Summary
Now in its new and fully updated third edition, The New Global Politics of the Asia-Pacific continues to provide a compelling analysis of a region undergoing dramatic changes. Based on new research and offering fresh interpretation, this edition evaluates the prospects for continuing US dominance in the ‘Asian Century’. Whilst presenting evidence for a multifaceted ‘Beijing Strategy’, which aims to counter the US by building an alternative regional order, it also explains Japan’s definitive departure from its limited military role. Providing an introductory guide for the main frameworks needed to understand the region, including realism, liberalism and critical theory, this new edition is reader-friendly, and offers sophisticated competing explanations. Key content includes:
- Intra-regional conflicts in the South China Sea and the Korean peninsula;
- The different responses within the Asia-Pacific to the globalization of Western ideas of democracy and political economy;
- The underappreciated success of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in building a regional identity;
- The European Union’s soft power in the region.
A highly topical account, which offers an overview of the main actors, institutions and contemporary issues in the Asia-Pacific, the book will be essential reading for undergraduate students of Asian Studies, International Politics and anyone interested in the region.
Summary
Japan’s Foreign Relations in Asia has been specifically designed to introduce students to Japan’s foreign relations in Asia since 1990, a period in which there have been dramatic developments in Japan, including the reinterpretation of the Constitution and expanded US–Japan defence cooperation. The geopolitical dynamics and implications of these new developments are profound and underscore the need for a new textbook on this subject.
Covering not only the key regional players of China and the Koreas, this textbook also encompasses chapters on Japan’s relations with India, Myanmar, Indonesia, Vietnam, the Philippines and Thailand, along with its multilateral engagement and initiatives. Combined with transnational chapters on critical issues, key themes covered by this book include:
- An historical overview of key post-war developments.
- Japan’s evolving security policy.
- Analysis of the region’s escalating maritime disputes.
- An evaluation of Japanese soft power in Asia.
Written by leading experts in accessible, jargon-free style, this new textbook will appeal to undergraduate and postgraduate students of Japanese politics, international relations and foreign policy and Asian affairs in general.
Abstract
This article aims to evaluate the will of the Chinese government to implement UN Security Council Resolution 2270 following North Korea’s fourth nuclear test (1 January 2016), thereby seeking out the implications on China’s sanctions against the DPRK after its fifth nuclear test (9 September 2016). The results of analysis in this article can be summed up as follows. First, the following instances capture the willingness of the Chinese government regarding the implementation of sanctions against the DPRK: (i) China agreed to stronger sanctions against North Korea (Resolution 2270); (ii) China boasted about its wholehearted support for – and complete willingness to implement – the sanctions at home and abroad; and (iii) upon the agreement, Beijing revealed the lists of items banned from export to North Korea and items subject to additional sanctions more promptly than before. Second, in spite of China’s expressed willingness, the following instances demonstrate that there remain some limitations to Beijing’s will regarding a thorough implementation of sanctions against Pyongyang: (i) the Chinese government argued that the United States should be responsible for sanctions against the North after its fourth nuclear test; (ii) China proposed the parallel approach of pursuing denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula and a peace treaty; (iii) China placed an emphasis on improving the living conditions of North Koreans; and (iv) China expressed opposition to deployment of terminal high-altitude area defense on the Korean Peninsula. Third, such reactions are indicative of China’s key essentials behind enforcing sanctions against the DPRK, which are the pursuit of Chinese national interests and the prevention of loss of those interests. To that end, China attempts to bypass the United States’ monitoring and pressure, considers the growing strategic value of North Korea as a result of intensifying conflicts between the United States and China, and induces the DPRK into a realm of dialogue. The fact that China needs to secure influence over North Korea and maintain the North Korean regime in a stable state even after its fifth nuclear test indicates that its sanctions against North Korea will be implemented within a boundary of not causing the regime collapse or chaos.
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Abstract
Of the nine countries known to have nuclear weapons, six are located in Asia and another, the United States, borders the Pacific Ocean. Russia and China were the first Asian nations with nuclear weapons, followed by Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea. Most of the world’s nuclear powers are reducing their arsenals or maintaining them at historic levels, but several of those in Asia—India, Pakistan, and North Korea—continue to pursue relentless and expensive programs of nuclear weapons development and production. Hopefully, the nuclear agreement reached in July 2015 between Iran, the European Union, and the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council will be a step toward eliminating nuclear weapons throughout Asia and the rest of the world. As we will discuss below, any country possessing a nuclear arsenal is on a path leading toward self-assured destruction, and is a threat to people everywhere on Earth.
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The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea), following the strategic line on carrying out economic construction and building nuclear armed forces simultaneously, conducted its fourth and fifth nuclear tests, and multiple launches of Nodong missiles that can reach Japan, Musudan missiles that can reach Guam, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM). It accelerated the pace of its nuclear and missile development, repeatedly fired ballistic missiles into the waters near Japan, and continues to increase its threat level. Moreover, a Five-Year Strategy for National Economic Development was announced at the Seventh Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK), convened for the first time in thirty-six years, and it appears, in fact, that nuclear and missile development is prioritized over economic development. Domestically, Kim Jong Un was installed as Chairman of the WPK and Chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the DPRK, continuing his regime’s dictatorship and reign of terror through purges.
