Policy Commentaries – Rising Powers Initiative

Indo-US Strategic Partnership: Top Challenges

Policy Commentary, April 17 2024

Dr. K.P. Vijayalakshmi

U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, right, with Secretary of State Antony Blinken, second right, speaks with their Indian counterparts in New Delhi, India, on Nov. 10, 2023 | Photo Credit: Jonathan Ernst/AP

In the ever-changing world of international relations, few relationships are as large and significant as those that unite the United States and India. In an increasingly linked global environment, the India-U.S. partnership, which is based on shared democratic principles, economic linkages, and strategic interests, is a vital foundation for global stability and progress. However, a deeper look reveals a complex network of nuances and intricacies that have come together to create this progression, which is closely related to the national advancements of both nations. Mutual recognition of each other’s strategic importance is the basis of the Indo-American partnership that international, regional, and bilateral factors have impacted.

Mutual Benefits

Politically, regardless of affiliation, the United States political system has acknowledged India’s significance in the bilateral, regional, and global strategic landscape. This prevalent opinion has underscored the belief that improved/positive connections between the two nations provide mutual benefits, particularly in areas like defense, security trade, technology, and healthcare, to name a few. Indian perceptions have matched these assumptions, too. Such thinking has led to a gainful reciprocal effect between the United States and India in multiple areas that are becoming more apparent, especially as India works to strengthen its industrial base and achieve self-sufficiency via joint ventures and technology transfers. In addition, the U.S. shift away from China in an era of “strategic competition” has accelerated the cooperation in many facets of the partnership.

However, even as the strategic landscape remains a push factor for both to work towards shared objectives, concerns about the depth and scope of cooperation continue to be aired in the U.S. political realm. Similarly, with China looming large and a dynamic U.S. policy towards managing the “China Threat,” questions arise in India regarding the feasibility of strategic initiatives like the Indo-Pacific economic framework and semiconductor partnerships. The concerns outlined in some of the dialogues on trade, tech transfers and “sensitivities” issues are compounded by internal variables, like election cycles (U.S. Presidential elections and Indian elections) and protectionist attitudes, which might impact the trajectory of bilateral relations. Apart from immediate concerns, differing strategic viewpoints on certain issues in India’s neighborhood and terrorism provide further challenges.

Complex Regional Security- Building Trust

India’s desire for strategic autonomy is accompanied by worries about possible isolationist tendencies coming from Washington, despite the U.S.’ emphasis on economic regeneration and maintaining strategic competitiveness through “friend shoring.” As seen by the breaks from conventional wisdom during President Trump’s presidency, the fluidity of U.S. foreign policy necessitates modifying Indo-American ties to consider evolving geopolitical circumstances. Further, highlighting the complex nature of the Indo-US relationship are the divergent perspectives on counterterrorism. Different perspectives on regional security and bilateral priorities also highlight how important communication and understanding are to address shared problems successfully. Historical legacies and sensitivity to perceived power dynamics further highlight the importance of building trust and developing empathy in bilateral relationships.

Despite such challenges, a remarkable transformation has occurred in the India-U.S. strategic ties, providing many opportunities for cooperation, particularly in fields like climate change and renewable energy. Though certain disputes still exist, the depth of the Indo-US partnership is nevertheless based on a firm commitment to practical collaboration and the upholding of common ideals to manage an inclusive, rule-based world order. Perceptible progress in managing the trajectory of strategic initiatives still draws attention to resolving long-standing issues and balancing divergent opinions that will need constant effort and shrewd diplomacy on the part of both sides.

Remarks made by Dr. K.P. Vijayalakshmi, Professor & Head, Department of Geopolitics, and IR, MAHE, Manipal, Karnataka at the Panel Discussion held on January 18, 2024, as part of the project Partners in Progress: How Does the U.S.-India Strategic Partnership Matter?

Organized by the Centre for East Asian Studies, CHRIST (Deemed to be University) & Rising Powers Initiative, Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University in collaboration with U.S. Consulate General Chennai.

