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Taiwan’s Elections and Reflections: The Domestic Impact

Asia Report #61 | May 2, 2024

The most recent elections held in Taiwan saw the incumbent Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) win a historic third term in January of 2024. This election was a close three way race between the DPP’s Lai Ching-te, the Koumintang’s (KMT) Jaw Shaw-kong, and the Taiwan People’s Party’s (TPP) Ko Wen-je. While many want to know how Lai Ching-te will approach cross strait relations and cooperation with the United States, there are also pressing domestic issues like election integrity, shifting party politics, and identity politics.

To delve deeper into these issues and understand what the DPP’s victory means for Taiwan, the Sigur Center for Asian Studies hosted a conference on Taiwan Elections and Reflections. This Asia Report will focus on the domestic implications of the election. An Asia Report on foreign policy will follow. The video of the entire conference can be found here.

The speakers of this panel included Yaqiu Wang, Research Director for China, Hongkong, and Taiwan at Freedom House, Chiaoning Su, associate professor in Communication, Journalism and Public Relations at Oakland University, and Shelley Rigger, the Brown Professor of Asian Studies at Davidson College. It was moderated by Alexa Joubin, Professor of English, Women’s, Gender & Sexuality Studies, International Affairs, East Asian Languages & Literatures, and Theatre at The George Washington University.

China’s Tactics and Taiwan’s Election Integrity

Yaqiu Wang started off the panel with a look into China’s disinformation campaign during the election and how Taiwan maintains its election integrity. While the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has had a history of spreading disinformation, the most recent election saw a heavy focus on the use of AI generated content on social media in conjunction with traditional media. Chinese owned media
companies, content sharing, and advertisements were the main focus of previous CCP misinformation campaigns. This time, the growing popularity of social media and the advancement of AI technology figured in the mix. These new tactics include circulating deep fake videos of Lai Ching-te and poorly written personal stories about Tsai Ing-wen with an AI generated voice narrating it.

When looking into the types of content circulated by the CCP, Wang noticed two clear messages that were pushed to the Taiwanese people. The first was that the election is rigged. There were videos that supposedly showed people reading off the real election results in order to discredit the DPP’s victory and create distrust towards the democratic institutions. The second was that Lai Ching-te and the DPP are pro war and independence and that should the Taiwanese people elect them, Beijing will be forced to attack. Alongside this message was the idea that the United States should not be trusted in the event that China does attack. These messages were clearly meant to scare the Taiwanese people out of voting for the DPP. Besides these clear messages, Wang also notes several unclear messages like rumors about imported goods and personal attacks on the candidates. While these may not have specific political goals, they were meant to create general distrust in society and the democratic institutions. Despite the use of new technology and the intensification of misinformation efforts by the Chinese government, Taiwan’s response has also proved effective in maintaining election integrity.

According to Wang, the response to the Chinese government’s misinformation campaign has been quick and multifaceted. The response from the government has been to create official messages and press conferences regarding disinformation. In 2022, the Ministry of Digital Affairs was created with the core purpose of countering disinformation and the Anti-Infiltration Act of 2020 allows the government to investigate foreign interference. This along with messages posted on government websites using clear and easy to understand language about misinformation has been effective. The other group countering China’s interference is Taiwan’s civil society. Organizations like MyGoPen, Fact Check Center, and Doublethink Lab are all dedicated to exposing misinformation and teaching the Taiwanese people media literacy. Due to government and civil society efforts, the Taiwanese people are very aware of the CCP’s efforts and have worked to improve general media literacy. This shows that China’s disinformation campaign can backfire if people actually know what’s happening. The phenomenon can be seen in the 2020 election when the DPP also had a major victory due in part to the Taiwanese people being alert to the CCP’s efforts to spread misinformation during the Hong Kong protests.

Wang then goes on to talk about the role that tech firms played in the lead up to the election. To her, companies like Meta, Microsoft, and TikTok did help to take down suspected misinformation from the CCP on their platforms and they were transparent about their efforts to do so. Firms also worked with civil society groups like MyGoPen to create fact checking chat boxes. While these did help curb the CCP’s influence during the election, Wang also noted several critiques of the response of tech companies. The main issue is that tech companies have always been resistant to government regulation that would help to detect and take down misinformation. Another is an issue with transparency and how effective these tech companies actually are at combating misinformation.

In the end, the misinformation campaign by the CCP failed because the DPP candidate Lai Ching-te was elected. However, Wang explains that it did not completely fail because the DPP did not win the legislature. Going forward, the technology used to spread and combat misinformation will continue to become more sophisticated and will turn into a type of cat and mouse game.

Changing Party Politics

Chiaoning Su continues the discussion with a look into the current state of the Taiwanese political parties after the election. Su was able to observe the election in person and track how the three parties have changed over time and what their prospects are for the future. While it was a close three way election, DPP’s victory for the presidency is not a surprising outcome and can be seen as a clear message to China and diplomatic allies. Despite winning 40% of the popular vote in the presidential race, the 2024 election was not a total victory or loss for any of the political parties.

For the DPP, this election was a weak win for Lai Ching-te. He was unable to create the political brand that made Tsai Ing-wen so popular and his previous embracement of pro independence could risk more aggression from Beijing. While they were able to secure the presidency, the DPP lost many seats in the Legislative Yuan and is no longer the majority. Su explains that the DPP needs to have a serious self-reflection on its positions, branding, and engagement. Originally, the DPP was started in 1986 as an opposition party to KMT dominance and relied on grassroots support. Three decades later, it has become an established political party that needs to redefine itself as an inspirational party rather than an opposition. Their refusal to use Tiktok and short video form has also shown the party’s weakness in terms of engaging with the youth.

While the KMT lost the presidential election with only 35.5% of the popular vote, they were able to gain 14 seats in the Legislative Yuan. This puts the party in a good position to direct future policy decisions and is still seen as a victory despite losing the presidential election for the third time. KMT’s performance also shows their ability to mobilize and use grassroot organizations in opposition to the DPP. According to Su, the KMT is having an identity crisis as most people self-identify as Taiwanese which has forced them to dial back their pro-China position. The nomination of Jaw Shaw-kong is a step in this direction as he is not a mainlander and is more fluent in Taiwanese than he is in Mandarin. Looking into the future, Su explains that the KMT need to redefine themselves as more than just the opposition to the DPP and that it is possible to maintain relations with China while still protecting Taiwanese interests.

Finally, despite gaining the least number of presidential votes with 26.5%, the TPP received the most media attention and gained 3 seats in the Legislative Yuan. This established the party as a rising star and critical minority in Taiwanese politics that both the DPP and KMT have to work with. Started by Ko Wen-je in 2019, he originally seemed to be an unconventional but DPP-like politician. Over time, however, he slowly became more China friendly and his position on cross strait relations remains confusing to the Taiwanese people even after the election. The recent election was very significant for the TPP because it established it as more than just Ko Wen-je’s party and that they are here to stay. They were able to effectively use platforms like Tiktok to promote their campaign and are now a crucial swing vote in the legislature. In the recent election of the speaker of the Legislative Yuan, the TPP voted for its own candidate which shows neutrality between the DPP and KMT but ultimately let the KMT candidate Han Kuo-yu win by not voting for the DPP candidate. Looking forward to the 2026 midterm elections, Su explains that the TPP’s decision to field its own candidates or form a coalition will have a massive impact on the future of Taiwanese politics.

Identity: Taiwanese, Chinese, or Both?

Shelly Rigger rounded off the panel with an in depth look into the national identity and political trends in Taiwan. One of the surprises from the recent election was the success of the TPP and Ko Wen-je as a candidate. Given that this is a first past the post election, many would expect people to abandon their preferred candidate in order to vote for the lesser of two evils. Despite this, 22% of voters still voted for a candidate with little chance of winning. This outcome is surprising because it does not fit into the two standard narratives of Taiwanese politics: cross strait relations and Taiwan’s identity in the world. While the DPP and KMT both have clear divisions on these issues, the TPP has a very vague position but still managed to gain 22% of the popular vote. Another surprise was that of the 22% of people that voted for Ko Wen-je, many of them were young people. There has been a growing trend among the youth to identify as Taiwanese only. The DPP is the political party that supports this trend, but Ko Wen-je was able to get young people to disproportionately break from the DPP.

The question of national identity, whether Chinese, Taiwanese, or both, has been used as a driver of an individual’s willingness to challenge Beijing’s preferred position on cross strait relations and Taiwan’s identity. Since the early 1990s the number of people who identified as solely Chinese has been on a sharp decline and people who identify as both Chinese and Taiwanese have also been on
a slight decline. Recently, and especially among young people, self identifying as solely Taiwanese has been on the rise. It would be expected that along with these trends in national identity, there would also be a rise in the support for the independence movement. This is not happening, however, and shows that changing identity does not necessarily translate into a strong trend for independence.

Age division plays an important role in the national identity and independence debate. There is a clear split between young and old in terms of identity as young people are most likely to identify as Taiwanese while older people identify as both Chinese and Taiwanese. The issue of independence and reunification, however, is much less clear after this most recent election. Rigger explains that younger people do not have a clear stance on independence and this can be seen by their disproportionate support for the TPP. The major takeaway, then, is that political conclusions cannot be drawn from someone’s identity. She concludes with the idea that we should refocus our attention away from identity as a driver and predictor of how people feel about the PRC, and instead focus on Beijing’s influences and perceptions. As Wang pointed out, the amount of influence from the Chinese government, especially on social media targeting the youth, greatly impacts how the Taiwanese people feel about the PRC. When asked if the Chinese government was a friend or enemy of Taiwan, only the 60+ age group was willing to say that they were a friend. Conversely, 72% of respondents said the Chinese government is an enemy of Taiwan and their influence on them is negative. Ultimately, national identity cannot be used to determine someone’s political affiliation and Ko Wen-je’s popularity shows a shift in how young people approach politics.

By Mark Sheehan, B.A.Candidate in International Affairs and Events Assistant, The Sigur Center for Asian Studies.

U.S. Perspective on Why the Strategic Partnership Matters with India

Policy Commentary, May 2 2024

Dr Satu Limaye

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and US President Joe Biden | Photo Credit: PTI

Introduction

The complex network of diplomatic relationships between states becomes more evident in the constantly evolving geopolitical landscape. Within this framework, the alliance between the United States and India emerges as a very promising one. Throughout the last seven decades, these two nations have traversed a complex trajectory characterized by divergent interests and objectives. Yet, the current century offers a unique chance for a robust collaboration between the United States and India, as their strategic objectives converge in light of China’s changing global influence. The geopolitical landscape is now seeing a shift away from the clear-cut rivals of the Cold War era, and instead, we are witnessing continuous and complex rivalry in regions such as Gaza, Ukraine, and the Indo-Pacific. At this critical juncture, the United States and India are in a situation where their interests are increasingly aligned, requiring a reassessment and adjustment of their diplomatic relations.

Opportunities

Amidst challenges to its leadership and dominance, both inside the country and on the global stage, the United States is striving to form alliances and collaborate with partners that go beyond traditional power dynamics. India has a special chance to engage in more sophisticated cooperation, characterized by seeking agreements gradually and to a limited extent, rather than in absolute terms. The fragmentation of the international rules-based system underscores the need for adaptable and interconnected coalitions, supplanting traditional one-on-one models with a more intricate network of alliances.

India, due to its strategic location, presents itself as a promising partner for the United States, not only in the Indo-Pacific region but also in areas like as supply chain collaboration, access to crucial minerals, and cooperation within the Quad relationship. The emergence of targeted industrial and innovation partnerships, together with the shift towards competitive government support and domestic industrial strategies, provide fresh opportunities for collaboration. The expansion and interconnection of geographical areas, especially in the Indo-Pacific region, provide additional levels of intricacy to diplomatic relationships. The increasing impact of the transatlantic community necessitates a more all-encompassing strategy towards diplomacy. With the growing interconnectedness of the world, both countries have the opportunity to use these connections for their shared benefit.

