Abstract: This article argues that the creation of ‘strategic partnerships’ as an alternative form of alignment represents an effort by Tokyo, and other US-allies, to ‘decenter’ their respective security policies from their erstwhile over-dependence on Washington. By examining the nature, purpose, and dynamics of strategic partnerships more closely, and investigating the empirical case of Australia, we can gain a greater appreciation of their significance both to Japan’s evolving security policy and the broader role they play in the Asia Pacific security landscape. The article argues that Australia has been the most significant and successful of Japan’s new strategic partnerships to date, has therefore come to represent the template for other new alignments, and hence provides a yardstick against which their effectiveness can be measured. It concludes that while the strategic partnership certainly represents a new departure for Japanese security policy – ostensibly independent of the US-alliance – closer inspection reveals how this relationship remains fundamentally bound to the broader American-hub-and-spokes system.
Country or Region: United States
Yuzawa, Takeshi
Abstract: Why has Japan attempted to promote Asian security multilateralism for over two decades despite its open acknowledgment of the vital centrality of the US–Japan alliance in its overall foreign and security policy? Why has Japan’s pursuit of regional security multilateralism sometimes swayed between an inclusive ‘Asia-Pacific’ (with the US) and an exclusive ‘East Asian’ format (without the US)? This article examines the nature of Japan’s approach to Asian security multilateralism through a new analytical model based on the decentering/recentering framework and major theoretical assumptions deriving from neoclassical realism. It unpacks the process by which Japanese policy-makers have come to recognize Asian security multilateralism as a means of advancing perceived political and security interests, arising from international pressures and opportunities. The analysis is divided into three phases; (1) Japan’s leading role in the formation of the ASEAN Regional Forum (1991–1994), (2) Japan’s initiatives for the establishment of the ASEAN Plus Three and the East Asian Summit (1997–2005), and (3) Japan’s renewed focus on the EAS with US membership (2010-onwards). The article reveals the changing dynamics of the ideas and motivations behind Japan’s initiatives for Asian security multilateralism.
Midford, Paul
Abstract: This article poses the question of why, after having consistently pursued an isolationist strategy of avoiding security ties with partners other than the US, and having followed the US in opposing regional security multilateralism, did Japan suddenly reverse course and get out in front of the US with its first post-war regional security initiative. This article addresses this question by tracing the internal debates, policy process and motivations that drove Japan to reverse its position, a process that transformed Japan into the leading champion of regional security multilateralism in East Asia.
Hughes, Chris
Abstract: Japan’s lifting of its arms export ban through the Three Principles on the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology has opened up new strategic opportunities for its policy-makers to reinforce existing, and build new, security partnerships. Japan still retains the intent to sustain and develop an indigenous defense production base, now through international collaboration rather than mainly autonomous production, and the leverage this may provide to hedge within and outside the US–Japan alliance framework. However, this paper demonstrates that Japan’s principal objective through international arms transfers is very much to use this as a mechanism to strengthen Japan’s integration of capabilities into the US–Japan alliance and overall US ‘rebalance’ strategy in East Asia. Japan’s main moves in developing an arms transfer strategy have either revolved around US–Japan bilateral projects, or cooperation with US allies and partners. Moreover, Japan’s continuing deficiencies in military technology and experience of international collaboration on the government and private sector levels means that its arms transfer strategy remains quite limited in ambition and especially implementation.
Midford, Paul
Abstract: During the cold war the United States was overwhelmingly central in Japan’s security policy. Japan hosted US bases and the Self-Defense Forces held joint exercises with the US military, even while shunning contacts with other militaries. Japan essentially refused even to discuss security with its neighbors. Special exceptions were made for the United States in otherwise sweeping policies, such as the exception for the United States in Tokyo’s ban on weapons exports and co-development. Since the end of the cold war, Japan’s security policy has undergone a little noticed transformation: it has steadily moved away from being centered on the United States as its sole security partner. Tokyo has initiated bilateral security dialogues with its Asian neighbors and assumed a leadership role in promoting regional multilateral security cooperation as a supplement to the US alliance. Japan has begun building bilateral security partnerships with a range of countries and actors, from Australia and India to the European Union. Paradoxically these changes have occurred even as the US–Japan alliance has strengthened. The articles in this special issue examine these new security ties with states and multilateral organizations, and other changes in policy that have made the United States less ‘special,’ such as by allowing arms exports to other actors.
