Abstract
As a result of the People’s Republic of China’s military modernization, Taiwan must rethink its security options, focusing on its asymmetrical advantage as the defender. This five-part paper (1) explains why the 2001 US arms offer to Taiwan is no longer appropriate for defending the island; (2) outlines China’s likely approach to neutralize Taiwanese air & naval forces, & suggests an alternative strategy for Taiwan to counter China’s forces & weapons; (3) explores how China’s options might change if Taipei lost both navy & air force; (4) examines Chinese options to blockade Taiwan & suggests how PRC blockade objectives might be denied by Taiwan; & (5) considers impediments to & repercussions of a “porcupine defense” by Taiwan, ie, a strategy of “hardening, & building redundancy into, its civil & military infrastructure & systems.” With this defense-only strategy, Taiwan could be attacked & damaged, but not defeated, which might deter China from attacking at all.
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