Challenges

While there is a positive outlook on possible cooperation, it is crucial to exercise prudence. The United States and India vary fundamentally in their structural components and strategic ambitions. The complex political landscapes in both countries, together with numerous challenges in Europe, the Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific region, need a careful and skillful balancing of interests. India’s commitment to autonomy and multipolarity directly contradicts the United States’ desire of primacy. Proficient diplomacy becomes essential to bridge the disparity between these conflicting goals for worldwide governance. There may still be obstacles in the form of financial, administrative, bureaucratic, and procedural challenges that might impede the progress of collaboration and development. Moreover, while the mutual interest in the Indo-Pacific strategy, it is imperative to acknowledge and resolve the divergent objectives between the United States and India. Due to its alliance responsibilities, the United States may give more priority to some matters in East Asia compared to India. To effectively manage these opposing agendas, it is necessary to establish strategic alignment and maintain continuous communication to uphold a cohesive strategy across the area.

Way Forward

Notwithstanding these difficulties, the strategic alignment between the United States and India remains robust and promising. The basis of this developing partnership is on the reciprocal assessment of security concerns, cooperation in industry and defense, and strategic coordination in combating terrorism. The shared areas of agreement serve as the foundation for creating strategies and tools that may enhance the relationship between the two countries. It is crucial to have the ability to collaborate with other countries, build alliances, coordinate plans for the Indo-Pacific area, use multilateralism to put strategic convergence into action, and prioritize cooperation in military relations and diplomatic tactics. When used proficiently, these instruments may successfully address present challenges and facilitate a stronger and more dynamic alliance between the United States and India on the international platform.

Remarks made by: Dr Satu Limaye, Vice-President, East-West Center & Director, East-West Center, Washington at First Virtual Panel Discussion on ‘The US-India Political/Strategic Landscape and Its Impact,’ January 18, 2024, as part of an ongoing project
on Partners in Progress: How Does the US-India Strategic Partnership Matter?

Organized by: Centre for East Asian Studies, CHRIST (Deemed to be University) & Rising Powers Initiative, Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University in collaboration with US Consulate General, Chennai.

Indo-US Strategic Partnership: Top Challenges

Policy Commentary, April 17 2024

Dr. K.P. Vijayalakshmi

U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, right, with Secretary of State Antony Blinken, second right, speaks with their Indian counterparts in New Delhi, India, on Nov. 10, 2023 | Photo Credit: Jonathan Ernst/AP

In the ever-changing world of international relations, few relationships are as large and significant as those that unite the United States and India. In an increasingly linked global environment, the India-U.S. partnership, which is based on shared democratic principles, economic linkages, and strategic interests, is a vital foundation for global stability and progress. However, a deeper look reveals a complex network of nuances and intricacies that have come together to create this progression, which is closely related to the national advancements of both nations. Mutual recognition of each other’s strategic importance is the basis of the Indo-American partnership that international, regional, and bilateral factors have impacted.

Mutual Benefits

Politically, regardless of affiliation, the United States political system has acknowledged India’s significance in the bilateral, regional, and global strategic landscape. This prevalent opinion has underscored the belief that improved/positive connections between the two nations provide mutual benefits, particularly in areas like defense, security trade, technology, and healthcare, to name a few. Indian perceptions have matched these assumptions, too. Such thinking has led to a gainful reciprocal effect between the United States and India in multiple areas that are becoming more apparent, especially as India works to strengthen its industrial base and achieve self-sufficiency via joint ventures and technology transfers. In addition, the U.S. shift away from China in an era of “strategic competition” has accelerated the cooperation in many facets of the partnership.

However, even as the strategic landscape remains a push factor for both to work towards shared objectives, concerns about the depth and scope of cooperation continue to be aired in the U.S. political realm. Similarly, with China looming large and a dynamic U.S. policy towards managing the “China Threat,” questions arise in India regarding the feasibility of strategic initiatives like the Indo-Pacific economic framework and semiconductor partnerships. The concerns outlined in some of the dialogues on trade, tech transfers and “sensitivities” issues are compounded by internal variables, like election cycles (U.S. Presidential elections and Indian elections) and protectionist attitudes, which might impact the trajectory of bilateral relations. Apart from immediate concerns, differing strategic viewpoints on certain issues in India’s neighborhood and terrorism provide further challenges.

Complex Regional Security- Building Trust

India’s desire for strategic autonomy is accompanied by worries about possible isolationist tendencies coming from Washington, despite the U.S.’ emphasis on economic regeneration and maintaining strategic competitiveness through “friend shoring.” As seen by the breaks from conventional wisdom during President Trump’s presidency, the fluidity of U.S. foreign policy necessitates modifying Indo-American ties to consider evolving geopolitical circumstances. Further, highlighting the complex nature of the Indo-US relationship are the divergent perspectives on counterterrorism. Different perspectives on regional security and bilateral priorities also highlight how important communication and understanding are to address shared problems successfully. Historical legacies and sensitivity to perceived power dynamics further highlight the importance of building trust and developing empathy in bilateral relationships.

Despite such challenges, a remarkable transformation has occurred in the India-U.S. strategic ties, providing many opportunities for cooperation, particularly in fields like climate change and renewable energy. Though certain disputes still exist, the depth of the Indo-US partnership is nevertheless based on a firm commitment to practical collaboration and the upholding of common ideals to manage an inclusive, rule-based world order. Perceptible progress in managing the trajectory of strategic initiatives still draws attention to resolving long-standing issues and balancing divergent opinions that will need constant effort and shrewd diplomacy on the part of both sides.

Remarks made by Dr. K.P. Vijayalakshmi, Professor & Head, Department of Geopolitics, and IR, MAHE, Manipal, Karnataka at the Panel Discussion held on January 18, 2024, as part of the project Partners in Progress: How Does the U.S.-India Strategic Partnership Matter?

Organized by the Centre for East Asian Studies, CHRIST (Deemed to be University) & Rising Powers Initiative, Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University in collaboration with U.S. Consulate General Chennai.

How the U.S. Partnership Boosts Indian Strategic Priorities

Policy Commentary, April 11 2024

By Shibani Mehta

Confederation of Indian Industry Director-General Chandrajit Banerjee, National Security Advisor Ajit Doval, his U.S. counterpart Jake Sullivan and U.S. Ambassador to India Eric Garcetti during a roundtable on Advancing India-U.S. Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies (iCET) at CII, in New Delhi on June 13, 2023. | Photo Credit: PTI

The growing partnership between India and the United States stands out in the quickly changing global partnership environment because both countries have strong military cooperation and a vision for the future that is rich in technological innovation. The acknowledgement of this shared interest at the highest levels of leadership creates the foundation for a strategic embrace that extends beyond government lines and into the corporate sector as both countries work to move up the value chain.

Partnership Core Components

Two essential components of this developing alliance are military cooperation and science and technology. These areas have gained significant traction in the last year, as shown by the volume and kind of interactions between the two countries. As a consequence of a unique alignment of top-level leadership buy-in from both India and the US, tangible results are anticipated. India’s goal to become a technological innovation powerhouse is a major motivator for this partnership. A shift in policy has been triggered by the introduction of iCET, which has caused a surge in several industries, including robotics, drone technology, and space research. The suggested deep tech draft strategy highlights India’s willingness to push boundaries and go into unexplored areas.

Yet, amid these positive developments, a critical gaze at the domestic innovation ecosystem within the industry is imperative. Challenges persist, as exemplified by initiatives such as the iDEX challenge on maritime intelligence capabilities. While grants and awards incentivize start-ups, there is a need to go beyond and demystify processes for the private sector. Regular workshops, both in India and the United States, can play a pivotal role in socializing innovation processes, fostering collaboration, and navigating regulatory landscapes.

Fuelling Innovation & Achieving Results

A specialized agency for military partnership might close the gap between the private sector and government initiatives, taking inspiration from successful models such as the collaboration between the US and India in their space industry. This cooperation would act as a bridge for idea sharing, priority alignment, and regulatory framework traversing in both countries. The GE Aerospace deal transaction serves as an example of a strategic relationship that might prove to be a game-changer for India. Concurrently, the creation of the micron plant serves as evidence of the Indian market’s appeal to US investors. Examining the internal operations of both countries is increasingly essential as the structures for cooperation are put in place. If we work together to improve cooperation, simplify procedures, and foster innovative ecosystems, we can achieve tangible results.

In the future, a mutual willingness in promoting innovation and military cooperation may bring in a new phase of bilateral relations. In addition to taking the India-US relationship to new heights, regular and concentrated workshops, a cooperative defense agency, and a strong emphasis on demystifying procedures will also provide a pattern for global partnerships based on innovation and strategic cooperation.

 

Remarks made by: Ms. Shibani Mehta, Senior Research Analyst, Carnegie India at First Virtual Panel Discussion on ‘The US-India Political/Strategic Landscape and Its Impact,’ January 18, 2024 for an ongoing project on Partners in Progress: How Does the US-India Strategic Partnership Matter?

Organized by: Centre for East Asian Studies, CHRIST (Deemed to be University) & Rising Powers Initiative, Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University in collaboration with US Consulate General, Chennai.

U.S.-India Political and Strategic Landscape and its Impact on Cooperation

Policy Commentary, April 2 2024

By Dr. C. Raja Mohan

Introduction

The dynamics of the Indo-U.S. relationship have defied persistent pessimism and surpassed analytical expectations. Despite the challenges and crises often viewed as potential deal-breakers, the trajectory of this relationship has consistently outperformed the prevailing narrative. A crucial factor contributing to this success is the unwavering political commitment exhibited by diverse governments in both nations. The prevailing inclination to prioritize alliances, non-alignment, and strategic autonomy has posed a challenge in comprehending the relationship’s development. Letting go of these fixations is crucial to understanding the partnership’s development in a more complex way. Allies, which are often seen incorrectly as being tight and inflexible, are essential components of global politics that provide flexible conditions as opposed to unchangeable restrictions.

The contentious idea of “strategic autonomy” has been used to justify avoiding collaboration with the US and maintaining reliance on other nations. India’s viewpoint on Asian security is clearly changing away from an ideological bias based on the West. The changing official narrative highlights the need for a practical approach and marks a break from the historical framework that hampered India’s achievements.

The emergence of a national consensus is a noteworthy change in India. The contemporary political environment, especially under Prime Minister Modi, shows a capacity to overcome nationalist resistance, in contrast to the difficulties experienced in the past by leaders such as Manmohan Singh in dealing with ideological opposition. This change is essential to developing trust in dealing with the United States and creating a partnership that benefits both parties. A closer look at the relationship’s structure indicates a break from ideological limitations. As the United States looks for effective allies in Asia to help build a new security framework to counter China’s growth, the burden-sharing idea becomes relevant. The focus now is on cooperative operations where Asian allies voluntarily contribute to their security, rather than the United States imposing conditions.

Recommendations

To effectively navigate the complex dynamics of the India-U.S. relationship, it is critical to establish a discussion framework that is both structured and strategic. The lack of a well-defined, cohesive framework continues to be a substantial barrier, emphasising the need for both countries to proactively develop a comprehensive strategy for diplomatic discussions. Notwithstanding initial scepticism and the perception of insurmountable obstacles, both factions’ leadership has consistently surpassed expectations.

Conversely, the fixation on alliances, non-alignment, and strategic autonomy, which has historically impeded progress, should be addressed by both countries. A paradigm shift is required to address the prevalent belief in India that partnerships are inherently inflexible and restrictive, which is heavily influenced by the concept of strategic autonomy. External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar admission that strategic autonomy had in the past been employed as a justification for avoiding collaboration with the United States underscores the imperative to abandon this way of thinking. To cultivate closer connections between the two countries, a more pragmatic and adaptable approach to partnerships is vital.

The present government in India is actively engaged in efforts to enhance diplomatic relations with the United States, acknowledging the strategic value of expanding diplomatic alliances. Cooperation that endures and is prosperous is widely recognised to require that both countries manage their domestic affairs and policies in an efficient manner. This requires a deliberate efforts to establish agreement within the country, guaranteeing that policies are in line with the cooperative objectives of the bilateral association.

