Summary
Does the proliferation of nuclear weapons cause ongoing conflicts to diminish or to intensify? The spread of nuclear weapons to South Asia offers an opportunity to investigate this crucial question. Optimistic scholars argue that by threatening to raise the cost of war astronomically, nuclear weapons make armed conflict in South Asia extremely unlikely. Pessimistic scholars maintain that nuclear weapons make the subcontinent war-prone, because of technological, political, and organizational problems. This book argues that nuclear weapons have destabilized the subcontinent, principally because of their interaction with India and Pakistan’s territorial preferences and relative military capabilities. These findings challenge both optimistic and pessimistic conventional wisdom and have implications beyond South Asia.
Summary
The author argues that, while nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles cast a shadow over Indo-Pakistani relations, they do not create strategic stability. He asserts that the development of command and control mechanisms would enhance stability, but that diplomatic steps focused on missiles must also be considered. Improved command and control and diplomatic engagement will provide some insurance that nuclear weapons are not used in any future conflict.
Summary
Since their founding as independent nations, nuclear issues have been key elements of nationalism and the public sphere in both India and Pakistan. Yet the relationship between nuclear arms and civil society in the region is seldom taken into account in conventional security studies. These original and provocative essays examine the political and ideological components of national drives to possess and test nuclear weapons. Equal coverage for comparable issues in each country frames the volume as a genuine dialogue across this contested boundary.
Abstract
Pakistan, the fastest growing nuclear weapon state in the world, has established over the last decade a nuclear management system it holds to be “foolproof.” Despite the explosion of radical groups challenging the writ of the state, it dismisses concerns by critics that its nuclear weapons are not safe and secure as “preposterous” and an attempt to “malign” the state. This article examines Pakistan’s nuclear management system in four functional areas: command-and-control, physical security, nuclear surety, and doctrine. It describes what is publicly known in each area, identifies areas of omission and inadequacy in each one, and examines several premises of the nuclear program the author considers to be unfounded. Comparing these deficiencies in Pakistan’s nuclear management system to the current problems plaguing the US nuclear management system, the author concludes that complacency and unfounded confidence in the efficacy of such programs, if not addressed and corrected, could lead to a future nuclear catastrophe in South Asia.
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Abstract
Pakistan has a nuclear weapons stockpile of 110 to 130 warheads, an increase from an estimated 90 to 110 warheads in 2011. With several delivery systems in development, four operating plutonium production reactors, and uranium facilities, the country’s stockpile will likely increase over the next 10 years, but by how much will depend on many things. Two key factors will be how many nuclear-capable launchers Islamabad plans to deploy, and how much the Indian nuclear arsenal grows. Based on Pakistan’s performance over the past 20 years and its current and anticipated weapons deployments, the authors estimate that its stockpile could realistically grow to 220 to 250 warheads by 2025, making it the world’s fifth largest nuclear weapon state. Pakistan appears to have six types of currently operational nuclear-capable ballistic missiles, plus at least two more under development: the short-range Shaheen-1A and medium-range Shaheen-3. Pakistan is also developing two new cruise missiles, the ground-launched Babur (Hatf-7) and the air-launched Ra’ad (Hatf-8).
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Summary
India and Pakistan have developed and flight tested seventeen new nuclear weapon delivery vehicles since testing nuclear devices in 1998 – an average of more than one per year. Military doctrines have also evolved to emphasize more rapid mobilization to engage in limited conventional warfare. Diplomacy to reduce nuclear risks has lagged far behind nuclear weapon-related advances and doctrinal change. Since 1998, Pakistan and India have negotiated four notable military-related Confidence-Building and Nuclear Risk Reduction Measures. No new measures have been agreed upon since 2007.
There is no basis for deterrence stability on the Subcontinent when diplomacy and nuclear risk reduction are moribund while nuclear capabilities grow and military doctrines evolve. The most desirable off-ramp to increased nuclear dangers is to secure normal relations with a nuclear-armed neighbor. This collection of essays – the product of bi-monthly discussions at the Stimson Center – provides analysis and ideas for deterrence stability and escalation control on the Subcontinent. This pursuit awaits leadership in India and Pakistan that is strong enough to persist in the face of violent acts designed to disrupt progress.
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Abstract
This essay provides an overview of the ongoing quantitative and qualitative changes in Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal and their impact on deterrence stability vis-à-vis India. Prominent among these trends is a major expansion in fissile material production that enables the manufacture of lighter and more compact warheads optimized for battlefield missions; the development of cruise missiles and shorter-range ballistic missiles possessing dual-use capabilities; and a greater emphasis in doctrinal pronouncements on the need for strike options geared to all levels of conflict. Although these trends pose problematic ramifications for the risks of unauthorized and inadvertent escalation, deterrence stability in South Asia is not as precarious as many observers fear. The challenges of fashioning a robust nuclear peace between India and Pakistan cannot be lightly dismissed, however, and policy makers would do well to undertake some reinforcing measures.
