Abstract: The purpose of this article is to review the practices of South Korea concerning interdiction, especially on the seas, in response to the various sanctions placed on the DPRK by the UN Security Council (UNSC). This article examines the UNSC’s resolutions along with Korean statutes and practices. The UN resolutions that are touched on in this article seem to mollify concerns of a breach of international law, and all member states owe a legal obligation to implement them. The primary institutions in charge of maritime law enforcement of South Korea are the Korea Coast Guard and the Korea Customs Service. The Korea Coast Guard is in charge of maritime law enforcement of coastal waters, adjacent waters, and pelagic waters in accordance with the Coast Guard Act. However, there is no statutory provision that provides for the measures, such as attachment and/or disposal of the seizures during search and inspection on the sea, and there is no provision concerning compensation and/or liability due to such measures. Therefore, there needs to be secure legal grounds for direct enforcement measures on seizures in line with the Coast Guard Act. The Korea Customs Service reserves the exercise of police power: to the extent of the legislative purpose of the Customs Act; in the proper administration of the imposition and collection of customs duties and the customs clearance of exported and imported goods; and in securing revenues from customs duties. However, the Customs Act does not provide that weapons of mass destruction and items related to them shall be subject to its application. Given these reasons, it is necessary to develop and implement legislation that recognizes that the transportation of weapons of mass destruction and transportation of designated items by the relevant Resolutions on the DPRK are a breach of the Customs Act.
Country or Region: South Korea
Chun, JaHyun, and Daeun Choi
Abstract: This study investigates the causes of Japan’s failure to reconcile the matter of South Korean “comfort women” from World War II. It draws on reconciliation theory to determine the cause of failure by Japan. After a review of the literature on this issue with an emphasis on its history, the effect of Japan’s problem‐solving attempts, and the backlash after the 2015 “comfort women” agreement, we call attention to Japan’s weak civil society and its distortion of history in textbooks as internal causes of this failure. Moreover, we highlight the US–ROK–Japan trilateral security cooperation as an external cause of the deterioration of the reconciliation attempts. We conclude by noting that internal and external factors have made it more difficult for Japan to reconcile the matter of South Korean “comfort women.”
Oh, Seung Jin
Abstract: East Asia is still politically and diplomatically divided while increasingly becoming integrated economically. East Asian states, excluding Japan, share a common experience in that they were deprived of their sovereignty, in part or as a whole, by Western or Japanese colonial powers. The experience still defines current international relations among East Asian countries, raising the issue of justice in international law. International lawyers, however, have been, in general, reluctant to talk about justice in international law. Before the 19th century, international law was dominated by naturalism or natural law doctrine. The international community was composed of European states, excluding non‐Christian and non‐European states. From the early 19th century to the end of World War II, international law was dominated by these states’ will. International law had developed various principles to facilitate Western powers’ colonial occupations and in the 19th century, international law was a tool for Western colonialism and imperialism. After World War II, international law almost abolished the divide between European and non‐European, Christian and non‐Christian, and civilized and non‐civilized states. Colonization is not allowed anymore and many parts of the world that had belonged to former colonies in Africa and Asia became independent states. Further, human rights are no longer considered internal affairs of a state. Asia met with Western powers when positivism was prevalent. The relationship between China and neighboring countries, such as Korea, Burma, Thailand, Vietnam, and the Ryukyu Islands, had been maintained by a tributary system until the mid‐19th century. The China‐centered tributary system, maintained for centuries in East Asia, was replaced, however, by a capitulation system from the mid‐19th century. East Asian states concluded many unequal treaties with Western powers and East Asian people might have been confused by the paradox of the principle of equality among sovereign states and the unequal nature of the treaties that were forced against them. Efforts to recover sovereignty and to decolonize after World War II in East Asia seem to be far from satisfactory. Japan has never recognized its legal responsibility from colonialism. Even with the conclusion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, many territorial issues still remain unresolved in East Asia. The Peace Treaty did not settle various colonialism‐related claims between Japan and neighboring countries, failing to render an effective remedy for past human rights violations. Thomas Franck argues that a rule’s legitimacy enhances its compliance. Steven R. Ratner argues that international law rules would be deemed just if they were to (i) advance international peace, and (ii) respect basic human rights. If the international community is really a legal community where states are bound by rights and duties, it should be naturally based on justice. The legacy of past colonialism in East Asia that might hinder global peace and respect for human rights should be addressed in the near future.