In addition, acknowledging the significance of effective security frameworks in Asia, the United States necessitates assistance from potent and capable nations. The adoption of burden-sharing as a practice becomes essential for all regional powers, and India’s advancements in this regard are praiseworthy. Asian nations’ collective initiatives to safeguard themselves are exemplified by the formation of the QUAD and trilateral alliances. As a result, there is a strong recommendation for the United States to reveal specific geopolitical obligations, thereby promoting openness and confidence in the alliance.

Notwithstanding notable advancements in defence, commerce, and industrial collaboration in recent times, it is imperative to sustain the collaboration’s momentum in the face of persistent global challenges. It is imperative for both countries to underscore the significance of ongoing endeavours, enduring alliances, and a mutual dedication to manoeuvring through the intricacies of the present geopolitical environment.

Remarks made by: Dr C Raja Mohan, Former Director of the Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore and Currently a Visiting Professor there, at the First Virtual Panel Discussion on ‘The US-India Political/Strategic Landscape and Its Impact,’ January 18, 2024, for an ongoing project on Partners in Progress: How Does the US-India Strategic Partnership Matter?

Organized by: Centre for East Asian Studies, CHRIST (Deemed to be University) & Rising Powers Initiative, Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University in collaboration with US Consulate General, Chennai.

 

India’s Path out of Learning Poverty: Crooked or Smooth?

सुखार्थिन: कुतो विद्या विद्यार्थिन: कुतो: सुखम् ।

सुखार्थी वा त्यजेत् विद्यां विद्यार्थी वा त्यजेत् सुखम् ।।

The above lines represent a couplet in Sanskrit. Were you able to read it? Were you able to comprehend it? 

Probably not! 

Let’s try another one:

Sukharthinah kutovidya vidyarthinah kuto sukham.

Sukharthi vaa tyajet vidyam, vidyarthi vaa tyajet sukham 

Now? More of us can now probably read it but still may not be able to comprehend it. Doesn’t this make you feel weird? You want to understand it, make sense of it, but you can’t!

Imagine a similar scenario, but for 10-year-old children from low and middle-income countries trying to read way simpler texts in their local language. If you can’t read and comprehend, you lose a major opportunity to learn. If you can’t read and comprehend at the right level, you end up playing catch-up forever!

As per the World Bank report: The State of Global Learning Poverty, 2022 – 6 out of every 10 ten-year-olds in low-and middle-income countries were suffering from learning poverty in 2019. The situation, as we all know, only worsened with COVID-19. Learning Poverty is defined as being unable to read and understand a short, age-appropriate text by age 10. The World Bank report states that without adequate action, the current generation of students now risks losing ~ $21 trillion in lifetime earnings in present value, or the equivalent of 17 percent of 2022’s global GDP.

The figure above shows the average percentage of 10-year-old children from each geographic region, who face learning poverty

Source: State of Global Learning Poverty, Update 2022

The figure above shows the average percentage of 10-year-old children from each geographic region, who face learning poverty [5]. The inequality is evident. While all countries face an increase post-pandemic, most developing regions face a sizeable gap (>50%) from their developed counterparts. Globally, countries are working towards respective national targets to achieve a 50% reduction in average global learning poverty by 2030 (SDG 4). 

Through this blog, I want to highlight India’s recent education policy reforms that align with SDG 4 and the implementation challenges. According to the World Bank report, India’s learning poverty rate was at 56.1% pre-pandemic. According to the Annual Status of Education Report 2022, 80% of students in Grade 3 in schools in rural India could not read a Grade 2 text and 74% of students in Grade 3 in schools in rural India could not do simple subtraction. 

In the last five years, India has undertaken two major educational policy initiatives – National Education Policy (NEP) 2020, and Nipun Bharat Mission 2021 with a focus on foundational literacy and numeracy. The NEP 2020 was a much-awaited reformation in the form of umbrella policy guidelines for education at all levels in India. It specifically highlighted that achieving Foundational Literacy and Numeracy (FLN) by all students by Grade 3 will be accorded the highest priority. Calling upon an existing infrastructure of primary schools and public early childhood care centers (Anganwadi centers) in India the policy set out a goal to “achieve universal quality pre-school education, as soon as possible, no later than 2030”.  As a follow-up on NEP 2020, the Ministry of Education, India launched the national mission on FLN – NIPUN (National Initiative for Proficiency in Reading with Understanding and Numeracy) Bharat in 2021. “Nipun” also doubles as a Hindi word that means ‘expert’ or ‘qualified’. The NIPUN Bharat mission, in other words, envisions a qualified India! It lays down priorities and actionable agendas for states/union territories to attain universal FLN by 2025 along with close tracking and monitoring of the progress. 

In the past two years of such increased focus on FLN, India has seen several encouraging success stories. As per an article by Central Square Foundation (a leading non-profit in the education sector in India that actively collaborates with local district and state governments for implementation of FLN initiatives), the initiative has shown promising developments in a few states like Uttar Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, and Assam. For example, the CSF blog [7] discussed how a 60-day targeted FLN program in the Pune district in India resulted in an 8% increase in the students moving from intermediate to advanced proficiency in FLN competencies. Several such local and national initiatives are being implemented to bring together common resources for various stakeholders – school authorities, government officers, parents, and teachers/facilitators. At the national level,  DIKSHA [8], an open-resource web portal provides useful standardized resources in terms of teacher training modules, teaching-learning material for pre-school and primary school kids, and community engagement modules.

Having said that, one must bear in mind that the implementation of the mission is a state government responsibility. Therefore, there is a lot of heterogeneity in the way different states are approaching the mission. The policy implementation must be monitored regularly at the center, otherwise, the state-wide heterogeneity may persist, and India may only reduce overall learning poverty and not the learning inequality!

Regular data and monitoring are important to inform and improve any policy implementation process. In a first-of-its-kind initiative, a large-scale Foundational Learning Study (covering 86000 students pan India) was conducted by the National Council of Education Research and Training, India in collaboration with UNICEF, in March 2022 to collect baseline data for the mission and set benchmark measures to compare progress with global proficiency levels in reading and numeracy.

The above graph depicts the baseline distribution of performance in reading (prepared by the author) using data from the large-scale benchmarking survey.

Source: Foundational Learning Study, 2022

The above graph depicts the baseline distribution of performance in reading (prepared by the author) using data from the large-scale benchmarking survey. The survey was conducted in 20 languages and hence is not representative of any state’s performance. The graph shows that roughly 50-55% of students are below the Global minimum proficiency level in reading, on average. We can see that performance in some languages is slightly better than others, and hence there is scope of learning across regions to enhance the improvement in foundational literacy and numeracy. 

If such data were collected and published year-on-year, it would be interesting to measure the interim success of the mission. While the full data set is not available on any open web-source, the report suggests efficient benchmarking across languages, which would facilitate scientific impact evaluation after the policy has been completely implemented. Overall, a more transparent data collection and reporting process can help foster more research around the feasibility of the mission and hold the stakeholders accountable.

Lastly, to speed up the implementation process there is a need for buy-in from local bodies on the importance of the policy and effective collaboration across states and non-for-profits to re-use existing material and prevent re-inventing the wheel. The government portal [8] provides useful standardized resources in terms of teacher training modules, teaching learning material for pre-school and primary school kids and community engagement modules. But there is a need to replicate the material in local languages and increase engagement with the resources through adequate publicity. 

In a survey of 450 respondents in a district in Bihar, India
only 40% of the early childhood care practitioners
report that they know about/have heard of the Nipun Bharat mission!

While I spent my summer (2023) surveying some early childhood caretakers/teachers in a district in Bihar (for a different project), I was curious to measure the extent to which stakeholders at the local community level know about this national mission. I was surveying Anganwadi workers, who cater to 3–6-year-old children in the form of nutrition and pre-school education. It is natural to expect them to be informed about this national mission which directly relates to their beneficiary group. I was taken by surprise when I found out that of 450 respondents, only 40% of these early childhood caretakers report having heard about the Nipun Bharat mission! 

Since government schools do not usually accommodate students younger than 6 years, and not all parents can afford private pre-schools, there is a big opportunity and responsibility to harness the existing public early childhood infrastructure in India (Anganwadi system) to make children school-ready as they embark on their journey to literacy.

Thus, while the initial planning for the mission has been powerful there is a need for a big push towards the execution of the policy mandates and tracking whether milestones are being achieved timely. Alongside collaboration on the educational resources, propagation of its availability at the rural community level, with stronger engagement among non-profits and local government bodies is crucial to make this mission a reality by 2025. 

And now, I would like to leave you with the translated meaning of the Sanskrit couplet – 

How can he who is after comforts have knowledge? How can he who seeks knowledge have comforts? Either one seeking comforts must give up knowledge or one seeking knowledge will have to give up comforts. 

Thank you for reading! 

Bio: Prerna Dokania is a PhD candidate in Economics at the George Washington University, Washington DC. She is a Sigur Center Summer 2023 Research Fellow. To learn more about her, visit her website: https://sites.google.com/view/prernadokania/home.

Sources used: 

[1] NEP 2020: https://www.education.gov.in/sites/upload_files/mhrd/files/NEP_Final_English_0.pdf

[2] ASER: Report 2022

[3] NIPUN Bharat website: https://nipunbharat.education.gov.in/index.aspx

[4] Ministry of Education:  Foundational Learning Study, 2022

[5] WORLD BANK: The State of Global Learning Poverty: 2022 Update

[6] Central Square Foundation website: https://www.centralsquarefoundation.org/fln

[7] Central Square Foundation: Blog 1

[8] DIKSHA portal: https://diksha.gov.in/fln.html

[9] Author’s SIGUR CENTER SUMMER FIELD RESEARCH Observations 

Assessing Thailand’s New Government’s Climate Policies

Thailand’s new Prime Minister, Srettha Thavisin, has assertively announced active climate policies on both national and international stages, notably in his inaugural speech to Parliament and at the UN’s Climate Ambition Summit in September 2023. The country has pledged to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050 and targets net zero by 2065. These goals are to be realized primarily through the enhancement of carbon pricing policies and the execution of the National Energy Plan to curtail greenhouse gas emissions.  But Thailand has frequently made strong pledges on combatting climate change before. It is thus worth taking a closer look at the policy tools it intends to use, and what are some of the challenges they face.

Thailand’s new Prime Minister, Srettha Thavisin attending the UN’s Climate Ambition Summit

Figure 1: Thailand’s new Prime Minister, Srettha Thavisin attending the UN’s Climate Ambition Summit (Source: Thairath)

Strengthening Carbon Pricing Instruments

Carbon pricing is an increasingly popular tool to control carbon emissions. But will they work in Thailand? 

Like many other countries, Thailand’s primary strategy to address climate change employs market-based approaches through carbon pricing, a focus that will be further intensified by the new government. Carbon pricing operates by incorporating the cost of the environmental damage from carbon emissions into the prices of goods and services that use carbon. When prices reflect only the costs to suppliers and not to the planet, we emit more carbon than the planet can sustain. By making carbon emissions more expensive, carbon pricing incentivizes firms to seek alternative energy sources and discourages consumers from using dirty energy.

Thailand has operated a voluntary carbon crediting program since 2016. While the country has not yet set the amount of carbon that can be emitted, a carbon market and crediting system were launched to encourage domestic firms wishing to “go greener” to voluntarily offset their emissions by purchasing carbon credits from projects certified by Thailand’s Greenhouse Gas Management Organization (TGO). The average price of carbon credit per ton has risen by approximately 40% within 6 years, with a total carbon credit trading volume of 1.92 million tons of CO2 equivalent. Many Thai analysts anticipate the price will continue to ascend further, especially if the country’s carbon crediting standard can align with international standards, a goal the new government is aspiring to achieve. Achieving this alignment would permit international firms to acquire carbon credits from projects certified by Thailand, thereby unlocking international demand within Thailand’s carbon market. Additionally, the country has been developing a cap-and-trade scheme to complement the carbon crediting system and is considering implementing a carbon tax in specific industrial sectors. This represents a significant advancement compared to other ASEAN countries; only Singapore has fully enacted a regulatory carbon pricing policy instrument, namely, a carbon tax.

