Abstract: Multilateral approaches such as the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, the Four-Party and Six-Party Talks, and the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (established by the USA, Japan, and South Korea to solve North Korea’s issues and to build a peaceful regime on the Korean Peninsula) have achieved few accomplishments since the Cold War. Exceptions include the avoidance of deadly clashes during ongoing multilateral talks at the time of serious situations including the nuclear crisis in 1994 and the Bush administration’s attempt to strike on North Korea with nuclear weapons. The USA has hesitated to conduct kind military relationships with North Korea because they seem to strongly recognize the high risk associated with physical conflict. Additionally, the USA and its allies have experienced North Korea’s ability with nuclear weapons. Many which have attempted to target the USA during the later years of the Clinton and Bush administrations. Dealing with North Korea contributes to the knowledge of those involved in the Six-Party Talks regarding how to work with the USA and others. Are multilateral approaches still efficient under this situation? Even with a number of several types of proposals such as China’s recent dual-track approach or double suspension approach—also backed by Russia—there seems to be no certain attempt to collaborate on building a peaceful regime. This paper will examine why multilateral approaches to building a peaceful regime post Cold War on the Korean Peninsula have forwarded little to a contextual perspective of the changing regional circumstances.
Country or Region: South Korea
Kwon, Edward
Abstract: This paper examines how South Korea might be able to deter the growing threat from North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile programs. North Korea’s six nuclear weapons experiments with various types of missile test fires using solid fuel and new technology pose a security threat to South Korea and the USA. The credibility of the North’s WMD capability and the military balance of two Koreas are critically analyzed. South Korea’s superior conventional weapons system, supported by U.S. strategic weapons and intelligence systems, could fend off North Korean nuclear weapons and missile attacks. However, it is imperative that the U.S.-ROK alliance continues to develop a stringent nuclear deterrence strategy and deploy a series of countermeasures, including preemptive strikes and a multilayered missile defense system, such as Kill Chain, KAMD, and THAAD, all to guard against a potential nuclear weapon attack from North Korea.
Karim, Moch Faisal
Abstract: This article examines how role theory can enhance the middle-power literature in understanding the role preferences of middle powers. Rather than treating it as merely a function of material capability or good international citizenship, this article resituates middle power as a concept of international status that states aim to pursue through the enactment of role conceptions. Thus, it reinstates a conceptual distinction between ‘middle-power status’ and ‘middle-power roles’. The article suggests that the notion of role conceptions can analytically connect the status-seeking behaviour of middle powers with their foreign policy agenda. In so doing, it provides a more nuanced explanation of middle-power behaviour, which might differ between one middle power and another. Using Indonesia and South Korea as case studies of middle power, this article contends that foreign policymakers have strategically conceptualised and enacted several main roles that aim to capture historical experience, as well as ego and alter expectations, in order to pursue middle-power status. These role conceptions determine the foreign policy agenda of states in articulating their middle-power status.
Park, Jae Jeok, and Erwin Tan
Abstract: The mainstream literature on weak status quo states’ diplomacy tends to identify their regional security roles in terms of dealing with non-traditional security issues. This article argues that such a limited approach is not sufficient to explain the current security dynamics in the Asia-Pacific. This article reviews the literature on weak status quo states’ influence on regional order. It then identifies a security environment in which they are more likely to exert some impact on maintaining and building a regional order. After contextualising these discussions in the Asia-Pacific setting, the article examines the experience of South Korea and Singapore as secondary powers in the East Asian region. Although both countries enjoy high levels of security cooperation with the US, both have also been able to exercise a certain amount of influence in advancing their own geostrategic interests amidst the growing Sino-US geostrategic competition. Yet their exploitation of Sino- US geostrategic competition is neither a simple balancing strategy against China nor a simple bandwagoning with the US, since both South Korea and Singapore have been increasing bilateral and multilateral security cooperation with China.
Kim, Sung Chull, and Yousun Chung
Abstract: This article compares the different trajectories of nuclear power policy in Japan, Taiwan and Korea in the post-Fukushima era. The Fukushima nuclear accident ratcheted up the level of contention between civil activism and supporters of nuclear power in all three states. The result of this contention has been decided by the combined effects of two factors – interest structure (complexity vs simplicity) and politicisation (national level vs local level). In terms of scope, policy change has taken place in Taiwan, Japan and Korea in that order. This analysis contributes to a balanced understanding of both structural constraints and the political process in which each actor, and in particular civil activism, is able to manoeuvre.