Weede, Erich
Abstract: Twenty years from now, the Chinese economy might be twice as large as that of the United States. Since great powers have always claimed spheres of influence, this raises the issue of what characteristics a Chinese sphere of influence might have. Currently, the Chinese sphere of influence is still rather fuzzy. But one might argue that North Korea is part of it. After all, the Chinese fought the Korean War in order to prevent all of Korea becoming part of the US sphere of influence. If one accepts that North Korea is part of the Chinese sphere of influence, then Kim Jong‐un’s nuclear weapons should become a Chinese concern instead of a US concern. If China wants a nuclear weapons power next door, and a joint missile defense effort by the United States, Japan, and South Korea because of it so be it. If China understands its national interest, as great powers have historically done, then it could undermine the North Korean regime more effectively than the United States could at much lower risks of escalation to a great war. Whereas the United States hesitates to recognize that North Korea is and should remain part of the Chinese sphere of influence, its economic sanctions against Russia risk driving Russia into China’s arms. Focusing on the incipient rivalry between China and the United States for global primacy does in no way imply advocacy of a hawkish US policy towards China. In the nuclear age, peace between rival powers should depend on two pillars: nuclear deterrence and economic interdependence, or “peace by fear” and “peace by trade.
Shin, Jongho
Abstract: This study analyzes the reflection of the “great power identity” of China during the Xi Jinping administration in its policy on the Korean Peninsula. The Xi leadership has emphasized the “core interests” of China founded on the great power identity, and has projected more assertive peripheral diplomacy to expand its influence in East Asia. China will not dare to challenge the US dominant international order, but will seek to receive treatments relative to “the rise of China.” On the basis of this recognition, the Chinese leadership regards the Korean Peninsula not simply as a security environment in which the status quo should be maintained, but as a venue on which it wields its expanding leverage. That is, China, as a rising great power, has no choice but to stress its relationship with both South and North Korea to prepare for the strategic competition with the dominating power, the United States, and undermine US regional influence in East Asia. Because of this point, China has shown inconsistent behaviors in its Korean Peninsula policy: It not only strongly denounces the nuclearization of North Korea, but also opposes economic sanctions that could inflict severe damage on the North Korean regime. While China values South Korea’s strategic values, it is taking a firm stand on foreign and security issues such as the THAAD deployment. Based on its great power identity, China recognizes the Korean Peninsula as a substructural part of its relations with the United States. However, South Korea should lead in solving the Korean Peninsula problem and North Korean denuclearization by preemptively suggesting a long‐term vision on issues regarding the Korean Peninsula
Lee, Seung Hyok, and Wooyeal Paik
Abstract: The Japanese often frame the history of East Asia in a “Japan versus China” dichotomy, and they have long embraced a “national narrative” that emphasizes the linkage between the Korean Peninsula and China in the traditional Confucian worldview. The narrative asserts that the peninsula has been culturally and geopolitically “attached” to China, and it has served as an important ideational backdrop to Japan’s positioning in the changing regional security environment. In this article, we analyze the origin and contents of the Japanese national narrative, and examine how it has influenced both the Japanese view of the peninsula and policy‐making. We focus on how it has reemerged in the post‐Cold War and the rising China era, and how it has been particularly applied to frame current South Korea–China relations. We then turn to analyze whether contem porary South Korean policies toward China offer evidence in support of the narrative. We conclude that the Japanese concern that South Korea could eventually “get pulled into China’s orbit” is a highly unlikely scenario, and that the Japanese narrative exhibits a time lag in incorporating contemporary factors into its historically generated storyline. South Korea’s understanding of regional politics is intrinsically different from that of the pre‐modern periods, and its relations with China are more complex than this particular Japanese narrative would suggest. Its interactions with China are guided by contemporary economic, political, and sociocultural considerations about the national interest, and the reality of the divided peninsula in the post‐Cold War period.
