Abstract: The increasing Chinese naval presence in and around Indian ocean, coupled with the rise of the home-grown Indian Navy and the US naval dominance over the global commons, has brought about a strategic maritime triangle in the Indian Ocean. This article looks into the evolving role, capacity and objectives of the Indian, Chinese and US Navy vis-à-vis their strategic interests in the Indian Ocean region. The article argues that the ascendency of China’s naval prowess in Indian Ocean will prod India to opt for a tactical naval entente with the USA. Few impediments to the potential formation of a close-knit Indo-US partnership like India’s fear of losing strategic autonomy, its aversion in being an east Asian naval power, US–Pakistan ties and the difference in the Indian and USA’s interpretation of the concept of ‘Freedom of Navigation’ have been discussed. The article contends that an effective Indo-US naval cooperation will depend on how these impediments are taken into considerations within the make-up of their partnership. Full text available here.
Country or Region: United States
Tu, Dang Cam, and Hang Thi Thuy Nguyen
Abstract: This paper seeks to explore the new dynamics of U.S.–Vietnam security relations from 2011 to 2017. It begins with a review of the attempts before 2011 to establish a foundation for a normal security relationship between the United States and Vietnam, and progresses in the scope and pace of the bilateral relationship in this field. The paper then examines the process of a deepening security relationship between the two countries from 2011 to 2017, focusing on the motivations for increased security cooperation and the developments in five main areas of cooperation, namely maritime security, high-level dialogues, search and rescue, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and peacekeeping operations. Finally, this paper looks at the potential and limits of the U.S.–Vietnam security relationship, analyzing the possibilities for building a more balanced and effective security relationship and the limitations of U.S.–Vietnam security cooperation. In conclusion, the authors argue that the years from 2011 to 2017 witnessed new and positive moves in the U.S.–Vietnam security relationship. This is a highly significant development for Vietnam and the United States and an illustration of the fast geostrategic change underway in the Asia–Pacific region in the post–Cold War. Full text available here.
Kelly, Robert E
Abstract: The years 2017–2019 have been remarkable in the long stand-off with North Korea,
as much for the drama of war-threats and then summits, as for the durability of the
North Korean status quo. Indeed, given all the sturm-und-drang of both hawkish
and then dovish approaches to North Korea since 2017, the greatest surprise is how
little both alternatives have accomplished ‘on the ground.’ This essay investigates
surprise—why is the North Korean status quo so persistent? Specifically, why
have the hawkish and dovish deviations from the status quo since 2017 so failed
to change much? Several hypotheses derived from levels of analysis theory in
international relations are suggested. In brief, a leader level analysis would focus
particularly on Trump’s personality—his swings of interest, his personalistic
bargaining style, his sloth, his chaotic staffing. A domestic analysis would identify
the divisions within both the United States and South Korea over policy toward
the North. And a structural answer would posit the value of nuclear deterrence
as the cause particularly of Trump’s failure to budge Pyongyang. Because North
Korean intentions, particularly Kim’s psychological preferences, are only poorly
discernible, assigning causal weight to each hypothesis is quite difficult so long as
the North’s opacity persists. Hence this essay focuses on concept and hypothesis
development while nonetheless laying out what evidence there is. Full text available here.
Ding, Yi, and Dingli Shen
Abstract: In the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)’s case of nuclear
proliferation, less attention has been paid to the role of security assurances. This
paper seeks to assess the role of security assurances for the DPRK provided by the
UN, the Soviet Union, China, and the United States and to figure out why these
assurances are less effective to bridle its nuclear ambition. It argues that an effective
security assurance for nuclear non-proliferation should meet at least two conditions.
Firstly the security assurance should be credible, which can be realized by being
publicized, legally binding, and infusing with further commitments. Secondly, the
security assurance tailored to the unique features of the target state’s concerns is
more likely to be effective. Using this set of criteria, the only moderately effective
assurance is that provided by the Soviet Union. The general security assurance
of the UN is neither legally binding nor specifically targeted. The alliance with
China exists only on paper as Pyongyang believes Beijing is reluctant to fulfill its
obligation as an ally. The United States is taking a capricious attitude on the DPRK
and none of its security assurances are legalized or address its major concern of
regime survival. These may help explain why security assurances failed to prevent
the DPRK from acquiring nuclear weapons. Full text available here.