Richey, Mason, Ohn Daewon, Jangho Kim, and Jaejeok Park
Abstract: There is a lacuna in the literature analyzing the mid-term (6-24 months) period after a DPRK contingency that results in the Pyongyang regime’s relatively sudden and unmanaged fall. This article helps fill that gap, particularly with respect to security issues that would challenge Korean unification efforts during such a period. Following an Introduction, Section I first makes the case for a DPRK contingency being the most plausible end to the Pyongyang regime. Assuming the scenarios from Section I, Section II addresses the question of what critical issues a unifying Korea will face over the mid-term, and how dealing with these challenges will condition the type of end-state that a unified Korea will embody. In particular we examine three challenges: (a) mid-term security provision related to potential weapons proliferation, cyber-security, organized criminality, and human security; (b) the foundations of institution-building through measures dealing with issues of transitional justice, disputed land title claims, and generating broad domestic stakeholder buy-in in a unifying Korea; (c) the disposition of Korea’s strategic alignment in a Northeast Asia that will have undergone a major alteration of the regional system. Section III concludes with policy recommendations concerning what efforts should be made now to prepare for the situations described in Sections I and II.
Roehrig, Terence
Abstract: For close to sixty years, the United States has maintained alliances with Japan and South Korea that have included a nuclear umbrella, guaranteeing their security as part of a strategy of extended deterrence. Yet questions about the credibility of deterrence commitments have always been an issue, especially when nuclear weapons are concerned. Would the United States truly be willing to use these weapons to defend an ally?
In this book, Terence Roehrig provides a detailed and comprehensive look at the nuclear umbrella in northeast Asia in the broader context of deterrence theory and U.S. strategy. He examines the role of the nuclear umbrella in Japanese and South Korean defense planning and security calculations, including the likelihood that either will develop its own nuclear weapons. Roehrig argues that the nuclear umbrella is most important as a political signal demonstrating commitment to the defense of allies and as a tool to prevent further nuclear proliferation in the region. While the role of the nuclear umbrella is often discussed in military terms, this book provides an important glimpse into the political dimensions of the nuclear security guarantee. As the security environment in East Asia changes with the growth of North Korea’s capabilities and China’s military modernization, as well as Donald Trump’s early pronouncements that cast doubt on traditional commitments to allies, the credibility and resolve of U.S. alliances will take on renewed importance for the region and the world.
Joo, Seung-Ho, and Yune Lee
Abstract: Since 2000, President Vladimir Putin of Russia has persistently pushed for trilateral economic projects involving Moscow, Seoul, and Pyongyang, especially in the fields of energy (oil, gas, and electricity) and transportation (railroad). The Kremlin has long maintained that its proposed trilateral projects would not only be economically beneficial to all but also pave the road to inter-Korean reconciliation and peaceful unification. This article addresses three questions regarding Putin’s trilateral economic projects. What motivates Russia to push for the projects? Would they bring benefits to the three countries? Would they facilitate Korean peace process? The authors argue that Putin’s trilateral economic projects are part of Russia’s quest for power and search for a multipolar world order and should be understood from the theoretical framework of “structural realism.” The research finds that the projects are not feasible due to North Korea’s nuclear crisis and economic uncertainties and may be implemented after the current North Korea’s nuclear crisis is resolved diplomatically, if North Korea’s leadership changes or if inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation is achieved by the progressive government of Moon Jae-In.
O’Hanlon, Michael
Preview: What should be the long-term future of the military alliance between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea (ROK) after North Korean demilitarization—that is, once North Korea is no longer seen as a serious security threat? Such a situation could result from Korean reunification or confederation, of course, but perhaps more likely is a situation in which the North Korean nuclear threat has been dramatically reduced or eliminated and other aspects of the regime’s military forces and posture have become much less threatening. This question seems very hypothetical and long-term at one level. But the shadow of the future can affect near-term policy debates, especially at a time when the world’s relations with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) are in such flux, and when at least some important elements of strategic thinking in both South Korea and the United States have become very hopeful about the prospects for peace.
