Abstract: In recent years, India-US security cooperation has accelerated, overall defense cooperation framework has become increasingly mature and has been continuously updated with the times. The scale of India’ s imports of weapons and military supplies from the United States has continued to expand, and India-US joint military exercises have deepened. Since the Modi government took office in 2014, it has signed two basic military cooperation pacts with the United States, paving the way for further upgrading the two countries’ defense cooperation in the future. India-US counter-terrorism cooperation is starting from scratch and continuing to deepen, further expanding the contents of their security cooperation. India-US close security cooperation has had a serious negative impact on India’ s overall foreign strategy, especially its tradition of long-standing strategic independence. It has eroded material and institutional foundations for India’s strategic autonomy, and deteriorated India’s geostrategic environment, which is not conducive to realizing its dream of being a great power. Full text available here.
Country or Region: India
Yang, Rui, and Wang Shida
Abstract: In 2017, the Trump administration formally articulated its vision for the Indo-Pacific strategy, replacing “Asia-Pacific” with “Indo-Pacific” in policy papers and taking measures to promote the realization of an “Indo-Pacific dream”. This represents a significant adjustment in US regional policies. An important power in the Indian Ocean region, India is perceived as key to the successful implementation of this Indo-Pacific strategy. Generally speaking, the current Indian government and strategy circle actively support the upgrading of the “Indo-Pacific” concept from a geographical and academic term to a US vision for foreign strategies, anticipating that India could garner significant strategic benefits from it. Given this, New Delhi will continually adapt its foreign policies to the US Indo-Pacific strategy and may even direct the development of the strategy to counter the Belt and Road Initiative, work with other nations to balance China’s influence and finally make the rise of India as a great power a reality. Nonetheless, the Indo-pacific strategy is in its early stages, and the content is not completely pro-India currently. On top of this India is still skeptical of the US and will proceed cautiously, leaving room for maneuver in the future, fully tapping into the benefits of the Indo-Pacific strategy and avoiding direct confrontation with China. Full text available here.
Li, Li
Abstract: India’s eastward advancement began in the early 1990s. It was then called the”Look East” policy, and was later upgraded in name to the “Act East” policy in 2014. Over the past 25 years, India’s “Advance East” strategy has continued to expand, undergoing a compound evolution and upgrade from economy to security, from bilateral to multilateral, from the ASEAN region to East Asia and further onto the Asia-Pacific region, which has been reflected in the rise in India’s national strength and regional influence, more and more become an important pillar in India’s diplomatic strategy. Nonetheless, the traditional development trends of India’s eastward advancement are being affected by the newly emerging Indo-Pacific diplomacy strategies and achievements. India’s Indo-Pacific diplomacy was born out of its Advance East strategy, though not limited to advancement east; the core demand of India has always been to merge into the Asia-Pacific region. In other words, India’s Advance East strategy is an important pivot for its Indo-Pacific diplomacy. The reliance of India’s Indo-Pacific diplomacy on major power diplomacy has impacted the core position of ASEAN in its Advance East strategy, while the element of containing China in India’s Indo-Pacific diplomacy will dilute its intention to cooperate with China. This is also manifested in its Advance East strategy. Full text available here.
Li, Li
Abstract: Since Modi took office as Indian prime minister in 2014, India has quickened its pace toward great power status. Although the Indian government did not issue relevant documents and did not systematically give official statements, from the perspective of Modi’s domestic and foreign policies the outline of its strategy of rising as a great power has become increasingly clear. There was not only a timetable but also many new characteristics of rising.Although the process of India’s rising as a great power will not be smooth, its possible geopolitical influence should not be overlooked. To sum up, under the leadership of the Modi administration, several new trends have emerged in the strategy of India’s rise to great power status. Full text available here.
