Category: Blog

As Narushige Michishita and I have argued, after decades of accepting U.S. supremacy in Asia as the foundation of its foreign and security policies, finding the right distance between the U.S. and China is the most important strategic choice facing Japan today.1 “Getting it just right” with these two powers will require both military and economic readjustments. But it will not be easy. Some in Japan fret about a Washington‐Beijing “G‐2” condominium. Others doubt U.S. capabilities and commitments going forward. There are also those who insist that unless Japan accommodates to Chinese power, it will lose influence in the region and globally. Still others are concerned that rivalry with China is unavoidable. Because the debate is often so clamorous, and because the Sino‐Japanese relationship is so frequently punctuated by tension, the possibility that improved relations with China might be compatible with sustained close relations with the United States is often lost in the noise.

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By Richard Samuels, Ford International Professor of Political Science & Director, Center for International Studies, MIT

No matter who wins the American presidency and who fills the new Chinese Politburo, on November 6 and 8 respectively, the world can expect a more strained relationship between the United States and China in the years ahead. While individual leaders do matter and domestic debates about foreign policy persist, Sino-American relations now operate on the basis of a number of systemic factors beyond the control of Xi Jinping & Co. on the Chinese side and either Mitt Romney or Barack Obama on the American side.

Over the past three years the relationship has become more strained, fraught, and distrustful in a number of realms. The competitive elements in the relationship are growing and now becoming primary, while the cooperative ones are secondary and declining. Taken together, this condition can be described as “coopetition.” But the intergovernmental meetings meant to forge cooperation are becoming more pro forma and increasingly acrimonious. Beneath the surface of official exchanges, mutual distrust is pervasive in both governments and one now finds few bureaucratic actors on either side with a strong mission to cooperate (educational and tourist exchanges are exceptions). The two sides wrangle over trade and investment conditions, technology espionage and cyber hacking, global governance challenges like climate change and Syria, nuclear challenges like Iran and North Korea, their respective military postures in the Asia-Pacific, and other issues. As China’s global footprint has emerged onto every continent, it is increasingly bumping up against longstanding American interests—thus adding a global dimension

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By David Shambaugh, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs & Director, China Policy Program, The George Washington University

The political awakening of Burma/ Myanmar is one of the most important, and positive, developments in Southeast Asian and global affairs. One of the major stakeholders in Burma/ Myanmar’s path to political and economic reform is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the region’s premier cooperative regional institution. What role has ASEAN played – and what role can it play in the future – in promoting the return of Burma/ Myanmar to the international community?

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By Amitav Acharya, UNESCO Chair in Transnational Challenges  and Governance, American University

The South China Sea is one of the great connecting oceans of the world, acting as a major conduit of Asian and global trade. It has also been a worrisome site of conflict. In recent years, disputes over territorial claims have led to armed clashes involving China, Vietnam, and the Philippines. It has also led to demonstrations. Arguments have spilled into cyberspace: on YouTube, Google Earth, online newspaper articles, and chat rooms, nationalist tempers have flared over their country’s claims to these tiny islands, atolls, and reefs.

Most of the territorial claims over the South China Sea are surprisingly weak, and none is incontestable. Here we must distinguish between arguments over the Paracels, the far-flung cluster of islands, reefs, and atolls closest to China, and those over the Spratlys, a similarly widely spread set of islands further to the south. Only China and Vietnam contest the Paracels, whereas six countries have claims to the Spratlys. Finally, the contemporary bitter arguments over sovereignty in this area repeatedly invoke historical evidence. It is the latter issue that will be the focus of this Policy Commentary.

Bluntly stated, we cannot impose contemporary notions of sovereignty on historical practices before the twentieth century. Despite much misinformation and inflamed rhetoric to the contrary, historical evidence overwhelmingly supports the view that states did not, traditionally, claim exclusive territorial rights over the vast majority of the South China Sea. To the contrary: the area has historically been an Asian maritime commons. What, then, does the historical evidence suggest? And how has argument over this evidence shaped Asian identity politics today?

