Cha, Victor D., and David C. Kang

Abstract
Much as political scientists would like to believe otherwise, the strength of any new U.S. foreign policy doctrine historically stands not on its principles and logic, but on its material results. In this regard, there is no denying that U.S. military victories in Iraq and Afghanistan, the capture of Saddam Hussein, the start of nuclear talks with Iran, and the agreement by Libya’s Muammar el-Oaddafi to submit to international nuclear inspections are impressive even to critics of the Bush administration. Although each of these developments is far from conclusive, they offer arguable evidence of the Bush doctrine’s effectiveness. Yet, one member of the “axis of evil” remains recalcitrant— the Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea). In social science terms, the DPRK remains a “hard test” of the Bush doctrine’s effectiveness at rolling back nuclear capabilities in rogue regimes. Unlike the suspected or potential nuclear weapons programs of Iraq or Libya, North Korea’s program is real, developing, and already most likely churning out nuclear weapons. North Korean officials reportedly are fond of telling their American interlocutors that the United States should stop trying to roll back North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs and should start thinking about how to live with a nuclear North Korea.
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