Thayer, Carlyle A

Abstract
This monograph is divided into seven parts: history, defence and security challenges, defence and military organization, defence budget/expenditure, defence procurement, development and modernization, and future plans.
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Park, Jae Jeok

From the publisher: The ‘hub-and-spoke’ alliance structure led by the United States was – and remains – a major feature of security politics in the Asia-Pacific. This article links its ‘general interests’ with the larger issue of the Asia-Pacific’s evolving multilateral regional order. After reviewing the concept of ‘hedging’, the first section problematises the literature that treats the US-led alliances which constitute the hub-and-spoke system mainly as instruments for the competitive side of a hedging strategy. The second section observes that they go beyond being instruments of threat response to becoming a more complicated network of regional multilateral order-maintenance and order-building. The third section claims that the United States and its regional allies have been utilising the hub-and-spoke alliance structure as a hedge against an undesirable multilateral order emerging in the region. The fourth section examines those arguments with reference to the East Asia Summit (EAS) and the Six Party Talks. The article concludes with some thoughts about what these findings mean for the future direction of the hub-and-spoke alliance structure in the Asia-Pacific.

Capiea, David

From the publisher: There is growing interest among scholars and advocates in the way that the nascent norm of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is diffusing at the regional level. This article critically explores the spread of R2P in Southeast Asia against the backdrop of recent scholarship on norm localization. It argues that, contrary to some recent analyses, the R2P norm has not been localized in Southeast Asia. Constitutive localization requires the active borrowing of transnational norms by local or regional actors who build congruence with local practices. Although some regional states have used the language of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ there are few signs that local actors are driving the reception of the norm in the region, nor have they institutionalized it. Rather, outsider proponents are the primary advocates and the norm lacks a champion or well-connected ‘insider’ proponent among regional governments or civil society groups. Second, despite an energetic campaign by advocates, emphasizing consensual and capacity-building activities, many governments are still wary of R2P as a potential threat to sovereignty and regime security. As a result, regional states have taken an ‘à la carte’ approach to R2P, accepting aspects of the R2P agenda that they find least threatening or that support their national interests, while ignoring or quietly resisting those they find challenging. Rather than localization, what we are seeing with respect to R2P in Southeast Asia is a dramatic change in the way outsiders are reframing the norm.

Bradshaw, Michael , Mikkal E. Herberg, Amy Myers Jaffe, Damien Ma, and Nikos Tsafos

From the publisher: Asia has emerged as the global center for energy demand growth and now accounts for more than two-thirds of the worldwide market for liquefied natural gas (LNG). However, there is enormous uncertainty about the extent to which the region will rely on LNG to meet its future needs, as well as what role the U.S. shale gas revolution might play in transforming markets and global energy diplomacy. To better understand these issues, The National Bureau of Asian Research’s Energy Security Report explores “Asia’s Uncertain LNG Future.” Essays in the report examine how and to what extent countries in the Asia-Pacific are integrating LNG into their energy-security strategies and the key geopolitical and market implications.
You can read the full report by clicking here.

Buszynski, Leszek

From the publisher: The risk of conflict escalating from relatively minor events has increased in the South China Sea over the past two years with disputes now less open to negotiation or resolution. Originally, the disputes arose after World War II when the littoral states—China and three countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines, as well as Vietnam which joined later—scrambled to occupy the islands there. Had the issue remained strictly a territorial one, it could have been resolved through Chinese efforts to reach out to ASEAN and forge stronger ties with the region.
Around the 1990s, access to the sea’s oil and gas reserves as well as fishing and ocean resources began to complicate the claims. As global energy demand has risen, claimants have devised plans to exploit the sea’s hydrocarbon reserves with disputes not surprisingly ensuing, particularly between China and Vietnam. Nevertheless, these energy disputes need not result in conflict, as they have been and could continue to be managed through joint or multilateral development regimes, for which there are various precedents although none as complicated as the South China Sea.
Now, however, the issue has gone beyond territorial claims and access to energy resources, as the South China Sea has become a focal point for the U.S.–China rivalry in the Western Pacific. Since around 2010, the sea has started to become linked with wider strategic issues relating to China’s naval strategy and America’s forward presence in the area. This makes the dispute dangerous and a reason for concern, particularly as the United States has reaffirmed its interest in the Asia Pacific and strengthened security relations with the ASEAN claimants in the dispute.
You can access the full article by clicking here.