Heo, Uk, and Terence Roehrig
Abstract: Despite the ties between politics and economics, little attention has been given to how economic development affects foreign policy. To fill the gap in the literature, Heo and Roehrig developed a theoretical framework, linking economic development and foreign relations. We refine the theory and name it development power theory, which is based on the logic that economic development influences a country’s foreign policy in three broad directions: (i) it encourages a transition to democracy that leads to elite changes and foreign‐policy modification; (ii) it provides more resources and a larger set of tools to be used to pursue a broader set of national interests; and (iii) it enhances pride and ambition among state leaders and the public, resulting in a stronger military and a greater role in international affairs. Then, we apply the theory to the South Korean case.
Jung, Changkuk, Wonbin Cho, and Wonjae Hwang
Abstract: This paper examines whether South Korea’s official development assistance (ODA) has promoted foreign policy cooperation from its recipients. To this end, vote congruence between South Korea and its ODA recipients over important issues in the UN General Assembly is analyzed. The results show that, as the size of South Korea’s ODA increases, its recipients are likely to vote alongside South Korea on issues important to South Korea, such as nuclear issues, human rights, and resolutions on human rights abuses in North Korea, in the UN General Assembly.
Ra, Jong-yil
Abstract: [Note: This a speech the author presented at the Northeast Asia Cooperation Forum hosted by the East Asia Research Center, School of International Relations, Renmin University of China, that was printed in the Journal of East Asian Affairs.] There are in general at least two aspects in any security regime among nations: One is a hard one, such as military strategic balance, diplomatic relations including treaties, organizations, and so on. There is another aspect which may comprise what may be called soft ones. Culture governs relations among people, attitude toward one another, implicit assurances about expected behaviour of the other side, and is a common value whether of implicit or explicit kind, shared identity, sense of attachment or belonging, etc. This latter aspect of the security regime in the context of Northeast Asia which I propose to address together with all who are present today, one of the reasons for doing so ebing the former aspect of the subject has been covered rather well and the latter relatively little.
Whiejin, Lee
Abstract: Reflecting upon the desire to expand the jurisdiction in the sea, the UNCLOS introduced and established the exclusive economic zone, new continental shelf system, and archipelagic waters and agreed upon the width of the territorial sea. In addition, compulsory settlement of international maritime disputes has gone into effect. Northeast Asian states such as Korea, China, and Japan enacted domestic laws and ratified the Convention in 1996. They concluded fisheries agreements, establishing a tentative legal order on fishery. There remains the task of effecting delimitation at sea. The delimitation does not seem to be feasible over a short term, with such big hurdles as method of baseline and possession of island issue. Since in the Yellow Sea no delimitation is in effect yet, Chinese vessels’ overfishing poses problems to the Korean economic zone. In the East Sea, the Southern Continental Shelf Joint Development Agreement is scheduled to expire in 2028 unless extension is made. Possible conflict seems to be in the offing in East China Sea around the development of natural resources and it may flare up further if endowment of resources is apparent. While continuously ascertaining the position of other states through maritime negotiations and making adjustment to their positions to be consistent with the practice, jurisprudence and the provisions of the Convention, an agreement is necessary to be reached. On occasion, political breakthrough needs to be made through decisions made at the highest level.