How the U.S. Partnership Boosts Indian Strategic Priorities

Policy Commentary, April 11 2024

By Shibani Mehta

Confederation of Indian Industry Director-General Chandrajit Banerjee, National Security Advisor Ajit Doval, his U.S. counterpart Jake Sullivan and U.S. Ambassador to India Eric Garcetti during a roundtable on Advancing India-U.S. Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies (iCET) at CII, in New Delhi on June 13, 2023. | Photo Credit: PTI

The growing partnership between India and the United States stands out in the quickly changing global partnership environment because both countries have strong military cooperation and a vision for the future that is rich in technological innovation. The acknowledgement of this shared interest at the highest levels of leadership creates the foundation for a strategic embrace that extends beyond government lines and into the corporate sector as both countries work to move up the value chain.

Partnership Core Components

Two essential components of this developing alliance are military cooperation and science and technology. These areas have gained significant traction in the last year, as shown by the volume and kind of interactions between the two countries. As a consequence of a unique alignment of top-level leadership buy-in from both India and the US, tangible results are anticipated. India’s goal to become a technological innovation powerhouse is a major motivator for this partnership. A shift in policy has been triggered by the introduction of iCET, which has caused a surge in several industries, including robotics, drone technology, and space research. The suggested deep tech draft strategy highlights India’s willingness to push boundaries and go into unexplored areas.

Yet, amid these positive developments, a critical gaze at the domestic innovation ecosystem within the industry is imperative. Challenges persist, as exemplified by initiatives such as the iDEX challenge on maritime intelligence capabilities. While grants and awards incentivize start-ups, there is a need to go beyond and demystify processes for the private sector. Regular workshops, both in India and the United States, can play a pivotal role in socializing innovation processes, fostering collaboration, and navigating regulatory landscapes.

Fuelling Innovation & Achieving Results

A specialized agency for military partnership might close the gap between the private sector and government initiatives, taking inspiration from successful models such as the collaboration between the US and India in their space industry. This cooperation would act as a bridge for idea sharing, priority alignment, and regulatory framework traversing in both countries. The GE Aerospace deal transaction serves as an example of a strategic relationship that might prove to be a game-changer for India. Concurrently, the creation of the micron plant serves as evidence of the Indian market’s appeal to US investors. Examining the internal operations of both countries is increasingly essential as the structures for cooperation are put in place. If we work together to improve cooperation, simplify procedures, and foster innovative ecosystems, we can achieve tangible results.

In the future, a mutual willingness in promoting innovation and military cooperation may bring in a new phase of bilateral relations. In addition to taking the India-US relationship to new heights, regular and concentrated workshops, a cooperative defense agency, and a strong emphasis on demystifying procedures will also provide a pattern for global partnerships based on innovation and strategic cooperation.

Remarks made by: Ms. Shibani Mehta, Senior Research Analyst, Carnegie India at First Virtual Panel Discussion on ‘The US-India Political/Strategic Landscape and Its Impact,’ January 18, 2024 for an ongoing project on Partners in Progress: How Does the US-India Strategic Partnership Matter?

Organized by: Centre for East Asian Studies, CHRIST (Deemed to be University) & Rising Powers Initiative, Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University in collaboration with US Consulate General, Chennai.

U.S.-India Political and Strategic Landscape and its Impact on Cooperation

Policy Commentary, April 2 2024

By Dr. C. Raja Mohan

Introduction

The dynamics of the Indo-U.S. relationship have defied persistent pessimism and surpassed analytical expectations. Despite the challenges and crises often viewed as potential deal-breakers, the trajectory of this relationship has consistently outperformed the prevailing narrative. A crucial factor contributing to this success is the unwavering political commitment exhibited by diverse governments in both nations. The prevailing inclination to prioritize alliances, non-alignment, and strategic autonomy has posed a challenge in comprehending the relationship’s development. Letting go of these fixations is crucial to understanding the partnership’s development in a more complex way. Allies, which are often seen incorrectly as being tight and inflexible, are essential components of global politics that provide flexible conditions as opposed to unchangeable restrictions.

