledge and defence techniques, India is undoubtedly a very prominent and important voice in world politics and global affairs. Therefore, Prof K.P Vijayalakshmi, Professor of US Studies at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University pointed out that regardless of the President in power in the US, India will remain an important strategic power. There have definitely been slight disagreements, however, in the last four leaderships, India has remained a rather important ally.

There are several factors that bring the US and India together. But according to Prof. Vijayalakshmi the most significant reason is the defence cooperation. Both India and US believe that there is an immediate need to reestablish and strengthen their defence ties on a much larger level. In the very recent Doklam standoff concerning India and China, it is believed that the US had a major role to play in bringing peace to the situation only because of the various defence agreements (like the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) and Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) and BECA between US and India. It is agreements like these that provide India with real actionable intelligence.

Thus, in order to enable any form of agreement there must be a dialogue between the two concerned parties that would help in the optimum utilization of the agreement in future. The continued talks and relations between the two countries is the sole reason that the Doklam issue was prevented from turning into a much more violent confrontation with China. Therefore, it is by no doubt that we can establish the fact that India is not just important to the US for resources but the US is important for India when it comes to defence cooperation and economic prosperity.

The US administration under President–elect Joe Biden strongly believes that India is a key figure in the Indo-Pacific belt and without India being a part of it, there is not much other countries could do in the region. Thus, a statement like this from the US government gives India a stronger role over the region.

India’s interests with Afghanistan will also prove to be a point of discussion between India and the US. Despite several contentions by the people on believing Taliban, the Indian convoy did end up meeting them at the Doha convention. This meeting with India and Afghanistan is important to the US primarily because the Biden administration believes in the systematic withdrawal of troops from the place but also, more importantly, a systematic end to the war as the ultimate goal. Therefore, this matter could be one of the most important topics that India, the Afghan government and the US administration could collectively deliberate, talk and debate about and possibly reach to a peaceful consensus.

During the question and answer session, Prof Ollapally spoke about how China should not be seen as a ‘threat’ to the US and India relationship despite the open dislike by US President Trump. USA’s interests in India would only be successful if India’s economics is successful and flourishing.

At present, China has a lot of border issues, not just India but Japan, the South China Sea issue etc, therefore, she pointed that due to these growing concerns, this would be the ideal situation for both India and the US to come together as one strong bloc.

Adding on to this, Prof Vijayalakshmi iterated the fact that rather than just India and the US trying to be the pioneers against Chinese aggression, it would be ideal if organizations like the ASEAN is encouraged to participate in the dialogue processes. The main reason for including ASEAN would be to welcome and make them aware about how difficult it is to handle a country like China which constantly has border issues and yet has a strong trade relation.

In her closing remarks, Prof. Ollapally says that the new Biden administration has a lot of existing problems to deal with as soon it resumes power. The pandemic, the vaccine rollouts and the upliftment of the economy from the losses it incurred during and before the pandemic. Therefore, in the first two years of the administration, India should be assured that there will not be any stringent agreements or deals. However, after two years, the India government can expect a few changes and formulations.

As a disadvantage to the Indian government, it could be a trouble because Biden has always been a strong supporter of “Democracy at home and abroad”. Therefore, India should gear itself to answer questions related to Kashmir, CAA and NRC. Prof. Vijayalakshmi pointed out that both the governments have a lot of common grounds that they could possibly talk and discuss about. In the agricultural sector, India could draw lessons from US domestic agricultural policies and focus on those areas that converge the interests of government and the farmers.

Overall the webinar brought to light the need to consistently engage in the issues of contention while keeping the common interests, rule of law, democracy and values of pluralism at the heart of bilateral ties between India and America. India should make all efforts to continue to intensify its warm relations with the Biden administration as it did during the Trump administration in the last four years.

Shared Worldviews in the Indo-Pacific and the Future of U.S.-India Relations

May 27, 2021

Amid the rising assertiveness of China, the worldviews and interests of U.S. and India are presently converging in unprecedented ways. After President Joe Biden took office, the Indo-Pacific has become the front and center of U.S. foreign policy as Washington adopts a renewed multilateral approach in the region. How will U.S.-India relations evolve in the post-pandemic era? What does the first 100 days of the Biden administration tell us? How important are shared values in the overall context of bilateral relations? To address these questions, the Rising Powers Initiative at the Sigur Center for Asian Studies and Christ University in Bangalore, invited a panel of leading experts to discuss the prospects for U.S. India relations, including Alyssa Ayres, Dean of the Elliott School of International Affairs at The George Washington University, Daniel Twining, President of the International Republican Institute, Joshua White, Associate Professor of Practice of South Asia Studies at Johns Hopkins SAIS, and Richard M. Rossow, Senior Adviser and Wadhwani Chair in U.S.-India Policy Studies at Center for Strategic & International Studies.

The purpose of the conference was to engage a younger demographic of students and young professionals in Bangalore and around the region on new directions in U.S.-India cooperation related to growing challenges in the Indo-Pacific. The conference attracted over 700 registrants and nearly 600 attendees. In this Policy Brief we examine the panel’s insights on how the U.S. and India could develop comprehensive relations beyond security and economic interests in the coming years.

Converging Interests

With the conference occurring against the grim backdrop of the devastating second Covid wave in India, the Charge d’Affaires of the U.S. Mission to India, Don Heflin, relayed a message expressing solidarity in these challenging times and detailed the ongoing efforts to send critical assistance to India. (As of mid-May, the U.S. government stands as the top donor in Covid assistance to India). He reiterated American commitment to ensuring that the Quad countries—Australia, India, Japan and the U.S.—meet their joint pledge to deliver up to one billion vaccines to Indo-Pacific countries, reaching one-seventh of the world’s population.

The Pro Vice Chancellor of Christ University, Fr. Jose, in his keynote, pointed to the common multicultural nature of U.S. and Indian societies and the global value that this represents. As India seeks to be a self-reliant world power, it needs strong and reliable partners.  “Who else can we look to other than the United States of America?” he queried.

Indeed, bilateral relations between the world’s two biggest democracies – the U.S. and India – have seen significant developments in recent years. Ayres kicked off the panel discussion by highlighting two main drivers of improving U.S.-India relations. First, India has become a major defense partner of the U.S. as the two countries have conducted more joint military exercises and established closer defense technology cooperation while being proponents of a free and open Indo-Pacific through the Quad. Second, Indian-Americans have become influential leaders in the U.S. in academia, journalism, technology, medicine, as well as the political arena.

Twining suggested that the dynamics of great power competition vis-à-vis China and the shared vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific are the main factors for the warming U.S.-India relations. Despite being two of the world’s largest democracies, the Cold War had distorted and constrained cooperation between U.S. and India. As both countries started confronting an increasingly assertive authoritarian China in the Indo-Pacific, shared interests in maintaining the model of free and open societies and defending the international system of peaceful rule-based dispute settlement are motivating closer cooperation. From freedom of the seas to open digital architecture, the partnership between the two democracies represents the need for free and open societies to demonstrate an alternative model to China’s surveillance, control, and repression. Twining described the Indo Pacific region as the “cockpit of wealth and power in the 21st century, which will determine the nature of the international order,” and argued that as “India and the United States have free and open societies, they have so much at stake in getting this right.”

White also emphasized the improvement of security cooperation between the U.S. and India, which saw significant advancements after the civil nuclear deal during the George W. Bush administration. Security cooperation between the two countries initially met with a good deal of resistance within the U.S. security institutions, but the mindset in Washington regarding India’s role as a security partner gradually shifted over time. Even though the two countries may not be totally consistent on the discourse vis-à-vis China, Washington and New Delhi share the same concerns toward China’s rising military presence in the Indo-Pacific, as well as similar views on the role of Pakistan in the scourge of global terrorism.

Looming Differences

Despite the recent steep upward trajectory of U.S.-India relations, there remains a number of areas where interests diverge between the two countries. Ayres pointed out that New Delhi favors the rise of Indian power as one of several global powers in a multipolar order, which is inconsistent with how Washington views the world. For decades, Washington practiced foreign policy with either a bipolar or a unipolar vision while having strong alliance relationships with European and Asia Pacific partners. Although Washington has become more sensitive to New Delhi’s multipolar vision, strategic divergence persists. Ayres also suggested that discussions about democratic institutions is another sensitive area where New Delhi has objected to external comments on its domestic affairs, especially when the U.S. itself has many problems of its own. Washington is best positioned when the U.S. offers a powerful example and lives up to the democratic ideals.