Kim, Min-hyung
Abstract: The main goal of this article is to explain the American failure of deterring North
Korean nuclear proliferation. Specifically, it examines the underlying reasons for
which U.S. inhibition policy toward North Korea has failed, despite the numerous
attempts by U.S. administrations (both Republicans and Democrats) to prevent
North Korea’s nuclear development. The central thesis of the article is that while
there were multiple reasons for the American failure of North Korean proliferation,
the most important ones were U.S. misperceptions about both North Korea’s and
China’s intentions and U.S. distraction by the war on terror. These factors, along
with Pyongyang’s shrewd strategies to manipulate Washington, Seoul, and Beijing,
played a key role in the emergence of a nuclear North Korea. Full text available here.
Zhu, Qin, and Xiuyu Fang
Abstract: Tensions flared for a time after North Korea’s fifth and sixth nuclear tests as well as
THAAD’s entry into South Korea. This paper extends the view that the root cause
of these issues is the lack of regional public goods (RPGs) on the Korean Peninsula,
and its insufficiency results from three major conflicts in the politico–economic
situation of the Peninsula. In order to resolve the issues and maintain lasting peace,
three specific aspects, i.e., in diplomacy, security and economy, are to be addressed
in carrying out the long-term mission of supplying RPGs to the Peninsula. For
effective operation and comprehensive management of the RPGs provision, an
integration platform with powerful commitments is called for, i.e., “Association of
Trans-Korean Peninsula Nations” (ATKPN) co-established by China, the United
States, and the two Koreas. Apart from the dilemma commonly identified in the
delivery of RPGs, the ATKPN also faces dilemmas specifically from the Northeast
Asian order. To overcome the ATKPN’s obstacles, concerted efforts are needed to
promote the institutionalization of Sino–U.S. “new type of great power relations,”
to transform the function of the alliance system, and to cultivate the awareness of
“common external threats.” Full text available here.
Kwon, Edward
Abstract: This paper analyzes the background of the nuclear stalemate between Trump and Kim in the Hanoi Summit and investigates various issues involving North Korean denuclearization, including a detailed roadmap and proper compensation for Pyongyang. The paper uses tree cardinal perspectives of analytical tools (the will of the leader, nuclear capability, and nuclear strategy) to critically assess North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and fathom Kim Jong Un’s stance on denuclearization. The United States reaffirms CVID/FFVD principles regarding North Korea’s WMD, while Pyongyang prefers an action-for-action method of denuclearization. Although Pyongyang has announced an end to its nuclear testing and has shut down nuclear facilities, experts question whether Pyongyang really is dismantling its nuclear program. Pyongyang’s hidden nuclear facilities and accumulation of HEU in numerous places, the complicated process of verification, as well as potential traps in the details of the denuclearization agreement pose a big challenge. In light of the current nuclear stalemate, President Moon’s mediating effort to bring Kim Jong Un back to the denuclearization table is imperative. Full text available here.
Cha, Victor D.
Abstract: Prudent leaders must always contemplate the unintended consequences of their foreign policy successes, particularly when those secondary consequences create negative externalities. In this article, I look at whether the unintended consequence of the South Korean government’s push for a peace declaration on the Korean peninsula could create the conditions by which the United States, led by an impulsive American president, could withdraw U.S. troops from the Korean peninsula. I first document the rationale behind the South Korean government’s approach to peace diplomacy with North Korea. I then examine the concept of the peace declaration, which is different from a ratifiable treaty, and the “catch-22” of this declaration as it relates to denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. Finally, I analyze how a superficial peace declaration will not address core national security concerns of either ally, and how it could create unintended consequences with regard to troop drawdowns. This research features an original and unique dataset that documents Donald Trump’s transactional view of U.S. military commitments to its allies over the past three decades. Full text available here.