The contentious idea of “strategic autonomy” has been used to justify avoiding collaboration with the US and maintaining reliance on other nations. India’s viewpoint on Asian security is clearly changing away from an ideological bias based on the West. The changing official narrative highlights the need for a practical approach and marks a break from the historical framework that hampered India’s achievements.

The emergence of a national consensus is a noteworthy change in India. The contemporary political environment, especially under Prime Minister Modi, shows a capacity to overcome nationalist resistance, in contrast to the difficulties experienced in the past by leaders such as Manmohan Singh in dealing with ideological opposition. This change is essential to developing trust in dealing with the United States and creating a partnership that benefits both parties. A closer look at the relationship’s structure indicates a break from ideological limitations. As the United States looks for effective allies in Asia to help build a new security framework to counter China’s growth, the burden-sharing idea becomes relevant. The focus now is on cooperative operations where Asian allies voluntarily contribute to their security, rather than the United States imposing conditions.

Recommendations

To effectively navigate the complex dynamics of the India-U.S. relationship, it is critical to establish a discussion framework that is both structured and strategic. The lack of a well-defined, cohesive framework continues to be a substantial barrier, emphasising the need for both countries to proactively develop a comprehensive strategy for diplomatic discussions. Notwithstanding initial scepticism and the perception of insurmountable obstacles, both factions’ leadership has consistently surpassed expectations.

Conversely, the fixation on alliances, non-alignment, and strategic autonomy, which has historically impeded progress, should be addressed by both countries. A paradigm shift is required to address the prevalent belief in India that partnerships are inherently inflexible and restrictive, which is heavily influenced by the concept of strategic autonomy. External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar admission that strategic autonomy had in the past been employed as a justification for avoiding collaboration with the United States underscores the imperative to abandon this way of thinking. To cultivate closer connections between the two countries, a more pragmatic and adaptable approach to partnerships is vital.

The present government in India is actively engaged in efforts to enhance diplomatic relations with the United States, acknowledging the strategic value of expanding diplomatic alliances. Cooperation that endures and is prosperous is widely recognised to require that both countries manage their domestic affairs and policies in an efficient manner. This requires a deliberate efforts to establish agreement within the country, guaranteeing that policies are in line with the cooperative objectives of the bilateral association.

In addition, acknowledging the significance of effective security frameworks in Asia, the United States necessitates assistance from potent and capable nations. The adoption of burden-sharing as a practice becomes essential for all regional powers, and India’s advancements in this regard are praiseworthy. Asian nations’ collective initiatives to safeguard themselves are exemplified by the formation of the QUAD and trilateral alliances. As a result, there is a strong recommendation for the United States to reveal specific geopolitical obligations, thereby promoting openness and confidence in the alliance.

Notwithstanding notable advancements in defence, commerce, and industrial collaboration in recent times, it is imperative to sustain the collaboration’s momentum in the face of persistent global challenges. It is imperative for both countries to underscore the significance of ongoing endeavours, enduring alliances, and a mutual dedication to manoeuvring through the intricacies of the present geopolitical environment.

Remarks made by: Dr C Raja Mohan, Former Director of the Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore and Currently a Visiting Professor there, at the First Virtual Panel Discussion on ‘The US-India Political/Strategic Landscape and Its Impact,’ January 18, 2024, for an ongoing project on Partners in Progress: How Does the US-India Strategic Partnership Matter?

The Fallacy of a Taliban Strong State

Policy Commentary, August 21 2021

Will the blast outside the Kabul airport on the eve of American withdrawal prove to be a warning shot to the Taliban or a case of an isolated attempt to take advantage of a chaotic security environment? Be that as it may, one thing is certain—it won’t be long before the Taliban faces an ongoing paradox like every previous government in Afghanistan—in order to have a strong state, Afghanistan needs a weak center. This hard realization is something that since the late 1970s, each successive group running the country has been unable to come to terms with. There’s no reason to think that the Taliban will be any different this time around and therein lies a fundamental weakness for the new dispensation in Kabul.