Twining agreed with Ayres and emphasized that both countries need to work closer together to improve their democratic institutions and to demonstrate how these institutions are the sources of strength in free and open societies. He conceded that neither the U.S. nor India are “perfect democracies” but pointed out “that is no reason to stop trying, and that is no reason to somehow deter ourselves from working more closely together.”  In addition, Twining argued that interests and values are indeed inseparable in the partnership between U.S. and India. Cooperation between the two democracies is about defending the value of a free and open way of life in the Indo-Pacific against the threat of China’s authoritarian control and repression. Both Washington and New Delhi need to emphasize this fundamental alignment of the value and interests in the bilateral relationship.

Unlike the converging security interests and worldviews, economic cooperation between the U.S. and India saw mixed outcomes in recent years. Rossow stated that before the pandemic, bilateral trade and direct investment were improving – especially in the IT service industry, which is the bedrock of U.S.-India economic relations – but Washington and New Delhi were also engaged in an intense trade war. He finds that despite the initial momentum, U.S. companies began to lose interest in the Indian market as New Delhi started to put barriers on its economic borders while Washington reciprocated in full. After the pandemic, New Delhi initiated some economic reforms in spite of domestic opposition, but Rossow remains skeptical about the prospect of economic relations between the two countries. Despite the need to recover from the pandemic, both countries seem to be unwilling to reverse the existing protectionist trade policies, even under the Biden team.

Taking Actions to Move the Needle

The improvement in security relations and the convergence of shared interests have enabled a wide range of opportunities in future cooperation between the U.S. and India. To reconcile with New Delhi’s vision of a multipolar international order, Ayres proposed that Washington should support more Indian representation in institutions of global governance. Given the difficulty of changing the status quo in the UN Security Council, the U.S. could start with something more feasible, including India’s participation in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and in G7. Moreover, Ayres suggested that more American students need to study in India. Despite India sending the second largest number of  international students to the U.S. at about 200,000 students annually, students going in the other direction are low.  Less than 4,000 students from the U.S. studied in India in 2018, and that number dropped to 3,366 in 2019, which is about one tenth of American students in the U.K and less than one third of American students in China. Ayres asserted that increasing the number of U.S. students in India is crucial for strengthening all aspects of U.S.-India ties and for enhancing the shared worldview between the two countries.

Twining proposed that the future cooperation between the U.S. and India should focus on how diffusion of new technologies could empower the citizens, make governments more responsive, and ultimately drive outcomes that would enhance broad-based prosperity. It is necessary for the U.S. and India to work together and counter the technology of surveillance and control disseminated by China’s Belt and Road Initiative. From the establishment of digital infrastructure to the revolution of clean energy, the U.S. and India need to partner with other like-minded countries and offer a free and open alternative to China’s authoritarian model.

White suggested that the two countries have put too much weight on defense and security and that bilateral relationship should be more comprehensive. Based on the existing foundations, Washington and New Delhi need to continue building habits of cooperation, which allows existing partnerships to evolve from one area to another. Moreover, the two countries should work closely in developing next generation technology, including artificial intelligence, machine learning, and advanced manufacturing, which would fit well with New Delhi’s Make in India initiative. To achieve these goals, however, White pointed out that India would need to overcome the challenge of having mixed defense equipment and security systems from different supplier countries, as well as the challenge of constrained fiscal budgets.

Rossow suggested that government-led initiatives will be the main driver of economic cooperation between the U.S. and India. Despite the existing challenges in bilateral trade, Washington and New Delhi should be able to initiate economic collaboration, especially in the area of 5G communication and information security. However, in order to truly energize the economic relations between the two countries and to attract U.S. investments in the critical areas like infrastructure and renewable energy, he argued India needs to significantly improve its legal and financial architecture, as well as the transparency and competency of state governments, so that the country will be able to accommodate private investments in an open and transparent way. Further, Rossow warned that the Made in China 2025 plan essentially shows Beijing’s agenda is to “dominate global manufacturing and production flows,” and called on U.S. and India to cooperate more especially given the Chinese government’s worrisome economic statecraft.

Building Momentum for Future Relations: Role of Values

Discussants Madhumati Deshpande and N. Manoharan reflected some questioning by Indian students about just how much the U.S. was willing to do to facilitate India’s rise in the context of competing American ties to Pakistan, whether U.S. interests was simply confined to countering China in the Indo-Pacific, and what was ultimately expected from India—common values notwithstanding.

Speakers in turn illustrated how a common worldview and habits of cooperation enhance bilateral strategic trust, an essential ingredient for any strong and enduring partnership. White called values “tremendously important…the feeling that exists in the U.S. Congress and among the American people that India is a country and people with shared values, really shapes the willingness of the Congress and the administration to go out of its way to help India find an exceptional role on the world stage.” Likewise, Twining says that ultimately “It’s not just a question of who’s going to control the sea lanes or what the trade balance is going to be—these are secondary questions, the foundational issue is that the free and open way of life that Indians and Americans want to lead will become harder and harder to sustain in a world in which we are not working together very strongly to sustain global public goods and to sustain a free and open order.”

Conference moderator Deepa Ollapally acknowledged that shared values do not automatically translate into shared material interests. But she suggests that in the case of India and the U.S., over the past several years, shared worldviews themselves are influencing and shaping more tangible foreign policy interests. This is in no small part due to the growing recognition that the threats they both face in the Indo-Pacific could transcend geopolitics and economics and include whether the regional order remains transparent and open or not. So far, the Indo-Pacific has been central in the Biden administration’s crafting of post-pandemic foreign policy. With the striking vulnerabilities that the pandemic exposed in having global supply chains over concentrated in China, the issue of strategic trust is likely to gain even more currency according to Ollapally. And here again, like-minded countries like the U.S. and India will find more common cause. Ayres summed up the relations by noting that “We do not necessarily see absolutely every single issue in the same way, but that doesn’t mean we aren’t closer now than ever before in the past.” In facilitating this bond, it would be a mistake to underestimate the role of shared worldviews.

 

By Dennis Li, Ph.D. Candidate, Political Science Department, and Graduate Research Assistant, Rising Powers Initiative, George Washington University.

 

This Policy Brief is a part of the ‘Shared Values and Worldviews in U.S.-India Relations’ project of the United States Government, George Washington University and Christ University. The opinions expressed here are solely of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Government, George Washington University or Christ University.

The AAGC: India’s Indo-Pacific Fulcrum?

September 17, 2018

Read the PDF version here.

What is AAGC?

A counter-narrative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has yet to arrive in the Indo-Pacific region. Set against China’s rising influence under the BRI, many competing initiatives have been proposed by “like-minded” countries such as Japan, US, India and even the European Union (EU). These range from Japan’s “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) and “Expanded Partnership for Quality Infrastructure” (EPQI), the United States’ Indo-Pacific strategy, India’s Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) and India-Japan co-envisioned “Asia-Africa Growth Corridor” (AAGC), to the EU’s “Sustainable Connectivity” under the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM). Among these, the AAGC is the most significant because it is based on an inter-continental connectivity proposal factoring in Asia, the Indian Ocean and Africa. The AAGC emphasizes connectivity, corridors and infrastructure development with emphasis on the Indian Ocean, which is also a focus of Beijing’s Maritime Silk Road (MSR), making it a competing framework to reckon with China’s BRI in the Indo-Pacific.

New Delhi’s approach towards the AAGC is key given the centrality of India in Indian Ocean. Formally announced by Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the opening ceremony of the African Development Bank (AfDB) Group Annual Meeting in Ahmedabad in his home state of Gujarat on May 23, 2017, the AAGC emphasizes cooperation with Africa in an intercontinental growth and developmental framework. It intends to focus on four aspects: development and cooperation, quality infrastructure and institutional connectivity, capacity building and enhancing skill development and improving people-to-people partnership between Asia and Africa. These proposed areas complement Japan’s “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” foreign policy strategy and the “Expanded Partnership for Quality Infrastructure” initiative to promote investment in quality infrastructure announced by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in 2016.

