The Fallacy of a Taliban Strong State

Policy Commentary, August 21 2021

Will the blast outside the Kabul airport on the eve of American withdrawal prove to be a warning shot to the Taliban or a case of an isolated attempt to take advantage of a chaotic security environment? Be that as it may, one thing is certain—it won’t be long before the Taliban faces an ongoing paradox like every previous government in Afghanistan—in order to have a strong state, Afghanistan needs a weak center. This hard realization is something that since the late 1970s, each successive group running the country has been unable to come to terms with. There’s no reason to think that the Taliban will be any different this time around and therein lies a fundamental weakness for the new dispensation in Kabul.

That the first stirring of a militant opposition from within is coming from the Panjshir Valley in the north and led by the son of legendary fighter Ahmad Shah Masud is no surprise. Afghanistan is comprised of multiple ethno-linguistic minorities, all of whom have long sought to protect their de facto federal status and if necessary, fight for it. What should be surprising for any observer is the complete absence of any secession sentiment among these groups. This is despite the fact that Afghan minorities have next door kin, with Tajiks having Tajikistan and Uzbeks having Uzbekistan. Even after 42 years of war and turmoil, including five years of civil war in the early 1990s, the majority (barely) Pashtuns as well as all the others, seem to share a strong sense of Afghan national identity.

Theoretically, this should make it much easier for the Afghan state to hang together unlike so many other states with minorities that want a country of their own. Empirically though, the Afghan state flourished (or at least functioned reasonably) only when the country resembled a highly decentralized political entity with powerful regional powerbrokers in charge of their own affairs. This was the case much of the time prior to the 1978 communist coup against the republican Mohammed Daoud and during the earlier nominal monarchy of his cousin King Zahir Shah. The system worked because the central “state” represented by Kabul was fragmented and non-threatening and served more as a symbol of pan-Afghan nationalism.

Kabul has always been dependent on foreign sponsors to lesser or greater degrees precisely because of the de facto strong federated state and the lack of access to resources that are necessary to run the country. Customs duties, transit fees, taxes and the like that should be the privy of the central government, was largely in the hands of regional leaders. The American intervention could disturb but not dislodge this political economy system. U.S. dollars of course produced a financial bonanza for those who controlled Kabul starting in 2001 thanks to soaring levels of corruption, but external assistance also allowed the central government to take credit for important gains. According to the Human Development Report 2020, Afghanistan managed to make substantial strides from 2000 onwards in key areas. For example, life expectancy went up from 55.8 years in 2000 to 64.8 by 2019. Across the same time, expected years of schooling showed a dramatic increase from 5.9 to 10.2 years.

Now that the Taliban has swept in and the Afghan military forces melted away, a big question is how much political power the new central government is going to amass, and perhaps more significantly, how much it is willing to give away. It is hard to not to see the centralizing tendency taking hold among the militants, especially as they arrive in the capital on the wave of hubris borne out of defeating not one, but two, superpowers—the Soviets and the United States. The Taliban this time may be able to consolidate their power much better than any predecessor for a very different reason in this instance and it’s no thanks to internal support or transformation. Rather, it is because the regional environment they find is way better than they could have ever hoped for, given the simultaneous friendly ties to Pakistan, China and Russia.

American withdrawal has coincided with China’s increasing interest in Afghanistan’s mines and minerals and a new commitment to shore up its political credentials with the Taliban to secure those economic stakes. Investments were stepped up when NATO forces left in 2014 and more recently China has been attempting to expand its influence with Afghanistan via the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) which includes a network of roads, ports, oil and gas pipelines and optical fiber cables. For the world’s biggest rising power, this part of the BRI known as China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) could be optimized within a trilateral China-Pakistan-Afghanistan combination.

From the Taliban’s point of view, China is attractive not just for its deep pockets but because Beijing will leave them free to pursue any domestic policies they choose. If the Taliban exerts central control through harsh Sharia laws that affect rights of women and girls or squeezes minorities, they can expect a free pass from China, Russia and Pakistan.