Blazevic, Jason J

Abstract
Competition and conflict in the South China Sea involves many nations due to its resources and vital sea lanes. However, it is China which increasingly serves as a common denominator of intensifying anxiety for its South China Sea maritime neighbours due to the aggressive scope of its claims to the sea and its islands. Among those states, Vietnam is most affected as it is first in the path of Chinese ambitions – ambitions which authorities fear would give China significant tactical military and economic advantage. For China, there are similar fears over threats to the sea lanes and sea bed resources. Leaders of both states also perceive their diplomatic and martial actions in the sea in historical terms as well. However, enforcement actions taken by either state may lead to a worsening security dilemma in which reactive security strategies could dangerously destabilise relations. This article discusses the motivations and strategies of both states as well as the consequences of such and applies realism, its tenets of defensive and offensive realism, and neoliberalism to examine their security concerns and perceptions. The article further proposes that the most valuable insights can be provided by defensive realism and neoliberalism, which together can encourage security, cooperation and conciliation in order to best promote the improvement of relations.
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De Castro, Renato Cruz

Abstract
This paper examines the regional security implications of China’s realpolitik approach in its territorial claim over the South China Sea. It observes that China uses the following power-politics tactics: (i) citing a historic claim; (ii) applying a bilateral approach to weaken ASEAN; (iii) relying on a divide-and-rule stratagem in dealing individually with ASEAN member states and creating a wedge between ASEAN and the USA; and (iv) buttressing its naval capabilities to resolve the territorial dispute according to its own terms. This consequently has driven the small claimant states, like Vietnam and the Philippines, to adopt a balancing strategy that involves the USA in the issue. In conclusion, the paper argues that with China’s realpolitik approach, the idea that Europe’s (violent) past is becoming East Asia’s future is turning into reality.
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Brown, Frederick Z

Abstract
The improvement of bilateral relations between Vietnam and the United States has added a fresh dynamic to the geopolitics of Southeast Asia. This article discusses the laborious process of normalization of political relations between 1976 and 1995. It describes the course of economic normalization from the signing of the Bilateral Trade Agreement in 2001 and granting of Permanent Normal Trading Relations in 2006 to Vietnam’s accession to the World Trade Trade Organization in 2007. It reviews current bilateral economic and trade issues and analyses domestic political norms and historical experiences which have acted as powerful forces shaping the foreign policies of both countries. The United States criticizes Vietnam’s human rights record, and Vietnam has lingering qualms about alleged US designs for “regime change”. The Vietnamese-American community, now 1.8 million strong, and the US Congress are major players in the expansion of bilateral relations. The article discusses the heightened visibility of ASEAN in US policy and implications for regional security. The article notes other positive factors at work in US-Vietnam relations: 13,000 Vietnamese now study in the United States; the sensitive Agent Orange issue is being addressed seriously; and there is bilateral cooperation on global warming, the environment, human trafficking and the Mekong River basin. The article concludes that US-Vietnam rapprochement is on a positive, mutually beneficial track but that its dimensions and durability have yet to be established.
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Thayer, Carlyle A

Abstract
Ever since the Vietnamese nation-state emerged as an independent entity in the first millennium it has had to contend with “the tyranny of geography”. Vietnam shares a common border with China its giant neighbour to the north. Even today, with a population of eighty-eight million, Vietnam ranks as a middle sized Chinese province. As a major study by Brantly Womack notes, the bilateral relationship has been embedded in a structure of persistent asymmetry throughout recorded history.
This chapter focuses on how Vietnam’s leaders manage relations with a rising China. Womack’s theory of asymmetry provides a useful framework for analyzing this relationship. Womack argues “disparities in capacities create systemic differences in interests and perspectives between stronger and weaker sides”. The larger power always looms more importantly to the weaker than the reverse. This structural factor results in over attention to the bilateral relationship on the part of the weaker state because more is at risk. The result, Womack concludes, is that weaker states are “prone to paranoia”. Conversely, the stronger power is less attentive to the details of the bilateral relationship with a weaker state. These contrasting views often lead to misperception.
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Thayer, Carlyle A

