Abstract
Rarely before has such a large and potentially consequential country tried to reform itself politically and economically as Myanmar is now attempting, following an extended period of extreme isolation and amid unprecedented international and digital connectedness that exists today. This is a challenge not only for Myanmar, but also for the United States and Japan as they try to facilitate this transformation in productive ways, in a coordinated fashion, and consistent with their own foreign policy and commercial interests. A pertinent question, therefore, is whether or not Washington and Tokyo are inclined and prepared to address Myanmar’s transition as an alliance issue, and if they are, then what is an efficient and effective way to go about this task.
The answer is mixed, for despite their pursuit of many common interests, the policy priorities and policy making environments in the United States and Japan differ significantly. In simple terms, the United States has a “democracy first” agenda in Myanmar that sometimes limits its options, while Japan takes a more flexible approach in order to maximize engagement and business opportunity. Still, President Obama and Prime Minister Abe provided a mandate in April 2014 to strengthen alliance cooperation in Southeast Asia (and in Myanmar in particular), and the two countries have complementary strengths and local networks that can be leveraged more effectively for the benefit of all.
Despite US concerns about stalled political liberalization and human rights abuses in Myanmar, Washington should take a longer-term horizon for evaluating reforms and consider enhancing its leverage with Myanmar through more effective policy coordination with Japan (which is a major player in the country), rather than the maintenance or reapplication of sanctions.
Read more here (purchase required)
Country or Region: United States
Satake, Tomohiko, and Yusuke Ishihara
Abstract
How does America’s greater focus on Asia impact the security policies of Japan and Australia? How does it change the nature of the Japan-US-Australia security partnership? This paper attempts to answer these questions by looking at Japanese and Australian responses to the Obama Administration’s new security policy toward Asia called “rebalancing.” After examining them, it argues that the regional allied response to America’s new security posture has generated greater momentum for both allies to collaborate in wider areas in a more timely and effective way than before. It concludes asserting that, in the era of rebalance, Japan, the United States, and Australia have not only deepened their existing cooperation, but also have expanded potential areas of cooperation toward a more “dynamic” partnership.
Read more here (purchase required)
Rozman, Gilbert
Abstract
This article traces the evolution of heightened Chinese expectations and the resultant spike in national identity in 2010, using a six-dimensional framework: 1) ideological, 2) temporal, 3) sectoral, 4) vertical, 5) horizontal, and 6) intensity. A hybrid ideology rose to the forefront. Forceful historical arguments covered three distinct periods. The triad of economic, cultural, and political identity raised sectoral identity to an unprecedented level. The leadership kept pressing the case for vertical identity in contrast to the West. Above all, it put the spotlight on horizontal identity to draw a sharper contrast with the United States and neighboring states as well. If at the time of the Hu-Obama summit the tone softened somewhat, China continued its risky wager on widening the identity gap. Regardless of whether China’s foreign policy is currently assertive, its national identity narrative remains a driving force for divisiveness in the regional and international order.
Read more here (purchase required)
Pollack, Jonathan D
Abstract
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and the Bush administration’s policy changes, Chinese strategic specialists are engaged in a wide ranging and increasingly public debate over China’s national security strategies and priorities. Although senior leaders continue to argue that most trends remain favorable for Chinese security interests, far more cautionary assessments are also being voiced. In this article, Jonathan D. Pollack, chairman of the Strategic Research Department, US Naval War College, points out that the increased complexity and differentiation in Chinese policymaking reveals multiple trends at work. Even as Chinese policymakers emphasize their keen desire to reinforce regional stability, the longer-term picture remains clouded, from the Taiwan straits to the Korean peninsula to Central Asia to future developments in nuclear weapons policy. Pollack argues that there is a compelling need to invigorate exchanges between senior officials in Beijing, Washington, Tokyo and other major capitals, lest China and other states undertake policies that undermine the prospects for long term regional stability and security.
Read more here (purchase required)
Perkins, Dwight H
Abstract
The paper aims to examine economic interdependence and balancing power politics, and their mixed implications for regional institution building in East Asia based on the concept of common security. By pointing out the gap between the violent conflict prediction and the stability and prosperity reality following the end of the Cold War, the paper gives analysis to the factors affecting the security relations in the region, including (i) the role of the US, (ii) the rise of the PRC, (iii) ASEAN’s efforts at regional cooperation, (iv) the PRC Japan rivalry. The author concludes that economic interdependence and regional cooperation in Asia have constrained a power struggle from spiraling out of control, while open regionalism has become a reasonable approach to regional institution building. Finally, the paper makes policy recommendations with respect to principles and steps in moving to a new regional security order.
