Fitzpatrick, Mark

Abstract
On some issues, particularly Iran, the fallout has been negligible, yet there is still reason for concern. The gravest dangers are the devaluing of security assurances and cracks in the credibility of extended deterrence.
In the immediate aftermath of Russia’s annexation of Crimea, gloomy pre-dictions for the non-proliferation agenda were a commentariat staple. On some issues, particularly Iran, the fallout has so far been marginal. Yet there remains ample reason for concern, including over US–Russia cooperation on nuclear security. The gravest proliferation danger stemming from the crisis is the devaluing of security assurances of the kind provided to Ukraine in The manuscript was received 23 April 2003 and accepted for publication after revision 4 August 2003. 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances and potential cracks in the credibility of extended deterrence.
As with many other global issues, preventing proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons requires partnership among major powers. US–Russia cooperation last autumn brought Syria into the Chemical Weapons Convention and launched the process that has now successfully removed all declared chemical weapons from that country. Concerns remain about the completeness of Syria’s declaration, its reported recent use of chlorine as a weapon and its retention of chemical-weapons facilities. Yet multilateral diplomacy has proven far more effective in eliminating the arsenal than a bombing campaign would have been. If such cooperation stops with regard to other issues, North Korea and Iran will not easily be reined in, the prospect of nuclear terrorism will rise and the fabric of the non-proliferation regime will fray. By the beginning of 2014, the arms-control aims that US President Barack Obama laid out in Prague four years earlier had largely been frustrated, in part because of Russia’s lack of interest. On other matters on the nuclear-dangers agenda, however, there was still hope that overlapping interests would compel a consensus among the major powers. What some see as a new Cold War sparked by the Ukraine crisis leaves much, but not all, of this in doubt.
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