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The car bomb targeted at an Israeli diplomat in New Delhi has accentuated the ongoing tensions over Iran’s nuclear program and the imposition of sanctions on its oil exports. India in particular is having a hard time responding to the ramifications of this attack. This Policy Alert highlights the variety of Indian viewpoints, as well as reactions from China and Russia.  

INDIA

This incident has castIndia’s diplomatic and strategic predicament in a harsh light. Indian commentaries reflect a deep anxiety and uncertainty over what this means for the future of Indian foreign policy toward the Middle East and Central Asia, as well as its energy supply and relations with theU.S.

• The Business Standard says New Delhi should not revise its current approach, and must reject the notion that it has to choose between Iran and Israel.
• But as C. Raja Mohan argues in The Indian Express, “Unlike in the past, India no longer has the option of doing nothing….While engaging all sides in a crisis is important, Delhi must recognize that circumstances will force its hand, sooner than later.” Yet even a great-power realist like Mohan is not outlining specific foreign policy prescriptions and instead suggests the need for domestic political unity, reflecting perhaps the enormous complexity ofIndia’s dilemma.
• Similarly, Bharat Karnad, a hard power nationalist at the Center for Policy Research only suggests that Indiashould tell Iranand Israelto keep their disputes away from Indian soil, and “publicly proclaim a policy that makes it clear that this country will not be made the site for a clash of strictly Western Asian interests.” An editorial in The Times of India makes a similar point.

A few analysts are more explicit in their foreign policy recommendations:

• Examining the pros and cons of India’s current support of Iran, Rajesh Rajagopalan of JawaharlalNehruUniversityconcludes that the possible negative reaction from some Arab states and the importance of Delhi’s relationship with Washingtonhas made India’s position increasingly costly to India’s “strategic balance sheet,” and it is time to change course.
• A different approach favoring multilateral diplomacy and opposing sanctions in general is espoused by Prakash Shah, India’s former Permanent Representative to the United Nations. He suggests “a diplomatic initiative by India, China and Russia” to persuade the EU and theU.S. to withdraw their sanctions.

In contrast, the more isolationist and domestically-focused view of the “neo-nationalist” paper The Hindu instead blames  India’s lax internal security (drawing many  favorable responses from readers): “Indians ought to apply their minds to a more important issue nearer home: the dysfunction that continues to characterize the country’s counter-terrorism infrastructure.”

CHINA

More broadly, Chinese commentary over the past two months has generally argued for a careful management of China’s position vis-à-vis Iran. Yin Gang of the ChineseAcademyand Social Sciences points out the possible disruption to China’s oil supply and says “China should persuade Iran back to the negotiation table.” Chen Ping, deputy managing editor of the Global Times also notes the need for a “Chinese roadmap for the peaceful resolution of the Iranian issue.” As the paper likewise argues in its editorials, “the U.S. is not ready for a war against Iran yet,” and the Iran issue gives “room for China to exert its diplomatic power.”

RUSSIA

Press coverage in Russiais heavily focused on the upcoming presidential elections, but Prime Minister and presidential candidate Vladimir Putin took time to weigh in on Iranin a recent editorial outlining his foreign policy priorities. In the event of a military strike against Iran, “the consequences will be disastrous,” wrote Putin. “We propose recognizingIran’s right to develop a civilian nuclear program…in exchange for putting all Iranian nuclear activity under reliable and comprehensive IAEA safeguards.”  If this is done, sanctions againstIran must be rescinded. Putin added that “the West has shown too much willingness to ‘punish’ certain countries.”

WASHINGTON — The visit by China’s vice president, Xi Jinping, to Washington this coming week offers a unique opportunity to take the measure of the man who will lead China for the next decade.

While Xi has traveled the world since being anointed Hu Jintao’s designated successor in 2007, he has not been to the United States during this grooming period (he did visit earlier as a provincial official).

This will be a good opportunity for Xi to familiarize himself with America and vice versa. As he is not well known outside of China and enigmatic even inside the country, observers will be looking for clues to Xi’s domestic and international orientation.

Here are 10 questions China watchers would like to know about Xi Jinping:

•1. Will Xi return to a politically reformist path for the Chinese Communist Party?

