Abstract
A regional conference is scheduled to be held in 2012 on the establishment of a Middle East without weapons of mass destruction (WMD). At the official level, there are some positive argumentations in the West for achieving a Nuclear Free Zone (NFZ) in the Middle East at a time that the threat of war by Israel against Iran looms on the horizon. Thus, NFZ looks as a better alternative to a military option to everyone, except perhaps some Israeli officials and their supporters in the US.
Cognizant of the fact that any initiation that would lead to a world free of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction is valuable and welcomed by everyone who is committed to the world peace, the success of the forthcoming conference very much depends on a realistic approach and understanding the real challenges ahead. In the analysis of future negotiations for the establishment of NFZ or WMD Free Zone, some points are of great significance.
Read the article online here.
Country or Region: Iran
Meier, Oliver, and Simon Lunn
Abstract
Strenuous efforts are currently being made to control the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and to reduce existing stockpiles of such weapons. New talks on Iran’s nuclear program have resulted in an interim agreement that could lead to a comprehensive solution of the conflict over how to better control Tehran’s nuclear efforts.
The United States and Russia are cooperating in the destruction of Syrian chemical weapons, despite competing geopolitical interests in the region. Some hope this cooperation could be the long-awaited “game changer” in relations with Russia, opening the way to progress on the broader agenda of nuclear arms control and other issues.
Read the article online here.
Kim, Duyeon
Abstract
The biennial nuclear security summit process is entering its third round, but despite the significant progress made thus far, nuclear security still is not dramatic or “sexy” enough to sustain top-level attention and interest.
The nuclear security summits, launched by U.S. President Barack Obama, began in Washington in 2010. Before the second summit, which took place in Seoul two years later, summit fatigue already had begun to set in despite the expanded participation list and agenda at the 2012 event.
On March 24, the leaders of 53 countries, the European Union, the United Nations, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and Interpol will gather in The Hague to continue their discussion on ways to prevent nuclear terrorism. The challenge going into The Hague summit and the 2016 U.S. summit is finding ways to sustain the momentum and political attention they have generated at the highest levels on nuclear security issues. At the start of preparations for every meeting, the discourse still begins with, “What is nuclear security, and why does it matter?”
The recurrence of this most basic question indicates that nuclear security is still a highly specialized concept that is difficult for nonspecialists to grasp, a problem that is made more difficult by the changes every few years in the cast of leaders and their supporting “sherpas.”[1] The recurrence of the question also indicates that nuclear security is generally not regarded as urgent or compelling as the Iranian or North Korean nuclear problems. It should be.
Nuclear security is not an issue for nuclear-weapon states alone. Countries that generate nuclear power to meet their electricity needs or have research reactors are at risk of nuclear materials theft and smuggling as well as the sabotage of facilities. Adding radioactive sources—ingredients that can be used in “dirty bombs” and other means of radiological terrorism—to the assessment greatly expands the issue because they are used essentially everywhere for medical and industrial purposes.
The threat is not merely hypothetical. Between 1993 and 2012, there were 16 confirmed incidents that “involved unauthorized possession of highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium [and] some of these incidents involved attempts to steal or traffic these materials across international borders,” according to the IAEA.[2] In the past two years, there have been break-ins at a French nuclear power plant and at the Y-12 National Security Complex in Tennessee.[3] With regard to radiological materials, another recent incident highlighted the need for improved security. On December 5, 2013, a missing shipment of cobalt-60, which is radioactive and can be used in a dirty bomb, was discovered abandoned after it was stolen from a truck transporting it to a storage facility in Mexico.[4]
Fortunately, the world has not yet experienced a catastrophic incident involving the security of nuclear materials that could be used by terrorists to cause mass destruction. Yet, that does not mean the coast is clear. A nuclear security failure seems to be low in probability, but its consequences would be devastating. Moreover, a nuclear incident in one country would affect its neighbors and the world.
The Hague summit comes at a pivotal and opportune time in the summit process. If done well, it can be the watershed moment for the global nuclear security regime.
Read the article online here.
Perkovich, George
Abstract
A final nuclear deal with Iran should meet the underlying objective of the relevant UN Security Council resolutions since 2006: “the establishment of international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme.”[1]
A final agreement could be codified and endorsed through a new resolution, which need not include all of the specific instrumental elements of past resolutions—for example, suspension of all uranium enrichment—if the council determines that the overall objective has been met. As the resolutions acknowledge, to be durable, such an agreement also must satisfy Iran’s interest in having a purely peaceful nuclear program free from sanctions.
The devilish challenge will be in the details. History will inform each party’s requirements. The six-country group that has been negotiating with Iran, the so-called P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States), will remember that Iran secretly had, at least until 2003, what appeared to be a dedicated, multifaceted program to acquire capabilities to produce nuclear weapons. Iran still has not cooperated fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to clarify these activities and continues to expand sensitive fuel-cycle capabilities beyond any plausible civilian requirement. Iranian leaders, for their part, remember numerous episodes that reflect a U.S. determination to hasten an end to their regime.