Despite seemingly proactive policy actions and efforts related to carbon pricing, the tangible results in emission reductions seem uncertain at best. This is for three reasons. First, the carbon market price in Thailand is still significantly underpriced. It sits at approximately USD 3 per ton, significantly below the globally recommended carbon price of at least USD 75 per ton—the price deemed necessary to reduce emissions sufficiently to keep the temperature increase below 2°C. 

Second, doubts persist regarding whether Thailand can align its methods for measuring and verifying carbon emissions with international standards. Currently, international carbon credit standards like those from Verra do not recognize Thailand’s standards. Moreover, TGO itself has become more reluctant to synchronize the country’s standards with Verra, especially after the controversy arose around the company’s overstatements of actual achieved carbon offsetting levels. Irrespective of the reasons, the inability to link Thailand’s crediting standards to international ones could hinder the anticipated rise in carbon prices, contrary to the expectations of Thai analysts. The ensuing low carbon prices may not effectively incentivize firms to reduce emissions, even with the implementation of a cap-and-trade scheme.

Third, the system of carbon credits – when they are poorly managed – can lead to detrimental effects on  host communities where carbon credit projects are located. In many developing nations like Thailand, fostering emissions reductions involves not only limiting carbon emissions but also promoting forest restoration and planting. This approach is grounded in the principle that afforestation can capture a portion of emitted carbon, reducing overall emissions. When such a project receives certification from the TGO, the resultant credits can be sold by the host community as compensation. However, despite contributing the majority of the labor and care, community members reported receiving compensation from only 20 percent of the tradable credits. These are communities whose livelihoods are intertwined with both preserving and accessing resources in forest. Yet, they have been barred from utilizing resources from the forest – such as firewood or mushrooms, causing economic hardship and substantial alterations to their way of life. This situation is further exacerbated by the fact that utilizing such products does not detrimentally impact forest growth.

Mangroves Planted for Carbon Credits
Community Members Sharing their Experiences and Opinions on Carbon Credits
Figure 2: (Upper) Mangroves Planted for Carbon Credits (Source: Thailand’s Department of Marine and Coastal Resources); (Lower) Community Members Sharing their Experiences and Opinions on Carbon Credits (Source: The Netizen.Plus).

National Energy Plan: Moving Towards Clean Energy?

Aside from carbon pricing, there is a second prong to the Thai government’s plan to reduce carbon emissions, the new National Energy Plan (NEP). While carbon pricing adopts a more market-based approach, the NEP involves more direct government intervention through a roadmap to help industries transition from carbon-based energy to cleaner energy solutions. The impending plan is poised to encompass policy initiatives like the utility green tariff, designed to shift the country’s energy mix away from coal. Under this initiative, consumers who opt into utility green tariffs may pay a premium to ensure that their electricity consumption is matched with cleaner energy. The additional cost paid by the consumers usually goes toward supporting the development of cleaner energy projects, although the details are still unclear in Thailand’s case. The NEP seems particularly promising because the energy sector accounts for nearly 60 percent of Thailand’s total emissions.

However, upon closer inspection, the emphasis of these proposed policies leans towards transitioning from coal to fossil gas, rather than embracing a more substantial reliance on renewable energy sources. Despite the combustion of natural gas emitting 50-60 percent less CO2 than coal, investing in natural gas infrastructure could impose obstacles in meeting climate targets due to the risks of fossil lock-in and consequent delays in adopting renewable energy. Moreover, the long-term impact on emissions reduction is further clouded by increasing evidence suggesting that the advantages of natural gas as a bridge between coal and renewable energy are often overstated, and the economic risks inherent in investing in natural gas are significant.

Despite the country’s strong pledges on climate mitigation, the main policies currently in play make it highly unlikely that the climate goals will be materialized, not to mention the possible adverse impacts on other social dimensions. This trajectory becomes even more precarious considering the new Prime Minister’s recent proposition for Thailand to serve as the “central hub” for the final phase of the fossil fuel car industry, ostensibly to bolster the country’s industry supply chain, which implies a diminished commitment to addressing the issue.

Bio: Jittip Mongkolnchaiarunya is a PhD candidate in Political Science at the George Washington University, Washington DC. She is a Sigur Center Summer 2023 Research Fellow. To learn more about her, visit her website: https://jittipm.wixsite.com/jittipm. 

Urban Slum Education in Indonesia: Calling for Adopting a Child-Rights Based Approach

Indonesia’s education has been lauded for its significant progress. The collective efforts of decentralized and central governments on education led to over 10 million children’s school enrollments since 2002 with roughly equal gender parity in education. The statistics of 2022 showcased such progress that almost all Indonesian children are enrolled in primary education (97.78%) and a considerable number are enrolled at lower secondary level (80.82%). 

The glowing feats however conceal the enduring social issue of Indonesia: education inequality of economically underprivileged children living in urban slums (aka. informal settlements). The recent report by the University of Indonesia’s Center on Child Protection and Wellbeing reveals that the school completion rate among urban slum children is lower than the average school completion rate of Indonesian students. The gap between slum and non-slum children is especially more pronounced in the upper secondary level at 10.8%.   

The enduring gap therefore shows that effort-making for ensuring equal and equitable education for urban slum children remains imperative in Indonesia, and the issue is even more critical at present than before due to growing urbanization. With the rapid pace of urbanization, Indonesia has been experiencing the expansion of urban poverty and the rise of the urban slum population who live alongside train tracks, riverbanks, and canals. About 38.2% of urban slum households have children, and such a large number of urban slum children suggests that the education experiences of those children must be re-examined to ensure their quality and equal education opportunities.Figure 1. Slum communities under the overpass in Jakarta

Figure 1. Slum communities under the overpass in Jakarta

Government’s Policy Approaches and Limitations

It is important to note that the Indonesian government’s attention, shown by politicians’ speeches and funding schemes, has heavily focused on sending children to school. However, needless to say, school-going is not equivalent to learning, and it does not guarantee the happiness of school-going children.

A. Indonesia Smart Card Program. To improve low-income children’s access to school, the Indonesian government has granted considerable financial aid, but slum children’s academic motivation and continuity of schooling were neglected in the process. The financial aid is called Indonesia Smart Card (KIP), which is one of the flagship programs launched under President Jokowi in 2014. The government has issued and distributed the cards to children aged 6-21 in low-income households, supporting them to use the money loaded to use it for school supplies (e.g., books, school uniforms), transportation costs, and more. The fundamental aim of the program has been to encourage low-income school-aged children to go to school and/or continue schooling until the completion of their high school education. 

In the country’s capital city, Jakarta, alone, approximately 675,000 children were the recipients of the Jakarta-run Smart Card program this year. While the figure alludes to a considerable number of students benefitting from the program, the substantial impact is not clear due to problems, including numerous misuse cases (e.g., spending at shopping malls, gas stations, and karaoke) and out-of-school children’s use of money for non-education purposes. Referring to these loopholes of the financial program, Jakarta’s former governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama criticized the program as waste. 

Figure 2. Indonesia Smart Card

Figure 2. Indonesia Smart Card (Mujab, 2020)

B. Rusunawa: Public Rental Housing Policy. Another policy that the Indonesian government implemented was for urban slum households’ better living conditions and sustainable cities, which however further interrupted children’s schooling. Aligned with the global commitment to Sustainable Development Goal 11 (i.e., Sustainable cities and communities), the government implemented a slum upgrading and prevention policy, called Kota Tanpa Kumuh (“City without Slum”) in 2007, which aimed at slum eradication by demolishing slum houses and instead building public low-cost flats (rusunawa) for urban slum dwellers. 

However, the policy negatively affected slum children in regard to their mental health and schooling since it neglected children’s education in consideration. Slum households, including children, were forcefully evicted (often by military force) in the process of building rusunawa, which posed significant stress to slum children. When it comes to education, living in rusunawa deterred children’s learning since households had to bear monthly rent fees (IDR 250,000, or USD 16.75), which was an additional economic burden for them to support their children’s education costs. In addition, because of their forced relocation, children had to experience sudden parting from their friends and neighbors. Children also had to commute longer distances and hours from their new place to schools. In Jakarta, at the end of 2014, this public housing policy with little advantage to children’s education was discontinued due to a lack of fiscal support from its city council.

Rusunawa in Jakarta

Figure 3. Rusunawa in Jakarta (Jakarta Review, 2018)

Notably, each policy case shows that the government’s focus has exclusively been associated with children’s access to school education and lack of consideration for children’s education, respectively. Moreover, neither policy paid attention to children’s socio-emotional well-being. This raises a critical need to examine the actual learning experiences of slum children at school. 

Looking Closer the Slum Children’s Schooling Experiences 

With its insufficient attention to the socio-emotional aspect, the current policy approach has perpetuated a non-inclusive and non-welcoming school climate towards slum children. It is a concerning situation that many slum children commonly experience discrimination, bullying, and exclusion in schools. Slum children are often the target of teasing, bullying, physical abuse, and rumors by their non-slum peers due to their poor living conditions, all of which demotivate slum children and even drive them to drop out of school. Their feeling of distress in school is often aggravated by teachers’ nonchalant attitudes towards slum children’s experience of bullying. 

It can be interpreted that such a negative classroom climate tied with slum children’s lack of relationships with peers and teachers nullifies the aforementioned government’s efforts for slum children, which has entailed their academic demotivation, unhappiness, and school dropout. 

Shifting the Policy Discourse to Child Rights-Based for Slum Children’s Well-being at School 

If so, what should we focus on to actually promote slum children’s equal and equitable education? Greater attention must be given to ensure a positive school climate that is supportive and safe for children’s learning. Indeed, such an environment is the foundation as well as an enabler that could lead slum children to continue their schooling with increased academic motivation, a sense of belonging, and a feeling of being valued. 

This means that the current policy approach should look beyond providing material/physical support, to promote slum children’s well-being and happiness in their school experience. In order to do so, the policy discourse should be shifted to be child rights-based. 

It is the deficit view that has been permeated with the current policies, in which slum children’s education is considered as deprivations, problems, and obstacles that need to be addressed and fixed through access to schools and secure housing. The deficit view has justified and emerged the government’s financial aid and construction of a public rental house. 

However, for slum children’s well-being and happiness in their long-term process of school education, the policy discourse should recall and include the core ideas of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) of 1989, particularly Article 29 (a):

“States Parties agree that the education of the child shall be directed to the development of the child’s personality, talents and mental and physical abilities to their fullest potential.”

The statement therefore calls for the Indonesian government’s child rights-based approach, reminding of its responsibility to focus on promoting education support that aligns with the best interests of the child. Based on this approach, the Indonesian government should prioritize providing holistic and whole-school support to foster a supportive school environment, ensuring slum children’s equal education opportunities, and enhancing their academic and socio-emotional skills to their fullest potential.

Then, what are some practical ways that the government could implement for child rights-based approach? Some practical strategies include organizing in-class anti-bullying workshops targeting both teachers and students, establishing community-based activities for a child-friendly school environment with mutual care, and implementing mentorship programs between university students and slum children to boost the latter’s academic motivation. 

Taking all these into account, what should be kept in mind is: It is the Indonesian government’s utmost duty to prioritize the long-term effects and growth of slum children in pursuit of the child rights-based approach, which ultimately could lead them to become active members of Indonesian society with their full potentials. 

By InJung Cho, Sigur Center Summer 2023 Field Research Grant Fellow. Cho is a Ph.D. student in Education at George Washington University. Cho researches educational inequality and learner identity of children in urban slums of Jakarta, Indonesia.

The Fascinating History and Legacy of Kai Tak Airport in Hong Kong

Kai Tak Airport, located in the Kowloon region, holds a special place in aviation history. Its distinctive runway and the infamous “Kai Tak Heart Attack” landing approach made it one of the world’s most challenging airports.