Since late 2009, the party has retrenched significantly — halting and rolling back reforms by Xi’s predecessor, Zeng Qinghong. Can Xi stand up to the powerful conservative institutions that have blocked reforms — the state security apparatus, the military, the party propaganda system and large state-owned enterprises — or will he be beholden to them, as Hu Jintao has been? Will reformers such as Li Yuanchao, Wang Yang, Bo Xilai, Wang Huning and Liu Yandong be promoted to top Politburo positions along with Xi at the 18th Party Congress in October?

• 2. Can Xi and the next prime minister (the contenders are reportedly Vice Prime Ministers Li Keqiang and Wang Qishan) turn the rhetoric of economic “rebalancing” into reality?

Many official speeches have been made over the past two years calling for a reorientation of the economy away from the export sector and the coastal regions to domestic consumption and the interior as the basis for a new and more sustainable growth model for China. To date the reality of investment has not matched the rhetoric.

•3. Will Xi be able to devise a more humane policy toward Tibet and Xinjiang, where ethnic unrest has steadily risen since 2008 and has spiked in recent weeks?

Government security forces have responded with a heavy hand, resulting in loss of life and heightened instability. A new, softer approach is needed. But will Xi have the political strength to stand up to the repressive apparatus and put in place conditions for a more stable coexistence between restive ethnic groups and the Chinese state?

•4. Can Xi and the party apparatus rein in the nationalism that is pushing the government to take extreme positions on territorial disputes with China’s neighbors, to “stand up” to the United States and behave aggressively internationally?

• 5. Will Xi be sufficiently confident to all the relaxation of tightened controls on mainstream media, social media, the Internet and educational institutions?

•6. Can Xi rein in the military, which has demonstrated a worrisome tendency in recent years to undertake actions that provoke China’s neighbors and, seemingly, act independently of civilian party control?

•7. Will Xi authorize a foreign policy that is more about substance than rhetoric?

China’s diplomatic platitudes have become increasingly incredulous in a dangerous world where real action is needed from Beijing. One hopeful indicator in this regard is a speech Xi gave at the Central Party School in late 2009, in which he explicitly criticized the pervasive tendency toward sloganeering in domestic and foreign policy, arguing that slogans needed to be replaced by substance and hard work.

•8. How will Xi handle the growing discontent across Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America over China’s rapacious and mercantilist energy, aid and trade policies?

•9. Will Xi and the Chinese government begin to take more active and less passive, more supportive and less obstructionist, roles in global governance? Will China continue to stand with Russia in the United Nations Security Council against the will of the majority of other nations on issues like Syria and Iran — and become part of the solution instead of part of the problem?

•10. Will Xi have the strategic foresight to invest in advancing the relationship with the United States?

There is no more important relationship for either country in the world today, yet strategic mistrust permeates the current relationship. Advancing the relationship requires the active engagement of China’s next leader — and the American president — to build strategic trust between the two great nations.

As Xi’s visit is not likely to provide answers to these 10 questions, time will tell if he is a “transformational” leader who embraces and shapes positive changes for China at home and abroad, or whether he is another risk-averse apparatchik.

David Shambaugh is director of the China Policy Program in the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University.

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A subversive pragmatic vision is increasingly challenging some of the key foundations of India’s traditional nationalist and left-of-center foreign policy, diluting the consensus that shaped the policy, and raising new possibilities especially for India’s relations with the United States and global nuclear arms control. This debate between two centrist foreign policy perspectives is not yet settled. The two are described here as ‘‘traditional nationalist’’ and ‘‘pragmatist,’’ with the former representing the established and dominant perspective, and the latter as the emerging challenger. Actual Indian policy mostly splits the difference, mouthing traditional nationalist (hereafter referred to as simply nationalist) slogans while following pragmatist prescriptions. One major result has been the widening of political space for closer relations with the United States, even without a stable consensus.

These taxonomies are ideal types: it is very unlikely that those characterized as either nationalist or pragmatist would agree with or accept every tenet of these categories. The categorizations are designed to provide an outline of the competing lines of argumentation about Indian foreign policy, rather than identify nationalists or pragmatists per se. It also is important to note that it is difficult right now in India to associate these perspectives with particular political parties, think tanks, or ministries. Thus, these perspectives are individualistic and do not correspond to particular organizations. They do, however, represent the views of important public intellectuals, policy analysts, academics, journalists, diplomats, and government officials.