Chung, Kyung-young
Abstract: This study aims to develop a strategy for building a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula and to explore a desirable future of the United Nations Command (UNC) in the event that the Korean Peninsula peace treaty is signed. The study draws lessons learned from the inter–Korean dialogues and proposes a peace regime initiative consisting of North Korea denuclearization, transition of wartime operational control, a security regime in Northeast Asia and a peace treaty. There is a controversial debate regarding the dissolution or continuing presence of the UNC after a peace treaty. This article proposes the twenty nations involved to reorganize the UNC to consist of the UN Security Council P+5, the two Koreas, and thirteen nations as member states of the UNC in order to play a supervisory role in a peace treaty through the transformation of the Demilitarized Zone to a peace zone. The article makes a policy recommendation related to the UNC Reorganization Roadmap. The first phase is to consult with the United States on the future of the UNC after a peace treaty in the event of substantial progress of North Korea’s denuclearization. In addition, the ROK–U.S. should discuss and agree to the command relations between the future Combined Forces Command and the UNC in terms of armistice, wartime and contingency plans in the event of the transition of wartime operational control. The second phase is to recuperate the Military Armistice Commission (MAC), Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) and consult with the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on the reorganization of the UNC for the Korean Peninsula peace treaty. The third phase is to reactivate the reorganized UNC in a supervisory role for a peace treaty. Full text available here.
Khan, Muhammad Khurshid
Abstract: It is always a risky affair, especially for a weak state to strike the right balance while dealing with two great powers having serious conflicting interests in a particular region. For a country like Pakistan which remains dependent on foreign aid, running an independent foreign policy seems quite difficult. While Pakistan’s relations with China continued to remain smooth throughout history, its relations with the United States has been more of a roller coaster than a smooth ride but still both could never be too apart from each other because of various compelling reasons. Currently, China and Pakistan are extensively engaged in promoting their mutual economic and strategic interests that go against the U.S. interests. Therefore, in the case of a possible conflict between the United States and China, Pakistan might be trapped in a catch-22 because it cannot afford to infuriate the United States beyond certain limits. In such a trap, staying neutral might be even riskier. Slow and steady change in the status of Gilgit–Baltistan beyond a certain level for promotion of the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) would also be a serious trap. Pakistan could afford to lose economic benefits of the CPEC but it cannot afford to give up its claim over Kashmir which remains the “lifeline” for its survival. Pakistani Generals fighting on exterior fronts must therefore, make smart moves to ensure that at no stage should Islamabad be compelled to put all its eggs in one basket. Full text available here.
Basu, Titli
Abstract: Since the post–war era, understanding Japan’s security rhetoric and actions presented certain incongruities. While the constructivist arguments underscore that the influence of post–war antimilitarist norm shaped Japan’s security behavior, it contradicts the realist underpinnings influencing Japan’s choices. To understand Japanese post–war security orientation and comprehend the rapidly unfolding policy shift, this paper explores three sets of questions: firstly, what are the competing schools of thought in the Japanese security debate? What are their core arguments on key issues including Article 9 of the Constitution, potency of the Self–Defense Forces (SDFs), nature of the U.S.–Japan alliance and historical narratives of Japan’s past? What are the inter-school and intra-school fault lines? Secondly, what are the drivers that propelled the dominance of each school at different time frames? How does the factional power struggle in the domestic political landscape enable each school to maximize their space and influence in the current security discourse? More specifically, why did mercantilists remained the dominant political force throughout the Cold War? In contrast, what led to normalists gaining momentum and substituting mercantilism as a potent force in the post–Cold War period? Thirdly, how have political elites pursued their competing agendas and critically analyze the case of Shinzo Abe? What are the influences that shaped his values? What are the methods he employed to pursue his ambitions of making Japan a “normal” nation? And how did he consolidate his political strength and manage to realize concrete policy objectives? Full text available here.
Haong, Hai Ha
Abstract: The paper explores the development of Vietnam’s bilateral defense diplomacy with world and regional powers including the United States, India, and Japan, with a particular focus on the period from 2009 to 2018. The paper finds that Vietnam’s multidirectional defense diplomacy is fundamentally shaped by its historical experience, the contemporary shift in the balance of power and the strategic challenges caused by China’s emerging power. By pursuing a multi–polar balance among major partners, Vietnam avoids being pulled into their rivalry, and keeps its non-alignment as well as strategic autonomy. The international defense cooperation has become further deepened and more substantive to satisfy Vietnam’s strategic interests including national security, territorial integrity, economic development and regime legitimacy. However, domestic and geo–strategic constraints, and asymmetrical economic interdependence with China lead this paper to suppose further challenges in the future of Vietnam’s defense diplomacy. Full text available here.