Remodeled after Japan’s earlier “Partnership for Quality Infrastructure”(PQI), the EPQI seeks to encourage the export of high-quality infrastructure with partnering countries across the world within a mutual economic developmental framework. An approximate US$200 billion was allocated by the Japanese government under the EPQI for quality infrastructure investment. “Conditional support” to China’s BRI notwithstanding, Japan’s aim is to have a better strategic space internationally by promoting its quality infrastructure. How does India, a global partner of Japan, visualize AAGC?

Foreign Policy Complementarity

New Delhi visualizes that both Asia and Africa need a demand-driven consultative shared growth process that is based on international norms and values. Given Japan’s emphasis on quality infrastructure and transparency, India sees its partnership with Japan as substantial with convergent values. A strategic complementarity between India’s “Act East” Policy (AEP) and Japan’s FOIP makes this arrangement particularly convenient as both the AEP and FOIP emphasize connectivity which is the trademark of AAGC (see Map 1), something India aims to extend to Africa.

The framework of this proposed growth corridor is based on establishing a strategic and consultative partnership for growth and development between African and Asian countries. With its emphasis on the Indian Ocean, the role of countries of Southeast Asia and South Asia are crucial. A feasibility study to find ways to promote the AAGC is currently being carried out among a group of think-tanks in India, Japan and Indonesia which have been state-designated as partners. The operational module, financing opportunities and administrative mechanisms to formally operationalize the AAGC still needs to be finalized. Prime Minister Modi’s forthcoming visit to Japan later in 2018 might witness more progress on the issue.

In any event, New Delhi’s approach towards the AAGC is essentially a reflection of its growing foreign policy outreach and exposure in the Indo-Pacific. India never loomed large in the calculus of major powers nor was its maritime policy a key constituent of its foreign policy even though the Indian Ocean had an enormous impact on India’s historical engagement with the outside world. The growing importance of the Indian Ocean as a key transportation zone for energy and trade encouraged India to factor it as an important component of its Indo-Pacific outlook.

New Delhi put forward the Indo-Pacific as a geopolitically inclusive construct to position its interest while factoring in the maritime security issues in the Indian Ocean region (IOR). This was aptly reflected in Prime Minister Modi’s speech at the Shangri La Dialogue on June 1, 2018, where he stated that the Indian Ocean holds the key to our future: “India does not see the Indo-Pacific as a strategy or as a club of limited members”. The AAGC proposition so far complements this perspective.

Meeting the BRI Challenge

The AAGC would work well with India’s preference for a broadly consultative and collaborative approach in the greater Indian Ocean region with people-to-people cooperation as a priority while promoting connectivity. With an “infrastructure and connectivity first” approach, BRI aims to position China as an investor and facilitator in different sectors across Asia and the world. A competing and neighboring economy like India will clearly be affected by such a unilateral approach that Beijing follows. China’s foreign policy heavily concentrates on the Indo-Pacific region with its Maritime Silk Road (MSR), which is one of the key aspects of the BRI. In the Indian perception, BRI offers China strategic and political space to exert financial supremacy through loans. Moreover, India sees BRI as adversarial to India’s regional and global standing. BRI affects India’s sovereignty claims through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and overlooks generally accepted values and norms in signing the deals and agreements. These factors have encouraged India to initiate a grand inter-continental proposition like the AAGC with Japan.

Concrete, on-the-ground cooperation between India and Japan under the AAGC framework has yet to take-off. However, Japan’s rising investment in India across all states, especially in the strategically sensitive Northeast, showcases the AAGC spirit. Northeast India’s immediate geographical proximity to Southeast Asia remains an auxiliary factor that strengthens the AAGC. The Japan-India Coordination Forum on Development of North Eastis so far the best example of a partnership that places great importance on people-to-people exchange.

Through the AAGC, India also aims to shore up relations with other democratic states who share its views on freedom of navigation, rule of law and free trade in the IOR. The AAGC is strongly linked to the liberal construct in the Indo-Pacific thereby aligning it with the “Quad” framework which includes Australia, Japan, the United States and India. The Quad consultative consensus is supportive, especially in areas such as infrastructure cooperation, maritime security and building capacities in the IOR.

India’s Domestic Drivers

Most significantly, India also aims to strongly link India’s economy with the IOR to take advantage of and revitalize the commercial linkages of India’s approximately 7500 km-long coastlinesby linking the three coasts of India – east, south and west –structurally and strategically with the IOR. India has (re)introduced several maritime programs like Cotton Routes, Spice Routes and SAGARMALA (“ocean necklace”) to re-establish the lost structural linkages between India’s export-import supply-chain networks in the IOR and to rejuvenate its maritime strategy. For instance, more than 577 commercial coastal projects have been identified from 2015-2035 under the SAGARMALA initiative for port development, port connectivity enhancement, port modernization, port linked industrialization and coastal community development. If successful, these initiatives will rejuvenate India’s coastal states (which contribute roughly 60 percent to India’s GDP), ports (India has 12 major and 200 non-major ports) and harbors, establishing a strategic and structural network with the economies of the IOR states. Just as SAGARMALA is designed to promote India’s maritime ambition, AAGC aims to facilitate India’s port-led developmental initiatives, embedding it into a consultative and collective maritime trading environment between the IOR states.

Promoting Inter-Continental Cooperation

Additionally, the AAGC fosters a sustainable developmental culture for both Asian and African countries. Africa is increasingly being seen in a new light in India’s foreign policy, with the objective to factor it as a continental partner. Collaboration in energy exploration, exploring market potential and establishing stronger maritime contacts through the Indian Ocean are three key aspects of India’s Africa policy.

Prime Minister Modi stated at the launch of the AAGC that India is cooperating with the United States and Japan for developmental activities in Africa. With India’s inclusion as a full member in the African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF) and as observer in COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa), SADC (South African Development Community) and ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States), the India-African partnership has become more development oriented over the last decade. Launched in 2004, the Techno-Economic Approach for Africa-India Movement, known as TEAM-9, has been pivotal behind trade and economic contacts between India and some West African countries, which are in search of low-cost technology and investment from India and Japan. AAGC aims to work on these issues, complementing the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and Agenda 2063 for the African Union.

Conclusion

India’s ambition to promote the AAGC reflects its growing domestic economic demand, growing maritime ambitions, the need for inter-continental cooperation with Africa and the urge to balance China’s maritime activities in the IOR. Given these multiple objectives, the AAGC is nothing less than a strategic fulcrum in the Indo-Pacific. To India’s convenience, Japan brings capital, high technology and quality infrastructure as part of AAGC. However, the AAGC proposition is too ambitious and a real, time bound strategy is missing between India and Japan at present even though both countries have strategic ambitions to promote it. Balancing China’s BRI outreach would require a serious and concrete long-term approach. The BRI is already at an advanced stage while the AAGC has yet to formally take-off. Addressing its funding requirement is also a challenge. Even though the AAGC seeks to have public-private partnership of funding from multilateral banks, there is still no concrete procedural mechanism. Above all, the fact remains that India and Japan share strong relations with China despite their differences with Beijing. It therefore remains to be seen how India and Japan will act together to promote the AAGC while balancing respective relationships with China.

 

By Dr. Jagannath Panda, Research Fellow and Head of the East Asia Centre, Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA), New Delhi. He is the Series Editor for Routledge Studies on Think Asia and is the author of India-China Relations: Politics of Resources, Identity and Authority in a Multipolar World Order. The views expressed are the author’s own.

RPI acknowledges support from the MacArthur Foundation and Carnegie Corporation of New York for its activities.

Between the AAGC and BRI: Japan’s Emerging Calculus

August 30, 2018

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Last year saw the launch of two regional connectivity projects in the Indo-Pacific. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) celebrated its official start at the inaugural Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation on May 14, 2017, and Japan and India unveiled their Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC) Vision Document during the African Development Bank Meeting on May 22, 2017. The back-to-back announcements, in the context of India and Japan’s strained relations with China, led to rampant speculation that the AAGC was the two countries’ attempt to block their neighbor’s influence in the region. Editorials, scholarly journals, and even a presentation at the World Economic Forum characterized the AAGC as Japan and India’s “answer,” “challenge,” “counter to” and “balance against” China, especially against the larger backdrop of maritime territorial disputes in the Indo-Pacific region.