Report of a conference organized by the IPCS in collaboration with the Sigur Center for Asian Studies, George Washington University on 21 February 2011.

Prof. Amitabh Mattoo, Honorary Director General, Institute of Peace and conflict Studies The present seminar is a part of a three year project named ‘Rising Powers Initiative’ and aims at reaching a better understanding of how identity issues and power transitions affect the international policies of China, India, Korea and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Research on identity issues has not yet expanded enough to have analytical rigour. Thus, this project aims to contribute substantially to the literature on international relations by defining and examining identity issues.

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By the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies

2009—2010 will be remembered as the years in which China became difficult for the world to deal with, as Beijing exhibited increasingly tough and truculent behavior toward many of its neighbors in Asia, as well as the United States and the European Union. Even its ties in Africa and Latin America became somewhat strained, adding to its declining global image since 2007. Beijing’s disturbing behavior has many observers wondering how long its new toughness will last. Is it a temporary or secular trend? If it is a longer-term and qualitative shift toward greater assertiveness and arrogance, how should other nations respond?

What the world is witnessing in China’s new posture is in part the product of an ongoing intensive internal debate, and represents a current consensus among the more conservative and nationalist elements to toughen its policies and selectively throw China’s weight around. Although there seems to be domestic agreement at present, China remains a deeply conflicted rising power with a series of competing international identities. Many new voices and actors are now part of an unprecedentedly complex foreign-policymaking process. Consequently, China’s foreign policy often exhibits diverse and contradictory emphases. Understanding these competing identities is crucial to anticipating how Beijing’s increasingly contradictory and multidimensional behavior will play out on the world stage. Each orientation carries different policy implications for the United States and other nations.

Few observers of negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program anticipated a breakthrough from the Istanbul meeting between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the six major powers known as the P5+1 (five members of the Security Council plus Germany). Yet a swift breakdown was not expected either. The assumption was that a difficult negotiating path was possible and perhaps even desired by both sides.

The United States officials continue to insist that the two-track approach — seeking engagement while still putting pressure on Iran through sanctions and other punitive financial actions — will continue until an agreement is reached.

Yet Tehran’s hardliners, currently in charge, effectively declared the structure of negotiations over the country’s nuclear program obsolete. If Tehran’s Istanbul posture does not change, P5+1 may – and only may – maintain its utility as a vehicle for yet another round of American-led efforts to impose new UN sanctions on Iran but it will not be useful for negotiations with Iran.

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By Farideh Farhi, Affiliate Graduate Faculty, University of Hawai’i-Manoa

Mike Mochizuki, Associate Dean of the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University and holds the Japan-US Relations Chair in Memory of Gaston Sigur, offers his insights on the 2010 collision incident between Japan’s patrol ship and China’s fishery boat. He discusses whether Beijing over-reached its hand and whether Tokyo successfully played its card in handling the diplomatic crisis. He also explores the security implications of the incident for the U.S.-Japan alliance.

What are the prospects for the development of an Asian regional community? How might identity influence the formation of that community? Will this emerging community include or exclude the United States? In May 2010, a group of preeminent scholars from the United States, Japan, China, South Korea and India gathered in Beijing at a conference organized by the Sigur Center for Asian Studies and China Foreign Affairs University to discuss the influence of identity on the foreign policy of Japan, China, South Korea and India, as well as the impact of identity on regional cooperation.

Asia is one of the most diverse regions on Earth. It contains countries with a broad spectrum of ethnicities, languages, religions, economic and political systems. Yet there continues to be discussion on the notion of Asian community or regionalism at the popular, academic and policy levels in Asia. Two important components of identity are values and world views. This ASIA REPORT will explore some commonalities and differences between the values and world views of Japan, China, South Korea and India, and the implications of those values and world views on potential regional cooperation. It will also examine the potential impact of these values and world views on the United States’ involvement in the region.

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