Thus, this time around, the Taliban will have a much better externally permissive and resourced hand to rule from Kabul unlike their earlier regime in 1996-2001 which saw only Pakistani and Saudi Arabian support. This external advantage however may not be enough if the internal state-regional equilibrium is fundamentally disturbed. The strong state fallacy and the push for centralization and homogenization when Afghan history dictates just the opposite, might be what ultimately foils Taliban control.

Deepa Ollapally, Research Professor of International Affairs & Director of Rising Powers Initiative, George Washington University.

Understanding Indian Policy Dilemmas in the Indo-Pacific through an India–US–China Maritime Triangle Lens

Policy Commentary October 13, 2016

The author is Dr. Deepa Ollapally, Research Professor of International Affairs and Director of the Rising Powers Initiative.

Between the American rebalance strategy and Chinese Maritime Silk Road initiative, India is increasingly pressed to formulate a maritime strategy that ideally meets Indian economic and strategic objectives. This is generating major policy dilemmas for India stemming from the attraction of economic integration led by China on the one hand, versus the attraction of strategic integration offered by the United States on the other hand. This paper suggests that between these binary options, there are both opportunities and challenges for India, calling for fine-grained policymaking. The notional concept of an India–US–China maritime triangle is useful in sifting through the choices before India to meet its ambitions of development as well as retain and improve its strategic influence in the Indian Ocean and beyond.

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The ADIZ imbroglio: A Chinese View

Policy Commentary December 15, 2013

In a Policy Commentary for the Rising Powers Initiative, RPI author Dr. Ren Xiao, director of the Center for the Study of Chinese Foreign Policy at Fudan University in China, offers a view from China on the recent dispute over Beijing’s air defense identification zone in the East China Sea. Though China’s latest move in the on-going islands dispute prompted a range of reactions from Asian powers, Ren Xiao defends the decision as a natural response to recent developments and calls on China and Japan to form a crisis management mechanism to avoid further conflict in region:

On November 23, 2013,China announced its establishment of an East China Sea air defense identification zone (ADIZ). The ADIZ was clearly under deliberation for some time, and its announcement was carefully timed by Beijing. The announcement was withheld as the new Chinese leadership concentrated on the upcoming Third Plenum and was released ten days after the third Plenum concluded.

The ADIZ announcement was a continuation of the Diaoyu/Senkaku island crisis, a counter-measure that resulted from Japan and China’s failure to establish a mechanism to avoid conflict and manage the island dispute. One puzzle is why the announcement of the ADIZ did not happen last year (2012). Following Japan’s “nationalization” of the islands, China took a series of steps to counter-balance Japan’s act. An announcement of the ADIZ back then would have seemed more natural and logical.

Nevertheless, there is an important follow-up question: why did the announcement seem sudden and abrupt to other nations, triggering strong reactions from several parties, including the United States? Not surprisingly, when meeting with the Chinese leaders in early December, U.S. Vice President Joseph Biden expressed concern with China’s establishment of the ADIZ. Chinese leaders responded by restating its position on the ADIZ.

In Defense of China’s Rights to an ADIZ

China has the legal right to establish the ADIZ, given the previous establishment of ADIZs by the United States and Japan. An air defense identification zone is an area outside a country’s territorial airspace that is defined in an attempt to identify whether an approaching aircraft is a threat or not so that they have enough time to react. The ADIZ is not territorial airspace. Over 20 countries have set up their ADIZs, thus China has the legitimate right to do the same.

Japan should not have been surprised by China’s counter-measure move. This move was not a question of “if”, but “when.” The ADIZ is a continuation of China’s reactions to Japan’s “nationalization” of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands in September 2012. Infuriated by Japan’s actions, Beijing is determined not to let Japan have unilateral de facto control of the islands. China keeps sending coast guard ships to the adjacent waters to form a situation of joint but separate patrolling. In fact, China is aiming for a new status quo, in which China will reciprocate Japan’s actions.

