Hwang, Ki-Sik, and Hyun-Jung Kim

Abstract
In order to analyze the EU’s FTA strategies, this paper introduces a theory of three-level games, putting a two-level games theory in practice. Since Putnam suggested the theory of two-level games, many analysts have tried to apply it to international negotiations at the bilateral level. Putnam decomposes the international negotiation process into two stages. As authors apply this theory to a regional integration area such as the EU, the Community has rights to the Common Commercial Policy. In view of these, this article puts forward a number of hypothetical propositions. A theory of three-level games analytically breaks down the international negotiation process into three stages; international level, regional level and national level. First, at the regional level, the Community takes a high standard of product and process regulation. Second, certain industries in each of the member states, forecasting comparative disadvantage, directly put pressure on the national level (level n) or the regional level (level I). Third, though each of the member states faces pockets of strong domestic pressure to protect certain industries, it is impossible to refuse to negotiate with other states at the international level. Also, the member states cannot establish any strategy such as package negotiation or negotiation between different issues. Forth, in particular, the EU carries its point to insist on KORUS parity in the case of Korea-EU FTA, to widen Korea’s win-sets.
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