How has Japan been calculating its interests and positions in regard to the BRI and AAGC, and what does this reveal about Japan’s view of its role in the changing and challenging strategic and economic circumstances in the Indo-Pacific?

 

Concurrent Conceptions

During Chinese President Xi Jinping’s tour of Central and Southeast Asia in late 2013, Xi proposed the idea for a Silk Road Economic Belt and Maritime Silk Road. The programs were combined and took the name One Belt One Road (OBOR) when formalized planning began in 2014. The BRI officially premiered in its current form at the first Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation in May 2017, although Chinese investment in BRI member countries had already begun.

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s ambition for stronger bilateral ties with India and concern for security in the “Asia-Pacific” was apparent during his visit to India in January 2014 with then-Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. This continued following the election of Prime Minister Narendra Modi in May 2014, and the two committed to “realise a peaceful, open, equitable, stable and rule-based order in the Indo-Pacific region” during Abe’s visit to India in December 2015. When Modi visited Japan the following year, the leaders reiterated their desire for a “free and open Indo-Pacific region” through “regional integration and improved connectivity as well as industrial networks based on the principles of mutual consultation and trust.” Abe and Modi’s intentions came to fruition in May 2017 as the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC).

The AAGC’s commitment to inclusivity with recipient countries and environmental protections was seen as a critique of China’s alleged exploitation of BRI recipients. The Chinese response to the AAGC, which included calls for India and South Africa to pursue regional development through the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) organization, further fueled chatter about Japan and India’s intentions despite the AAGC’s lack of strategic teeth. However, Japan’s announcement in December 2017 that it would support the BRI by encouraging Japanese businesses to participate and its January 2018 invitation to China to participate in joint development projects in Africa disrupted the narrative that the AAGC was Japan’s pointed alternative to the BRI.

 

Domestic Pressure to Cooperate

While the Japanese public is anxious about China’s growing influence in the Indo-Pacific, business interests seem to outweigh these concerns. Japan’s eight-quarter streak of economic growth–the longest since the bubble economy collapsed in 1991–was dashed by contraction in the first quarter of 2018. The growth potential of Japan’s domestic market is limited due to its rapidly declining population, which leaves no alternative but to expand operations and sales in foreign markets. The Japanese government itself has taken to encouraging businesses to increase sales abroad with a special interest to increase infrastructure exports. Partner countries to the BRI, especially those in Africa, are prime markets to be tapped given their projected population growth and increasing buying power. The Abe administration’s volatile public support ratings in the wake of a series of scandals provide an additional motivation to solidify political support wherever it can be found. Encouraging Japanese businesses to participate in advantageous BRI projects while the AAGC takes form kills two birds with one stone.

 

Foreign Policy Concerns

Japan’s participation in both the AAGC and BRI is sensible with regard to the country’s long-term foreign policy concerns as well. Japan desires to remain relevant and influential in the Indo-Pacific region and to mold China into a “responsible global player.” To the first point, it is important to keep in mind that Japan has been pursuing the principles of regional connectivity and “proactive contribution to peace” long before the formalized “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy” was announced in 2016. Japanese official development assistance for port infrastructure, for example, predates the BRI by nearly a decade. In 2007, Japan provided a loan to Oman for the construction of the Duqm port, and Japanese assistance for Sihanoukville Port in Cambodia began in 1999. For Japan, both the AAGC and BRI serve as new platforms to improve regional connectivity and cooperation.

Increasingly mixed signals from the US provide an opportunity for Japan to strengthen its position in the region. As its patron wobbles in its role as the protector of liberal values in Asia, Japan stands to inherit the torch–or at least hold it while the US regains its footing. The US’s adoption of the “Indo-Pacific” terminology along with Trump’s apparent enthusiasm for Abe’s “quadrilateral” initiative between India, Japan, Australia and the USin late 2017 was seemingly forgotten when the administration slapped tariffs upon its allies as well as its competitors in 2018. Japan wasted no time in salvaging the failed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) without US support, rebranding it as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPATPP) in 2018. Spearheading yet another multilateral forum to promote free trade and economic growth in the region only garners Japan’s reputation in this regard.

But Japan cannot secure its position as an influential regional leader by simply countering China’s every move. It must also demonstrate its commitment to international norms of responsible leadership, especially given its own imperialist history. Participation in the BRI and other Chinese-led programs affords the Japan the opportunity to promote liberal norms within the Initiative as an active member and stakeholder, rather than an adversarial bystander. Furthermore, Japan should be willing to support China only as long as it commits to “play a responsible and constructive role for the sake of regional peace, stability and prosperity.” Japanese participation in the BRI may serve as an acknowledgment for China’s own efforts to improve bilateral ties in the wake of the North Korean missile crisis and the shared strain of US tariffs.

 

Can the BRI and AAGC Cooperate?

A counterpoint to the assumption that the AAGC and BRI are inherently competitive is the cooperation between the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). The ADB was founded in 1966 with the leadership of Japan and the United States, who remain the largest shareholders. Although China is an active member in the ADB, the AIIB was perceived as the Chinese challenge to the ADB when it was founded in 2016. However, officials from the ADB and AIIB have adamantly maintained that development in Asia is not zero-sum. In an interview with the Japanese newspaper Yomiuri Shimbun commemorating the ADB’s fiftieth anniversary, ADB President Takehiko Nakao explained that the funding through the AIIB is welcome given that demand for infrastructure in Asia is projected to reach 26 trillion US dollars by 2030. At the time of the interview in May 2017, the ADB and AIIB had agreed to work together on three joint development projects, and Nakao had met with the AIIB chief nine times since its foundation. As with AAGC and BRI, the ADB funds a much wider scope of development projects whereas the AIIB is intended for infrastructure. As Nakao explained, economic development fuels demand for infrastructure and improved infrastructure can fuel demand for further growth as well. The complementary nature of each bank’s goals provides a strong impetus for cooperation.

 

Conclusion

Analysts and scholars have since begun to contextualize the AAGC and BRI within Japan’s longer history of cooperating with China and have largely found that the country’s simultaneous support of the two initiatives does not represent a major policy change. Japan is promoting investment in BRI projects that align with the goals of the AAGC, especially those related to cooperative projects in sustainable energy development and improving industry, while discouraging investment in projects that could be used for military purposes, such as development of port facilities. The recent example of Itochu Corp and Nippon Express literally hopping on board the BRI by utilizing new railways to ship Japanese products to Eastern Europe at half the cost of traditional maritime shipping demonstrates the necessity of increased regional connectivity for the country. Through complementary participation in both the AAGC and BRI, Japan is most able to pursue its own policy goals.

 

By Kathleen K. McAuliffe, Ph.D. Student, The George Washington University, and Graduate Research Assistant, Rising Powers Initiative. The views expressed are the author’s own.

This Policy Brief is the first in a three-part series on connectivity and competition in the Indo-Pacific.

Vietnam’s Strategy in the South China Sea and What the Trump Administration Needs to Know

November 10, 2017

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Among China’s rivals in the South China Sea, Vietnam stands out with the most intense experiences and the greatest interests. If the South China Sea did only in the last decade emerge as a major regional hotspot, it has been a main bone of contention between Vietnam and China since the mid-1970s. The two countries fought over the Paracel Islands in 1974 and over the Spratly Islands in 1988, both times ended in Vietnam’s loss of land, lives, and assets.


Vietnam’s High Stakes

Vietnam’s stakes in the South China Sea are more critical and of an existential nature than most others. About 80% of its population lives within 100 miles from the South China Sea coast. Millions of its fishermen live from this body of water. Eighty six percent of its trade with the world outside passes through this domain. Nearly all of its hydrocarbon reserves are in the South China Sea. Security and resources are two of Vietnam’s major interests in the South China Sea. But the territorial and maritime disputes over this area also profoundly affect the country’s political and economic stability and the ruling regime’s legitimacy. Concerns over security, resources, stability, and legitimacy interact to jointly drive Vietnam’s policy in the South China Sea.