Japan is still paying a price for its ill-conceived action in September 2012 to “nationalize” the islands, unnecessarily and unwisely provoking China and grossly underestimating China’s reaction, will, and determination. For Beijing, its restraint over the unresolved dispute went unappreciated by Japan, who has took advantage of China’s restraint to consolidate its control of the islands, thereby revealing Japan’s intention to seize the islands.

Moreover, 44 years ago, Japan established its ADIZ, which far exceeds its self-claimed “medium line” in the East China Sea. The closest point of Japan’s ADIZ is only 130 kilometers from China’s coast. On the basis of its own ADIZ, Japan’s military jets often scrambled to follow and monitor Chinese jets flying in international airspace within Japan’s ADIZ. After the Diaoyu/Senkaku crisis broke out, Japanese jets scrambled more frequently than before, highlighting tensions in the East China Sea.

With China’s ADIZ established, the two countries are now more “equal.” It is unfair to claim that China should not have set up an ADIZ when both Japan and the United States have established their own ADIZs. The United States was the first country to unilaterally declare an ADIZ; Japan’s ADIZ declaration was also unilateral. Thus, China also has the right to make such a unilateral declaration.

Mishandling the South Korean Reaction

Soon after, it was reported that China’s ADIZ overlapped with a section of the Korean ADIZ that is 20km wide and 115km long, and encompasses Suyan rock (what South Korea calls “Ieodo”). China argues that because Suyan is underwater there is not a territorial dispute between China and South Korea over the rock. This problem can be solved through maritime demarcation. On December 8, 2013, South Korea declared the extension of its ADIZ to now include Suyan rock. China expressed regret at this move. One question is whether China could have handled this ADIZ matter more carefully in order to not involve South Korea.

Conclusion

This imbroglio once again highlights the urgent need for Japan and China to form a crisis management mechanism. Both countries need to sit down and discuss what they should do to avoid conflict in East China Sea.

The author is the director of the Center for the Study of Chinese Foreign Policy at Fudan University, Shanghai, China. He is also a co-author on the Rising Powers Initiative’s Worldviews of Aspiring Powers project.

The Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA): U.S. Perspective

Policy Commentary January 22, 2012

Four and a half years after the agreement between the U.S and Korean governments, the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA or KORUS) was finally ratified by both the U.S. Congress and the Korean Parliament in late 2011 and is likely to be implemented early this year. At present, the United States has FTAs in force with 17 countries. President Barack Obama also signed free trade agreements with Colombia, Korea and Panama on October 21, 2011, but these agreements have yet to be implemented. The KORUS agreement is the most important free trade agreement for the U.S. since the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) that came into force in 1994.

With $3.3 trillion in 2010, international trade accounts for 23% of the $14.5 trillion U.S. economy. U.S. exports supported an estimated 9.2 million jobs in 2010, up from 8.7 million in 2009. (Johnson, 2011) Despite sluggish U.S. economic growth between 2003 and 2010, export-related jobs increased by over 3 million during this period. For every billion dollars of exports, over 5,000 jobs are supported in this country. That is why President Obama issued an executive order on March 11, 2010, creating the National Export Initiative (NEI), which aims to double U.S. exports over the next five years creating 2 million new jobs here at home. The NEI recognizes that exports will play a critical role in promoting American economic growth. In particular, exports play an important role in supporting a healthy and vibrant manufacturing sector. The nearly 3.7 million manufacturing jobs supported by exports account for 27% of all employment in the manufacturing sector. In this connection, free trade agreements play a critical role in promoting American exports and job growth.

Read the rest of the Policy Commentary.

By Yoon-shik Park, Professor of International Finance, the George Washington University

Is There a Relationship between Political and Economic Integration?

Policy Commentary October 22, 2011

Economic integration in Asia has progressed further and enjoys broader support than political integration. Whether economic integration requires political integration in order to survive, and the nature of the relationship between interdependence and conflict, remain open questions. That is the case in general as well as in the particular case of key contemporary rising powers: China and India. These questions will play an important role in understanding the prospects for conflict or cooperation in Asia. This Policy Commentary will outline the general debate on these questions and apply it to China and to India.

