Abstract
In this article, we puzzle through the dilemmas involving Indian use of limited air power against Pakistan. We evaluate the potential benefits and risks of selecting certain targets in different parts of Pakistan in light of India’s strategic objective to motivate Pakistani leaders to cease allowing proxy militants to attack India. We then analyze the escalation potential involved in target selection and the need for ground mobilization to back up an air power option. Finally, we discuss the capabilities that India currently has, and would need, to prosecute effective airstrikes against Pakistan. Our assessment is that India is several years, and perhaps longer, from having an effective option for stand-off strikes. Even then, the escalatory effects of anything more than politically symbolic strikes could be counterproductive to Indian strategic interests.
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