Lee, Min Yong

Abstract
This paper aims to discover the main factors that steered North Korea in determining its provocations against South Korea. To this end, we first did a survey about what actually happened in the Yeonpyeong Island crisis to detect any driving forces for North Korea to go for provocation. From this, we confirmed that it was an internal factor that provoked North Korea to open fire on Yeonpyeong Island. We also referred to the garrison state model to explain the reason and factor that is behind the provocation, based on the hypothesis that North Korea is likely to provoke according to shifts in the military’s status in North Korea. We analyzed North Korea’s state system as it corresponds with the garrison state model. Then, we inferred the circumstances and period that made it possible for the North Korean military to carry out this act of provocation. As a social group, the military and its policy is more important than any other interests or values in North Korea, thus holding enormous political power in collusion with the supreme leader. Consequently, the military has supposedly determined a provocation when they find it necessary to consolidate their vested position or power from any domestic challenges. The last question is estimating the time or conditions for the North Korean military to act on a provocation. According to the analysis of main crisis provocations since the end of the Korean War, there are three internal circumstances that are likely to trigger the military to act on a provocation: when they feel obliged to create stability during the transition of political power; when they feel endangered by a relative decline of power or interest vis-a-vis other social groups; when they feel urged to create a crisis situation spurred by fear of signs of a peaceful security environment. Based upon the results, we suggest a few policy recommendations for South Korea to seek reliable and credible measures for the deterrence of provocations from the North.
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