Kim, Sung-Han

Introduction
Since the relationship between economics and security diverse and complex, their causal nature is often contested. Thus, it is not easy to elucidate where and how economic factors interact with, and sometimes determine, security practices and outcomes. When Asia was “rising” in the early 1990s, the debate between liberals and realists in theories international relations was centered on whether economic growth and interdependence in Asia would have positive security effects. Liberals believed that interdependence could create economic incentives to avoid war and that economic and other influences could reduce the significance of power in interstate relations. On the other hand, realists argued that interdependence not only failed to prevent war but would actually make it more probable, and they thus prescribed power-balancing and deterrence.
However, economic interdependence has both positive and negative security effects. On the positive side, it creates disincentives to wage war because disruptive conflicts could threaten economic linkages which generate wealth. On the negative side, the unequal nature of dependency relationships gives more powerful and less dependent states levers of influence which can be used against less powerful and more dependent states. What has been described as the “economic security dilemma” in East Asia arises because the increased wealth that derives from commitment to market-oriented development policies is seen both as fostering security enhancing democratic institutions and interdependence, while also providing the resources to enhance military power in possibly destabilizing ways.
PDF