Bitzinger, Richard A., and Michael Raska

Summary
The U.S. military has never been at a loss for catchphrases to describe its warfighting strategies or operational objectives. In the 1980s, there was “AirLand Battle,” which gave way in the 1990s to “full-spectrum” and “network-centric warfare.” The nomenclature currently in vogue within the Department of Defense is “AirSea Battle” (ASB). Of ASB, it has been said that “no new operational concept has been touted as more important, or more hotly debated.” In addition, given Washington’s renewed emphasis on the Asia Pacific as a security sphere, as evidenced by its recent “pivot” (or “rebalancing”) back to Asia, how ASB plays out as a U.S. warfighting concept will have important repercussions for the region.
ASB is being presented as a novel approach to warfare intended to counter 21st century threats. And yet, given that some have made ASB such an essential cause in the future of U.S. warfighting, and considering the high underlying stakes that it supposedly deals with, it is mystifying that so few particulars been made public as to what ASB really entails. ASB is often advanced as an essential military approach when it comes to dealing with modern threats posed by countries such as Iran, North Korea, and China. And yet so little is known, beyond some banalities about how ASB would work in a real-world situation and, more importantly, why it is necessary. One journal has termed ASB as simply “a help desk for 21st century warfare” – an ad hoc, catchall device intended to “fix the problem in front of you with the tools you have on hand.” Not surprisingly, Pentagon staffers deny this, but the lack of substance or detail surrounding ASB has permitted wide-ranging speculation as to what it really is. In particular, in light of such ambiguity, ASB is being increasingly regarded, first and foremost, as a response to perceived growing Chinese military power in Asia. This discernment of a “counter-China” emphasis has especially been spurred by the many briefings and writings that predominantly identify China as the raison d’être behind ASB. These perceptions, even if exaggerated, raise concerns that AirSea Battle could exacerbate security and stability in the Asia Pacific.
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