That the first stirring of a militant opposition from within is coming from the Panjshir Valley in the north and led by the son of legendary fighter Ahmad Shah Masud is no surprise. Afghanistan is comprised of multiple ethno-linguistic minorities, all of whom have long sought to protect their de facto federal status and if necessary, fight for it. What should be surprising for any observer is the complete absence of any secession sentiment among these groups. This is despite the fact that Afghan minorities have next door kin, with Tajiks having Tajikistan and Uzbeks having Uzbekistan. Even after 42 years of war and turmoil, including five years of civil war in the early 1990s, the majority (barely) Pashtuns as well as all the others, seem to share a strong sense of Afghan national identity.

Theoretically, this should make it much easier for the Afghan state to hang together unlike so many other states with minorities that want a country of their own. Empirically though, the Afghan state flourished (or at least functioned reasonably) only when the country resembled a highly decentralized political entity with powerful regional powerbrokers in charge of their own affairs. This was the case much of the time prior to the 1978 communist coup against the republican Mohammed Daoud and during the earlier nominal monarchy of his cousin King Zahir Shah. The system worked because the central “state” represented by Kabul was fragmented and non-threatening and served more as a symbol of pan-Afghan nationalism.

Kabul has always been dependent on foreign sponsors to lesser or greater degrees precisely because of the de facto strong federated state and the lack of access to resources that are necessary to run the country. Customs duties, transit fees, taxes and the like that should be the privy of the central government, was largely in the hands of regional leaders. The American intervention could disturb but not dislodge this political economy system. U.S. dollars of course produced a financial bonanza for those who controlled Kabul starting in 2001 thanks to soaring levels of corruption, but external assistance also allowed the central government to take credit for important gains. According to the Human Development Report 2020, Afghanistan managed to make substantial strides from 2000 onwards in key areas. For example, life expectancy went up from 55.8 years in 2000 to 64.8 by 2019. Across the same time, expected years of schooling showed a dramatic increase from 5.9 to 10.2 years.

Now that the Taliban has swept in and the Afghan military forces melted away, a big question is how much political power the new central government is going to amass, and perhaps more significantly, how much it is willing to give away. It is hard to not to see the centralizing tendency taking hold among the militants, especially as they arrive in the capital on the wave of hubris borne out of defeating not one, but two, superpowers—the Soviets and the United States. The Taliban this time may be able to consolidate their power much better than any predecessor for a very different reason in this instance and it’s no thanks to internal support or transformation. Rather, it is because the regional environment they find is way better than they could have ever hoped for, given the simultaneous friendly ties to Pakistan, China and Russia.

American withdrawal has coincided with China’s increasing interest in Afghanistan’s mines and minerals and a new commitment to shore up its political credentials with the Taliban to secure those economic stakes. Investments were stepped up when NATO forces left in 2014 and more recently China has been attempting to expand its influence with Afghanistan via the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) which includes a network of roads, ports, oil and gas pipelines and optical fiber cables. For the world’s biggest rising power, this part of the BRI known as China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) could be optimized within a trilateral China-Pakistan-Afghanistan combination.

From the Taliban’s point of view, China is attractive not just for its deep pockets but because Beijing will leave them free to pursue any domestic policies they choose. If the Taliban exerts central control through harsh Sharia laws that affect rights of women and girls or squeezes minorities, they can expect a free pass from China, Russia and Pakistan.

Thus, this time around, the Taliban will have a much better externally permissive and resourced hand to rule from Kabul unlike their earlier regime in 1996-2001 which saw only Pakistani and Saudi Arabian support. This external advantage however may not be enough if the internal state-regional equilibrium is fundamentally disturbed. The strong state fallacy and the push for centralization and homogenization when Afghan history dictates just the opposite, might be what ultimately foils Taliban control.

