Abstract
One of the most striking features of the economic development that has occurred in the East Asian region has been the influential role of the state in directing its course. Vietnam is also following this well-worn path of state-led developmentalism. The principal contribution of this paper is two-fold. First, we place the Vietnamese experience in comparative historical and conceptual perspective. It is suggested that the structure of the Vietnamese state itself and the distinctive nature of the policies it has undertaken are reflections of the country’s traumatic recent history and the fact that its leadership is notionally “communist.” Our second contribution is to detail some of the more important aspects of this process. We provide two case studies which focus on the role of state-owned enterprises and decentralisation initiatives which demonstrate that, despite the frequently ad hoc and contingent nature of the developmental project and an absence of the sort of state capacity that distinguished the likes of Japan in its heyday, the Vietnamese government is overseeing economic development in creative and surprisingly effective ways.
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Country or Region: Vietnam
Park, Choon-ho
Abstract
Among the numerous border and territorial disputes between China and its neighbors, the Paracel‐Spratly case is the most serious to date. Primarily, the dispute concerns the ownership of some 200 midocean islets in the South China Sea, most of which are coral outcroppings without much value in themselves. But the issue is complicated by the expectation that the owner(s) will, be entitled to whatever natural resources may be developed from the offshore waters of the islets. Since the two‐day clash of arms between China and the former Republic of Vietnam (South) in January 1974, the Paracels have been firmly in Chinese control, while the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam are each holding a part of the Spratlies. The sea lane between the two archipelagos is the only major route that links East Asia with Africa and Europe, a fact that accounts for the deep interest of the major powers in the South China Sea. Since the fall of Saigon to Hanoi in April 1975, China has to argue the same issue against its ally, Hanoi, which also happens to be an ally of China’s adversary, the Soviet Union. Unless provoked forthrightly or provoked to provoke, none of the parties is likely to use force to gain control of the “flyspecks,”; nor would they seek international adjudication or other forms of third‐party involvement to settle the dispute. Pending settlement of the ownership issue, however, delimitation of sea boundaries among the parties will be delayed, and this in turn will necessarily delay development of the sea resources. For geographical and, to a lesser extent, political reasons, the attitudes of both China and Vietnam toward the issue are going to play a decisively important role in the final settlement.
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Hearns, Glen S., and William G. Stormont
Abstract
1994 witnessed interesting developments in cooperation and confidence building dialogue amongst the States of the Asia Pacific region, and in the South China Sea region in particular. On 25 November 1994 in Bogor, Indonesia, the leaders of Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Council’s (APEC) member States committed to link their economies together through the future creation of the largest free trade zone in the world. Previously, 18 foreign ministers met in July, at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Bangkok, to discuss the post Cold War situation in Southeast Asia. Much of the discussion focused on the role that confidence building activities could play in facilitating transparency in the face of the increasing armaments build up in the region. One of the longest standing confidence building activities in the region are the informal meetings of the project on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea (MPC).1 Since 1990 this project has continued to develop avenues for cooperative activities and to foster dialogue amongst the littoral States of the South China Sea region. New challenges were presented in 1995 for the MPC project. China’s announcement that she would endeavour to settle disputes in the South China Sea through accepted norms of international law and the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea was welcomed by Southeast Asia’s leaders. In orde to take advantage of this favourable climate, the MPC convened the First Meeting of the Technical Working Group on legal Matters in the South China Sea in Jakarta, in July. The meeting represents a significant step for the project as previously it was felt a legal debate may degenerate into participants merely restating rhetorical and entrenched positions. The large, and increasing, volume of naval traffic in and around Spratly Islands coupled with the concern that misinterpretation of another’s actions could lead to conflict, resulted in the signing of multiple ‘code of conduct’ agreements between claimants. Vietnam and the Philippines as well as China and the Philippines agreed to cooperate in this regard. During 1995 China continued to be the main source of concern for the countries of the region. Her occupation of Mischief Reef at the end of 1994 and rising tensions between the mainland and Taiwan over President Lee Teng-Hui’s visit to the US in June, culminating in missile tests off Taiwan, renewed questions over China’s intentions in the region.
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Capling, Ann, and John Ravenhill
Abstract
he Asia-Pacific region is home to a large and rapidly growing number of preferential trade agreements (PTAs). These agreements differ widely in design, scope and purpose. The “noodle bowl” that has resulted runs the risk of distorting investment and trade. Neither global institutions (the WTO) nor regional institutions such as the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) grouping have successfully addressed these issues. Amidst this increasingly messy situation, the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement stands out for a range of important economic and political reasons, not least of which is its potential to take existing PTAs in the Asia-Pacific region in a new direction. The aim of the TPP negotiators is to produce a comprehensive, high quality, multi-party agreement to tame the tangle of PTAs and be a potential stepping stone to achieving the goal of liberalizing regional trade on a non-discriminatory basis. The economic gains from removing border barriers among the countries involved in the initial TPP negotiations are likely to be limited, however, given the small size of many of the economies and the existing PTAs among them. To date, the US has been unwilling to offer a single set of arrangements for all TPP partners, preferring to build on existing bilateral agreements. Pessimism about the immediate results from the TPP should be tempered, however, by considerations of the dynamics that it might set in train; on the other hand, it has the potential to divide the region and exacerbate China’s concerns about “containment”.
