Abstract
North Korea’s provocative behavior led to a toughening of U.S. and South Korean policy toward Pyongyang and drove a stake through the heart of any potential peace initiatives for the foreseeable future. However, there are circumstances that could force the peace issue back to the forefront of inter-Korean and multilateral engagement with Pyongyang. U.S. political impatience with the lack of diplomatic progress on achieving North Korean denuclearization could, ironically, lead to a growing chorus advocating yet more diplomatic engagement. An even stronger catalyst would be the election of a progressive candidate as South Korea’s president in 2012 and a return to North Korean policies that prioritized process over actually achieving objectives. Washington and Seoul should understand that a poorly crafted peace treaty could give a dangerous false sense of security. An accord that failed to reduce the North Korean conventional military threat could lead to calls for a premature reduction of allied deterrent and defense capabilities. Also, a failure to link a peace treaty with substantial progress in North Korean denuclearization would lock into place a perilous imbalance between the two Koreas. Reducing the North Korean military threat would require arms reductions and redeployments, confidence- and security-building measures, and a comprehensive verification regime. Several of the necessary components of a peace treaty were previously agreed to by the Koreas in the 1992 Basic Agreement and other documents. The fact that Pyongyang has repeatedly violated those commitments does not bode well for its willingness to abide by the terms of a new peace treaty.
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Klingner, Bruce
Published inBlog