PDF
Pempel, T.J
Abstract
Over the last decade, essentially since the Asian crisis of 1997–98, the economic integration of Northeast Asia has been marked by three overarching trends. Economic relations have become: 1) more institutionalized; 2) more “Asian;” and 3) more China-centric. These macro-trends are demonstrated and analyzed in the paper. But by way of anticipation, numerous counter-cutting facts need also to be kept in mind. In essence, recent trends, notable as they are, have by no means reversed three counter-realities: 1) economic ties are still largely driven, less by governments and formal arrangements, than by corporations in search of profits and production efficiencies; 2) despite growing economic interdependence across Northeast Asia and between that sub-region and Southeast Asia, Japan, China and South Korea remain heavily linked to global, and particularly US, markets; and 3) though China is an ever important hub in Northeast Asian trade and investment, Japan remains by far the most powerful economic player in the region.
Read more here (purchase required)
Kubo, Fumiaki
Abstract
The controversy in the Unites States on how to deal with the “fiscal cliff” revealed not just a deep ideological difference between the Democratic Party and the Republican Party but also a new sign of a possible crack of the conservative Republican ranks between those Republicans close to the Tea Party and those who favored the tax hike for the wealthy in order to save the tax cut for the rest of the people.
The planned deep cuts in the defense expenditure will have important implications for national security of Japan, which recently experiences increasing tension with China over the Senkaku Islands. The Obama Administration adopted a tough stance with China over the territorial issues in the South China Sea in July 2010. Rebalance to Asia could be understood, at least in part, to be a response to the rise of China, in a financial situation with fewer resources available for the national defense in the US.
The logical conclusion for Japan and the US would be for both of them to deepen security cooperation. Shinzo Abe, the new Prime Minister of Japan, should further clarify his foreign and national security policy priority and concentrate his efforts on strengthening the alliance with the US and building up the capabilities to defend Japan’s territory, while exerting caution in jumping into “history” issues with China and South Korea so that Japan’s message on the Senkaku Islands issue is crystal clear and focused: that it is against the established international norm to try to change the status quo by force or intimidation; this message should have universal appeal to a wider international community.
Read more here (purchase required)
Hang, Nguyen Thi Thuy
Abstract
The Obama administration perceives the Asia-Pacific as a vital and dynamic region and thus prioritized it in its foreign policy agenda. Some scholars have suggested that the Obama administration’s rebalance towards Asia has taken a realist approach to engagement with the Asia-Pacific while others suggested that it deviated significantly from realism. This article seeks to examine more closely the question of the realist nature of the US rebalance policy towards the Asia-Pacific. It begins with a discussion of views of the Obama administration’s rebalance towards the Asia-Pacific before giving an overview of realism. Then, it seeks to establish a realist model of foreign policy and examine the Obama administration’s rebalance towards the Asia-Pacific against that model. It finds that the Obama administration has high scores on two of the indicators of realism—the emphasis on military capabilities and the emphasis on alliance-building—but has lower scores on the third and the fourth—a low regard for multilateral institutions, and a low regard for values. The Obama administration has actively engaged with regional institutions and has strongly supported the spread of democracy and human dignity all over the Asia-Pacific. Hence, the Obama administration’s rebalance towards the Asia-Pacific is a realist foreign policy with certain modifications.
PDF
Fitzpatrick, Mark
Abstract
Members of the IAEA Board and of the Nuclear Suppliers Group may need to decide this year whether to go along with the US proposal to allow nuclear cooperation with India despite its non-NPT status. Permitting nuclear sales to India would have important geo-strategic benefits by strengthening its partnership with the US. Yet granting India an exception to nuclear supply guidelines would also have significant non-proliferation disadvantages by weakening the NPT. Whether it would assist India’s nuclear weapons development is unclear. If India were to agree voluntarily to cap its production of fissile material, this would rectify the greatest lost opportunity of the US-India nuclear agreement. The non-proliferation benefits that the Bush Administration has claimed for the accord, such as that it brings India into consensus on the Iran nuclear issue, are neither guaranteed nor long-lasting. Perhaps the best that can be said is that the transparency the accord will bring to some aspects of the Indian nuclear program could contribute to arms control measures in the future.
Read more here (purchase required)
Drifte, Reinhard
Abstract
Compared with the strained relationship during the Koizumi era, Japanese-Chinese relations today seem to prove that despite many bilateral problems, a solution can always be found. This attitude is too complacent as a closer examination of the three main disputes shows: the history-related issues, the territorial disputes in the East China Sea, and Taiwan. Bilateral agreements, understandings, or protracted negotiations may provide temporary relief but may turn out to be very costly in the long run to Japan’s national interests and to regional stability while time is not on Japan’s side in view of the shifting comprehensive power relationship between the two countries. Instead, Japan should clarify its position in the Japan–US–China triangle, reform its economy, strengthen its Asian policy and sort out its priorities concerning the three main problems by striking a grand bargain.