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Bae, Kwanpyo
Abstract
Most studies on the decision by the Republic of Korea (ROK) to send troops into combat in the Vietnam War share an assumption that the ROK did not actually want to dispatch them. However, some historical sources show that since the armistice agreement of the Korean War the ROK had tried to send troops to defeat the communists, and it was rather the United States that had dissuaded the ROK from doing so—until the United States was faced with unexpected difficulty in the ground warfare in 1965. By reviewing existing data and unearthing new documents, this paper clarifies why the ROK had tried to send the combat troops for a long period of time. According to research findings, it was not just to obtain more military and economic compensation from the United States. It was rather to gain more reliable security assurances for the ROK’s own survival. At the time, the ROK was dissatisfied with the deficient bilateral alliance with the United States and had pursued institutionalization of a new regional collective security regime to replace SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization). The ROK expected the dispatch to create an opportunity to initiate such a regime. These attempts could be seen as commendable. However, the attempts ended in failure, even though the ROK actually dispatched them, because the attempts required a change of the firmly established San Francisco System.
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Thanh, Vo Tri
Abstract
Ever since the policy of economic renovation (Doi Moi) was initiated in 1986, comprehensive domestic reforms and proactive economic integration have been major pillars of Vietnam’s economy. Deepening cooperation and integration through the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) framework lies at the centre of Vietnam’s trade and investment liberalization agenda. Any domestic reforms undertaken in the lead up to the announcement of the AEC by the end of 2015 should engage the ongoing economic restructuring process as well as the country’s growth paradigm. Reforms will also entail narrowing the development gap between Vietnam and more advanced ASEAN economies. The Vietnamese government has to weigh adjustment costs from reforms and greater liberalization as well as ensure that benefits are distributed among a diverse set of stakeholders in the domestic economy. Past experiences have shown that stakeholders can be sensitive to adjustment costs and accompanying uncertainties. This paper focuses on three key issues related to managing consensus during the community-building process: (i) increasing consultation with stakeholders during reforms; (ii) building community awareness of potential changes; and (iii) mitigating adverse impacts of reforms.
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Kawai, Masahiro, Peter J. Morgan, and Pradumna B. Rana
Summary
The global financial crisis of 2007-2009 exposed flaws and shortcomings in the global economic architecture, and has sparked an international debate about possible remedies for them. The postwar global architecture was essentially guided by the major developed economies, and was centered around the IMF, the GATT – the predecessor of the WTO – and the World Bank. Today, however, the balance of economic and financial power is shifting toward the emerging economies, especially those in Asia, and both global governance and economic policy thinking are beginning to reflect this shift. This book addresses the important question of how a regional architecture, particularly one in Asia, can induce a supply of regional public goods that can complement and strengthen the global public goods supplied through the global architecture. These public goods include institutions to help maintain financial stability, support more open
trading regimes and promote sustainable economic development.
Southgate, Laura
Abstract
This article investigates the history of ASEAN’s relationship to external intervention in regional affairs. It addresses a specific question: What was the basic cause of the success of ASEAN resistance to the Vietnamese challenge to ASEAN’s sovereignty from 1978-1991? ASEAN’s history is understood in terms of a realist theoretical logic, in terms of the relationship between an ASEAN state with the most compelling interests at stake in a given issue, which I call a ‘vanguard state,’ and selected external powers. Using the Third Indochina War (1978–1991) as a case study, this article contends that ASEAN’s ability to resist violations to the sovereignty of Thailand from a Soviet-backed Vietnam is a consequence of high interest convergence between Thailand, and a designated external power, China.
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Liu, Ruonan, and Xuefeng Sun
Abstract
China’s rise in recent years has exacerbated Vietnam–China security tensions over maritime disputes in the South China Sea. To manage its security competition with China, Vietnam has simultaneously improved its security cooperation with the United States while maintaining a safe distance from it, in efforts to reassure China. This article attempts to explore the dynamics of the Vietnam’s security policy towards the United States and China in the Post-Cold War era. The authors find that the combinations of Vietnam’s Post-Cold War security policy towards the United States and China are shaped by its concerns over regime security with respect to the primary threats of infiltration by US democratic norms and of excessive anti-Chinese nationalism. The relative levels of both these risks lead to various combinations of Vietnam’s security policies vis-à-vis the United States and China.
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Amer, Ramses
Abstract
The study analyzes disputes and dispute management in the South China Sea. The progress made is outlined through an overview and analysis of formally settled disputes. The unsettled disputes are identified, analyzed, and assessed. The study concludes with a broader assessment from the perspective of dispute management.