More often than not, these concerns entail contradictory inputs for policy. Concerns over territorial security, resources and legitimacy tend to push policymakers toward the hard lines, but concerns over political and economic stability pull them back to a softer line. Securing the country’s interests when they are at odds with those of a giant and increasingly more powerful neighbor places Vietnam’s policymakers before the daunting task of challenging an unchallengeable power. As a result, Vietnam has adopted a broad-spectrum strategy that is informed by six distinct logics. On the hard side of the spectrum are the logics of self-help, international coalition-building, and enmeshment, while on the soft side Vietnam pursues engagement, deference, and solidarity toward China.


Mixed Strategy

Modernization of the Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard represents a major effort of Vietnam’s self-help in the South China Sea. Boosting the presence and activities of the fisheries and oil and gas industries is also seen as a means to augment the country’s position. Mindful that itself alone is no match to China, Vietnam strengthens ties with several major powers, most notably the United States, Russia, Japan, and India, to secure their support. Leveraging international law and organizations to enmesh other disputants in a complex web of legal regimes and political agreements is also a key direction of Vietnam’s policy. In this respect, Vietnam has played an active role in ASEAN, endorsed the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), supported the use of legal action to settle the dispute, and aligned its position to that of the United States.

In combination with these “hardline” logics, “softline” logics are also part and parcel of Vietnam’s strategy. Vietnam engages China economically and politically to promote cooperation and limit conflict. It uses deference, self-restraint, and even self-constraint to signal its benign intentions toward China. Capitalizing on ideological ties with China’s ruling Communist Party, Vietnam not only nurtures party-to-party channels but it also tries to subordinate the sea dispute to the solidarity of two Communist regimes.

 

Mixed Internal Support: Energy, Defense and Nationalism

These various strategic logics receive mixed and uneven support from major groups and sectors in the Vietnamese government and society. While the military has a vested interest in military buildup, its leaders often emphasize solidarity with and deference to China because they view the military not just as the protector of national sovereignty and territorial integrity but also, and sometimes more importantly, as the guardian of the Communist regime. The energy sector has a large interest in hardline efforts such as pushing out to the sea, reaching out to China-resistant partners, and taking legal action against China, but it also spearheads deep economic engagement with China in the Vietnamese mainland.

The relative weight of different logics in Vietnam’s South China Sea strategy reflects less of the logrolling among parochial interest groups and more of a response to events in the South China Sea. China’s deployment of the giant HYSY-981 oilrig to waters within Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in 2014 has triggered a significant boost in Vietnam’s buildup of its naval and law enforcement forces. An earlier boost occurred in 2009 and 2010, when Vietnam signed contracts to buy six Kilo-class attack submarines and 20 Su-30 air superiority aircraft from Russia. This shopping spree was a response to the 2009 surge of China’s attacks on Vietnamese citizens and assets in the South China Sea. China’s aggressive actions have enlivened anti-China nationalist sentiments that are popular among the intellectual elite and the populace. The chief advocates of this nationalism are strategic entrepreneurs that operate across sectors and institutions in the social media, the state-sanctioned press, the government, and the business.

Vietnam’s nationalism has two main versions, one is anti-China and another is anti-Western. China’s recent assertiveness in the South China Sea has tremendously strengthened Vietnam’s anti-China nationalism at the expense of the anti-Western version. This nationalism expresses itself in strong concerns over national existence, power, territory, and identity. It is these concerns that subsume those over resources and energy security, not the other way around, in Vietnam’s concept of maritime security.

 

Implications for the US

Vietnam’s South China Sea strategy has important implications for the United States. As the country that would lose the most if war broke out in the South China Sea, Vietnam needs peace more than any others in the region. At the same time, its strong anti-China nationalism suggests that Vietnam has the capacity to put up the toughest resistance to China among the South China Sea claimants. A strong support for Vietnam will not escalate tension to the extent that it will destabilize the region. On the contrary, it will help restore regional equilibrium and deter China from taking aggressive actions.

An effective strategy to counter Chinese expansion in the South China Sea can only emanate from an international coalition that is able to match China’s power regionally. Such a coalition requires the participation of the United States, Vietnam, Japan, and India at the least.

This coalition must not pursue a pro-status quo approach; instead it must take international law as a rallying point. Not only will this place it on a moral high ground, but this also helps it to avoid falling into the trap created by China’s gray zone and salami slicing tactics. China has been successful in making a new normal without triggering sufficient resistance because its opponents have kept clinging to the changing status quo. With this pro-status quo approach, China’s rivals have accepted Beijing’s fait accompli, enabling China to expand without having to fire a single bullet. A tenet of the pro-law coalition’s strategy therefore must be the determination not to accept fait accompli.

The United States will serve its interests well if it takes the lead in forging a pro-law coalition of key stakeholders in the South China Sea that are determined not to accept fait accompli by an aggressor.

 

Dr. Alexander Vuving is a professor at the Daniel K. Inoyue Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, HI.

This Policy Brief is part of a series in a project at the Rising Powers Initiative exploring the linkages between energy security and maritime strategies in the Indo-Pacific that is supported by the MacArthur Foundation.

China, India and the Strategic Balance in the Indian Ocean: The Maritime Silk Road as a Double Edged Sword

July 20, 2017

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China’s ambitious drive to achieve ‘global power’ status pivots on the use of political and economic strengths for regional and trans-regional outreach. It has creatively used the maritime medium to promote its geopolitical, geo-economic and geostrategic interests through initiatives such as the 21st century Maritime Silk Road (MSR). The MSR passes through Southern Asia-Indian Ocean and China is using the associated maritime infrastructure as naval launch pads to disrupt the ability of potential hostile powers in the region to thwart its ambitions.  It would appear that China believes that the MSR is a double-edged sword (economic-commercial-connectivity and strategic-military-naval) which not only helps expand trade networks in the region, but also secures the sea lanes and legitimizes its naval presence in the region. Further, this is in line with the Chinese Defense White Paper 2015 which notes that the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLA Navy) will progressively shift its focus and combine both ‘offshore waters defense’ with ‘open seas protection’ wherein its task forces are to be deployed in the Arabian Sea-Indian Ocean.

The MSR has found favor among most of the South Asian nations, barring India. New Delhi sees the MSR and other Chinese political, diplomatic, economic and strategic initiatives in Southern Asia – Persian Gulf – Indian Ocean as a containment strategy, aimed at ensuring that India remains embroiled in the sub-continent particularly against Pakistan, which serves as a ‘brinkmanship actor’ and is of immense strategic value for China.

India is now responding by invoking a number of creative rejoinders including those which have so far remained diplomatic ‘taboos’ among the Indian foreign policy mandarins. These have peeved Beijing, which has advised caution to New Delhi as one of these involves its ‘core interest.’

Chinese naval activity in the Indian Ocean  

Chinese naval posturing in the Indian Ocean clearly showcases a confident PLA Navy, ready to sail into distant waters and project naval power. Since 2013, there have been at least six deployments by Chinese submarines in the Indian Ocean, and according to the Indian Navy chief his forces maintain “maritime domain awareness of the deployment of PLA naval forces in the Indian Ocean region (IOR)” and keep a close eye on these vessels. Chinese conventional and nuclear propelled submarines have been sighted in Karachi and Gwadar in Pakistan and Colombo in Sri Lanka. The Chinese have defended these deployments  stating that their “submarine docks during its escort missions in the Gulf of Aden and waters off Somalia” where the PLA Navy is conducting anti-piracy operations. Interestingly, the Sri Lankan Navy chief too resonated with the Chinese argument. During his visit to India, he  defended the port call to his country by the Chinese submarines stating that the visit was for ‘economic’ reasons; further, his country has “assured the Indian Government that nothing against India will happen in Sri Lankan land and waters around it.” These assurances notwithstanding, India has consistently expressed concerns over the presence of the PLA Navy in the Indian Ocean which is seen as a challenge to the Indian Navy’s sphere of influence in the Indian Ocean.