The Birth of a Legend

Kai Tak Airport evolved from a modest British Royal Air Force airstrip in the 1920s to a bustling commercial airport around the 1930s. It experienced relentless expansion, even during World War II (WWII) when it primarily served as a military base. After WWII, Kai Tak underwent further expansion and modernization to meet the growing demand for air travel. Its famous single runway (Runway 13/31) was extended into Victoria Harbour by reclaiming land, posing a unique challenge for pilots and air traffic controllers.

The “Kai Tak Heart Attack” Approach

What made Kai Tak Airport truly legendary was its iconic single runway (Runway 13/31). This runway required pilots to navigate a series of sharp turns and descents while avoiding tall buildings and mountainous terrain. Pilots usually had to make a 47-degree turn – known as the “Checkerboard Turn” – to land safely. Pilots had to display their finest skills to execute this “Kai Tak Heart Attack” approach, and there was no room for error.

Legacy and Closure

Over several decades, Kai Tak Airport played a pivotal role in Hong Kong’s development as a tourist destination and an international business hub. However, as the demand for air travel continued to grow, Kai Tak faced several challenges, including noise concerns in densely populated urban areas and very limited expansion options.

In July 1998, after serving Hong Kong for over six decades, Kai Tak Airport was closed, marking the end of an era. Prior to its closure, Kai Tak Airport had the third-largest volume of passengers and the largest freight volume in the world. The operations of air transportation were relocated to the newly built Hong Kong International Airport on Lantau Island, which offers more extensive runways, 24-hour operation, and modern facilities.

Today, the former airport runway and airport grounds of Kai Tak have been transformed into a vibrant urban district known as Kai Tak Development (KTD), featuring residential, commercial, and recreational spaces. This development has preserved some of the airport’s history and integrated it into the fabric of the neighborhood. The metro station exits still showcase the fascinating history of Hong Kong (see the picture taken from the Kai Tak metro station).

A picture of the Kai Tak Airport from an aerial view

Conclusion

Kai Tak Airport remains a legendary icon in the world of aviation, remembered for its unique challenges and captivating approach. One urban policy researcher at George Washington University has been conducting a research project surrounding the change in urban dynamics, building structure, and associated socioeconomic outcomes after the airport’s closure. This specific case of relocating an urban center-based airport can provide very interesting lessons and experiences for cities with airports located in densely populated city centers. 

Bio: Jingwen Zheng is a PhD candidate in Public Policy and Administration at the George Washington University, Washington DC. She is a Sigur Center Summer 2023 Research Fellow

The US-India Partnership After Modi’s Visit to Washington

Rising Powers Initiative Research Assistant Satvik Pendyala and Senior Research Assistant at Carnegie China Nathan Sher authored an article for 9DASHLINE about Modi’s visit to the United States and India’s position in US-China competition. You can read the full article on the 9DASHLINE website. It is also available below.

The US-India Partnership After Modi’s Visit to Washington

Early in June, the US Indo-Pacific Coordinator, Kurt Campbell, expressed hope that Narendra Modi’s recent visit to Washington DC would “consecrate” India as the United States’ most important partner. Following the visit on 22 June, the two sides agreed to deepen ties across technology, defense, economic, and people-to-people domains. India even received technology-sharing deals traditionally reserved for US allies. As the United States adapts to rising strategic competition with China, it has sought to strengthen ties with New Delhi as a key partner in the Indo-Pacific.

As US-India relations are strengthening, China-India relations are continuing to deteriorate, reaching their lowest point in decades with unresolved border tensions at the forefront of the downturn in relations. Over the last 10 years, India has lost nearly 40 percent of its patrolling posts in Ladakh along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Recent polling by Tsinghua University reveals that only eight percent of Chinese respondents have a favorable view of India, lower than the percentage of favorable views toward the United States and Japan. To make matters worse, India and China recently expelled nearly all of each other’s journalists, implemented mutual business restrictions, and are continuing to compete for influence in South Asia.

Even as New Delhi and Washington’s interests converge over mutual mistrust of Beijing, many analysts have questioned India’s value as a US security partner. Ashley Tellis of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace recently argued that Washington should not hold any “delusions of New Delhi becoming a comrade-in-arms during some future crisis with Beijing”. Similarly, a new RAND report suggests that New Delhi displays “no evidence of being willing to volunteer to join a war that does not directly involve” India’s interests.

As the United States adapts to rising strategic competition with China, it has sought to strengthen ties with New Delhi as a key partner in the Indo-Pacific.

Nonetheless, New Delhi may not need to get directly involved in a potential US-China contingency to be pivotal in a time of crisis. There is a range of actions, from logistical support to joint deterrence, that India could take to provide both strategic and tactical benefits to the United States in the event of a Western Pacific contingency. The possibility that India might get involved in a US-China crisis alone would be enough to deflect some of Beijing’s resources and attention from the direct zone of conflict. As the two sides work to continue to deepen their security relationship, Washington should not give up on the prospect of New Delhi’s growing appetite for defense cooperation.

Shared concerns and mutual interests

While many analysts point to the 2020 Galwan border clashes as the inflection point in India-China tensions, bilateral suspicions began rising years before, due to the growing assertiveness of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Western Theater Command. Not only did India and China face off at the Depsang Plains in 2013, but three years later several PLA officers involved in those clashes were also promoted to senior positions in the Tibetan Military District and the Western Theater Command.

Tensions then peaked with the May 2020 Galwan clash. While New Delhi claimed that Chinese border violations eroded the “entire basis” of India-China ties, Beijing attempted to put the border issue in an “appropriate place” in the bilateral relationship. At the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit this April, China portrayed the border situation as “stable”, even though the two sides clashed just months before, in December 2022, at Tawang.

Amid India’s estrangement from China, New Delhi’s underlying motive for strengthening relations with Washington is not solely to oppose Beijing but to cement its role as a rising great power. Therefore, India has joined US-led groupings like the Quad and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) along with participating in other coalitions such as BRICS and the SCO. However, India often recoils when the latter organizations try to insert language in support of Chinese initiatives, such as BRI projects, Beijing’s Global Security Initiative, or counter-terrorism efforts that do not target anti-India extremist groups in Pakistan.

During the Cold War, India partnered with the Soviet Union to avoid domination by either the United States or China. Today, the United States and India have discovered that common anxieties regarding China’s potential domination of Asia are bringing them closer together. As India’s threat perception of China continues to grow, India will find greater security cooperation with Washington — short of being a formal ally — ever more palatable.

India in a US-China Confrontation

It is true that India will likely seek to avoid the costs of any conflict that does not directly bear on New Delhi’s interests as much as possible, including in the Taiwan Strait or the South China Sea. India’s emphasis on economic development clashes with any desire to get directly involved in such a hypothetical military contingency. On the other hand, India’s security interests and great power aspirations do not start and stop at the Sino-Indian border. New Delhi recognizes that China’s increasingly destabilizing role in the Indian Ocean and larger Indo-Pacific undermines its own security. A scenario in which the United States loses a kinetic conflict with China and is pushed from East Asia would exacerbate India’s own vulnerability to Chinese domination.

Viewed through an economic lens, India may be reluctant to get involved in a US-China conflict to insulate its own economy. The reality, however, is that a major conflict, even far afield from India’s borders, would severely damage the Indian economy. Deterring and preventing potential Chinese aggression against its neighbors would serve India’s economic interests. In the security domain, India has an abiding interest in preventing Chinese hegemony not only along the Sino-Indian border but throughout the Indo-Pacific. If Beijing were to succeed in “reunifying” with Taiwan, the India-China border would become one of China’s last remaining territorial disputes, and India would be more vulnerable to Chinese pressure.

Even as it faces incursions along the border, India remains committed to improving its maritime capabilities to match the growth of the PLA Navy. New Delhi recently redoubled its military build-up at the Andaman and Nicobar Islands bases in the Bay of Bengal, just northeast of the Malacca Strait. In September 2022, India launched its first domestically built aircraft carrier, and in June 2023 the Indian Navy took part in twin-carrier exercises demonstrating improved interoperability with US and Japanese forces.

India’s naval bases at the mouth of the Malacca Strait give it a unique ability to apply pressure on China by leveraging access to important commercial shipping lanes. New Delhi could grant the United States and its partners access to these islands for logistical, as well as intelligence, support. Even if the Andaman and Nicobar Islands are not operationalized during a Western Pacific contingency, India’s decision to expand its capabilities in advance of any such crisis would enhance joint deterrence, complicating China’s strategic calculations against Taiwan.

Although Taiwan remains a far more important core territorial interest to China when compared with Aksai Chin or Arunachal Pradesh, the PLA still must prepare for the risk of a potential border conflict with India. This leaves Beijing in a tenuous position where it remains vulnerable to Indian pressure on disputed border territories while the bulk of its forces remains focused on preparing for a Taiwan contingency.

Indian geostrategist Brahma Chellaney recently proposed that an Indian escalation on the border in the event of an imminent Taiwan invasion could force China to consider a wider range of threats. Thus, deterrence signaling on the China-India border before a potential Taiwan invasion could be as important as any direct intervention in a US-China contingency. Joint deterrence by India and the United States would necessitate stronger strategic linkages between New Delhi and Washington to coordinate and manage the risks of escalation.

A partnership with teeth

While the degree of India’s involvement in a US-China conflict will depend on India’s threat perception of China, there is little to suggest that China and India plan to de-escalate soon. Although narratives in Chinese state media argue that Washington is to blame for rising China-India tensions, Chinese attempts to separate India from the United States have been largely unsuccessful. The confluence of India’s own strategic concerns and great power ambitions have facilitated its alignment with the United States.

Since the United States designated India as a Major Defense Partner in 2016 and elevated New Delhi to the status of Strategic Trade Authorization Tier 1 in 2018, the US-India relationship has become broader and deeper. The two countries now exchange vast quantities of military and dual-use technologies, conduct joint military exercises, and engage in intelligence-sharing bilaterally, as well as through the Quad.

Prime Minister Modi’s recent visit to Washington solidified new agreements to transfer critical jet technology, cooperate on spaceflight, purchase armed drones, and pursue joint research on semiconductor breakthroughs. In the aftermath of Modi’s state visit, more important than any single deliverable, the tone of the US-India relationship has shifted to one of long-term alignment.

The Contagion of Hope: Lighting up Thai Democracy in the Dark

Fighting for democracy under Thailand’s military regime is more than an election result. It is in the mobilization of Thai people to protect their ballots across the country.

The recent election results marked a historic moment in Thailand. The victory of the opposition parties signals a desire for a return to democracy. Yet, this is not the first time that the opposition parties have won a majority of votes while under military rule. But the prior election results in 2019 were overridden by the military government. Observers are cautious about celebrating too soon.

Thai people, however, are not holding their breath. It is not just the results that are significant. Unlike the cynicism that accompanied the 2019 election, there is a groundswell of hope among Thai people. It is this kindred hope, of which the election result is an important symptom, that is the real victory of this election. 

A Dark Precedent

The 2019 election was a dark moment in Thailand. It was the first election since the military coup of 2014. Even though the opposition party won a majority, the results were marred by questions of electoral fraud. Even as Thai people watched the election results reported live on TV, votes would suddenly disappear right before their eyes. There would be blackouts. After the power returned, vote tallies would be changed dramatically. The voting results in the South disappeared entirely and were left unreported until the next day. The Election Commission (EC) delayed announcing the final results without any justification. Three months after the election, they also blatantly admitted that they forgot to include votes from those who cast their ballots in advance of election day.

These scandals ushered in a malaise and a deep feeling of futility: what was the point of voting if the results were to be staged anyways? More than 1.3 million people signed the online petition via change.org to impeach the EC. The online petition, however, did not lead to anything tangible. People were upset but felt hopeless to bring about changes under the military regime.A Graph Showing a Fluctuation of Vote Counts Reported in 14 Hours

Photo 1: A Graph Showing a Fluctuation of Vote Counts Reported in 14 Hours, Source: iLaw

Organizing Against Fraud

Fast forward to the present and malaise has been replaced with an upbeat optimism. Thai people turned out to vote in record numbers. But this was not accomplished overnight. 

