Drilling Down into Views in Japan and India on the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China

Policy Alert #251 | November 10, 2022

The 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (NCCPC) was heavily scrutinized in international media given the symbolic importance Chinese leadership has given it. Newly reelected President Xi Jinping was “long expected to secure a third term,” but the decisiveness of Xi’s victory, the manner in which the NCCPC “cemented Xi Jinping’s iron grip on the party” and the sometimes contentious tone of the event were revealing of a more resolutely assertive stance than anticipated by experts and observers. From former president Hu Jintao being physically removed to the importance Xi dedicated to military modernization, the 20th NCCPC projected an image of a more dominant Xi in China, and a more hawkish China in the world.

India and Japan, two countries which have had increasingly fraught relations with China in the five last years since the 19th NCCPC, observed with heightened interest, and their respective national media and commentators focused on how specific issues were addressed during the NCCPC, particularly border clashes and Xi’s “complete control” over Chinese foreign policy.

 

INDIA
As the Communist Party of China held its National 20th Congress, India announced plans to participate in a series of military drills alongside the US, in proximity of Chinese borders. Indian committed to send a considerably larger force to these US led drills than it did in the Vostok 2022 drills in Russia. (See Policy Alert #249 for more on India’s participation in Vostok 2022.) Fittingly, Indian media and experts focused on the state of India-China relations and how they had deteriorated as of late.

Overall, the 20th NCCPC was perceived negatively by Indian media, notably as a consequence of the public outcry over the appearance of border commander Qi Fabao at the NCPCC. Qi had been a part of the skirmish of June 15, 2020, in which 20 Indian soldiers were killed and dozens wounded, and his presence at such a high-profile event was seen as a provocation.

Far from a diplomatic faux pas, Qi’s presence at the Congress was deliberate and was anticipated as early as August 2022, as he was publicly announced to be one of 304 delegates from the PLA and People’s Armed Police Force. China could only anticipate this would cause tensions with India as Qi’s selection as an Olympic torchbearer had already caused an outcry in February 2022.

Despite this perceived provocation, Indian media and experts also showcased Chinese diplomatic efforts to play down tensions and appease India. Former Indian Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale pushed back on the enemy rhetoric, and instead identified that to China,  India is a “significant neighbour with a troubled relationship that needs to be managed correctly.”

 

JAPAN

A few weeks prior to the 20th NCCPC, Chinese coast guard ships impinged on Japanese waters near the disputed Senkaku Islands, which tinted  the perspective of Japanese media and experts who picked up on the recurring theme of militarization throughout Xi’s speeches. As Indian perspectives showed, Xi’s victory was not a surprise, though the amplitude of it was. For instance, Bonji Ohara, a Senior Fellow at the, Sasakawa Peace Foundation in Tokyo, “expected to see the concentration of power, but did not expect it to be done in such a forceful manner.”

Associate Professor Suzuki Takashi, from Aichi Prefectural University, pointed out that Xi’s decisive victory entails that Xi will “tighten his grip on power and exercise strong leadership to confront the international community.” At the same time, Xi’s victory may also mean that certain bellicose refrains may be dropped as they are no longer necessary as electoral motivators.

Indeed, according to Takashi Kawakami, a Professor at Takushoku University in Tokyo, Xi’s consecration at the 20th NCCPC may signal a decrease in the probability of an invasion of Taiwan as: “Xi had to keep talking about the goal of Taiwan’s unification in order to strengthen his own power.” Having achieved that, Kawakami assesses that “the possibility that he will attempt to take Taiwan by force has probably receded.”

RPI acknowledges support from the MacArthur Foundation and the Carnegie Corporation of New York for its activities.”