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Ryan, Mark A., David M. Finkelstein, and Michael A. McDevitt
Summary
This is the first systematic study of modern China’s military campaigns and the actual fighting conducted by the People’s Liberation Army since the founding of the People’s Republic. It provides a general overview of the evolution of PLA military doctrine, and then focuses on major combat episodes from the civil war with the Nationalists to the last significant combat in Vietnam in 1979, in addition to navy and air operations through 1999. In contrast to the many works on the specifics and hardware of China’s military modernization, this book discusses such topics as military planning, command, and control; fighting and politics; combat tactics and performance; technological catch-up and doctrinal flexibility; the role of Mao Zedong; scale and typologies of fighting; and deterrence. The contributors include scholars from Mainland China, Taiwan, and the United States, who draw from a wealth of fresh archival sources.
Storey, Ian
Abstract
China’s deployment of the Haiyang Shiyou-981 (HYSY-981) oil rig into Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) from early May to mid-July raised tensions in the South China Sea to their highest levels since the end of the Cold War and reinforced existing negative trends.
The decision to dispatch the drilling platform provides further evidence that Beijing’s policy in the South China Sea is increasingly centralized, coordinated and proactive. China’s aim appears to be to achieve dominance within the nine-dashline by incrementally advancing its sovereignty and jurisdictional claims but without provoking military conflict. In doing so it also seeks to achieve regional primacy by undermining credibility in America’s security commitments to its friends and allies.
China’s dispatch of HYSY-981 severely ruptured relations with Vietnam and called into question the efficacy of Hanoi’s policy to manage its maritime disputes with Beijing.
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Storey, Ian
Abstract
Since September 2013, China has transformed seven features in the disputed Spratlys into artificial islands. It is currently developing extensive military and civilian infrastructure on these reclaimed atolls. • Beijing has argued that it is acting within its sovereign rights and that the facilities will provide public goods for international shipping. It has rejected accusations that its actions have endangered freedom of navigation or regional stability.
Contrary to China’s claims, the primary purpose of the man-made islands is strategic, as they will allow the Chinese navy, coast guard and air force to maintain a continuous presence in the Spratly Islands and strengthen Beijing’s ability to enforce its territorial and jurisdictional claims across the South China Sea.
The Philippines has been a vocal critic of the reclamations and has accused China of violating its sovereign rights and seeking to exert de facto control of the waters within the so-called ‘nine-dash line’.
ASEAN has expressed ‘serious concerns’ over the reclamations and their potential to undermine peace and stability, its strongest statement to date on the South China Sea. Several Southeast Asian countries have called for ASEAN and China to expedite a Code of Conduct to reduce tensions.
The United States has accused Beijing of changing the status quo in the South China Sea, intensifying the militarization of the dispute, destabilizing the region, undermining international norms and rules and violating existing agreements with ASEAN. The reclamations have sparked a debate on how the US should respond and whether it should adopt measures that challenge or impose costs on Chinese actions in the maritime domain.
China’s reclamations are likely to heighten tensions between Beijing and the Southeast Asian claimants, principally the Philippines and Vietnam, and become a growing source of discord in Sino-US relations.
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Storey, Ian
Summary
Since the early 1990s and the end of the Cold War, the implications of China’s rising power have come to dominate the security agenda of the Asia-Pacific region. This book is the first to comprehensively chart the development of Southeast Asia’s relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) from 1949 to 2010, detailing each of the eleven countries’ ties to the PRC and showing how strategic concerns associated with China’s regional posture have been a significant factor in shaping their foreign and defence policies. In addition to assessing bilateral ties, the book also examines the institutionalization of relations between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China.
The first part of the book covers the period 1949-2010: it examines Southeast Asian responses to the PRC in the context of the ideological and geopolitical rivalry of the Cold War; Southeast Asian countries’ policies towards the PRC in first decade of the post-Cold War era; and deepening ties between the ASEAN states and the PRC in the first decade of the twenty-first century. Part Two analyses the evolving relationships between the countries of mainland Southeast Asia – Vietnam, Thailand, Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia – and China. Part Three reviews ties between the states of maritime Southeast Asia – Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, Brunei and East Timor – and the PRC. Whilst the primary focus of the book is the security dimension of Southeast Asia-China relations, it also takes full account of political relations and the burgeoning economic ties between the two sides. This book is a timely contribution to the literature on the fast changing geopolitics of the Asia-Pacific region.
Sovacool, Benjamin K
Summary
This Handbook examines the subject of energy security: its definition, dimensions, ways to measure and index it, and the complicating factors that are often overlooked.
The volume identifies varying definitions and dimensions of energy security, including those that prioritize security of supply and affordability alongside those that emphasize availability, energy efficiency, trade, environmental quality, and social and political stewardship. It also explores the various metrics that can be used to give energy security more coherence, and also to enable it to be measured, including recent attempts to measure energy security progress at the national level, with a special emphasis placed on countries within the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), countries within Asia, and industrialized countries worldwide.
This Handbook:
- Broadens existing discussions of energy security that center on access to fuels, including “oil security” and “coal security.”
- Focuses not only on the supply side of energy but also the demand, taking a hard look at energy services and politics along with technologies and infrastructure;
- Investigates energy security issues such as energy poverty, equity and access, and development;
- Analyzes ways to index and measure energy security progress at the national and international level.
- This book will be of much interest to students of energy security, energy policy, economics, environmental studies, and IR/Security Studies in general.
