Category: Blog

After a tumultuous 2018 that saw the beginning of a trade war, US withdrawals from treaties on nuclear missiles and Iran, and historic summits with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, the Rising Powers are gearing up for another eventful year. China is already facing cross-strait tensions with Taiwan, while Japan prepares for a summit with Russia later this month and India braces for passionate general elections later this year. In this Rising Powers Policy Alert, we sample the Rising Powers’ resolutions, forecasts, and concerns for 2019. Read more here.

On November 30th and December 1st, the Group of Twenty (G20) Summit convened in Buenos Aires, Argentina. Unlike the stalemate at the APEC Summit, the G20 managed to pass a declaration championing “fair and sustainable development,” however, the omission of a clause criticizing protectionism did not go unnoticed. In this RPI Policy Alert, we examine how well the Rising Powers’ bilateral blitzes culminated in success at the G20 Summit. Read more here.

The Rising Powers Initiative added Australia to the list of countries included in our Research Database. RPI’s citation entries on Australia will be limited to its role in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the “Quad” or “security diamond”) with India, Japan, and the United States, as well as its relevance in the Rising Powers’ regional foreign policymaking.

We’re working to include citations for works back to 2007, when the Quad was first pitched by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, and to add the tag where appropriate to existing entries in the database.

The Rising Powers gathered in Singapore November 11th-15th for the 33rd Summit of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). At the ASEAN Summit, the East Asia Summit subgroup and continuing negotiations of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) multilateral free trade agreement also convened. The Economic Leaders’ Meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum met on the heels of ASEAN November 17th-18th in Papua New Guinea. For the first time since APEC’s annual Economic Leaders’ Meetings began in 1993, no joint declaration was issued, which many observers attributed to tensions between China and the United States. Instead, Papua New Guinea’s Prime Minister and Chair of this year’s APEC Forum Peter O’Neill issued the Era Kone Statement to conclude the proceedings. In this RPI Policy Alert, we catch up on the developments in the Rising Powers’ whirlwind multilateral summit tours. Read more here.

As the ASEAN and G20 Summits approach, the Rising Powers have continued to focus on their bilateral ties. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe made an official visit to China on October 25th and 26th, breaking a seven year period without one. Upon his return to Tokyo, Abe hosted Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi on October 28th and 29th. Meanwhile, China rolled out the red carpet for the first China International Import Expo in Shanghai, and Brazil elected its own “Trump of the Tropics.” In this RPI Policy Alert, we continue to cover developments in the Rising Powers’ diplomatic efforts. Read more here.

On October 19th, the New York Times reported that the United States was preparing to announce its exit from the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty) ahead of US National Security Advisor John R. Bolton’s visit to Moscow. US President Donald Trump raised the issue at a campaign rally in Nevada on October 20th: “Russia has violated the agreement. They have been violating it for many years. And we’re not going to let them violate a nuclear agreement and go out and do weapons and we’re not allowed to.” Speaking to reporters, Trump claimed that one of the reasons for the withdrawal was China’s lack of participation, even though the INF Treaty was a bilateral agreement between the US and Russia. At a press conference in Moscow on October 23rd, Bolton explained that the US’s concerns began during the previous administration of President Barack Obama and emphasized the discussion of withdrawal was motivated by Russian violations: “The problem is there are Russian INF-violating missiles in Europe now. The threat is not American withdrawal from the INF Treaty; the threat is the Russian missiles already deployed.” At the press conference, Bolton confirmed that the US would file its official withdrawal “in due course.” Read more here.