Deepa Ollapally, Research Professor of International Affairs & Director of Rising Powers Initiative, George Washington University.

Understanding Indian Policy Dilemmas in the Indo-Pacific through an India–US–China Maritime Triangle Lens

Policy Commentary October 13, 2016

The author is Dr. Deepa Ollapally, Research Professor of International Affairs and Director of the Rising Powers Initiative.

Between the American rebalance strategy and Chinese Maritime Silk Road initiative, India is increasingly pressed to formulate a maritime strategy that ideally meets Indian economic and strategic objectives. This is generating major policy dilemmas for India stemming from the attraction of economic integration led by China on the one hand, versus the attraction of strategic integration offered by the United States on the other hand. This paper suggests that between these binary options, there are both opportunities and challenges for India, calling for fine-grained policymaking. The notional concept of an India–US–China maritime triangle is useful in sifting through the choices before India to meet its ambitions of development as well as retain and improve its strategic influence in the Indian Ocean and beyond.

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The ADIZ imbroglio: A Chinese View

Policy Commentary December 15, 2013

In a Policy Commentary for the Rising Powers Initiative, RPI author Dr. Ren Xiao, director of the Center for the Study of Chinese Foreign Policy at Fudan University in China, offers a view from China on the recent dispute over Beijing’s air defense identification zone in the East China Sea. Though China’s latest move in the on-going islands dispute prompted a range of reactions from Asian powers, Ren Xiao defends the decision as a natural response to recent developments and calls on China and Japan to form a crisis management mechanism to avoid further conflict in region:

On November 23, 2013，China announced its establishment of an East China Sea air defense identification zone (ADIZ). The ADIZ was clearly under deliberation for some time, and its announcement was carefully timed by Beijing. The announcement was withheld as the new Chinese leadership concentrated on the upcoming Third Plenum and was released ten days after the third Plenum concluded.

The ADIZ announcement was a continuation of the Diaoyu/Senkaku island crisis, a counter-measure that resulted from Japan and China’s failure to establish a mechanism to avoid conflict and manage the island dispute. One puzzle is why the announcement of the ADIZ did not happen last year (2012). Following Japan’s “nationalization” of the islands, China took a series of steps to counter-balance Japan’s act. An announcement of the ADIZ back then would have seemed more natural and logical.

Nevertheless, there is an important follow-up question: why did the announcement seem sudden and abrupt to other nations, triggering strong reactions from several parties, including the United States? Not surprisingly, when meeting with the Chinese leaders in early December, U.S. Vice President Joseph Biden expressed concern with China’s establishment of the ADIZ. Chinese leaders responded by restating its position on the ADIZ.

In Defense of China’s Rights to an ADIZ

China has the legal right to establish the ADIZ, given the previous establishment of ADIZs by the United States and Japan. An air defense identification zone is an area outside a country’s territorial airspace that is defined in an attempt to identify whether an approaching aircraft is a threat or not so that they have enough time to react. The ADIZ is not territorial airspace. Over 20 countries have set up their ADIZs, thus China has the legitimate right to do the same.

Japan should not have been surprised by China’s counter-measure move. This move was not a question of “if”, but “when.” The ADIZ is a continuation of China’s reactions to Japan’s “nationalization” of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands in September 2012. Infuriated by Japan’s actions, Beijing is determined not to let Japan have unilateral de facto control of the islands. China keeps sending coast guard ships to the adjacent waters to form a situation of joint but separate patrolling. In fact, China is aiming for a new status quo, in which China will reciprocate Japan’s actions.

Japan is still paying a price for its ill-conceived action in September 2012 to “nationalize” the islands, unnecessarily and unwisely provoking China and grossly underestimating China’s reaction, will, and determination. For Beijing, its restraint over the unresolved dispute went unappreciated by Japan, who has took advantage of China’s restraint to consolidate its control of the islands, thereby revealing Japan’s intention to seize the islands.