Right after the 2019 election, civil society groups began planning their next move. They took months to learn the logistics behind how votes are tallied from each polling station to the central system, how frauds could occur, and the lessons learned from the previous election. One of the problems they found was that the EC never digitalized the results from polling stations, making it difficult for the public to verify the final results. From this, Vote62 – a network of NGOs, social-tech companies, and media agencies – created a system to crowdsource real-time ballot-counting. Half a year before the 2023 elections, they began campaigning to recruit 100,000 volunteers to monitor vote-counting at just as many polling stations. The hope was that the presence of people at the polling stations would deter fraud and provide a potential source of verification if any irregularities occurred. 

This was easier said than done. The campaign to recruit volunteers was a long and arduous process. Thai people were unfamiliar with what election-monitoring even was. Civil society groups campaigned in more than 350 events in six months. They trained volunteers how to differentiate a valid ballot from a voided one, what actions to monitor, how to take photos of the voting results to upload in the crowdsourcing system of Vote62. 

Election Monitoring in Action

Photo 2: Election Monitoring in Action

The organizers never actually believed that Vote62 could obtain their target of 100,000 volunteers. The day before the election, the number of registered volunteers was only just above 30,000. They were not even sure if their plan would work. “We just knew that we had to do something,” said one of the organizers. But hope builds its own momentum. Their campaign and video-training spread organically, from people on the street, social media influencers, to TV coverage. What happened on the election day went far beyond their expectations. 

Turning up and turning out

 On the election day of May 14, Vote62 received almost 500,000 photos of vote tallies submitted by Thai people nationwide. Their webpage reported 4.2 million views. It is still unknown exactly how many volunteers there were, but it definitely exceeded the minimum 100,000. 

At the polling stations, volunteers begot more volunteers. Voters who had not heard of Vote62 stuck around after the ballot closed to join in the election-monitoring. Some stood for 4 hours in the rain. Despite not knowing each other before, a spirit of camaraderie quickly emerged: people organized themselves to share their tasks, food, and mosquito repellent with each other. 

People Standing in the Rain to Monitor Election.

Photo 3: People Standing in the Rain to Monitor Vote Counting.

Pre-empting the mysterious power outages during the previous election, they used their phones, torchlights, and even their car lights, to literally light-up the polling stations when they were too dark to monitor the vote-counting. They also caused EC staff to recount votes in instances of discrepancies.

Lighting up the Polling Station using Car Lights.

Photo 4: Lighting up the Polling Station using Car Lights.

Hope is Catching Fire

What is remarkable about this election is not merely the results themselves. It is not surprising that Thai people do not accept military rule lying down. But keeping the fight for democracy alive under a military regime can often feel futile. What civil society has accomplished is more than elicit greater transparency at the ballot box. They have kindred a belief in Thai people’s own political agency against the odds – the self-confidence to stand up for their own rights and to act out against power. It is a spirit that takes a life of its own and is not easily put out.

What happens next will surely be far from straightforward. However, as one of the organizers, Yingcheep Atchanont, put it: “Seeing how Thai people turned up on the election day, I feel that with or without civil society groups, Thailand is not the same country anymore.”

 

Bio: Jittip Mongkolnchaiarunya is a PhD candidate in Political Science at the George Washington University, Washington DC. She is a Sigur Center Summer 2023 Research Fellow. To learn more about her, visit her website: https://jittipm.wixsite.com/jittipm. 

Semiconductor Supply Chains in the Indo-Pacific: The Role of Taiwan, South Korea and Japan

Asia Report #60 | April 18, 2023

Introduction

The resiliency of supply chains in the Indo-Pacific now poses a central challenge for the United States and its partners in the Indo-Pacific. The U.S. has entered a new era of industrial policy, backed by the CHIPS Act and the latest round of export controls on China. The story of the chips race will unfold in Asia given that Taiwan, together with South Korea and Japan, account for over 90 percent of the world’s semiconductor production. How well are Taiwan, South Korea and Japan positioned to deal with the ongoing supply chain stresses and what are the economic and security implications to watch for?

To explore this question, the Sigur Center for Asian Studies recently hosted a Roundtable on Semiconductor Supply Chains in the Indo-Pacific: The Role of Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan as part of its Taiwan Roundtable Series. This Asia Report covers the deliberations of the Roundtable comprised of Lotta Danielsson, Vice President of the US-Taiwan Business Council, Daniel Aum, Associate at the Institute for Corean-American Studies, and Jeffrey D. Bean, Program Manager for Technology Policy and Editor at Observer Research Foundation America (ORF America). The panel was moderated by Deepa Ollapally, Associate Director of the Sigur Center for Asian Studies at George Washington University. Watch the full video of the conference here.

Taiwan’s Central Role in the Semiconductor Industry and its Spinoffs

Lotta Danielsson opened with a brief on how Taiwan evolved to become the epicenter for the global semiconductor supply chain. It was a concerted effort over 40 years, starting with initial government investments and encouragement of private enterprise. Taiwan’s innovations in the sector really hit its stride with the pioneering of the “foundry model” of semiconductor manufacturing. Simply put, it separates the design aspect from the production one, and Taiwan doubled down on semiconductor production. This was only bolstered by the clustering effect around Hsingchu, where thousands of suppliers across the value chain create an ecosystem that turbocharges research and development.

Taiwan’s centrality to the world’s supply chain is remarkably high. Taiwan enjoys around 60-70% of cutting-edge semiconductor manufacturing. It is fully cognizant of the geopolitical significance of its industry and has worked hard to cultivate it. It is recognized as a major factor in boosting its global ties, especially with the United States. Danielsson noted that there are many pressures on the semiconductor industry including talent shortages, intellectual property issues, supply risks, demand shocks, and most notably the Chinese security threat. These pressures incentivize Taiwanese companies to look abroad to diversify, however this is tempered by Taiwan’s own desire to remain central to the semiconductor industry, especially at the cutting edge.

Danielsson also considered the impact of the passage of the Chips and Sciences Act (CHIPS) by the U.S. Congress. The United States is having success in drawing investment from foreign companies such as TSMC and Samsung, but Danielsson argues that the $50 billion allocated for semiconductor investment under CHIPS is insufficient. Nearly $400 billion is needed to just replicate the capacity of TSMC alone. Taiwan built its semiconductor industry over several decades and the United States cannot replicate it easily. Danielsson also explored the Chip 4 Alliance with Taiwan, Japan and South Korea. Politically it is a big opportunity for Taiwan but South Korea and Japan are major competitors as well so this initiative would need to balance political cooperation with private competition.

South Korea in the Semiconductor Supply Chain: Challenges and Opportunities

Daniel Aum began by clarifying what South Korea’s semiconductor portfolio looks like. Although not as dominant as Taiwan in high end chip manufacturing, South Korea’s niche is found in memory chip manufacturing where it dominates nearly two-thirds of global market share. The South Korean economic boom is inexorably linked to the development of its semiconductor industry.

Aum provided historical context for South Korean chip manufacturing. Starting in the 1980s, a combination of government subsidies and conglomerate investment incentivized the hiring of talented engineers who pioneered South Korea’s initial forays into memory and DRAM chips. South Korea took advantage of the U.S.-Japan chip rivalry that restricted the ability of Japanese manufacturers to export to the United States. This allowed South Korean companies to leapfrog their competitors. Additionally, Aum put forth the South Korean “model” of chip manufacturing as a possible reason for success. Samsung, SK Hynix, and other South Korean Chip manufacturers are “end-to-end” service providers, from design to packaging. This allows them to build everything in-house while also servicing foreign clients.

Aum then described the strengths and shortfalls of the current government’s semiconductor initiatives. While South Korea today possesses only 1% of market share of non-memory chips, President Yoon Suk Yeol is targeting 10% by 2030. South Korea’s National Assembly has increased tax cuts by up to 15% for conglomerates, however these efforts fall short of Chinese, Taiwanese, Japanese, and U.S initiatives. The South Korean government has also attracted over $260 billion in private investment, mainly from Samsung, to create a cluster of over 150 firms that cover the entire semiconductor supply chain. To fuel this, the South Korean government has set the goal to train over 150,000 workers over 10 years. However, Aum points out several hurdles this initiative would need to overcome. The South Korean birth rate hampers talent supply, the tax incentives are not competitive, and the U.S.-China rivalry threatens South Korea’s economic ties to China.

Taking up the political implications of semiconductor policy, Aum suggested that to South Korean firms, the CHIPS Act initially seemed like a double-edged sword as subsidies would restrict production expansion in China. However, recent clarifications from the U.S government has allowed South Korean companies some limited expansion rights. South Korea will have to leverage its position as the premier memory provider while balancing the United States and China. Regarding Taiwan, Aum sees South Korean and Taiwanese cooperation as quite healthy. Both governments have a history of cooperation and on a corporate level, even though they compete for each other’s contracts, companies have voluntarily agreed to set up common global standards for chip stacking to increase mutual profits. Aum closed by mentioning that South Korea also faces great opportunity with Japan. President Yoon and PM Kishida have resumed bilateral visits, while Japan has agreed to lift restrictions on semiconductor material exports to South Korea. For its part, South Korea has dropped a World Trade Organization case against Japan. All in all, South Korea stands to gain substantially from cooperation with both Taiwan and Japan.

Getting Back to the Future: Japan’s Chip Challenge

Jeffrey Bean began by describing the downfall of Japanese semiconductor dominance. Decades of government and private investment had led Japan to emerge as a leader in DRAM and memory in the 1980s, but concerns from U.S firms put a stop to that. The United States compelled Japan to sign an agreement that put a price floor on Japanese DRAM in the U.S. and forced Japan to open its market up to foreign suppliers. Japanese firms entered a period of intense adjustment as other nations like South Korea quickly flooded the market. Japanese companies had a tough time adapting to the Taiwanese “fabless foundry model,” but eventually found a niche in specialized supply chain components. Despite Japan’s low market share in the global semiconductor industry, it is not reflective of how integral Japanese specialty products are to the manufacturing of chips.

According to Bean, several characteristics make the Japanese semiconductor industry special. Japanese firms are leaders in design and Japan is a hub for the creation of semiconductor manufacturing equipment and precursor materials. Additionally, Japan’s experience with electronic components, legacy chips, and consumer electronics makes it the premier place for semiconductor expertise. Japan is now actively seeking to grow its position in the supply chain. The Japanese government has subsidized the creation of a 5-nanometer facility in Kumamoto with TSMC and Sony, a 2-nanometer facility in Hokkaido with IBM, and manufacturing equipment plants in Oshu. Japan is seeking to reestablish itself in the industry.

Bean argues that this is largely as a result of Japan pioneering the effort to consider “economic security.” In 2020, the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan had conducted research on Japan’s role in a global economy with regards to national security and critical technology. The fruits of this changing focus have been new strategic documents listing China as a strategic competitor, the Economic Security Promotion Act which made national security a factor for investment for firms, and the establishment of a cabinet level position on economic security. Japan has been concerned about this issue longer than most other countries.

Bean summed up by contrasting Japan’s political position with South Korea and Taiwan. Unlike the other two, Japan plays an important role in leading multilateral institutions. Japan is the main driver for the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and has looked favorably on Taiwan’s accension, while negatively on China’s. Bean argues that Japan is eager to cooperate in the semiconductor industry, as Japan is part of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) and the Quad. In 2021, Japan and Taiwan also came to an agreement regarding semiconductor supply chain security. Japan has taken a leading role in the conversation on economic security and critical role the semiconductor industry plays in it.

Overall, the prospects for greater cooperation on the critically important global semiconductor supply chain resilience between Taiwan, South Korea and Japan appear bright, in spite of underlying competitive elements. By extension, this is good news for U.S. economic security interests in the Indo-Pacific.

 

By Satvik Pendyala, M.A Candidate in International Affairs at the Elliott School of International Affairs and Research Assistant, Rising Powers Initiative, The George Washington University.

