Weede, Erich

Abstract: Twenty years from now, the Chinese economy might be twice as large as that of the United States. Since great powers have always claimed spheres of influence, this raises the issue of what characteristics a Chinese sphere of influence might have. Currently, the Chinese sphere of influence is still rather fuzzy. But one might argue that North Korea is part of it. After all, the Chinese fought the Korean War in order to prevent all of Korea becoming part of the US sphere of influence. If one accepts that North Korea is part of the Chinese sphere of influence, then Kim Jong‐un’s nuclear weapons should become a Chinese concern instead of a US concern. If China wants a nuclear weapons power next door, and a joint missile defense effort by the United States, Japan, and South Korea because of it so be it. If China understands its national interest, as great powers have historically done, then it could undermine the North Korean regime more effectively than the United States could at much lower risks of escalation to a great war. Whereas the United States hesitates to recognize that North Korea is and should remain part of the Chinese sphere of influence, its economic sanctions against Russia risk driving Russia into China’s arms. Focusing on the incipient rivalry between China and the United States for global primacy does in no way imply advocacy of a hawkish US policy towards China. In the nuclear age, peace between rival powers should depend on two pillars: nuclear deterrence and economic interdependence, or “peace by fear” and “peace by trade.