Moreover, 44 years ago, Japan established its ADIZ, which far exceeds its self-claimed “medium line” in the East China Sea. The closest point of Japan’s ADIZ is only 130 kilometers from China’s coast. On the basis of its own ADIZ, Japan’s military jets often scrambled to follow and monitor Chinese jets flying in international airspace within Japan’s ADIZ. After the Diaoyu/Senkaku crisis broke out, Japanese jets scrambled more frequently than before, highlighting tensions in the East China Sea.

With China’s ADIZ established, the two countries are now more “equal.” It is unfair to claim that China should not have set up an ADIZ when both Japan and the United States have established their own ADIZs. The United States was the first country to unilaterally declare an ADIZ; Japan’s ADIZ declaration was also unilateral. Thus, China also has the right to make such a unilateral declaration.

Mishandling the South Korean Reaction

Soon after, it was reported that China’s ADIZ overlapped with a section of the Korean ADIZ that is 20km wide and 115km long, and encompasses Suyan rock (what South Korea calls “Ieodo”). China argues that because Suyan is underwater there is not a territorial dispute between China and South Korea over the rock. This problem can be solved through maritime demarcation. On December 8, 2013, South Korea declared the extension of its ADIZ to now include Suyan rock. China expressed regret at this move. One question is whether China could have handled this ADIZ matter more carefully in order to not involve South Korea.

Conclusion

This imbroglio once again highlights the urgent need for Japan and China to form a crisis management mechanism. Both countries need to sit down and discuss what they should do to avoid conflict in East China Sea.

The author is the director of the Center for the Study of Chinese Foreign Policy at Fudan University, Shanghai, China. He is also a co-author on the Rising Powers Initiative’s Worldviews of Aspiring Powers project.

The Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA): U.S. Perspective

Policy Commentary January 22, 2012

Four and a half years after the agreement between the U.S and Korean governments, the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA or KORUS) was finally ratified by both the U.S. Congress and the Korean Parliament in late 2011 and is likely to be implemented early this year. At present, the United States has FTAs in force with 17 countries. President Barack Obama also signed free trade agreements with Colombia, Korea and Panama on October 21, 2011, but these agreements have yet to be implemented. The KORUS agreement is the most important free trade agreement for the U.S. since the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) that came into force in 1994.

With $3.3 trillion in 2010, international trade accounts for 23% of the $14.5 trillion U.S. economy. U.S. exports supported an estimated 9.2 million jobs in 2010, up from 8.7 million in 2009. (Johnson, 2011) Despite sluggish U.S. economic growth between 2003 and 2010, export-related jobs increased by over 3 million during this period. For every billion dollars of exports, over 5,000 jobs are supported in this country. That is why President Obama issued an executive order on March 11, 2010, creating the National Export Initiative (NEI), which aims to double U.S. exports over the next five years creating 2 million new jobs here at home. The NEI recognizes that exports will play a critical role in promoting American economic growth. In particular, exports play an important role in supporting a healthy and vibrant manufacturing sector. The nearly 3.7 million manufacturing jobs supported by exports account for 27% of all employment in the manufacturing sector. In this connection, free trade agreements play a critical role in promoting American exports and job growth.

Read the rest of the Policy Commentary.

By Yoon-shik Park, Professor of International Finance, the George Washington University

Is There a Relationship between Political and Economic Integration?

Policy Commentary October 22, 2011

Economic integration in Asia has progressed further and enjoys broader support than political integration. Whether economic integration requires political integration in order to survive, and the nature of the relationship between interdependence and conflict, remain open questions. That is the case in general as well as in the particular case of key contemporary rising powers: China and India. These questions will play an important role in understanding the prospects for conflict or cooperation in Asia. This Policy Commentary will outline the general debate on these questions and apply it to China and to India.