Xi in Moscow and Kishida in Delhi & Ukraine—a One-Way Alliance vs Delicate Dancing

Policy Alert #254 | March 31, 2023

Last week, from March 20-22, 2023, Russian President Vladimir Putin hosted Chinese President Xi Jinping in Moscow for a three-day state visit. Both Putin and Xi published articles in each other’s national media before the visit, which ended with them penning and signing two joint statements “making plans and arrangements for the growth of the bilateral relations”.

Meanwhile Japanese Prime Minster Kishida’s visit to Ukraine hours after Xi arrived in Moscow, was painted as mirroring Xi’s to Moscow. The Japanese support to Ukraine was seen as the West’s response to China’s support of Russia, and was heavily criticized in Chinese media, which also took issue with Kishida’s visit to India just before Ukraine, adding to India’s difficulties in charting a course through troubled waters.

Russian media saw Xi’s visit as a mark of support from China and attacked critics, but Chinese media and Foreign Ministry statements were far more measured, which was seen as “a likely reflection of the unequal power balance within the alliance.” This contrast  is similar to the discrepancy in analysis between Russian and Chinese national media that was observable after the September 2022 Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Samarkand. In both cases, Russians went further than their Chinese counterparts in drawing conclusions about how Russia and China were forming a block to oppose the US-led West.  Significantly, Xi’s first words after landing in Moscow were to state that the China-Russia bilateral relationship was built “on the basis of no-alliance, no-confrontation and not targeting any third party”.

 

CHINA
As a whole, Communist Party of China (CPC) officials and media have insisted that China is not allied to Russia against the US, despite being strongly critical of the US in Ukraine and Xi essentially endorsing Putin for his reelection. The International Criminal Court in The Hague issuing a warrant for Putin did not stop Xi from making speeches vaunting “the international order underpinned by international law” while standing side-by-side with Putin.

However, despite the words extolling the deep friendship between the two countries and between the two leaders themselves, and while Putin showed an unusual level of deference towards Xi, Xi did not offer unequivocal support of Russia in Ukraine in return. He stood firm with the established line of China being the best possible peace broker and showcased the success of the Iran-Saudi Arabia negotiations as further evidencing this claim. That is not to say China made any steps towards the US. Back in Beijing, when asked if China was providing cover for Russia, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Wang Wenbin took his gloves off for a press conference’s last question and stated that the US have “been involved in virtually all the conflicts and wars in Europe”.

Chinese media covered the visit extensively, with hundreds of articles for the three-day event just in major publications. All painted a vibrant picture of the China-Russia relationship. Many restated China’s “objective and impartial position” over the Ukraine “issue” and put forward the Chinese peace plan Some voiced critics of the West through op-eds, including some written by American citizens. Official declarations only pointed to  a “third party”, but state media featured numerous articles that showed more teeth, overtly criticizing NATO, Japanese PM Kishda’s trip to Ukraine’s,  or depicting the US as a “warmonger rattling its sword”.

In all its condemnation of belligerence, China did not condemn Russia for its invasion and avoided the term entirely, instead preferring “crisis” or “issue” and on March 27th, China voted in favor of Russia at the UN Security Council. Officials stated that “China maintains communication with all sides”. In addition to vaunting the peace plan, Chinese media remarked that “Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has responded more positively to China’s position paper” and hoped to convince the international community to support the plan, which would  isolate the US as “standing in opposition to the vast majority of international community“. Some articles also pointed to the increasing gap between the US and European countries on this question, and interpreted European leaders visiting China as direct support for Chinese policy, indirectly inferring that Xi’s trip to Russia was less impartial than claimed if an official visit is equated as a show of support.

 

INDIA
Indian media had more diverse takes on the state visit, some articles saw the visit as  Xi making concessions to Putin, while others called Xi’s visit to Moscow a “shot in the arm” for Putin. Indian media was not overall critical of the event and played down the negative impact for Russia-India ties, supported by Russian Ambassador to India Denis Alipov, who stated that the growing Russia-China ties were not “harming the Russia-India strategic alignment”.

Indian media overall also did not share the perspective that the meeting was sealing an alliance between the two countries, dismissing this “Western” notion. There were diverging voices, such as former Indian Ambassador to France Mohan Kumar, who thought the visit “could have the effect of pushing India to align itself more to the West“. Despite some debate over the consequences and how meaningful the visit was, Indian media in general agreed that stronger ties between Russia and China are difficult for India to accept amidst tensions with China. India has placated Russia for over a year by not overtly denouncing the war in Ukraine and adhered to  Russian requests to avoid the term “war”, instead saying “crisis” or “challenge”, but this did not stop Russia from fully embracing Xi and courting Chinese support.

Kishida’s visit to India was welcomed, especially after the absence of Japanese Foreign Minister Yoshimasa Hayashi  from the G20 meeting. His visit was interpreted as an attempt to get India to side against Russia, an attempt that was not seen too harshly, perhaps because it was not expected to succeed.

  • The center-right newspaper Times of India published an opinion piece from former chairman of India’s Joint Intelligence Committee SD Pradhan, who disagreed that the visit displayed “China’s dominance over Russia” and pointed out tension areas between the two, which should prevent China from being able to “influence Russia to change its India policy”.
  • As Russia is increasingly entangled with China, The Daily Pioneer, a pro-BJP newspaper, honed in on other partners India has started to rely on to counter China, such as Australia and Japan.
  • The liberal Indian Express published a take correcting Western media about the intricacies of geopolitics among Asian rising powers, as well as a counterpoint aligning closer to Western media considering the growing ties between Russia and China to be detrimental to India. The coverage of the visit was completed by an  overview of the different visits made by East Asian state leaders in March.

 

JAPAN
Japanese media viewed Xi’s visit to Moscow unfavorably, seeing the visit as “cementing ties” between China and Russia and creating a “united front against the U.S”. Japanese media also saw the visit as a quid pro quo, the visit was “a political boost” for Putin, and Xi “walked away with a statement of support on Taiwan “.

Kishida’s visit to India was  more popular across the board, and Japanese media as a whole expressed support for stronger Japan-India cooperation, and noted that Japan would do well to focus more on India in addition to aligning with the US to counter China. While in India, Kishida promoted his “free and open Indo-Pacific” vision and pushed Modi to join Japan in condemning Russia over its invasion of Ukraine, even though India has increased its imports of Russian crude oil. Earlier in March, the Yomiuri Shimbun noted the US and Europe’s concern over the India-Russia relationship, but concluded that as an Asian country, Japan should build closer relations with India, “based on a different perspective from that of the United States and Europe”.

Regarding Kishida’s trip to Ukraine, Japanese media noted Chinese criticism of Kishida’s visit to Ukraine by Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin, as well as President Zelensky’s appreciation of the visit. Domestically, the visit was well perceived, including by Kenta Izumi, head of the main opposition party in Japan, except when it came to Kishida’s choice of gift to Zelensky.

 

RUSSIA

Russian media celebrated Xi’s visit to Moscow, calling it “historical”, a “tectonic geopolitical shift” and even the “most important, most great, and most gargantuan geopolitical, geo-economic, strategic-military events in the 21st century”. Xi’s avoidance of the term “alliance” was noted, but rather than considering it a sign of China’s reluctance of durably tying itself to Russia, it was rationalized by explaining that the Russia-China relationship is beyond mere geopolitics and is now a “holistic phenomenon”.

Beyond lauding Putin and Xi, Russian media put forward the Chinese peace plan through assertive op-eds which saw EU leaders announcing their future visits as endorsements of the Chinese peace plan, which could cause a “weakening of American influence over the EU”, though some analysts saw the US as the only driver in the West, while “the EU is but a passenger”, and a vassal to the US. At the same time, some columnists guessed that Xi will not want to meet Zelensky despite Chinese assurances that “China maintains communication with all sides”.

Kishida’s visits did not go unnoticed, the Russia-India relationship was covered by Russian media which sought to defend it against the idea that India would be rebuked by Russia tying the knot with China, a notion dismissed by Russia’s ambassador to India.  When it comes to Kishida’s visit to Ukraine, Russian media took aim at Kishida for visiting the country, but rather than lamenting the consequences for Russia, painted the visit as a domestic political mistake for Kishida.

 

By Gabriel Savagner, M.A. candidate in Security Policy Studies, Elliott School of International Affairs at GW. Research Assistant, Rising Powers Initiative.

Deadlock in Delhi & After: Rising Powers remain entrenched in their positions post Delhi G20 and Quad meetings

Policy Alert #253 | March 16, 2023

While the G20 Summit in New Delhi is only set to take place in September, it was already in the spotlight as of March, and not in the way that host country India had hoped. The Foreign Ministers’ Meeting on March 1st and 2nd in Delhi succeeded a joint G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors (FMCBG), and a Finance & Central Bank Deputies (FCBD) Meeting in Bengaluru in late February, with an ambitious agenda focused on multilateralism. However, the Foreign Ministers’ Meeting especially showcased divergences among G20 members despite an introductory speech by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi urging unity. Indeed, after one year of fighting in Ukraine, Rising Powers are still entrenched in their positions despite the fluctuations of the war. In fact, there seems to be less consensus as the war has gone on, as Russia’s military setbacks no longer elicit the same reactions from observers than the expected onslaught and initially rapid gains. While in Bali emerging powers seemed to side with the US, in Delhi they seemed to expect more about “seeking peace” rather than “defending Ukraine”.

The end result was that the acrimonious talks over Ukraine and whether the G20 was the appropriate venue to discuss security concerns overshadowed attempts to find consensus on multilateralism and development. Overall, the Foreign Minister’s Meeting appeared as a first major test for India ahead of the Summit in September, with pressure mounting as Russian President Vladimir Putin may attend the Summit in New Delhi. Similar turmoil at the Summit this September would be a disappointment to Modi, and a “chair’s summary will not do” for Indian diplomacy vying for international recognition.

 

CHINA

China decried the lack of unity at the Foreign Minister’s Meeting as the result of the US and European countries “using geopolitics to hijack the development agenda that G20 is supposed to focus on”. At the same time, China was careful to not blame India for this, or even downplay the event. Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Mao Ning deflected such concerns by stating that it was “an important event”, and Chinese media reported on the side talks between the foreign ministers of China and India where both “expressed their firm attitude to support multilateralism, oppose confrontation”. Chinese media praised Indian preparations and accused US and Western media of exaggerating the “divergences” between China and India.

At the same time, “Chinese experts” were quoted by the Global Times as questioning “whether India could really play a leading role”. In describing the event as a “test for India”, and then deploring the lack of success of the event, Chinese media also indirectly considered that India failed to lead the discussions towards its stated goals.

  • The China Daily, owned by the CPC, published an article by Swaran Singh, an Indian Professor of international relations, who shared an optimistic perspective about the meeting between China’s new foreign affairs minister Qin Gang and Indian minister of external affairs Jaishankar.
  • The South China Morning Post also reported on the bilateral talks between India and China, but concluded  that while the event was symbolically important, it did not bring significant progress to the border dispute.
  • The Global Times, a Chinese nationalist newspaper run under the official newspaper of the Communist Party of China, featured the series of meetings in Delhi prominently. It anticipated the lack of consensus, considered the meetings to be a test for India, and deplored that US and some EU foreign ministers “instrumentalized and weaponized G20”.

 

INDIA

Indian media as a whole presented the meetings in a better light. Articles published before the Foreign Ministers Meeting  disputed the apparent international consensus that it would follow in the footsteps of the FMCBG and FCBD meetings. After the meeting, Indian media highlighted limited progress rather than characterizing the event as a failure. At most, Indian newspapers suggested the event was “derailed by Western countries, and Russia-China”, while noting that Indian leadership was praised by both Russia and the US.

When it comes to the negotiations themselves, India voted in favor of the inclusion of paragraphs mentioning Ukraine in the joint statement, even though it avoided the term “war” and used the terms “crisis” or “challenge” instead. Despite appealing to both sides, Indian diplomats were not able to obtain concessions from Russia and China which refused to vote for these inclusions, while appeals to focus on development went unheeded by US and European diplomats.