Ohm, Tae-am
Abstract: The Republic of Korea, now more than ever, faces more security challenges, strategic dilemmas, and policy tasks. North Korea’s Kim Jong Un, after consolidating his power base internally and with his nuclear and ICBM programs completed, has begun negotiations with President Donald Trump of the United States to guarantee his regime security. Although a reconciliatory atmosphere within inter–Korean relations continues cautiously after the PyeongChang Winter Olympics and the Panmunjom Inter–Korean Summit, many issues remain before tensions disappear from the Korean Peninsula. The U.S.–DPRK Summit in Singapore resulted in an overall direction of “efforts” to resolve the North Korean nuclear problem. However, Korean people, well aware of North Korean behavior in the past, are in no hurry to predict its resolution. The trade war between the United States and China, being a global power struggle at its core, might become fiercer until it reaches climax. The Trump administration has ended sequestration—a legacy from the Obama administration—and significantly increased its defense budget, while slashing foreign aid and demanding that major allies, such as NATO member states and the ROK, take on a bigger burden of shared defense costs. The United States seeks to cement its superpower status for the future. China is undertaking some countermeasures, i.e., continued defense investments; a second sea trial for its aircraft carrier, which is a part of a wider program to acquire ten aircraft carriers by 2049; building military bases on artificial islands in the South China Sea; strengthening its economic and military partnership with Russia; and dramatically expanding its cyber forces. As the growth of Chinese military power has become a concern for countries in the region, the ROK confronts a particularly notable strategic dilemma. This is because inter–Korean relations, the ROK–U.S. alliance, and ROK–China relations are intricately overlapping in all areas. For the ROK, the security alliance with the United States continues to be a critical security asset. Full text available here.
Chijiwa, Yasuaki
Abstract: This research discusses why Japan’s “Basic Defense Force Concept” adopted earlier was maintained amidst the widely-discussed demise of détente and the arrival of the “Second Cold War” between the United States and the Soviet Union entering the 1980s. From the perspective that perceives the Basic Defense Force Concept as a “beyond-the-threat theory,” the defense controversies that unfolded during the Second Cold War were waged between the Basic Defense Force Concept and criticisms of the Basic Defense Force Concept resembling the “counter-threat theory” based on the increasing threat recognition. As a result, the Basic Defense Force Concept was not abandoned, which probably might finish with the victory of the Basic Defense Force Concept against the “counter-threat theory.” However, that was actually not the case. The Basic Defense Force Concept began to coexist with the “Idea of Defense Force Reinforcement,” a competing theory to the Basic Defense Force Concept that took prominence during the Second Cold War, due to the “Idea of Attached Table Early Achievement” and the “Idea of Attached Table Revision and Concept Change,” considered to be a competing theory to the Basic Defense Force Concept as well, due to the “Idea of Attached Table Revision and Concept Continuation.” Full text available here.
Satake, Tomohiko
Abstract: This paper will analyze why and how US-Japan-Australia security cooperation developed in the 2000s, mainly from the allied perspective (Japan and Australia). Existing literature notes that the United States aimed to form an alliance opposing China from the start of the 2000s by strengthening relationships with its allies. In contrast, Japan and Australia’s perception of China was different to that of the United States. This especially applied to Australia, geographically distant from China, which prioritized strengthening its relations with China through diplomacy and trade over direct antagonism. Regardless of this, both Japan and Australia worked to strengthen security cooperation between Japan, the United States, and Australia based on a strategy of “supplementing” the United States’ regional and global role by furthering cooperation between its allies in peacekeeping operations and non-traditional areas of security. The strengthening of security cooperation between Japan, the United States, and Australia during the 2000s developed in order to maintain and enhance the United States’ presence based on the “hub and spokes” alliance system, rather than to directly oppose China. Full text available here.