Read the rest of the Policy Commentary here.

By Nikola Mirilovic, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Central Florida

Caging the Dragon? Asian Regional Integration and the United States

Policy Commentary May 22, 2011

Americans tend to be skeptical about or troubled by the notion of regional integration in Asia. There is some basis for concern, but the advantages of integration are likely to exceed the cost to the United States. An integrated Asia, the process of which has been shaped by the United States and like-minded partners, should strengthen the international system that Washington has labored to build over the last half century, reinvigorating and strengthening the norms and principles that have provided its foundation.

Defining “Asian integration” can be problematic for functional and geographic reasons. For my purposes, the term refers to East Asia, which I equate institutionally with ASEAN Plus Three. That narrowly conceived geographical scope allows me to demand more when it comes to functions. Meaningful integration means more than the loose confederation that defines ASEAN (its ambitions to create “communities” notwithstanding) but it doesn’t require the detailed legal framework of the European Union. At a minimum, it includes a regionwide free trade area, a political superstructure to express its collective will (no matter how sharp its teeth to demand conformity with its pronouncements) and recognition by the rest of the world that it is a meaningful political unit. Even that scaled-back objective may be too much. For many, Asian nations are too diverse, too committed to their (relatively) new sovereignty, and the benefits of integration are too diffuse to justify the costs. But if those formidable obstacles can be surmounted – and integration is proceeding, fitfully for sure, but there is progress nonetheless — most US observers worry that integration would come at their expense.

Key Point

The three main objections to Asian integration are: 1) that a regional economic unit would divert trade from the US; 2)that a regional economic unit would be dominated by China; and 3)that the rise of Asia and the subsequent empowerment of China could alter the way the world works
Countries that are drawn into China’s economic orbit still seek to limit the spread of Beijing’s influence and eagerly seek counterbalances to Chinese power • Asian nations seek to integrate because they believe that a unified Asia is needed to give them a political voice commensurate with their rising economic power
US policy makers should see Asian integration as a way of balancing the scale and binding China in a web of commitments • Washington needs to develop an Asia-Pacific strategy where Asia can play a key role as both a focus of US foreign policy in its own right and a powerful means to achieve broader US interests

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By Brad Glosserman, Executive Director, Pacific Forum CSIS (Honolulu, Hawaii)

Re-Examining Nationality in Aging Asia- Insights from Japan and South

Policy Commentary January 22, 2011

Several countries in Asia have recently amended their nationality laws, including the Philippines (2003), India (2003), Indonesia (2006), Taiwan (2006), Thailand (2008), Japan (2008), Vietnam (2009), and South Korea (2010). Was it mere coincidence that these countries reassessed their nationality laws? Or did they have important reasons to discard variously ‘outdated’ clauses in the face of sharp public debates and political contestations over issues of nationhood? This policy commentary provides background and context towards understanding some key issues that motivate changes to nationality laws in Asia, especially in Japan and South Korea. It suggests that the issue of nationality has become bound up with the dynamics and political implications of ‘human flows’ in Asia.

Key Points

The key changes over nationality laws revolve around two points. First, there are moves to redefine the legal status of the children of international marriage and divorce because of the increase in international marriage over the past 20 years in Asia. Second, governments must decide whether to accept dual/multiple nationality status.
In Japan, influential voices, primarily from the business sector, have urged the government to relax conditions for acquiring Japanese nationality.
The higher percentage and more rapid increase of international marriage in South Korea (compared to Japan) and various issues of social integration helped to shape public opinion and push the government to reform its nationality law. • Unlike the government in South Korea, the Kan Cabinet in Japan has yet to form a party or public consensus on a new law on dual nationality.
The aging society of Asia’s developed countries and the population growth of its developing countries will together intensify intra-regional competition to attract ‘the best and the brightest’ while managing flows of cheap labor.

Read the rest of the Policy Commentary here.

By Aizawa Nobuhiro, Institute for Developing Economies, Japan