Hu, Shisheng
Abstract: Doklam Standoff,a crisis of Sino-Indian bilateral relations,was a large-scale military deployment between China and India.The crisis reflects the newly forming distrust between the two countries that led to an outburst as a result of a series of conflicts over the past two years,which signifies that Sino-Indian relations are entering a new stage characterized by increasingly obvious structural conflict.On the surface,the Modi Administration designed the crisis to stop China from building border infrastructure,to pursue its own absolute security,to maintain South Asian order dominated by India,and to consolidate the basis of strategic cooperation among India,the United States and Japan.Ultimately,however,the British buffer zone theory,the Mandala theory,the Brahmin supremacy theory in traditional Indian culture and the US Monroe Doctrine have also shaped the mindset and behavioral patterns of the Modi Administration.Under the influence of seeking absolute security and its strategic culture,as well as the strong desire to be a great power,the assertive Modi Administration has obviously strengthened its precautionary measures and hostilities toward China.The relations between the two countries are becoming tense.In order to achieve the goal of “dragon and elephant dancing together”,and to avoid the recurrence of crises like the Doklam Standoff,the two sides have to adhere to the two basic principles of viewing each other as opportunities for development instead of threats to each other.The mindset of a zero-sum game should be abandoned,and efforts should be made to co-found mutual respect and win-win cooperation in areas of common interest. Full text available here.
Islam, Md. Safiqul, Huand Ailian, and Zhang Jie
Abstract: Although the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIM-EC) has the potential to enhance economic and geo-strategic benefits of the four participating countries in the long run, its building process has often been stagnated due to India’s lingering concern about the implications of the Corridor for its national security and, more importantly, to the growing competition among major countries including China, the United States and India. Moreover, there remains ethnic insurgency in Northeast India and Myanmar as well as the Rohingya issue between Bangladesh and Myanmar, which poses lasting security threats to the building of the Corridor. By analyzing the nature of those challenges, this article shows that the emerging Indo-U.S. strategic coalition for checking China’s influence and India’s reluctant stance in building the BCIM-EC are the biggest challenges, whereas neither the ethnic insurgency nor the Rohingya issue can affect BCIM-EC building substantially. Therefore, it is concluded that the BCIM-EC cannot succeed unless China and India can both fully commit to the building process while enhancing all-round cooperation based on their mutual strategic trust. Full text available here.
Khan, Zahid, Guo Changgang, Riaz Ahmad, and Fang Wenhao
Abstract: Intended as a pilot flagship project under the Chinese-led Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has received relatively positive responses from actors in and outside the South Asian region. Islamabad, New Delhi, and Washington have offered their support to the project to varying degrees, because the financial commitments made by Beijing can help narrow the substantial funding gap for regional infrastructure connectivity. Nevertheless, enduring animosity and mistrust between India and Pakistan and growing strategic competition between Beijing and Washington present the biggest challenges to the project’s sustainable progress. Although the unfolding U.S.-China competition has not tangibly affected regional cooperation, as Washington’s enthusiasm for and investment in the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific Economic Corridor (IPEC) remain low compared with China’s down payment, the potential change in the balance of power in South Asia has triggered increasing concern from and collaboration between the United States and India. By highlighting the positive-sum logic of improved infrastructure interconnection as well as greater economic integration, and contributing to a more stable geopolitical environment in South Asia, Beijing can help alleviate the longstanding enmity between India and Pakistan and assuage Washington’s and New Delhi’s skepticism about its strategic intentions. Full text available here.