Abstract
This article analyses Vietnamese strategies to constrain China in the South China Sea. It tests Brantly Womack’s theory of asymmetry as a framework for analysing bilateral relations. Mature asymmetry exists when the weaker state gives deference to the more powerful state in return for the stronger state’s recognition of the weaker state’s autonomy. Vietnam attempts to achieve this balance through a process of “struggle and cooperation” with China on key issue areas. Vietnam pursues three strategies to manage its relations with China: codification of bilateral relations through high-level visits by party and state leaders; enmeshment of China in a web of cooperative relations including economic ties; and self-help, particularly military modernization. This article analyses the bilateral mechanisms that structure political, economic and defence relations. The party mechanisms include summit meetings, exchange visits by party commissions and ideological seminars. State-to-state relations are managed by a Joint Steering Committee at deputy prime minister level and comprise a dense network of ministerial exchanges. Defence relations are managed at ministerial level and include senior high-level visits and a range of defence cooperation activities including joint ship patrols and naval port visits. The article concludes with a discussion of tensions arising from territorial and sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea. In summary, the “tyranny of geography” dictates to Vietnam that [End Page 348] it judiciously apply the levers of cooperation and struggle through various party, state, military and multilateral structures in order to better manage its relations with China.
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Kenny, Henry J

Kenny 2002Summary
Shadow of the Dragon examines the long historical cycle of tribute, domination, and independence that has shaped Sino-Vietnamese bilateral relations. After generations of bloody struggle for independence and a slow crawl toward prosperity, Vietnam has reached a crossroads. The Vietnamese can fall back into their historically predetermined fate of kowtowing to their large neighbor, China, or they can continue to stand alone, forging their own developmental path.
Henry Kenny outlines what role the United States can play in encouraging Vietnamese growth and prosperity while protecting U.S. interests and easing the Chinese hegemonic tendency without humiliating Beijing. The analysis addresses potential tinderboxes in the Con Son Basin, the Paracel and Spratly Islands, and the Gulf of Tonkin.

Brewster, David

Abstract
For more than 40 years, India and Vietnam have consistently stood together in resisting Chinese domination of Indochina. The relationship represents one of the few longstanding political partnerships between East and South Asia. In recent years, the two have been seeking to recalibrate their relationship in the context not only of China’s growing economic and military power but also India’s own security ambitions in the region. What are India’s aspirations to project naval power into the South China Sea and how is this perceived in the region? This article looks at this longstanding political alliance in light of India’s attempts at strategic engagement with Southeast Asia.
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Vuving, Alexander

Abstract
This article examines Vietnam’s strategy toward China since 1990. The study suggests that Vietnam’s China policy has been informed by a changing mix of four different pathways, whose salience depends on the interplay of interest and balance of power among China, America, ASEAN, and Vietnam’s two grand strategic camps and supreme leader.
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Womack, Brantly

Womack 2006Summary
In their three thousand years of interaction, China and Vietnam have been through a full range of relationships. Throughout all these fluctuations the one constant has been that China is always the larger power, and Vietnam the smaller. Yet China has rarely been able to dominate Vietnam, and the relationship is shaped by its asymmetry. The Sino-Vietnamese relationship provides the perfect ground for developing and exploring the effects of asymmetry on international relations. Womack develops his theory in conjunction with an original analysis of the interaction between China and Vietnam from the Bronze Age to the present.

Manyin, Mark E

Summary
After communist North Vietnam’s victory over U.S.-backed South Vietnam in 1975, the United States and Vietnam had minimal relations until the mid-1990s. Since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1995, overlapping security and economic interests have led the two sides to expand relations across a wide range of sectors and begin to form a strategic partnership of sorts. Perhaps most prominently, in 2010, the two countries mobilized a multinational response to China’s perceived attempts to boost its claims to disputed waters and islands in the South China Sea. This coordinated effort has continued to the present day.
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