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Abstract
After North Korea conducted its fourth nuclear test in January 2016, China’s response was stern enough for certain China analysts to posit that the Middle Kingdom’s approach to its Cold War ally was changing. In reality, however, China’s imports from North Korea, especially coal, a crucial mineral for the North’s income but banned by United Nations (UN) Resolution 2270, did not decrease. Politically, China also strived to maintain mutual relations with North Korea. Based on its strategic and other cost-benefit calculations, Beijing needs to maintain economic and political ties with Pyongyang and thus has no incentive to seriously observe the U.N. resolution. In this context, China is expected to virtually repeat the gestures it made in the past in dealing with the North. Under these circumstances, sanctioning North Korea through China is not considered a viable option in tackling the nuclear issue; rather, the USA and South Korea should change their policy approach toward this problem.
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Abstract
The USA has long called for the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearisation of North Korea. But is this a realistic policy option? In order to address this question, a broader question needs to be answered: What are the primary drivers of North Korea’s interest in nuclear weapons? Most answers to this question take one of two basic positions. ‘Doves’, on the one hand, see North Korea developing nuclear weapons because of the threatening foreign policies of the USA and South Korea. ‘Hawks’, on the other hand, see North Korean nuclear development as driven by factors internal to the North Korean regime, inherent in its personality. The author examines these two arguments against the evidence and finds them both wanting. In contrast, he puts forth an alternative argument focused on the power of the global hegemon, the USA, and its position on the Korean Peninsula. This power and positional alternative is shown to be better reflected in the evidence presented.
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Abstract
North Korea’s participation in the UNHRC’s Universal Periodic Review (UPR)—a peer review in which states make recommendations to one another for improving human rights implementation—is a notable exception to its rejection of other human rights mechanisms. What explains North Korea’s willing participation in the UPR? This essay analyses North Korea’s participation in the first (2008–11) and second (2012–15) UPR cycles through its written submissions, responses to recommendations, and recommendations to other states. It finds that North Korea has consistently accepted weak recommendations, rejected more specific policy changes, and implemented accepted recommendations on a limited basis, allowing it to claim compliance with human rights at minimal cost. The UPR’s reliance on states’ self-reports and its inability to adjudicate competing factual claims allow North Korea to reject claims of egregious abuses, openly advocate for a radically state-centric vision of human rights, and challenge the legitimacy of human rights mechanisms like the Commission of Inquiry and Special Rapporteur while building support from other states with similar views. Notably, the Commission of Inquiry appears to have motivated North Korea to increase its cooperation with the UPR, demonstrating that the UPR complements but cannot replace other UN human rights mechanisms.
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Abstract
The coping strategies that small Chinese firms operating in North Korea have chosen involve insinuating themselves into North Korean political and social networks, and structuring their investments so as to minimize their exposure to North Korean infrastructure, workers, and institutions. As a result, it is unlikely that Chinese firms will be the main drivers of market transformation in North Korea.
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Abstract
Although North Korea remains one of the most isolated countries in the world, hundreds of foreign actors continue to work quietly inside the country. What is the size and scope of foreign engagement inside the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)? What types of activities do nongovernmental organizations, businesses, and other private actors conduct? What has been the experience and impact of those working inside the DPRK? Relying on an original data set and interviews with sixteen organizational field representatives and staff members with experience working inside the DPRK, I uncover basic trends related to people-to-people engagement in areas such as humanitarian relief, development assistance, educational assistance, professional training, and business interaction. Although impressive growth has taken place in foreign engagement in the DPRK, its potential impact remains unclear due to ongoing internal and external constraints.
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Abstract
In this article I explore the discursive origins of anti-Americanism or anti-American sentiments in the two Koreas, where the status of postcolonial states was pursued in different ways. I compare two early examples of stories that embodied anti-Americanism, based on discourse analysis in literary criticism: Jackals, written by the North Korean novelist Han Sorya, and Land of Excrement, written by the South Korean novelist Nam Jung-hyun. I emphasize the differences between the two anti-Americanisms in terms of their respective discursive origins. Land of Excrement was reprinted in a North Korean Communist Party bulletin without the author’s permission, and he was arrested in 1965. The incident symbolizes the antagonistic relations of the two Koreas as well as the implicit and unofficial linkage between South Korean civil society and the North Korean state.
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Abstract
This essay first considers the Kim regime’s prioritization of survival and the implications of this orientation for North Korean foreign policy. It then assesses the prospects for the international sanctions regime to successfully pressure Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear weapons program.
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Abstract
North Korea’s dogged pursuit of a nuclear and ballistic missile capability has never been the sole reason for its confrontational relationship with the United States. The issue sits at the intersection of multiple narratives about where North Korea fits in U.S. strategy toward Asia. From the U.S. perspective, North Korea is a deterrence challenge, a proliferation threat, and a dangerous wildcard in the increasingly contested regional order. Each of these views of North Korea implies different policy priorities, and each favors different ways of addressing the North Korean nuclear threat. The degree to which U.S. policy emphasizes different tools of statecraft depends on how each of these three narratives defines the North Korea problem.
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Abstract
In this essay, I elaborate on the three main components of Japan’s responses to North Korea’s provocations and discuss the problems of each component. In the concluding remarks, I point out two immediate challenges for which Japan needs to be prepared and then propose how Japan may be able to overcome the problems with its existing North Korea policies.
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Abstract
This essay will analyze the recent interactions between China and the DPRK and examine the factors that prompted China to adopt a tougher stance toward Pyongyang. However, this policy change has been complicated and mitigated by the United States’ decision to deploy THAAD in South Korea. Given its multiple strategic interests, China must constantly balance between different players and options, and this has put it in an awkward situation. Nevertheless, together with the United States and other UN Security Council members, China supported UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2321. Looking forward, China is also faced with the uncertainties that result from South Korea’s political crisis and the transition to the Donald Trump administration in the United States.
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