Abstract
It will be more difficult to establish a stable nuclear relationship between India and Pakistan than it was to establish deterrence between the Cold War’s nuclear contenders. Given the awesome consequences of nuclear war, reducing nuclear instability in the subcontinent must be the West’s overriding priority in handling India and Pakistan’s nuclear ventures. Rather than imposing inconsistent sanctions or engaging in needless lecturing, the West’s industrialised countries should consider a set of positive moves, while at the same time avoiding signals of approval for India and Pakistan’s nuclear build-up. Initiatives to enhance stability could include arms-control measures, particularly if China actively participated, and more direct technical-military measures. These could range from improvements in command, control, communications and intelligence capabilities to the sharing of early-warning information.
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