Indian concerns over Chinese naval presence were further aggravated after media reports announced China would increase the naval strength by 15 per cent from the current 235,000 personnel. The increase is specially targeted to augment the Marine Corps and recruit nearly 80,000 additional marines to “protect the nation’s maritime lifelines and its growing interests overseas”.  This would bring the total marine force strength to 100,000 personnel, to be stationed at Djibouti in the Horn of Africa and Gwadar, Pakistan. In this context it is useful to recall that in 2015, Exercise-Silk Road 2015,apparently named after the MSR, was held between the Sri Lanka Army’s Commando Regiment and Special Forces and the People’s Armed Police of China.

Maritime Infrastructure: Gwadar, Duqm and Malacca Gateway

It is evident that Gwadar is the Chinese pivot in the Indian Ocean. It is also the seaward end of the 2442 kilometers long China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) which is a part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).  The US$ 46 billion CEPC is the largest ever foreign investment committed by China and  is built around a number of projects involving rail and road networks from Kashgar in Xinjiang province of China to Gwadar in Balochistan. Besides, a number of power projects will be set up in Pakistan to tide over its energy shortages.

China and Pakistan are concerned about the security of the high value CPEC which prompted Pakistan to assemble ‘Task Force-88’ comprising of fast attack craft, unmanned aerial vehicles and surveillance platforms.  These forces will be supplemented by marines onboard ships deployed off Gwadar for security operations as well as to ensure ‘seaward security of Gwadar port and protection of associated sea lanes against both conventional and non-traditional threats’. In November 2016, the fourth Pakistan-China joint naval exercises were specifically conceptualized keeping in mind the maritime security threats and challenges to CPEC. The Pakistan Navy has also set up a Coastal Sec­u­rity and Harbour Defence Force for coastal security, and a Force Protection Battalion has been positioned at Gwadar for protection of Chinese workers.

Although Chinese investments in Hambantota and Colombo port projects in Sri Lanka and the Gwadar port in Pakistan are well known, China is now ready to finance and develop the Maleka Gateway in Malaysia and Duqm port in Oman. The former is located between the thriving maritime transshipment hubs of Port Kelang and Singapore but Malaysia has rejected the non-competitiveness of the port and offered it to China on a 99-year concession, along with a   “freehold status.” Melaka Gateway lies astride the international sea lane and overlooks the shipping entering or exiting the Straits of Malacca and is therefore strategically important for China which has interest in the safety and security of its ship borne trade and energy supplies and possible threat from the US Navy which is well entrenched in Singapore.

Likewise, Duqm in Oman overlooks the Arabian Sea and carries enormous strategic and geopolitical importance, “far removed from Strait of Hormuz and the Arabian Gulf,” a fact acknowledged by the Government of the Sultanate of Oman. Unlike Gwadar, Duqm has attracted  Britain, and the British Defence Minister Michael Fallon commented that the base will help establish “a per­manent training hub” in addition to a key military logistics center that “will bring British engineering expertise to help develop Duqm as a strategic port for the Middle East on the Indian Ocean, benefiting the Royal Navy and others.”  These projects also have immense strategic value and can thus  be seen as part of the Chinese attempts to build commercial infrastructure in friendly countries and put these to military use.

Indian politico-diplomatic riposte

The Indian riposte to China’s containment strategy involves imaginative politico-diplomatic tools. Among these, the issue of sovereignty with regard to the CPEC and the Tibet-Dalai Lama card merit special attention.

As background, it is useful to mention briefly the  partition of India in 1947. The partition involves a number of relevant issues: (1) disputed territory which India refers to as Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) and Pakistan refers to as Northern Territories, now called Gilgit and Baltistan; (2) territory which Pakistan calls Indian Occupied Kashmir; and (3), United Nations Security Council Resolution 47 adopted on April 21, 1948. Under this resolution, both sides were to withdraw their militaries from Kashmir and thereafter India had to appoint a plebiscite administrator nominated by the United Nations who would conduct a free and impartial plebiscite. India and Pakistan had raised objections to the Resolution 47 which has not been executed to date. Both sides have vehemently contested their respective positions. Moreover, in the aftermath of the 1962 India-China war in the Himalayas, under a border agreement in 1963, Pakistan illegally ceded 5,180 square kilometers area in the Shaksgam Valley in POK to China.

Over the years, India had played down but not ignored its claim over POK. India has now taken strong exception to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor the Indian Foreign Secretary observed  that the project “violates Indian sovereignty because it runs through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (POK).” Further, CPEC will legitimize the presence of PLA in the POK that can potentially tilt the conventional military balance in favor of Pakistan.

Perhaps the Tibet-Dalai Lama issue is the most sensitive for the Chinese. Significantly, Tibet is part of the Chinese core interests including Taiwan and Xinjiang which have been the hotspots of domestic unrest in China. India was one of the first countries to recognize this political reality and has abided by the ‘one China policy,’ which had remained unaltered until  recently. India has also been very conscious of  Chinese sensitivities over the Dalai Lama, regarded by China as a political exile. New Delhi  has prevailed upon the spiritual leader to refrain from any political activity which may be inimical to the Chinese interests, thus putting to rest any doubts in Beijing about India’s position on these issues. In recent times, New Delhi has been under tremendous pressure over several Chinese actions such as issuing stapled visas to people of Arunachal Pradesh, an Indian state under the constitution, which China considers as its territory and occupied by India.

India has now attempted to put pressure on China by allowing Dalai Lama to visit Arunachal Pradesh leaving Beijing visibly upset;  the Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson noted that “Border issues and Tibet-related issues concern China’s core interests. India failed to honor its commitments on Tibet-related issues and further stirred up border trouble by inviting and allowing the Dalai Lama to visit the disputed border region,” A Global Times commentary noted that India is using the ‘monk as a diplomatic tool to put pressure on China’ after Beijing did not support India’s membership bid to the Nuclear Suppliers Group and refused to blacklist Masood Azhar, head of a Pakistani militant group, in the UN Security Council resolution. The immediate fallout of this move in the maritime domain has been Chinese refusal to acknowledge the support provided by the Indian Navy to the PLA Navy in the Gulf of Aden while interdicting pirates attempting to hijack a merchant vessel.

Balance Sheet: Advantage Whom?

There are sharp political, diplomatic and strategic differences between China and India over a number of issues as enumerated above. Both sides are unwilling to reconcile and accede to each other’s expectations. What indeed merits attention is that the Asian powers are invoking new tools to pressurize each other. Clearly, the cordial note struck two years ago by Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping appears to be wearing away and China and India are sending signals of an unfolding relationship which can potentially cause aggressive posturing both at sea in the Indian Ocean and on land across the Himalayas.

India has been rattled by the growing presence of Chinese submarines in the Indian Ocean, and begun to feel the pressure of the ongoing naval developments at Gwadar and Djibouti ports. Perhaps the presence of Chinese naval marines at Gwadar port will impact on India’s Act East policy which has a strong maritime strategic content, forcing New Delhi to focus on the Arabian Sea than on South China Sea.

The Indian Navy’s warfighting capabilities are now being augmented and the focus is on antisubmarine warfare with new class of ships being acquired from foreign sources or being built at Indian shipyards. Similarly, China is investing in amphibious forces which enable maritime access for troops, hardware and supplies ashore in distant waters and fits well into the strategic dimensions of the MSR. It has announced plans to build new class of Type 075 amphibious vessels that are comparable to the US Navy Wasp-class and bigger than the Japanese Izumo and Kaga class. These vessels will support Chinese marines with regular presence in Gwadar, Djibouti, Colombo, Maleka Gateway, Duqm and across the Indian Ocean.

It is fair to argue that the current strategic-military balance in the Indian Ocean is in China’s favour and India would have to either reconcile to be a good large neighbor or build additional power potential, possibly in  close partnership with the US, Australia  and Japan.

Dr Vijay Sakhuja is Director, National Maritime Foundation, New Delhi. A former navy officer, Sakhuja is author of Asian Maritime Power in the 21st Century and co-author of Climate Change and the Bay of Bengal.

The views expressed are the author’s own.

 The Policy Brief series is supported by a generous grant from the MacArthur Foundation through the RPI Energy and Maritime Security in the Indo-Pacific project. 

