Can Regional Architecture for the Global Commons Catch Up in the Indo-Pacific with US and Indian Cooperation?

Introduction

India and the U.S. have become a significant part of the Indo-Pacific’s security framework with their active participation in regional groupings. This makes them indispensable member states in structuring the architecture for partnerships in the Indo-Pacific.

The Rising Powers Initiative at The George Washington University and Christ (Deemed to be University) in Bangalore recently held a joint Conference on Regional Architecture for Partnerships in the Indo-Pacific: The Role of US and India in Security and the Commons. The first session sought to explore important aspects of the security dynamics in the region, focusing on how joint contributions may help in upholding a ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ and promoting a rules-based order. See the Security Policy Brief here. This Policy Brief considers a spectrum of commons issues that the two countries can cooperate on, from climate refugees to the blue economy. Watch the Commons session here.

There is an urgent need for the US and India to go beyond their traditional cooperation in maritime security and address pressing challenges in oceanic ecosystems, international maritime law, and fishing disputes. These are areas which have a direct impact on the lives and livelihood of local and larger populations of the Indo-Pacific. Successful collaboration would thus meet both foreign policy and domestic objectives.

Experts on the commons consisted of Jason Donofrio, External Affairs Officer at The Ocean Foundation, Cornell Overfield, Analyst at CNA Corporation, and Abhijit Singh, Senior Fellow at Observer Research Foundation’s Maritime Policy Initiative. The session was moderated by Deepa Ollapally, Director of the Rising Powers Initiative and Research Professor of International Affairs at George Washington University.

 

Read full Policy Brief here.

Assessing Taiwan’s New Military Security: Cross Strait, Defense and US-Taiwan Relations

Asia Report #59 | November 21, 2022

A high-tension visit by U.S. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan in early August 2022 led to the People’s Liberation Army Navy holding exercises near Taiwan and firing live missiles near the island. Chinese military escalation and stern diplomatic warnings to the U.S. came in the midst of final deliberations of the Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors and Science Act of 2022 (CHIPS act) in Washington. A week after Speaker Pelosi’s visit, President Biden signed the measure into law, providing over $50 billion to help develop and produce semiconductors while encouraging U.S. companies to cut China out of their semiconductor supply chains.

To explore these issues and how heightened tensions are likely to affect Taiwan and its economy and security, the Sigur Center for Asian Studies hosted a conference on Taiwan’s New Security Challenges: Economic Security and Military Security. The Asia Report from the first panel on economic and high-tech security may be found here. This Asia Report focuses on Taiwan’s changing military security challenges and assesses how cross strait, defense and US-Taiwan relations factor into possible responses. The video of the entire conference may be found here.

The speakers included Elbridge Colby, Co-Founder and Principal of the Marathon Initiative, Robert Sutter, Professor of Practice of International Affairs at the Elliott School of George Washington University, and Jacob Stokes, Fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). The panel was moderated by Deepa Ollapally, Associate Director of the Sigur Center for Asian Studies at George Washington University.

Read the full Asia Report here.

Policy Alert: Tricky Summitry as Rising Powers Meet at Shanghai Cooperation Organization in Samarkand

Policy Alert #250 | September 21, 2022

 

The 2022 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Samarkand, which took place from September 15th to 16th, was much anticipated by international media, as it would provide the opportunity for Russian President Vladimir Putin to meet with Chinese President Xi Jinping, as well as with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, for the first time since the beginning of the Russian war in Ukraine. As such, their encounters were heavily scrutinized, especially to assess the extent to which China and India would support Russia. Both China and India shared circumspection about the war and did not provide unconditional assurances of support. In fact, Prime Minister Modi spoke out in a rare public rebuke of Russia, while President Xi shared his concerns. Both China and India played a balancing act of not endorsing Russian actions while also not outwardly condemning them, with Chinese media criticizing the US for trying to seed dissent within the SCO while some Indian media saw this as a premise to nurturing India’s “growing ties with the US.” Russian media minimized the dissent within the SCO, and President Putin deflected criticism about the war in Ukraine, blaming continued hostilities on Ukrainian intransigeance. The most striking contrast in analysis of the SCO summit was between Russian and Chinese officials. Indeed, while Russian officials and state media argued that the SCO gave its member states tools to resist Western sanctions as a united bloc, and that the Samarkand summit contributed to building a new world architecture, Chinese officials resisted the notion of “China and Russia as a political and military bloc.”

Read the full Policy Alert here.

A Tale of Two Indias? China and India from Hambantota to Vostok

Policy Alert #249 | September 8, 2022

 

On August 16 at 8:20 am local time, the Yuan Wang 5, a Chinese ship, docked in Hambantota port in Sri Lanka. It left after six days on August 22nd, but not without causing an international stir. Its docking had been delayed for a few days by Sri Lankan authorities as the ship came embroiled in controversy. Indeed, the ship arrived in Sri Lanka as India was testing new missiles, raising suspicions that the ship, which has the capacity to track ballistic missile and satellites, had been sent to collect data on Indian missile launches.

This incident comes in the context of the extended standoff between China and India along the Line of Actual Control in Eastern Ladakh. Weeks before the Yuan Wang 5 was scheduled to dock, India denounced it as a “dual-use spy ship,” an assessment that was shared by the US Department of Defense. China pushed back against this narrative, asserting that the ship was solely docking for replenishment and was a research ship, conducting marine scientific research, and that its docking was part of “normal exchanges and cooperation between China and Sri Lanka.”

However, the Chinese ship had barely left Sri Lanka before India joined the Vostok 2022 military exercises in Russia held September 1-7. These exercises are hosted by Russia but China is the second largest participant, having sent a 2,000 strong contingent from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). As part of these exercises, around 200 Indian troops drilled with contingents from other participant countries, and thus collaborated and trained with the Chinese military even as the controversy over the Yuan Wang 5’s docking near India was still fresh. India seems to be playing a delicate balancing act, drawing concern for different reasons from both the US and China.

What are the opinions in the region on these developments from Hambantota to Vostok?

Read the full Policy Alert.