Lee, Inyeop
Abstract: Why has North Korea been unable to implement serious economic reforms like those of China? By tracing the process of economic reform in China, this paper argues that the improvement of national security, especially as a result of diplomatic normalization with the United States, was an essential precondition for successful economic reform and growth. It reduced the fear of an open‐door policy and eased domestic control as well as reallocation of resources from the military to economic development. Furthermore, diplomatic normalization with the United States lifted economic sanctions, and allowed access to global markets, foreign direct investments, and membership in major international economic organizations. However, North Korea has technically been at war with the United States for the last 66 years. Therefore, it maintains very tight control of its population and spends a substantial portion of its GDP on the military. It has also been under severe economic sanctions and does not have access to the global economy. The possibility of any meaningful economic reforms in North Korea will depend on its success in improving national security by resolving the nuclear issue and normalizing diplomatic relations with the United States.
Weede, Erich
Abstract: Twenty years from now, the Chinese economy might be twice as large as that of the United States. Since great powers have always claimed spheres of influence, this raises the issue of what characteristics a Chinese sphere of influence might have. Currently, the Chinese sphere of influence is still rather fuzzy. But one might argue that North Korea is part of it. After all, the Chinese fought the Korean War in order to prevent all of Korea becoming part of the US sphere of influence. If one accepts that North Korea is part of the Chinese sphere of influence, then Kim Jong‐un’s nuclear weapons should become a Chinese concern instead of a US concern. If China wants a nuclear weapons power next door, and a joint missile defense effort by the United States, Japan, and South Korea because of it so be it. If China understands its national interest, as great powers have historically done, then it could undermine the North Korean regime more effectively than the United States could at much lower risks of escalation to a great war. Whereas the United States hesitates to recognize that North Korea is and should remain part of the Chinese sphere of influence, its economic sanctions against Russia risk driving Russia into China’s arms. Focusing on the incipient rivalry between China and the United States for global primacy does in no way imply advocacy of a hawkish US policy towards China. In the nuclear age, peace between rival powers should depend on two pillars: nuclear deterrence and economic interdependence, or “peace by fear” and “peace by trade.
Jung, Sung Chul
Abstract: What will be the future of international relations in Asia? What is the relation between Sino–US power transition and alliance politics? This study distinguishes two types of paths for great powers: lonely and popular. The lonely rise means attaining great power without winning strong allies (the United States and China provide examples), while the popular rise refers to the process of becoming a great power by attracting security partners (e.g., Germany, the Soviet Union, and Japan). Because the United States is no longer a lonely power due to its creation of an alliance network since the Cold War, today the lonely rising power, China, faces the arguably declining but still popular great power. Asian states will take four different strategies – (i) internal and external balancing, (ii) binding and buck‐passing, (iii) internal balancing, or (iv) hesitant bandwagoning – according to the existence or absence of two factors: an alliance relationship with the United States and territorial conflict with China. In the competition to attract more Asian states as allies and friends, China has a disadvantage in comparison to the United States due to its geographic location, authoritarian system, and fast‐growing economy, which cause it to be regarded as an aggressive power.
Cruz de Castro, Renato
Abstract: From 2011 to 2016, then US President Barack Obama vigorously pursued the policy of strategic rebalancing to Asia. The policy’s underlying goal was to prevent China from becoming the dominant power in the Asia–Pacific region. Unfortunately, the Obama administration’s efforts were thwarted by the strategy’s lack of a deterrence component, distracting shifts and crises in certain parts of the world, and the failure of the US Congress to pass the Trans‐Pacific Partnership into law. The 2016 election of Donald Trump, however, does not necessarily mean that the strategic rebalancing to Asia is doomed, if not already dead. It is still a “work in progress,” as the region remains a top security priority for Washington for two reasons. First, North Korea’s nuclear weapons program poses a clear and present danger to the United States; and second, China’s naval build‐up and island‐building and militarization activities in the South China Sea threaten not only the freedom of navigation but also the rules‐based international order. Consequently, the Trump administration has directed the US military to proceed with the rebalancing of its forces and capabilities in the Asia–Pacific. In conclusion, this article argues that despite his administration’s rhetoric that the rebalancing is dead in the water, President Trump is heeding his predecessor’s advice that “engaging in the Asia–Pacific is critical to America’s future prosperity and security.”
Klinger, Bruce
Abstract: Fears at the beginning of 2018 of imminent military hostilities on the Korean Peninsula were replaced by hopes of a diplomatic resolution to the long-standing North Korean nuclear problem. At first, North Korea appeared to have reversed its long-standing resistance to abandoning its nuclear arsenal. After meeting with Kim Jong-un, a senior South Korean delegation announced Pyongyang had “clearly expressed its commitment to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” But a careful reading of Pyongyang’s offer showed it came with heavy strings attached and consistent with enduring regime objectives. North Korean statements reflected traditional regime demands for conditionally and reciprocity. All previous attempts at diplomatic resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue have failed, so there is good reason to be skeptical and wary. Given the lengthy record of diplomatic failures in curbing the North Korean nuclear program, it is prudent to be cautious is trusting reports that the regime is now willing to abandon its nuclear arsenal. That is not to say the U.S. should not try again, but engagement should be based on a thorough knowledge of past efforts. Even during negotiations, the North will continue to augment and refine its missile and nuclear capabilities. So, Washington and its allies must keep their eyes open, their shields up, and their swords sharp.