Cheng, David
Abstract: China’s current approach towards the Korean peninsula, especially in the security dimension, is the product of a combination of long-standing Chinese historical concerns and Xi Jinping’s calculations of China’s political and security interests. Of particular importance, from the Chinese perspective, is the need for South Korea to accede to Chinese concerns, even if that requires subordinating South Korean interests to Chinese ones. China therefore sees the Korean peninsula mostly with reference to its own needs, and only marginally in terms of what are the interests and needs of either North or South Korea.
Pirie, Iain
Abstract: A defining feature of the Northeast Asian developmental state was a focus on maximising investment and suppressing growth in consumption. While consistently high rates of investment were an integral part of the growth model, as the South Korean and Taiwanese economies matured, the viability of this model was undermined by the inability of these economies to generate sufficient opportunities for profitable investment. At the same time, the legacies of systems of labour control associated with the developmental state have impeded the development of stable wage-led growth regimes in both political economies. Instead, they have become reliant on an unstable combination of current account surpluses and consumer borrowing to sustain growth. The legacies of the developmental state continue to define many aspects of the political-economic landscape in Korea and Taiwan. However, changes in the growth regimes, the reorientation of the financial sectors from corporate to household lending, and the downgrading of industrial policy mean that it is no longer useful to define Korea or Taiwan as developmental states. Instead, contemporary Korea and Taiwan can be best understood as post-developmental states.
Nguyen, Viet Phuong
Preview: In this paper, following a brief history of the development of nuclear energy in South Korea, the root causes that instilled public distrust of nuclear energy and Moon Jae-in’s phase-out policy are discussed. Subsequently, by analyzing the validity of Moon’s plan,I argue that this phase-out policy is not beneficial for the long-term sustainability of South Korea’s economy in general, and of the Korean nuclear industry in particular. The paper concludes with policy recommendations for a more balanced nuclear policy that can accommodate public opinion and, at the same time, ensure energy security and provide other economic and diplomatic benefits.
Fraser, Timothy, and Daniel P. Aldrich
Preview: Despite short-term perturbations, however, nuclear power’s massive sunk-cost structure and embeddedness in national energy plans have made massive changes in the field unlikely in East Asian nations. Since the Fukushima disaster, civil society held large-scale protests, referenda, and petitions against nuclear power, but their results have been mixed. Contentious politics have successfully put new nuclear safety laws on the books in Japan, South Korea, and China, but have failed to overpower the nuclear lobby and shift the trajectory of nuclear power in their countries. Only Taiwan has managed to secure an exit from nuclear power. Civil society has helped push governments to change regulatory institutions, but civil society organizations have had limited impact on nuclear restart decisions. Below, we outline why we should not expect major change in East Asian nuclear policy to come from civil society, and we discuss alternative avenues for civil society to achieve lasting change in energy policy in East Asia.
Liu, Chien
Abstract: Since the 1980s, Japan’s war memory has strained its relations with South Korea and China, to a less degree, the USA. Two of the thorniest issues are the comfort women and the US atomic bombing of Japan. Before the Obama administration announced its policy pivot to Asia in 2011, both Japanese and American leaders were reluctant to make amends for the past acts of their countries. However, in 2015, the Japanese conservative Prime Minister Abe reached an agreement with South Korea that “finally and irreversibly” resolved the comfort women issue, thus achieving a historic reconciliation between the two countries. In 2016, then President Obama visited Hiroshima to commemorate the atomic bomb victims. Then, in December 2016, the comfort women issue resurfaced in Japan and South Korea relations, indicating a failure of the reconciliation. Why did the USA change its policy on historical issues involving Japan? Why did Abe and the South Korean President Park Geun-hye settle the comfort women issue? Why did Obama visit Hiroshima? Why did the reconciliation fail? In this article, I propose a rational choice theory to answer these questions. Applying the proposed theory and relying on available evidence, I argue that the settlement of the comfort women issue and Obama’s visit to Hiroshima are important components of Obama’s pivot to Asia to balance China’s rise. The reconciliation failed mainly because it did not resolve the historical justice issue promoted by the human rights norms. I discuss some implications for reconciliation in Northeast Asia.