Debating India’s Maritime Security and Regional Strategy toward China

October 30, 2016

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The Hague ruling in July 2016 on the South China Sea has served to sharpen the debate among India’s political and strategic elite on how to assess China’s growing presence in the Indian Ocean region and India’s own optimal maritime strategy in the Indo-Pacific. Indian maritime security discourse has been in noticeable churn since the 2011 US rebalance policy, accentuated by China’s Maritime Silk Road (MSR) initiative in 2013.  Increasingly, India is being pressed to spell out its maritime thinking in strategic terms, going against historical practice. Three competing narratives are evident encompassing what may be termed Nationalist, Realist and Globalist worldviews.     

A Nationalist view is highly suspicious of the outside world, does not trust alliances, and seeks strategic independence through the country’s own military capabilities. A Realist outlook too sees the outside world as hostile, but more manageable, especially through balancing, security alliances and hard-nosed bargaining even if it means having to tradeoff some element of strategic autonomy. Realists see merit in both power and prudence and are pragmatic cost-benefit maximizers. Setting the rules of the international game with other great powers is especially valued by Realists. Globalists abhor military instruments and strongly believe in the power of economic integration, globalization and multilateralism to build a country’s strength as well as abate the potential for conflict by raising the cost of conflict. 

One area of growing convergence across the spectrum is the perception of China as a threat in the Indian Ocean. On the level of the threat, and strategies to meet it, there is less agreement.

The maritime Nationalists view China’s MSR as highly threatening and a masked military attempt to contain India to South Asia and challenge it in its own backyard.  They see a looming double threat from China—on land from the trans Himalayan China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and on sea from Beijing’s push for naval bases or port access all the way from Myanmar to Djibouti, along with the planned sale to Pakistan of 8 submarines, doubling Islamabad’s force.  They want to dramatically speed up Indian naval modernization, lament the accidents and project delays hampering Indian efforts, and want the Andaman and Nicobar base capabilities to be significantly enhanced to fully take advantage of its extremely favorable location at the mouth of the Malacca Straits. Politically, they believe in internal balancing and keeping equidistance from the US and other great powers like Russia, and they argue against any alliance-type embrace of the former as implied by the recent Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) which they see as a big mistake.

Instead, they call for India and regional powers to militarily coalesce to counter China in the South China Sea and the Indo-Pacific. India’s plans to sell Indo-Russian Brahmos short range, supersonic cruise missiles, which can be launched from ships, aircraft or land (a first sale for India), is seen by Nationalists as a powerful regional deterrent to China. They find the combination of US reluctance to forcefully contest Chinese claims in the South China Sea and domestic critics calling on American allies to do more as signs of US unreliability. Besides, they worry that Washington might even make a deal with Beijing in the future, leaving regional states high and dry. 

Indian maritime Realists also want greater military teeth to India’s ‘Act East’ policy introduced by Prime Minister Narendra Modi in 2014 but, in stark contrast to Nationalists, they want to do this in conjunction with the US, the biggest naval power in Asia. Seeing convergent India-US maritime concerns in the Indo-Pacific and India’s power asymmetry with China, Realists find great value in decisively tilting toward the US as the best balancing strategy. They have been increasingly arguing for this since mid-2000s and see LEMOA as long overdue. They would point to India’s hard negotiations with Washington to ensure that LEMOA was specifically tailored to suit India’s idea of strategic autonomy—unlike other countries with the logistics agreement, there is no presumption of support for American military operations. Realists are the only group strongly open to sharing the costs of sea lanes protection in the Indian Ocean and beyond or becoming a so-called net security provider, something the US has called on India to do. They see it as India’s responsibility rather than something forced to accept as a burden. Some Realists are open to joint patrols with the US in the Indian Ocean and even the South China Sea, a step so far not acceptable to Indian decision makers.

Whereas Nationalists and Realists define regional security in military terms, for Globalists, Asian regional security is best assured through economic integration or interdependence. At this juncture, the key for Globalists is to avoid the kind of naval military competition between India and China that would overwhelm prospects for regional maritime and economic cooperation. The Indian Ocean has been relatively peaceful, and Globalists want a strategy that ensures it stays that way. They tend to see the MSR originating from China’s surplus domestic capacity and need for capital export to stimulate a slowing Chinese economy rather than from a grand military strategy. They would point to the political pushback that China has gotten over the last two years from Indian Ocean littoral states like Myanmar and Sri Lanka that are eager for Chinese funds but not undue Chinese influence or undesirable contract terms.

Given the MSR’s emphasis on connectivity and infrastructure, a good question for them is how India can leverage the MSR for India’s own acute needs and integrate more effectively into the global supply chain, as well as implement Prime Minister Modi’s “Blue Economy” projects. Regionally, India seeks to boost its trade with ASEAN from $80 billion currently to $200 billion by 2022. A huge hurdle is the lack of cheap and viable connectivity to Southeast Asia, something that keeps India-ASEAN trade to one-fifth of China-ASEAN trade. The Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) economic corridor with its promise of transforming India’s poor northeast region is supported by even by some Realists.

For now, the center of gravity in India’s debates is blended Realist/Globalist, with economics the leading edge of strategic engagement in the Indo-Pacific. To this end, India’s 2015 Maritime Security Strategy states that “the ‘Look East’ policy has now been transformed into the ‘Act East’ policy, to expand India’s engagement and relations to its East, across the Indo-Pacific, with emphasis on economic and security cooperation.” But under the Modi government, there is a much greater chance that Indian priorities could flip if China is unwilling to show greater transparency and imagination to convince India that the MSR is not a threat but an opportunity, as Beijing claims. This means doing more than exhorting visiting Indian parliamentarians to get India to join the MSR or warning them that the US is not trustworthy.

Dr. Deepa M. Ollapally is Research Professor of International Affairs, Director of the Rising Powers Initative, and Associate Director, Sigur Center for Asian Studies, Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University. The author would like to thank the MacArthur Foundation for its support with research on maritime security that contributed to this article.

This article was originally published as a guest column for the China-India Brief Series at the Centre on Asia and Globalisation, Lee Kuan Yew Shool of Public Policy, National University of Singpore.

The views expressed are the author’s own.

India-U.S. Naval Cooperation Gathers Momentum Despite Doubts

September 20, 2016

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India and the United States have ratcheted up their bilateral military relations through the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) signed at the end of August that provides the basis for reciprocal usage of each other’s military facilities. The agreement is seen as a game changer for India’s foreign policy and Prime Minister Narendra Modi has found the United States a willing partner to support India’s military modernization. Two other similar agreements – Communication Interoperability and Security Memorandum Agreement (CISMOA) and Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geo-Spatial Cooperation (BECA) – are under active consideration and would add to the robustness of the India-U.S. bilateral defense cooperation. In this Policy Brief, Dr. Vijay Sakhuja, Director of the National Maritime Foundation in New Delhi, explains how for a variety of reasons, the momentum in bilateral relations is gaining despite lingering doubts.

An India-Specific Agreement

The LEMOA is an India specific agreement between the armed forces of India and the United States and is quite similar to the Logistics Support Agreement (LSA) which the United States has signed with more than 80 nations and most of these are non-military U.S. allies. The agreement enables India and the United States to provide basic logistic supplies such as water, oil and lubricants, food and provisions, and clothing to the militaries of the two countries on reciprocal basis. As far as services are concerned, these include repair and maintenance of military equipment, supply of spare parts and components, port and stevedore, medical arrangements and basic communication facilities. By their very nature, these are basic services in the view of maritime forces and are extended to any navy by another country during goodwill visits, port calls, as well as during emergencies.

It is useful to mention that the above arrangements are not being offered free of charge; instead the LEMOA sets out procedures for billing for these to enable accounting for such transactions. These would be either on cash payments or on the reciprocal provision of logistic support, supplies, and services. The agreement comes into operation only during port visits, joint exercises, joint training, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations.

The LEMOA is also not a carte blanche agreement; instead there are a number of inbuilt checks and balances and a number of provisions in the agreement that prevent India from getting into a military alliance with the United States. It also gives India the right to refuse any contentious joint military activity, and New Delhi is not bound by the agreement to offer logistic support to United States military when they engage in military operations overseas. This makes the LEMOA India specific.

