In my previous blogpost, I explained what is development-envy and its role in inspiring Acehnese to engage in a separatist conflict. Here, I demonstrate how current developmental efforts at peacebuilding can end up exacerbating the same development-envy.
Given how development-envy motivates conflict, how do economic development programs encourage or discourage the use of violence? Development programs can be counterproductive for peace because they can inspire development-envy. This has implications for programs designed to prevent, end, or rehabilitate conflict. For example, the demobilization and reintegration program in Aceh has provided funds (Badan Rehabilitasi Aceh, or BRA) for ex-combatants as a means of increasing the opportunity cost of returning to conflict. While there is some evidence that this has worked, the patronage system of armed groups means that some ex-combatants would get more access to the proverbial pot than others. Moreover, victims of the conflict who were not combatants had to rely on a more general fund. As a result, there has been at least one attempt to revive armed struggle, which was led by an ex-combatant who has not received as much assistance post-conflict.
The biggest flaw of this policy is that it presumes that increasing the economic opportunities during peacetime will disincentivize conflict. As I discussed in an earlier post, many combatants were perfectly happy to give up their comfortable and secure lives in the pursuit of historical justice in Aceh. The irony is that by legitimizing economic development as the marker of status, paying ex-combatants to not fight (and other development programs) only reifies development-envy in Aceh. Therefore, when I asked ex-combatants if Aceh has peace today, many would lament that Aceh still does not have justice because Aceh remains poor. One former combatant recounted how he had visited Jakarta on holiday, and only felt anger because he knew that all of Jakarta’s roads and buildings were being funded by Acehnese natural resources. For many Acehnese, Jakarta’s colonization has not yet ended: in their narrative, Aceh’s special autonomy status from the Helsinki peace agreement in 2005 was supposed to be de facto independence within an Indonesian federation. However, because Jakarta has not honored its side of the deal, Aceh remains underdeveloped. Former combatants would tell me they would be willing to fight again if they had the chance. Children orphaned by the conflict, in particular, were keen to take the mantle as a new generation of combatants, and many revere Hasan di Tiro (the founder of GAM) as Aceh’s lost father figure. For these respondents, the struggle for Aceh is not yet over.
If development-envy inspires conflict, what can be done about it? Development programs may do some good, but they are ultimately insufficient. For lasting peace to occur, Aceh needs a new narrative of what it stands for. Aceh is not simply a historically great economic power that has fallen behind. Several of my interviewees pointed to various aspects of Aceh’s history that should inspire Acehnese to be proud of. I hope their voices are heard.
By Amoz JY Hor, Sigur Center Summer 2019 Field Research Grant Fellow. Amoz is a Political Science Ph.D. student at George Washington University. He researches on the emotional practices of violence and humanitarianism in Indonesia. Read Part I and Part II of Amoz’s blog series.