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Abstract
While recent history arguably demonstrates a high level of nuclear stability in South Asia, this article argues that this stability has historically been a function of India’s relative weakness. It argues that, as India becomes stronger, attention must be paid to the technical and political requirements of nuclear stability: the reliability of weapons and command and control and the political conditions that underpin stable relations between nuclear-armed states. It concludes by recommending the United States aim to modify the perceptions of regional elites about their various intentions and decision-making processes and the role of the United States as crisis manager.
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Abstract
This article analyzes India’s nuclear doctrine, finding it to be critically flawed and inimical to strategic stability in South Asia. In pursuing an ambitious triad of nuclear forces, India is straying from the sensible course it charted after going overtly nuclear in 1998. In doing so, it is exacerbating the triangular nuclear dilemma stemming from India’s simultaneous rivalries with China and Pakistan. Strategic instability is compounded by India’s pursuit of conventional “proactive strategy options,” which have the potential to lead to uncontrollable nuclear escalation on the subcontinent. New Delhi should reaffirm and redefine its doctrine of minimum credible nuclear deterrence, based on small nuclear forces with sufficient redundancy and diversity to deter a first strike by either China or Pakistan. It should also reinvigorate its nuclear diplomacy and assume a leadership role in the evolving global nuclear weapon regime.
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Abstract
The question of nuclear stability in South Asia is a subject of both academic and policy significance. It is the only region in the world that has three, contiguous nuclear-armed states: India, the People’s Republic of China, and Pakistan. It is also freighted with unresolved border disputes. To compound matters, all three states are now modernizing their nuclear forces and have expressed scant interest in any form of regional arms control. These issues and developments constitute the basis of this special section, which explores the problems and prospects of nuclear crisis stability in the region.
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Abstract
This article analyzes India’s efforts to deploy a Ballistic Missile Program (BMD). The article has three objectives. First, it argues that scientific-bureaucratic factors and India’s incapacity to deter Pakistan’s use of terrorist proxies have driven its quest for BMD. Second, the article also evaluates the current state of India’s two-tiered missile defense shield. In spite of various claims on the part of India’s defense science establishment, the paper estimates that India still lacks a deployable BMD system and is still far from developing an effective strategy of deterrence-through-denial. Third, the article analyzes the implications of the development of India’s BMD system for nuclear stability in South Asia. The article shows how India’s BMD capacities, however limited, have indirectly exacerbated the security concerns of India’s regional rival, Pakistan.
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Abstract
Nuclear relations in South Asia cannot be fully analyzed without taking into
account the China factor. After the May 1998 nuclear tests, a substantive amount
of strategic literature has been focused on Indian and Pakistani nuclear postures
and policies, respectively. However, their integral links with China in transforming
South Asia’s nuclear environment remains one critical component that has not
been adequately examined. Multifaceted cooperation, competition and conflict have
engulfed this triangle since the India-U.S. nuclear deal. This deal has significantly
increased India’s nuclear weapons capability, and hence exacerbated the security
dilemma of Pakistan and China, which has important implications for the strategic
stability in the region. This paper analyses the strategic implications of this deal
for the nuclear triangle and argues that the nuclear triangle will remain complex
with inherent risks as well as pose challenges to the region’s strategic stability.
China-India-Pakistan nuclear strategies will be determined by the larger triangle
of U.S.-China-India relations, which will define the politics of South Asia as well
as the larger Asian landscape.
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Summary
Nationalism appears to be rising in a renascent Asia and stoking tensions, aspirations, and identity politics while amplifying grievances and raising questions about prospects in what is touted as the Asian century. This book provides a broad overview and introduction to nationalism in Asia. Leading experts in their fields succinctly convey key information and critical analysis useful to students in a range of courses across disciplines.
Part I presents thematic chapters, mostly cross-national studies, that elucidate the roots and consequences of nationalism in these societies and the varying challenges they confront.
Part II presents concise country case studies in Asia, providing an overview of what is driving contemporary nationalism and surveys the domestic and international implications. Approaching Asia from the perspective of nationalism facilitates a comparative, interdisciplinary analysis that helps readers better understand each society and what the ramifications of nationalism are for contemporary Asians, and the worlds that they (and we) participate in.
Asian Nationalisms Reconsidered is an invaluable textbook for undergraduate courses and graduate seminars related to international relations, Asian Studies, political science, government, foreign policy, peace and conflict, and nationalism.
Abstract
Pakistan is in a deep power crisis since 2008 which the government is trying to control by adding new generation capacity. This strategy, however, will not be helpful in the short-run. The only way, the power crisis can be controlled or mitigated in the short-run, is to efficiently utilize the available resources. Government lacks such a strategy at this point. The paper provides such a strategy by setting up a power sector model with multiple modules of generation, transmission and distribution. The model provides an efficient way of utilizing the available resources and can be used to perform simulations at different stages of the supply-chain. The results of model show that, if the given resources are utilized efficiently, the power generation increases by 3222 GWh or 5 percent of the current output and the revenue increases by $945 million or 12 percent. The extra generated power decrease the cost of power production by 0.52 ¢/KWh cents and reduces the power load-shedding for 2–3 h. These outcomes can significantly relieve the sector and the people of Pakistan. The results of the model have important policy implications on working of the sector and circular debt reduction.
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