Country or Region: North Korea

Summary
With little faith in reaching a peaceful and sustainable solution to the nuclear question though engagement and negotiations with the regime in Pyongyang, some scholars argue that nuclear nonproliferation can be forced on North Korea only through the use of coercive tools within a general framework of containment. Other scholars, alarmed by the catastrophe that might result from a vigorous attempt to confront and/or topple the regime in Pyongyang, suggest bypassing it and engaging the North Korean people, hoping that they will gain enough power to transform North Korea into a democratic nuclear-free country. Indeed, to a great extent, current American policy toward North Korea reflects both stances. North Korea’s history indicates that Pyongyang’s sense of vulnerability is directly related to the developmental status of its nuclear program. This deviates from Nicholas Eberstadt’s claim that the regime’s rationale behind the program has been predominantly and persistently offensive since its initiation. On the other hand, this supports Joachim Krause and Andreas Wenger’s claim that the predominant rationale behind Pyongyang’s nuclear program is deterring what it perceives as a threat to the survivability of its regime–namely, to a large extent, American power.
On the basis of this finding, it can be argued that if North Korea’s perceived vulnerability can be significantly reduced, it is more likely to give up its nuclear arms program. How, then, can Pyongyang’s sense of vulnerability be significantly reduced? The observation herein suggests that Pyongyang’s sense of vulnerability has been more influenced by its perception of its adversaries’ hostility than its perception of its allies’ guarantee for its security. During the 1960s, Pyongyang perceived that its allies had strong interests in guaranteeing North Korean security, but its perception of the continuous hostility from its adversaries increased its sense of vulnerability, which resulted in its continuous pursuit of developing a nuclear program. Despite the decreasing guarantee by Moscow and Beijing for Pyongyang’s security since the late 1960s, Washington’s progressive approach toward Pyongyang had so significantly reduced its sense of vulnerability from the late 1980s to the mid-1990s as to persuade North Korea to sign the Agreed Framework in 1994. This indicates that the key to reducing North Korea’s sense of vulnerability and to bringing it back into compliance with international nonproliferation regimes is in the hands of its adversaries rather than those of its traditional allies. In this sense, it can be assumed that China is not bluffing when it claims that it lacks the necessary leverage to push North Korea into an internationally agreed solution to the nuclear problem. America’s calling for China to put more pressure on North Korea may thus not yield a significant breakthrough in efforts to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. The key factors determining Pyongyang’s sense of vulnerability, and hence the future of its nuclear program, are U.S. projects and, more importantly, the manner in which its messages are perceived by North Korea. In this sense, the two previous U.S. administrations’ policies toward the North Korean nuclear question can provide invaluable lessons to the contemporary U.S. Government. The 1994 Framework Agreement manifested, among other attributes, tolerance towards diversity, a theme borrowed from President Richard

Summary
The regime of Kim Jong-Il has been called “mad,” “rogue,” even, by the Wall Street Journal, the equivalent of an “unreformed serial killer.” Yet, despite the avalanche of television and print coverage of the Pyongyang government’s violation of nuclear nonproliferation agreements and existing scholarly literature on North Korean policy and security, this critical issue remains mired in political punditry and often misleading sound bites. Victor Cha and David Kang step back from the daily newspaper coverage and cable news commentary and offer a reasoned, rational, and logical debate on the nature of the North Korean regime.
Coming to the issues from different perspectives — Kang believes the threat posed by Pyongyang has been inflated and endorses a more open approach, while Cha is more skeptical and advocates harsher measures — the authors together have written an essential work of clear-eyed reflection and authoritative analysis. They refute a number of misconceptions and challenge much faulty thinking that surrounds the discussion of North Korea, particularly the idea that North Korea is an irrational nation. Cha and Kang contend that however provocative, even deplorable, the Pyongyang government’s behavior may at times be, it is not incomprehensible or incoherent. Neither is it “suicidal,” they argue, although crisis conditions could escalate to a degree that provokes the North Korean regime to “lash out” as the best and only policy, the unintended consequence of which are suicide and/or collapse. Further, the authors seek to fill the current scholarly and policy gap with a vision for a U.S.-South Korea alliance that is not simply premised on a North Korean threat, not simply derivative of Japan, and not eternally based on an older, “Korean War generation” of supporters.
This book uncovers the inherent logic of the politics of the Korean peninsula, presenting an indispensable context for a new policy of engagement. In an intelligent and trenchant debate, the authors look at the implications of a nuclear North Korea for East Asia and U.S. homeland security, rigorously assessing historical and current U.S. policy, and provide a workable framework for constructive policy that should be followed by the United States, Japan, and South Korea if engagement fails to stop North Korean nuclear proliferation.

Summary
The North Korean nuclear program is headed in a dangerous direction. Yet the United States and its allies have not set forth a coherent or unified strategy to stop it. This Task Force report evaluates the challenges facing the United States in and around the Korean Peninsula and assesses American options for meeting them.
The situation on the peninsula has deteriorated rapidly since October 2002, when North Korea admitted having a secret highly enriched uranium program that put it on course to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons. North Korea has since withdrawn from the Non-proliferation Treaty, asserted that it possesses nuclear weapons, and declared that it is reprocessing its spent nuclear fuel. Having initially emphasized the need for a negotiated solution, North Korea in its recent rhetoric has stressed the deterrent value of nuclear weapons.
The Task Force report makes specific recommendations to help guide U.S. foreign policy: 1) articulate a strategy around which U.S. regional partners can rally; 2) as part of that strategy, engage in a serious negotiating effort with North Korea and test its intentions by proposing an interim agreement; 3) secure the commitment of U.S. allies to take tougher action should talks fail; 4) restore the health of the U.S.-South Korea alliance; 5) persuade China to take greater responsibility for resolving the crisis; and 6) appoint a full-time high-level coordinator for Korea.