Read more here (purchase required)
Desker, Barry
Abstract
The rise of China provides a major challenge to the United States, the undisputed hegemon in the Asia-Pacific region since the second world war. This development provides regional states with an opportunity to shape the regional security architecture by adopting an inclusive approach to China. The role of the Association of Southeast Asian States (ASEAN) tends to be under-estimated by Western scholars who often see the European model as the only approach to regional integration. This paper discusses the significant achievements of ASEAN in serving as a catalyst for the establishment of regional institutions. Such institutions could serve as instruments for the management of China’s relations with Japan and India. It is contended that the emergence of Asian powers, especially China, will result in a challenge to the Washington Consensus of Western norms and values focusing on individual rights which have governed international institutions. The rise of China is likely to see the application of a Beijing Consensus emphasising the balance between individual rights and social obligations, which would resonate positively in the region. In the twenty-first century, global institutions will need to reflect the norms, values and practices of global society and not just Atlantic perspectives.
Read more here (purchase required)
Delamotte, Guibourg
Abstract
In August 2009, the Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP), which had been in power since 1955, lost the general elections to a recently-formed party, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). The LDP’s foreign policy had placed emphasis on relations with the US, and on international cooperation and relations with Asia. The LDP’s foreign and defense policy lacked a long term vision; it was incremental, pragmatic and could be described as reactive or passive. An examination of the DPJ’s foreign policy, three years after its coming to power, reveals that it has accepted part of the LDP’s inheritance. The Japan-US Alliance was reasserted as pivotal to Japan’s security. Cooperation with Asia has not given birth to a new regional structure or to new institutional mechanisms, and dialogue with China has not improved; incrementalism is still preferred in the field of defense. Nonetheless, the fact that Japan’s opposition is now a catch-all party at the center of the political scene changes the framework of foreign and defense policy-making considerably. Therefore, the likelihood of interpartite cooperation over foreign and security policy is theoretically conceivable. Nonetheless, political and institutional constraints to change in the field remain.
Read more here (purchase required)
Curtis, Gerald
Abstract
This article first examines specific recent issues facing the two countries, namely the Senkaku Islands fishing boat incident and the relocation of the Futenma Marine air base in Ginowan city, Okinawa, and then proceeds to make some observations on the larger issue of the future of the alliance.
Read more here (purchase required)
Cossa, Ralph A
Abstract
The US–Japan alliance serves as the cornerstone of US security strategy in East Asia. The Bush administration remains supportive of efforts by Japan to become a more “normal” nation and is expected, during its second term, to continue to encourage Tokyo to play a more active role in regional security (while refraining from open pressure or from meddling in the debate over constitutional revision). The Pentagon’s ongoing Global Force Review will likely result in some modest adjustments in the US military footprint in Japan, but with no lessening of Washington’s overall commitment or ability to respond to regional crises. Meanwhile, Washington will continue to support institutionalized multilateral mechanisms (including sub-regional efforts that do not include the US) as useful means to promote regional security and coordinate counter-terrorism efforts, while relying on ad hoc coalitions (or unilateral actions if necessary) to address specific threats to its own security or to the security of its allies.
Read more here (purchase required)
Berkofsky, Axel
Abstract
The EU calls itself a “soft power,” making “soft power” contributions to Asian security. That is undoubtedly what the EU is and does in Asia and the track record of European contributions to Asian peace and stability through economic and financial as well as development aid and technical assistance over the decades is not unimpressive. As will be shown below, over recent years Brussels and the Union’s individual member states have sought to increase their involvement and role in Asian “hard security,” attempting to get rid of its reputation of being security a “free-rider” enjoying but not sharing the burden of US regional security guarantees. While the EU will continue to be a “hard security” actor in Asian security within limits, it is advised to concentrate its security cooperation with like-minded partners such as Japan and the US as opposed to hoping that talking to Beijing on regional or global security issues produces tangible results. As will be shown below, it clearly does not as Beijing continues to conduct very assertive and at times aggressive regional foreign and security policies insisting on the “principle of non-interference” in Chinese domestic and foreign policies. Consequently, EU influence on Chinese foreign and security policies in general and its increasingly aggressive policies related to territorial claims in the East China and South China Seas will continue to exist on paper and paper only.
Read more here (purchase required)