Kim, Lami
Preview: The credibility of the United States’ nuclear umbrella has been questioned time and again by its allies in Europe and Asia since the dawn of the nuclear era. Skepticism toward U.S. extended deterrence to the Republic of Korea (ROK) is particularly high amid their strained relationship in light of political leadership changes in Washington and Seoul as well as North Korea’s rapidly advancing nuclear capabilities. A growing sense of abandonment among South Koreans raises the concern that Seoul may go nuclear. However, pursuing nuclear weapons is not likely given the enormous security and economic costs. A more likely scenario is Seoul’s nuclear hedging, i.e. “maintaining, or at least appearing to maintain, a viable option for the relatively rapid acquisition of nuclear weapons.” South Korean President Moon Jae-in’s pursuit of nuclear-powered submarines may be part of Seoul’s nuclear hedging strategy.
Draudt, Darcie, and John K. Warden
Preview: This article begins by describing the broad strategic challenge that North Korea, once armed with an operational nuclear weapons capability, poses to the United States and its allies. It then reviews the history of maritime clashes between North and South Korea in the Yellow Sea (“West Sea” in Korean) and describes the ongoing risk of violent provocations and war. Finally, the article proposes measures that could reduce tension, arguing that they would be mutually beneficial to the United States, South Korea, North Korea, and China, and would contribute to, rather than detract from, an ideal U.S.-led strategy for deterring and containing a nuclear-armed North Korea.
Kim, Inhan
Preview: Washington watched the rise of Moon Jae-in with concern this spring. Throughout his campaign to be the new president of South Korea, he pledged to revive the sunshine policy of engagement with North Korea, championed by former liberal presidents Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003) and Rho Moo-hyun (2003-04, 2004-08). Moon also vowed to restore economic cooperation with North Korea, which the impeached president Park Geun-hye severed in early 2016 after Pyongyang’s fourth nuclear test and missile launch. Moon surprised many by remarking, “I would consider visiting Pyongyang first before Washington if elected president,” a very controversial statement, given the U.S.-South Korea alliance. If Seoul shifted to engagement, it could undermine U.S. strategy, relieving pressure Washington has been applying against Pyongyang’s weapons programs. During the campaign, Moon even criticized the United States’ deployment of a missile defense system (known as Terminal High Altitude Area Defense or THAAD) in the southern part of the Korean Peninsula, calling it “very regrettable.” In the months following his May 9 election, President Moon has certainly appeared to moderate his campaign rhetoric: Washington was the first stop for his official visit; the first THAAD deployment became complete in early September; and he has called for stronger international sanctions against North Korea’s missile launches and nuclear test. Is President Moon departing from his campaign promise to revive the sunshine policy with Pyongyang? Or is he still looking for an opportunity to adopt and pursue that policy?
Sagan, Scott D
Preview: It is time for the U.S. government to admit that it has failed to prevent North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles that can reach the United States. North Korea no longer poses a nonproliferation problem; it poses a nuclear deterrence problem. The gravest danger now is that North Korea, South Korea, and the United States will stumble into a catastrophic war that none of them wants.
Emmers, Ralph, and Sarah Teo
Abstract: Security Strategies of Middle Powers in the Asia Pacific examines what drives the different regional security strategies of four middle powers in the Asia Pacific: Australia, Indonesia, South Korea and Malaysia. Drawing on the extant middle power literature, the authors argue that the regional security strategies of middle powers could take two forms, namely, functional or normative. A functional strategy means that the middle power targets its resources to address a specific problem that it has a high level of interest in, while a normative strategy refers to a focus on promoting general behavioural standards and confidence building at the multilateral level. This book argues that whether a middle power ultimately employs a more functional or normative regional security strategy depends on its resource availability and strategic environment.
Kim, Sung Chull, and Michael D. Cohen
Abstract: North Korea is perilously close to developing strategic nuclear weapons capable of hitting the United States and its East Asian allies. Since their first nuclear test in 2006, North Korea has struggled to perfect the required delivery systems. Kim Jong-un’s regime now appears to be close, however. Sung Chull Kim, Michael D. Cohen, and the volume contributors contend that the time to prevent North Korea from achieving this capability is virtually over; scholars and policymakers must turn their attention to how to deter a nuclear North Korea. The United States, South Korea, and Japan must also come to terms with the fact that North Korea will be able to deter them with its nuclear arsenal. How will the erratic Kim Jong-un behave when North Korea develops the capability to hit medium- and long-range targets with nuclear weapons? How will and should the United States, South Korea, Japan, and China respond, and what will this mean for regional stability in the short term and long term? The international group of authors in this volume address these questions and offer a timely analysis of the consequences of an operational North Korean nuclear capability for international security.