In the past few weeks, attention within the Rising Powers has been on strengthening–or at least soothing–bilateral relations. The common motivating factor: the United States. Vice President Mike Pence stoked fury from China with his scathing comments about China in a speech at the Hudson Institute in Washington, D.C., on October 4th that accused the country of a variety of ills, including sponsorship of “the wholesale theft of American technology” and plans to interfere in the upcoming midterm elections. India diversified its strategic partnerships with a five billion dollar deal with Russia amidst uncertainty about the US’s intentions and commitments. Debates in Japan over the US military bases in Okinawa have flared again as the country seeks to strengthen ties with regional partners as the US stands on the sidelines. Meanwhile, Brazil’s presidential election has entered a run-off between far-right Jair Bolsonaro and the liberal Fernando Haddad, who have opposing foreign policy platforms. In this week’s Policy Alert, we lend an ear to the Rising Powers’ frustrations and hopes. Read more here.

RPI’s three-part series on Connectivity and Competition culminated in a panel at The George Washington University entitled “Regional Trends in the Indo-Pacific: Towards Connectivity or Competition?” on September 24, 2018. Recordings of the event are available here, but for a summary, we’ve also published an Asia Report. Miss the first and second installments in the series? Read “Between the AAGC and BRI: Japan’s Emerging Calculus” and “The AAGC: India’s Indo-Pacific Fulcrum?”

The United States’ latest round of tariffs against China took effect on September 24th, clocking in at approximately $200 billion worth of goods. The tariff will begin at 10 percent, then rise to 25 percent on January 1, 2019. As the battle wages on, are the Rising Powers feeling the heat? Read more here.

The Rising Powers Initiative will be co-hosting a panel entitled “The Indo-Pacific and Regional Trends: Towards Connectivity or Conflict?” with the Sigur Center for Asian Studies on September 24, 2018. For more information and to RSVP, click here.

Earlier this month, Professor Rory Medcalf, Head of the National Security College at the Australian National University in Canberra and Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, gave a presentation at the Sigur Center for Asian Studies on Australia’s response to China’s “sharp power” projection in the Indo-Pacific region entitled The Great Australian China Debate. Read Professor Medcalf’s remarks here, or click here for recordings of the presentation and more information about the event.

A counter-narrative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has yet to arrive in the Indo-Pacific region. Set against China’s rising influence under the BRI, many competing initiatives have been proposed by “like-minded” countries such as Japan, US, India and even the European Union (EU). These range from Japan’s “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) and “Expanded Partnership for Quality Infrastructure” (EPQI), the United States’ Indo-Pacific strategy, India’s Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) and India-Japan co-envisioned “Asia-Africa Growth Corridor” (AAGC), to the EU’s “Sustainable Connectivity” under the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM). Among these, the AAGC is the most significant because it is based on an inter-continental connectivity proposal factoring in Asia, the Indian Ocean and Africa. The AAGC emphasizes connectivity, corridors and infrastructure development with emphasis on the Indian Ocean, which is also a focus of Beijing’s Maritime Silk Road (MSR), making it a competing framework to reckon with China’s BRI in the Indo-Pacific.

New Delhi’s approach towards the AAGC is key given the centrality of India in Indian Ocean. Formally announced by Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the opening ceremony of the African Development Bank (AfDB) Group Annual Meeting in Ahmedabad in his home state of Gujarat on May 23, 2017, the AAGC emphasizes cooperation with Africa in an intercontinental growth and developmental framework. It intends to focus on four aspects: development and cooperation, quality infrastructure and institutional connectivity, capacity building and enhancing skill development and improving people-to-people partnership between Asia and Africa. These proposed areas complement Japan’s “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” foreign policy strategy and the “Expanded Partnership for Quality Infrastructure” initiative to promote investment in quality infrastructure announced by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in 2016.

Remodeled after Japan’s earlier “Partnership for Quality Infrastructure”(PQI), the EPQI seeks to encourage the export of high-quality infrastructure with partnering countries across the world within a mutual economic developmental framework. An approximate US$200 billionwas allocated by the Japanese government under the EPQI for quality infrastructure investment. “Conditional support” to China’s BRI notwithstanding, Japan’s aim is to have a better strategic space internationally by promoting its quality infrastructure. How does India, a global partner of Japan, visualize AAGC? Read the full Policy Brief here.