The United States and its negotiating partners seem to have reached a general understanding regarding key components that should be included in a satisfactory deal. Iran must significantly constrain its activities related to uranium enrichment, revise plans to build a heavy-water reactor, resolve outstanding questions with the IAEA about Tehran’s past activities, and implement an additional protocol, which would strengthen and broaden the IAEA’s ability to carry out inspections in the country, and a modified version of Code 3.1 of its safeguards subsidiary arrangement, which would require Iran to provide design information as soon as decisions are made to construct a nuclear facility. The combination of these measures would help the IAEA conclude over time that there are no undeclared nuclear activities in Iran and that its nuclear program is exclusively peaceful.
This article highlights four measures that are considered less frequently but would help resolve the Iran crisis and prevent or redress similar crises in the future. It then suggests an initiative that competing factions in Washington should take to buttress confidence that the United States seriously seeks a diplomatic outcome.
Read the article online here.
Singh, Michael
Abstract
In the debate over sanctions on Iran—their role in bringing Tehran to the negotiating table and their proper place in U.S. diplomatic strategy in the future—scant attention has been paid to a major shift in the negotiating position of the P5+1, the group of six countries (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) that is negotiating with Tehran over the Iranian nuclear program.
No longer is the P5+1 demanding that Iran halt uranium enrichment. Indeed, in the November 24 first-step nuclear accord, the Joint Plan of Action, the P5+1 all but concedes that Iran will be permitted to enrich in perpetuity. In separate comments that have quickly become conventional wisdom among Iran analysts, U.S. negotiators now characterize their previous position that Iran should halt enrichment as “maximalist.” Although undoubtedly expedient, this shift away from a zero-enrichment negotiating position is misguided and unnecessary.
The U.S. shift away from zero enrichment to limited enrichment represents a significant diplomatic victory for Iran. For the last decade, the position of the EU-3 (France, Germany, and the UK) and then the P5+1 had been that Iran must “suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development.” This position was enshrined as an Iranian obligation in a series of UN Security Council resolutions. Iran, however, asserted a “right to enrich” and refused to halt enrichment after resuming it when nuclear talks with the European Union broke down in 2005. This difference formed the core of the confrontation that subsequently developed between Iran and the allies.
Read article online here
Mukhatzhanova, Gaukhar
Abstract
From April 28 to May 9, states-parties to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) will gather in New York for the third and final meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference.[1] Although it is unlikely that states will try to negotiate substantive recommendations for the review conference, the preparatory meeting is still an opportunity to take stock of developments and assess the condition of the regime as the treaty approaches the 45th anniversary of its entry into force.
More than a year away, the 2015 review conference is promising to be highly contentious, with the Middle East and nuclear disarmament at the center of tensions among the parties and progress on both issues viewed as a test of the treaty’s credibility. The rapidly evolving initiative centered on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons is reshaping the traditional NPT debate, challenging the incremental approach to disarmament. The events unfolding in Ukraine may yet have a serious impact, reaffirming the belief among some that nuclear weapons or protection of a nuclear alliance are necessary for national security and further diminishing the possibility of any progress on disarmament. On the other hand, the crisis might help re-energize the discourse on the risks of escalation and use of nuclear weapons.
Read the article online here.
Ahmad, Ali, Frank von Hippel, Alexander Glaser, and Zia Mian
Abstract
In November 2013, Iran and the P5+1 group of countries (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) agreed on a six-month Joint Plan of Action to enable negotiations on a final settlement to contain the proliferation risks from Iran’s nuclear program.
This interim agreement freezes Iran’s enrichment capacity, thereby preventing a further shortening of the time Iran would require to produce weapons quantities of highly enriched uranium (HEU) if it wished.1 This enrichment capacity has expanded greatly over the years since it first came to international attention in 2002.
Iran and the P5+1 also have agreed on the need to constrain Iran’s option to produce plutonium for weapons using the reactor that is under construction near the city of Arak and that will be under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.
Under the Joint Plan of Action, Iran has agreed to freeze the Arak reactor project for six months.2 It also has committed not to separate plutonium from spent nuclear fuel or construct a facility capable of doing so. These are important interim commitments.
According to Ali Akbar Salehi, the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, the Arak reactor is intended for radioisotope production and testing of nuclear fuel and materials. In response to the P5+1 proposal that Iran scrap the Arak reactor project, Salehi stated that “we see no point stopping the work on this reactor.” He has acknowledged, however, the international community’s concerns about the Arak reactor and offered the possibility of design changes “in order to produce less plutonium in this reactor and in this way allay the worries and mitigate the concerns.”3
This article proposes technical steps that would provide assurance that Iran could not quickly make sufficient plutonium for a nuclear weapon with the Arak reactor while at least maintaining the reactor’s performance in peaceful applications.
The solution proposed here involves changing the fueling and operating power of the Arak reactor to make it less of a proliferation concern. The case of Algeria’s Es-Salam research reactor provides a useful precedent.
Read the article online here.
Einhorn, Robert
Abstract
The current review process of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is unsatisfactory. It produces high drama and intense diplomatic activity, but rarely contributes to the strengthening of the NPT regime. All NPT parties are frustrated with it. It is time to consider a better way.