Read the rest of the Policy Commentary here.

By Nikola Mirilovic, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Central Florida

Caging the Dragon? Asian Regional Integration and the United States

Policy Commentary May 22, 2011

Americans tend to be skeptical about or troubled by the notion of regional integration in Asia. There is some basis for concern, but the advantages of integration are likely to exceed the cost to the United States. An integrated Asia, the process of which has been shaped by the United States and like-minded partners, should strengthen the international system that Washington has labored to build over the last half century, reinvigorating and strengthening the norms and principles that have provided its foundation.

Defining “Asian integration” can be problematic for functional and geographic reasons. For my purposes, the term refers to East Asia, which I equate institutionally with ASEAN Plus Three. That narrowly conceived geographical scope allows me to demand more when it comes to functions. Meaningful integration means more than the loose confederation that defines ASEAN (its ambitions to create “communities” notwithstanding) but it doesn’t require the detailed legal framework of the European Union. At a minimum, it includes a regionwide free trade area, a political superstructure to express its collective will (no matter how sharp its teeth to demand conformity with its pronouncements) and recognition by the rest of the world that it is a meaningful political unit. Even that scaled-back objective may be too much. For many, Asian nations are too diverse, too committed to their (relatively) new sovereignty, and the benefits of integration are too diffuse to justify the costs. But if those formidable obstacles can be surmounted – and integration is proceeding, fitfully for sure, but there is progress nonetheless — most US observers worry that integration would come at their expense.

Key Point

  • The three main objections to Asian integration are: 1) that a regional economic unit would divert trade from the US; 2)that a regional economic unit would be dominated by China; and 3)that the rise of Asia and the subsequent empowerment of China could alter the way the world works
  • Countries that are drawn into China’s economic orbit still seek to limit the spread of Beijing’s influence and eagerly seek counterbalances to Chinese power • Asian nations seek to integrate because they believe that a unified Asia is needed to give them a political voice commensurate with their rising economic power
  • US policy makers should see Asian integration as a way of balancing the scale and binding China in a web of commitments • Washington needs to develop an Asia-Pacific strategy where Asia can play a key role as both a focus of US foreign policy in its own right and a powerful means to achieve broader US interests

Read the rest of the Policy Commentary here.

By Brad Glosserman, Executive Director, Pacific Forum CSIS (Honolulu, Hawaii)

Re-Examining Nationality in Aging Asia- Insights from Japan and South

Policy Commentary January 22, 2011

Several countries in Asia have recently amended their nationality laws, including the Philippines (2003), India (2003), Indonesia (2006), Taiwan (2006), Thailand (2008), Japan (2008), Vietnam (2009), and South Korea (2010). Was it mere coincidence that these countries reassessed their nationality laws? Or did they have important reasons to discard variously ‘outdated’ clauses in the face of sharp public debates and political contestations over issues of nationhood? This policy commentary provides background and context towards understanding some key issues that motivate changes to nationality laws in Asia, especially in Japan and South Korea. It suggests that the issue of nationality has become bound up with the dynamics and political implications of ‘human flows’ in Asia.

Key Points

  • The key changes over nationality laws revolve around two points. First, there are moves to redefine the legal status of the children of international marriage and divorce because of the increase in international marriage over the past 20 years in Asia. Second, governments must decide whether to accept dual/multiple nationality status.
  • In Japan, influential voices, primarily from the business sector, have urged the government to relax conditions for acquiring Japanese nationality.
  • The higher percentage and more rapid increase of international marriage in South Korea (compared to Japan) and various issues of social integration helped to shape public opinion and push the government to reform its nationality law. • Unlike the government in South Korea, the Kan Cabinet in Japan has yet to form a party or public consensus on a new law on dual nationality.
  • The aging society of Asia’s developed countries and the population growth of its developing countries will together intensify intra-regional competition to attract ‘the best and the brightest’ while managing flows of cheap labor.

Read the rest of the Policy Commentary here.

By Aizawa Nobuhiro, Institute for Developing Economies, Japan