Another element that was noted by the Indian Press before the meeting was the announced absence of Japanese foreign minister Yoshimasa Hayashi. His absence at the G20 was deplored and may have “cast some shadows over New Delhi-Tokyo ties”, though Foreign Secretary Vinay Kwatra said he “understood” that Hayashi was “not able to come because of his domestic compulsions” and looked “forward to a very active participation”.  According to the Times of India, “Indian officials strongly denied that Hayashi’s likely absence was an intended snub”, adding that  “Japan is sending one of the largest delegations to the meeting”. Hayashi’s presence a day later for the Quad meeting and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s visit to Delhi on March 20 served to reaffirm Japan’s commitment to its relationship with India.

 

JAPAN

Japan’s participation in the G20 meeting was eclipsed by the debate about Hayashi’s absence from the Foreign Ministers meeting. Japanese Liberal Democratic officials said the sessions attended by Hayashi instead of the G20 were “extremely important” and “many lawmakers and citizens want to hear directly from the foreign minister“. Even members of the opposition Constitutional Democrats said it would be “unthinkable for the foreign minister not to be there”.

Japanese newspapers were not all fully supportive though as some gave voice to Japanese critics from the Constitutional Party of Japan while others wrote their own critical editorials on the topic. However, critics took issue with the Diet’s pressure and scheduling rigidity rather than with Hayashi himself. Interestingly, newspapers from both countries amplified critical voices from the other. Indian media had cited harsher Japanese critics, while the few pessimistic Indian outlooks about Hayasahi’s absence were cited in stronger terms than in Indian media. While the content of the G20 meetings were not delved into deeply, Hayashi’s participation to the Quad meeting was noted, and his “rare direct reference” to China was noticed.

 

RUSSIA

Russia stood firm against the recriminations of the rest of the G20 members, with the exception of China which backed Russia in voting against adopting language on Ukraine. Russian statements mirrored China’s, pinpointing the “bullying from US-led Western nations over the Ukraine situation” as the reason for the lack of consensus.

Russian media was careful with not blaming India for the G20’s deadlock, even praising India as  a “credible global leader”, though it did not fully consider India to be on Russia’s side either, instead considering India as “caught in a diplomatic balancing act”.

By Gabriel Savagner, M.A. candidate in Security Policy Studies, Elliott School of International Affairs at GW. Research Assistant, Rising Powers Initiative.

Japan’s Rising Role as an Indian Ocean Actor: What Do Port Stories Tell Us?

February 14, 2023

In January 2023, a little-noticed naval exercise took place between the U.S. and Sri Lanka in the strategically located Trincomalee port and Mullikulam base in the Indian Ocean. The annual bilateral CARAT Sri Lanka exercises have been long-standing, but this year, Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force joined them for the second time after its initial participation in 2021. This came right on the heels of India sending the INS Delhi to dock at Trincomalee and providing training for the Sri Lankan Navy. These actions come four months after the controversial Chinese docking of a surveillance ship at Hambantota port in the midst of Sri Lanka’s historic economic and political meltdown in 2022.

Japan’s increasing involvement in the Indian Ocean will have a deep impact on the interests of its Quad partners, especially India. While Japan has been a traditional development aid partner in the region, its newest role suggests a leading strategic edge. What does Japan’s strategic edge in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) look like? And to what extent is it characterized by a partnership with India versus a more unilateral approach?

 

The Race for Ports in the Indian Ocean

            Sri Lanka

Japan’s strategic outlook on the Indian Ocean may be best reflected in how it participates in port and port infrastructure development. China took an early lead in constructing ports in the Indian Ocean Region ahead of both Japan and India. The latter two have been playing catch-up since 2010. Given Japan’s greater capital, resources and a better reputation for building and delivering quality infrastructure, Tokyo is in a more advantageous position to compete than India. India, however, brings strong historical experience working closely with key states like Sri Lanka and Bangladesh that could add value for Japan.

Tokyo’s sweeping new National Security Strategy, released in December 2022, points to China’s rising assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific as Japan’s “greatest strategic challenge.” In turn, Japan’s National Defense Strategy further notes that it must “deepen bilateral and multilateral defense exchanges” and will prioritize “the importance of stable use of sea lane and an energy and economic perspective” with coastal Indian Ocean states. Japan has been increasing its port investment portfolios across the Indian Ocean in recent years. Its major investments include Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Myanmar. Sri Lanka is where Japan is poised to gain the most, with unexpected opportunities since the economic and political crises hit the island nation last year.

That said, the way forward in Sri Lanka has not been easy for Japan. After receiving approval for the Colombo Port East Container Terminal (ECT) project in 2019, Japan and India were dismissed two years later in what amounted to a high-profile rebuke. The government of President Maithripala Sirisena-Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe had signed an MOU with Japan and India to develop the Colombo terminal jointly. The operating company was to be 51% owned by the government, with the remainder held by Japan and India. When a new government led by the China-friendly Gotabaya Rajapaksa unceremoniously took over in 2021, the decision was reversed, allowing the state-run China Harbor Engineering to develop the East Container Terminal. Initially, Rajapaksa had indicated that there would be no change, only to change his mind. Caught by surprise, this unilateral move was decried by Japan and India but without effect, even though nearly 70% of the transshipment business through ECT is linked to India.  This setback came on the heels of the handover of Hambantota Port to China in 2017 and the construction of the Colombo International Container Terminal (CICT) by China in 2011, where China Merchants Port Holdings has majority stakes.

The dramatic fall of Rajapaksa in 2022 and the political turbulence saw the return of a more even-handed government under Wickremesinghe. This government has wasted little time firming up another contract to Japan and India, this time for a new Colombo West Terminal project. This project will involve a yet-to-be-announced Japanese investor and India’s Adani Ports and Special Economic Zones (APSEZ). It will allow India and Japan to hold an 85% stake in this project under a build-operate-transfer schema for 35 years. While not generally viewed as strategic as the ECT, it is next to China’s activity in Colombo port.  It was at the Colombo International Container Terminal that China docked a submarine in 2014, causing much consternation in India.

Japan’s willingness to persist and ride the waves to acquire a port project in Sri Lanka points to the high level of commitment to gain a stronger foothold in the IOR. Apart from Colombo and Hambantota ports in Sri Lanka’s southwest and south, respectively, is the even more strategic Port of Trincomalee located in the northeast of the country within the Bay of Bengal. Trincomalee is the world’s fifth-largest natural harbor and one of the few natural harbors deep enough to easily accommodate submarines. Some view it as the second-best natural harbor in the world after Sydney.

The Bay of Bengal holds significance as the link between the Indian and Pacific Oceans; it is the fulcrum of the Indo-Pacific. More than 80 percent of Japan’s oil imports pass through the Bay of Bengal. If there is a priority for Japan (and India) in Sri Lanka, it would be to prevent China from establishing a permanent presence elsewhere on the island, especially Trincomalee. Trincomalee has a major Sri Lankan naval base and an air base. Still, given its low population, distance from the capital, and proximity to areas in conflict during the decades-long civil war, it has remained underdeveloped. In mid-2022 however, the Chairman of Sri Lanka Ports Authority announced plans to develop Trincomalee as an industrial port and to call for an “Expression of Interest” from investors to utilize the port premises and up to 2,400 hectares of surrounding land.

While plans to develop Trincomalee have surfaced from time to time, it was apparently only in December 2021, after a Japanese company established a ship repair and rebuilding facility there, that Colombo got serious. In joint operations with Japanese Onomichi Dockyard, Colombo Dockyard founded a rapid response afloat service in Trincomalee Port to cover a gap in Sri Lanka’s coverage. Another Japanese company, Tokyo Cement, had already built a state-of-the-art cement manufacturing facility which began commercial operations in 2017. Tokyo Cement’s products, trusted for decades for their superior strength and quality, also incorporated sophisticated equipment from India and Germany in this project. Given Hambantota port’s poor performance, the idea of developing Trincomalee has been met with some skepticism. However, supporters can point to a 2020 Asian Development Bank study commissioned by the Japanese which concluded that the Trincomalee harbor had substantial benefits to offer, including catering to increasing maritime cargo trade from India’s eastern seaboard and Bangladesh and Myanmar.

            Bangladesh, Myanmar, and the Greater Indian Ocean

Bangladesh’s primary port is the Port of Chittagong. Problems have long plagued Chittagong, with the World Bank ranking it the least efficient major port in Asia. It handles nearly 98% of Bangladesh’s containerized trade with the rest of the world. Japan has recognized this problem and has invested in the construction of Matarbari Port to alleviate the burden from Chittagong. Estimated to be completed in 2026, Matarbari port is also envisioned as a transport option for Indian goods from India’s sensitive northeast. “Key infrastructure projects funded by Japan like the Matarbari port in Bangladesh are expected to provide an entry point for Indian business to establish a foothold in Southeast Asia,” says VP of Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Nakazawa Keiichiro. Matarbari port, although not an Indian investment, is indicative of India and Japan’s close cooperation and shared goals.

In Myanmar, both Japan and India had planned major projects, despite the country’s troubled politics. India’s APSEZ had plans to build and operate an international container terminal in Yangon port, and Japan had planned to invest in the Thilawa SEZ surrounding Yangon port. While Japan’s SEZ in Thilawa and investments into Yangon port have come through, they have encountered delays and an increased investment risk due to sanctions on the Tatmadaw government. These sanctions have led to the cancellation of Indian APSEZ’s Yangon investment. Japan remains susceptible to Myanmar’s political instability.

Meanwhile, Japan continues to be a leader in developing critical Southeast Asian infrastructure, especially in Indonesia, which lies astride the strategically important Strait of Malacca. Japanese companies have been awarded contracts for the construction and operation of Patimban Port in Java. Indonesia’s primary port in Jakarta, Tanjung Priok Port, handles more than 50% of Indonesia’s transshipments. As President Joko Widodo looks to reevaluate Jakarta’s centrality in Indonesia, Japan has started construction in Patimban, which is expected to be completed in 2027. JICA extended Official Development Assistance (ODA) loans to Indonesia for this project in 2017 and again in 2022, making it Japan’s largest port investment project in ASEAN.

In November 2022, in the small town of Saumlaki in the Maluku Islands, construction on a Japanese-funded fishing port began. Saumlaki has a small port and is not used for containerized traffic but is close to major fishing spots and Japan intends to turn it into a regional fishing hub. In 2018, Japan financed the improvement of Saumlaki and five other minor fishing ports throughout Indonesia’s peripheral islands. Through developing fishing ports in Indonesia, Japan also seeks to combat persistent issues such as illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing and the lack of coastal infrastructure on smaller islands in the littoral waters of Southeast Asia. That Japan finds it necessary to invest in projects as big as Patimban and as small as Saumlaki, indicates a thorough investment portfolio in Indonesia and across the Indian Ocean.

Further away, Japan has provided Madagascar with ODA loans worth more than $340 million to expand its largest port, Toamasina Port. JICA has also no doubt considered the strategic location of Madagascar in the Indian Ocean. Near the islands of Comoros, Mauritius, and the Seychelles and close to the African coast, Toamasina port can serve as a regional hub for the Southern Indian Ocean.

 

The Strategic Shadow

Taken in isolation, Japan’s forays into port infrastructure in the Indian Ocean are unremarkable. After all, economic connectivity in the Indo-Pacific is a priority for the region and major powers. However, the backdrop to Japan’s stepped-up port development activity is increasingly strategic and cannot be easily delinked from the broader competition for influence with China. Japan’s growing joint projects with India in the Indian Ocean region indicate convergent strategic challenges and responses.

Indeed, we can see Japan as a critical linchpin for the Quad and the Indo-Pacific partnerships: working closely with its Quad partners often minus India in the Western Pacific and aligning closer and closer with India in the Indian Ocean. Together with India or separately, Japan’s significantly rising profile in critical port development is adding new momentum to the politics of the Indian Ocean. Whether this will lead to strengthening a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” or more great power rivalry is likely to depend on how China’s ambitions take shape in the Indian Ocean.

 

By Deepa M. Ollapally, Research Professor of International Affairs and Director, Rising Powers Initiative and Satvik Pendyala, Research Assistant, Rising Powers Initiative, Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University.

 

 

 

 

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