Roach, Stephen S
Preview: In the midst of an ever-escalating tariff war, I do not share the view that Sino-American tensions are all about trade imbalances. The real battle is a strategic clash over innovation and technology — the Holy Grail of any nation’s prosperity. Yes, there is a large and seemingly chronic trade imbalance between the United States and China that is growing even wider today. But this is just as much a function of America’s own macroeconomic problems as a reflection of unfair Chinese trading practices long alleged by the Washington consensus and now underscored by the shrill rhetoric of the Trump Administration.
Seyrafi, Sassan, and Amir-Hossein Ranjbarian
Abstract: The so-called Iran nuclear agreement, officially known as the Joint Comprehensive plan of Action, is an agreement between Iran and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council as well as Germany and the EU to ensure that Iran’s nuclear program will be exclusively peaceful. Praised as an historic diplomatic achievement that resolved a decade-long crisis, the 2015 agreement is distinctive in its comprehensive provisions and innovative solutions to various legal and technical issues. However, US President Donald Trump’s controversial decision to withdraw the US from the agreement in May 2018 has put its future in peril. This paper attempts to analyze the legal aspects of the US’ decision to withdraw from the Iran nuclear agreement with special reference to the currently on-going US-North Korea deal for the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. In the course of this study, special attention is given to the lessons learned from the Iran nuclear agreement.
Le, Tom
Abstract: The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) has not only changed how the USA engages in warfare but also how it maintains its military supremacy and how other nations budget and strategize. The very idea of the RMA has impacted how nations manage their technological advantages and raises the questions of can the RMA be monopolized and if not, which nations can adopt their own RMA? In September 2000, the Japan Defence Agency (now the Ministry of Defence [MOD]) produced a report titled ‘“Info-RMA”: Study on Info-RMA and the Future of the Self-Defence Forces’ to explore the prospects of implementing RMA principles in the Japan Self-Defence Forces. In this article, I explore to what extent can RMA principles be implemented in the Self-Defence Forces? I argue that although several significant changes have been implemented in technology, doctrine, operations and organization, various normative and technical constraints have directed the MOD to craft an RMA with Japanese characteristics, emphasizing defence and interconnectedness with the US armed forces. These findings suggest that current efforts to ‘normalize’ the Self-Defence Forces can succeed if crafted to appeal to the sensibilities of the Japanese public.
Liu, Chien
Abstract: Since the 1980s, Japan’s war memory has strained its relations with South Korea and China, to a less degree, the USA. Two of the thorniest issues are the comfort women and the US atomic bombing of Japan. Before the Obama administration announced its policy pivot to Asia in 2011, both Japanese and American leaders were reluctant to make amends for the past acts of their countries. However, in 2015, the Japanese conservative Prime Minister Abe reached an agreement with South Korea that “finally and irreversibly” resolved the comfort women issue, thus achieving a historic reconciliation between the two countries. In 2016, then President Obama visited Hiroshima to commemorate the atomic bomb victims. Then, in December 2016, the comfort women issue resurfaced in Japan and South Korea relations, indicating a failure of the reconciliation. Why did the USA change its policy on historical issues involving Japan? Why did Abe and the South Korean President Park Geun-hye settle the comfort women issue? Why did Obama visit Hiroshima? Why did the reconciliation fail? In this article, I propose a rational choice theory to answer these questions. Applying the proposed theory and relying on available evidence, I argue that the settlement of the comfort women issue and Obama’s visit to Hiroshima are important components of Obama’s pivot to Asia to balance China’s rise. The reconciliation failed mainly because it did not resolve the historical justice issue promoted by the human rights norms. I discuss some implications for reconciliation in Northeast Asia.
Lee, Yaechan
Abstract: Liberalists have argued that increased economic interdependence will deter the likelihood of war as opportunity costs of a military conflict will not be fashionable for either side. Realists such as Waltz contended that while interdependence promotes peace to a certain extent, it also multiplies the occasions for conflicts. Dale Copeland drew perspectives from both sides to argue that interdependence may lead to peace depending on the expectations of the future trade environment. Now, with the United States’ (US) ongoing trade war with China and its legacy of trade conflicts with Japan in the 1990s, the question of whether economic interdependence brings peace deserves to be revisited. This article, through making a comparison between the cases of bilateral trade conflicts between the US and China and the US and Japan, contends that increased bilateral economic interdependence also increased the frequency of conflicts in the two respective cases. Moreover, it further argues that such increase in frequency was due to the US’s negative expectations on the future trade environment.