Read the article online here.
Glaser, Alexander, Zia Mian, Hossein Mousavian, and Frank von Hippel
Abstract
Iran is negotiating with a group of six states over the future of its nuclear program. In November 2013, Iran and the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) agreed to a Joint Plan of Action that seeks to reach a “comprehensive solution” by July 20, 2014.
The goal is an agreement on a set of measures that can provide reasonable assurance that Iran’s nuclear program will be used only for peaceful purposes and enable the lifting of international sanctions imposed on Iran over the past decade because of proliferation concerns.
A key challenge is to reach agreement on limiting Iran’s uranium-enrichment program, which is based on gas centrifuges, in a way that would enable Iran to meet what it sees as its future needs for low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel for nuclear research and power reactors while forestalling the possibility that this program could be adapted to quickly produce highly enriched uranium at levels and in amounts suitable for use in nuclear weapons.
Kimball, Daryl G
Abstract
This month, top diplomats from Iran and six world powers have a historic opportunity to seal a long-sought, long-term comprehensive deal that guards against a nuclear-armed Iran and helps avoid a future military confrontation over its nuclear program.
The negotiation is one of the most important and complex nuclear negotiations in recent decades. Nevertheless, for the United States and the other members of the six-country group (China, France, Germany, Russia, and the United Kingdom), which is known as the P5+1, the goals are straightforward.
Read the article here.
Rauf, Tariq, and Robert Kelley
Abstract
For nearly a year, negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program have been underway between Iran and the EU3+3 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States). The two sides in the negotiations, which the European Union has facilitated, are seeking a “mutually-agreed long-term comprehensive solution that would ensure Iran’s nuclear programme will be exclusively peaceful.”
Read the article here.
Kwon, Bo Ram
Abstract
Why were economic sanctions able to produce successful political outcomes in Iran but not in North Korea during 2006–2015? Experts have argued that sanctions are not really effective in changing a state’s objectionable policies or behavior. However, such conclusions should not be drawn without a close examination of the complex environment under which sanctions are imposed. This paper attempts to identify the conditions of sanctions success by comparing the economic sanctions imposed on Iran and North Korea. It begins with a critical assessment of extant evaluations of sanctions imposed on North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons program. Next, it examines Iran sanctions to identify the factors that facilitated the resumption of nuclear talks in 2013 and led to a political agreement in 2015. Subsequently, this is compared with North Korea sanctions to explain why sanctions were more effective in Iran. Finally, the paper extrapolates the conditions for sanctions success that incorporate the political and economic characteristics of the states involved as well as the sanctions policy per se. The paper concludes with a discussion of the lessons learned.
Read the article online here (scroll down to No. 9 for full text).
Simón, Luis
Abstract
The winding down of military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan has prompted a scholarly debate around America’s evolving strategic role and posture in the broader Middle East. Allegedly, its isolated geographical position and “seapower” condition would allow the US to behave as an “offshore balancer”, by pulling back militarily, retreating from alliances and formal security commitments and relying on the different regional powers to balance each other. However, it remains unclear to what extent a seapower like the US would be able to effectively manipulate the balance of power in the Middle East from offshore. An examination of US strategy in the Middle East from 2009 to 2015 suggests that the main puzzle Washington confronts is not so much whether to retreat offshore or remain engaged onshore, but rather to work out the terms of onshore engagement. As this article shows, current US strategy in the Middle East revolves around the need to reconcile two seemingly contradictory sets of pressures. The first is that war fatigue, financial pressures and the ongoing reorientation of military-strategic resources towards the Asia-Pacific theatre do require that the US cuts back on its engagement elsewhere, including in the Middle East. The second relates to Washington’s deep-seated conviction that there is a direct correlation between US forward presence and the preservation of a favourable balance of power in the Middle East, which is itself critical to the security of other regions, including the Asia-Pacific. By discussing the relationship between seapower and forward presence, this article places US strategic retrenchment in the Middle East in perspective. In particular, the article transcends the rather vague notion of “balancing” and concentrates on US perceptions about which geographical areas in the Middle East need to be balanced, and how, i.e., through which alliances, instruments and policies.
Read the article online here.
Jentleson, Bruce
Abstract
Bruce W. Jentleson reviews coercive diplomacy’s track record and looks at how the United States used it to deal with Libya. Jentleson also presents policy recommendations that might be applied to current cases such as Iran and North Korea.
Read the article online here.
Wilner, Alex S
Abstract
The arguments presented here are based on a future scenario in which Iran has succeeded in developing nuclear weapons. Employing the logic and theory of deterrence, the article suggests ways in which the United States and its allies might counter, contain, and coerce nuclear Iran’s sponsorship of terrorism and nonstate militant groups. Four strategic concerns are explored in particular: nuclear Iran may blackmail rival and neighboring states; shield an especially assertive foreign policy; protect its nonstate proxies and protégés; and facilitate nuclear terrorism. Deterrence theory is applied to each scenario.
Read the article online here.