The LEMOA has a strong maritime component and follows several other bilateral maritime agreements signed recently such as (a) the technical arrangement for sharing of information on merchant shipping; (b) maritime security dialogue; (c) agreement on India as a major defense partner. India and the United States have also signed the Defense Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI) which enables India license-free access to a wide range of dual-use technologies including arrangements for co-production and co-development of technologies. Two working groups have been established and are overseeing transfer of technology covering naval systems and aircraft carrier technology.

Domestic Opposition and Debate

The LEMOA has invited criticism in India and had to be delayed for nearly six months due to domestic political opposition. A number of Indian political parties have questioned the government’s decision to sign the LEMOA and criticized it as a ‘fundamental departure’ from India’s policy of ‘strategic military neutrality’ and that it ‘compromised Indian sovereignty’ and ‘surrendered strategic autonomy.’ They have argued that India is falling into a trap and would be under tremendous pressure to provide basing facilities to the visiting U.S. military forces in the future.

It is also their belief that the agreement will result in political and strategic challenges for New Delhi and cause serious misgivings regionally and globally unless the agreement is explained and justified. There are also fears that in a worst case, New Delhi may have to choose between the United States and India’s traditional partner and time tested ally Russia.

Several serving and retired Indian naval officers working as analysts at think tanks believe that not many operational and functional advantages are accrued by signing the LEMOA. India’s maritime strategy defines the Indian Ocean as the primary area of operation and there are a number of non-U.S. military facilities in the region which are available to the Indian Navy to visit and obtain necessary logistic support. Further, the Indian Navy has never been denied access to foreign ports in the Indian Ocean. Similarly, by adding India to its list of access locations, the United States does not gain any distinct advantages; it has formal operational and logistic arrangements with a number of countries in the Indian Ocean such as Australia, Bahrain, Djibouti, Malaysia, Oman, Thailand and Singapore, as well as having its own facilities at Diego Garcia.

Furthermore, in the past, the United States’ plans to use Indian military facilities for refueling its aircraft in India that were bound for operations in the Persian Gulf during the 1991 Gulf War were criticized. For instance, in 2007, the Communist Party of India held anti-U.S. demonstration to protest against the visit of USS Nimitz to Chennai in South India raising slogans like “Go back” and “Down with U.S. imperialism,” and argued that the visit was a “violation of our [Indian] foreign policy”. These concerns continue to prevail, but in recent time, visits by U.S. warships to Indian ports have been welcomed.

Another important issue relating to LEMOA is the U.S. Navy’s policy to ‘neither confirm nor deny’ the presence of nuclear weapons on board its ships calling at foreign ports for obtaining logistic support. It is important to recall that this policy had led to a nearly three-decade political impasse between United States and New Zealand after the latter enacted domestic legislation in 1986 which forbid nuclear-armed or nuclear-powered ships to enter New Zealand waters The United States had imposed sanctions, declared New Zealand “a friend, but not an ally” which altered the nature of the ANZUS treaty.

In India too there was an instance when some political parties and environmental groups had protested against the visit of USS Nimitz over radiation hazards. This is a contentious issue in India and has so far remained unaddressed; for its part, the Indian government has chosen to skirt it.

Unlike these critics, many in the military and the Indian strategic community believe that the agreement is a harbinger of a number of exceptional opportunities for military cooperation which can potentially lead to a number of other cooperative ventures to support the ‘Make in India’ defense programs. These opportunities may include facilities and support arrangements unique to U.S. Navy’s maintenance and repair requirements, warehousing for stores, and even the storage of U.S. ammunition and ordnance in Indian facilities. Similarly, many analysts in the United States believe that there are opportunities to make India-U.S. strategic partnership more robust and relevant to the changing times particularly for the United States ‘rebalance to Asia’ strategy.

Operational Opportunities

The text of the agreement states that LEMOA comes into operation during port visits, joint exercises, joint training, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations. Geographically, the Pacific Command (PACOM) area of responsibility stretches from the western United States to India’s western border and from Antarctica to the North Pole covers India. Any LEMOA related naval operations that take place in the western Indian Ocean would fall under the Central Command (CENTCOM), which has its own area of responsibility encompassing 20 countries of the Middle East including Israel, Central Asia, South Asia (Afghanistan and Pakistan), Red Sea, Gulf waters and the western portion of the Indian Ocean.

The LEMOA can potentially address the Indian concern of being limited to the PACOM area, i.e., the Asia Pacific and only a part of the Indian Ocean and this could help Indian Navy access United States military facilities in Djibouti and maintain a near continuous presence in the Gulf of Aden. Further the joint Malabar series of naval exercises could be held in the Gulf of Aden adding to the discomfort of the Chinese who are now building military facilities in Djibouti for use by the PLA Navy.

Political Drivers for Signing the LEMOA

Apart from the operational sphere, there are at least four political reasons which encouraged India and the United states to push through LEMOA. First, there was pressure from the U.S. side on the Modi government to sign the agreement given the fact that President Obama has invested enormous political and diplomatic capital in the relationship and would prefer to see some agreements such as LEMOA to be concluded before finishing his term later during the year. Second, Prime Minister Modi’s government is keen to showcase the successes of its foreign policy given that the agreement could not be signed during the two terms of the previous Congress led United Progressive Alliance government.

Third, Modi government wants to leverage the U.S. technological and military industrial complex to ensure that the ‘Make in India’ program is taken forward. Fourth, there are the external factors such as China’s rise, its naval assertiveness and the growing nexus between China and Pakistan exemplified by the Chinese investment of $46 billion in the China Pakistan Economic Corridor and the recent announcement to supply six conventional attack submarines which encourage the Indian government to sign LEMOA.

The China Factor

Pakistan and China have watched with interest the signing of LEMOA. Although there has been no official statement on the issue from Pakistan, it is fair to assume Islamabad may have obtained an assurance from the U.S. side that the agreement ‘would not hurt Islamabad’s interests’. Unlike Pakistan, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson characterized the agreement as ‘normal’ and observed that ‘cooperation between India and the United States would work to promote stability and development of the region’ and ‘we are glad to see it happen.’ However, some among the Chinese strategic community have questioned the political and strategic reasoning behind the agreement and cautioned that the LEMOA may ‘irritate China, Pakistan or even Russia’.

Indian Dilemmas

India appears to have taken note of the guarded approach adopted by Beijing on the LEMOA and can be expected to dispel any misgivings about the agreement among the Chinese leaders. Although India accrues advantages by collaborating with the United States, it has a ‘neighbor’s dilemma’ and it cannot afford to antagonize China, keeping in mind that settlement of the boundary dispute amicably through dialogue is a top agenda of the Modi government.

India also sees China as an opportunity with their bilateral trade touching over $71 billion in 2015. As such, India may not be willing to sacrifice economic dividends accrued from its engagement with China at the ‘altar of politics’ led by the United States.

Notwithstanding the above dilemmas, India wants to leverage the two-decade long bilateral defense cooperation with the United States, and graduate from a buyer-seller relationship to a higher plane involving co-development and joint production. Significantly, the United States had responded favorably and India has decided to position the DTTI high on the agenda. Even if it is beginning on a modest scale, it would graduate to more sophisticated levels.

The India-U.S. relationship is at an all-time high and the defense trade has touched $15 billion. Also, both countries have common position on Afghanistan, counter­terrorism, Bay of Bengal and the South China Sea. At another level, the bilateral trade has touched $105 billion and over 40 work groups on a variety of issues ranging from health, urban planning, space, cyber etc. have been established.

In essence, the Indian political leadership believes that the country cannot miss the opportunity to participate and par-take from the immense technological and military edge of the United States and leverage it to advantage even if India has to selectively forego strategic autonomy.

Dr Vijay Sakhuja is Director, National Maritime Foundation, New Delhi. A former Indian navy officer, Sakhuja is author of ‘Asian Maritime Power in the 21st Century’ and co-author of ‘Climate Change and the Bay of Bengal’. The views expressed are the author’s own.

The Policy Brief series is supported by a generous grant from the MacArthur Foundation through the RPI Energy and Maritime Security in the Indo-Pacific project.