Freilich, Charles D

Abstract
A difficult security environment, electoral system and bureaucratic structure create five pathologies for Israel’s national-security decision-making process.
In recent months Israel’s political and defence leaders have engaged in an unprecedented and vociferous public debate about Iran’s nuclear programme, and about the advisability of an Israeli strike to destroy or delay it. Meir Dagan, the former head of the secret intelligence service Mossad, called an Israeli attack, at this time, ‘the stupidest thing I have ever heard of’, warned that it might ignite a regional war and stated that there was still a window of some three years, while the former head of the internal security agency Shin Bet, Yuval Diskin, stated that he did ‘not trust’ Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s and Defense Minister Ehud Barak’s ‘messianic’ leadership.
The former chief of staff (2007–11) of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), Gabi Ashkenazi, has been more restrained, but has made clear his opposition to an operation at this time, and even the current chief of staff, bound by the strictures of his office, has let it be known that he is not enthusiastic.
President Shimon Peres, usually a model of discretion, has gone beyond the highly circumscribed limits of what is normally considered appropriate to his largely ceremonial position and come out publicly against an operation, stating that Israel should rely on US President Barack Obama’s public commitment to a policy of containment. Kadima Party leader Shaul Mofaz has joined the fray, becoming the first senior political figure to adopt a partisan position, averring that an attack at this time is premature and that Netanayhu is ‘speculating’ with Israel’s security.
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