Ali, Murad
Abstract: The year 2015 marked the deadline for finishing the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) as the United Nations (UN) member states launched the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development with its Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The UN 2030 Agenda encompassing 17 goals and 169 targets aims at eradicating global poverty, combating inequalities and utilizing natural resources in a sustainable manner so that “no one is left behind.” All stakeholders have committed to proceeding with the incomplete agenda of the MDGs and achieve the SDGs by 2030. Also in 2015, China initiated the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a collection of projects to develop energy, industry and communication infrastructure costing US$46 billion as a key part of the “Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).” This paper examines different components of the CPEC and explores the extensive convergence between the main goals envisioned under the CPEC and the universally accepted SDGs. It posits that if successfully implemented, the CPEC will contribute to achievement of various SDGs in Pakistan. While it is expected that the CPEC will enable the country to move forward on a number of SDGs, three goals are particularly relevant to the construction of the CPEC. The paper argues that there is immense potential for convergence, commonality, and division of labor for a host of bilateral and multilateral actors to enhance the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development (SDG17), resolve political differences, participate in the CPEC, and contribute to the implementation of the UN 2030 Agenda even beyond Pakistan in the broader South Asian region. Full text available here.
Ishibashi, Natsuyo
Abstract: Japan’s policy toward India since 2000 appears to be a sign of new directions in Japan’s security policy since its decision to establish a strategic partnership with India is different from the previous policy of exclusive bilateralism centering on the US–Japan alliance. Nonetheless, Japan’s recent security partnership with India is part of Japan’s long-term effort to support the US-led liberal political and economic order in East Asia. This paper argues that Japan’s policy toward India since 2000 has evolved toward becoming fully aligned with US policy toward the Indo-Pacific region. The critical shift in Tokyo’s policy toward India came in spring 2005, when Japanese political leaders and policy elites came to recognize India as an important balancer against China as a result of the violent anti-Japanese demonstrations in China. They decided to support including India into the East Asian Summit and incorporated India into their new values diplomacy. This shift in Japan’s policy toward India, along with efforts to increase interoperability between Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Forces and Indian Navy, coincides with US strategy to bring India into the US-led coalition to balance against China
Midford, Paul
Abstract: During the cold war the United States was overwhelmingly central in Japan’s security policy. Japan hosted US bases and the Self-Defense Forces held joint exercises with the US military, even while shunning contacts with other militaries. Japan essentially refused even to discuss security with its neighbors. Special exceptions were made for the United States in otherwise sweeping policies, such as the exception for the United States in Tokyo’s ban on weapons exports and co-development. Since the end of the cold war, Japan’s security policy has undergone a little noticed transformation: it has steadily moved away from being centered on the United States as its sole security partner. Tokyo has initiated bilateral security dialogues with its Asian neighbors and assumed a leadership role in promoting regional multilateral security cooperation as a supplement to the US alliance. Japan has begun building bilateral security partnerships with a range of countries and actors, from Australia and India to the European Union. Paradoxically these changes have occurred even as the US–Japan alliance has strengthened. The articles in this special issue examine these new security ties with states and multilateral organizations, and other changes in policy that have made the United States less ‘special,’ such as by allowing arms exports to other actors.
Ganguly, Sumit
Abstract: [Note: This is a review essay of the following books: Shadow States: India, China, and the Himalayas by Bérénice Guyot-Réchard, India Turns East: International Engagement and the US-China Rivalry by Frédéric Grare, Muslim, Trader, Nomad, Spy: China’s Cold War and the People of the Tibetan Borderlands by Sulmaan Wasif Khan, and China’s India War: Collision Course on the Roof of the World by Bertil Lintner.]
These four books on Sino-Indian relations provide new evidence and novel arguments about the origins of the border dispute, the Sino-Indian border war of 1962 and the evolution of the Sino-Indian rivalry. Three of the four books have made use of newly declassified archival material and have thereby challenged existing knowledge about various features of this contentious relationship. The books, nevertheless, are of varying quality. One or two of them represent the acme of dispassionate scholarship while at least one asserts some very partisan claims. That said, they all represent a new wave of scholarship on Sino-Indian relations and should be of value to those interested in this fraught relationship.
