Clemens Jr., Walter C

Abstract
This essay seeks to spell out the lessons from East Europe, the former USSR, and China that may be relevant to North Korea-lessons that could be useful for policy-makers and analysts in the DPRK as well as in the USA, the ROK, and other countries concerned about security and development in Northeast Asia. All the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, the former USSR, and China changed due to internal reasons-not from external pressures. The East German case, however, shows that internal pressures within the disenfranchised group of a divided people tend to accumulate and may explode if central controls weaken. When one government fears and dislikes another but cannot overthrow it, planners may seek to ignore, isolate, contain, or engage the target regime; while ignoring or isolating is the opposite of engaging, engagement can contribute to containment. This is a cardinal lesson of U.S. policy towards the former USSR and Communist China. Applied to North Korea, this lesson calls for engaging Pyongyang as a way to contain and, in time, help reform or transform the existing regime. Like the rulers of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), those in Pyongyang wish to avoid the fate of erstwhile comrades in Moscow and other bygone citadels of Communist rule. For North Korea’s leaders the East European and Soviet examples offer some hope: Engagement with the U.S. can improve living standards and buy time in which to reform an inefficient system. China’s Communists have prospered and retained power even as they engage the capitalist world and foster economic liberalization. Optimal societal fitness, however, requires self-organization, not top-down control. If North Korea’s leaders wish to save their system, they must embark on far-reaching economic and political reforms. China’s example shows that market reforms are possible while retaining strong political controls. Top-down rule is not optimal for development, but may preserve the regime for some years. If the United States and the Republic of Korea seek arms control with North Korea and wish to promote peaceful change, then they should reexamine their policies towards Pyongyang. Neither an ultra-hard nor an ultra-soft approach works well in foreign affairs. Neither zero-sum nor win-win assumptions are wise. The lesson from U.S. dealings with the former USSR and present-day Communist China (as well as Libya in the past) can be summarized: If you can’t overthrow a regime you dislike, engage it and work for positive change.
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