Murphy, Martin N., and Toshi Yoshihara

Abstract
Geography gives strategy its context. Secure from land invasion, Great Britain and later the United States employed a distinctive form of sea power to defeat their adversaries. Both used their navies to control sea-lanes and vital choke points and to apply direct pressure along enemy coastlines. Through their dominance of the oceans they were able to shape the political and economic order of the world. It is fair to say that what amounts to the Anglo-American school of naval power has demonstrated its efficacy time after time: over the past 250 years these two powers have, singly or together, and always with other allies, defeated every opponent that has attempted to change that order.
An alternative school of naval thought, one rooted in coastal defense, follows an asymmetric path intended to enable the weak to take down the strong. This approach to naval warfare has always sought to capitalize on leading-edge technology while drawing inspiration from French tactics of guerre de course (with their origins in piracy and privateering), the Russian Revolution, and “people’s war” in China. In contrast to the oceanic outlook of the Anglo-American tradition, this approach focuses on operations in the littorals and command of the sea in those waters alone. It yokes the operational and tactical offense to the strategic defense. It eschews fleet-on-fleet engagement and refuses frontal battle. Instead it seeks to wear down the opponent while channeling enemy forces as they approach the shoreline, forcing them to attack coastal and inland positions from unfamiliar seas. The aim is to make the intruder vulnerable to a counterattack that shifts the initiative to the defender. It extracts advantage from geography. For instance, China’s control over Asian waters and major shipping lanes would give Beijing substantial global leverage.
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