Bajpai, Kanti
Abstract: The Doklam confrontation between India and China in the summer of 2017 was symbolic of the brewing tensions in their relationship. While the confrontation was resolved peacefully, its roots go back at least to 2007. Both the Manmohan Singh government and the Narendra Modi government pushed back against what they perceived to be a series of moves on bilateral, regional, and international issues that went against Indian interests. Modi’s responses have been more aggressive than Manmohan Singh’s in two ways. First, under Modi, India has more openly than ever before attempted to construct a coalition of militarily powerful states in the Asia-Pacific to increase Delhi’s bargaining power with Beijing. Second, India has sought to change the terms of engagement on the border conflict in three respects: a return to clarification of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) as the first step in border negotiations; linking further normalization between the two countries to progress towards a final border settlement; and seeking to inject a greater sense of urgency in the search for a settlement. This article concludes by asking why Modi responded more aggressively to China. It presents four explanations and concludes that Modi’s election in May 2014 coincided with a growing sense of strategic exasperation in India over its China policy, which questioned the value of the post-1988 commitment to normalization. The paper suggests that Modi shared that sense of exasperation, hence the rapid change in India’s stance within months of his coming to power.
Ganguly, Sumit
Abstract: Sino-Indian relations, which have long been fraught, took an especially adverse turn this summer with a military-to-military confrontation on the Doklam Plateau near the India-Bhutan-Tibet trijunction. After several weeks, Indian and Chinese forces withdrew from the region. However, neither side resiled from their respective territorial claims. This episode exemplified the troubles that have come to characterize the Sino-Indian relationship, especially since Prime Minister Modi assumed office in 2014. His regime, which is more nationalistic and reposes greater faith in the utility of force in international politics, had initially sought to diplomatically court the PRC in the hopes of improving their bilateral relationship. However, these efforts did not prove successful. Instead, the People’s Liberation Army, as in the past, continued to undertake limited probes along the Himalayan border, while the PRC continued to make diplomatic, commercial, and strategic inroads into India’s neighbours, trying to reduce India’s influence in those countries. The Modi regime, in turn, sought to counter these initiatives through various efforts of its own in the neighbourhood. Beyond South Asia, India has also sought to enhance its ties with Australia, Japan, the United States, and Vietnam in an attempt to hedge against the PRC’s growing economic and military assertiveness in Asia. These endeavours, however, have elicited hostile reactions from Beijing, which sees New Delhi as the only significant potential hurdle to the expansion of its influence in Asia. Despite Beijing’s adverse reactions it is unlikely that the current regime in New Delhi will scale back its efforts to cope with what it deems to be significant threats emanating from its behemoth northern neighbour.
Ahmen, Zahid Shahab, Sarfraz Ahmed, and Stuti Bhatnagar
Abstract: South Asia is one of the least integrated regions in the world, with persistent India–Pakistan rivalry acting as a major stumbling block to regional cooperation through the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Nonetheless, both India and Pakistan continue to experiment with multilateral arrangements and both became members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in 2017. While it is too early to predict the impact of the India–Pakistan rivalry on the SCO, dominant scholarship highlights the likelihood of a negative influence. This paper would like to present an alternative possibility – of the SCO providing opportunities for collaboration in the areas of security and counterterrorism, which in turn may positively influence Indo–Pak relations. Further, the likelihood of the Indo–Pak conflict negatively impacting the SCO is low primarily because, unlike SAARC, the SCO is led by China and Russia, who are actively invested in keeping the SCO influential to serve their key interest in challenging the dominant Western world order.
Mehra, Meeta, and Guarav Bhattacharya
Preview: The growing demand for energy has raised some questions pertaining to energy transitions in the recent years: larger access to energy, switch from traditional bioenergy to modern and cleaner energy, and security of energy supplies. These issues have important areas of intersection amongst them. Notably, however, policies toward achieving these goals often pose trade-offs, making it difficult to achieve them simultaneously. For instance, “energy for all” and the shift to cleaner energy might be fiscally burdensome and raise energy import-dependence, both having obvious implications for energy security. An analysis of recent policies aimed at accomplishing the three goals (“energy for all,” renewable energy, and energy security) and discussing the possible policy trade-off occupies center-stage in this paper.
