Summary
An active member of the U. S. Foreign Service until 2001, William B. Milam possesses an exhaustive knowledge of the history and culture of Bangladesh and Pakistan. His insightful study expresses a profound empathy for both countries and, with the death of Benazir Bhutto and the decline of Pervez Musharraf, could not be a timelier contribution to current debates concerning the stability of the region.
Since 1971, Pakistan has evolved into a praetorian state plagued by army interventions and corrupt civilian governments. Nevertheless, the tunnel-vision of General Musharraf triggered a political implosion in 2007, and widespread dismay over the assassination of Benazir Bhutto has led Pakistanis to vote overwhelmingly for unfettered civilian rule and the diminishment of religious parties. In contrast, the Bangladesh Army seems intent on returning control to civilians, having remained averse to power for the past seventeen years. Furthermore, Bangladeshi society isn’t nearly as Islamicized as Pakistan’s, though jihadi groups stand ready to exploit the government’s weaknesses.
Milam takes a hard look at the political and religious realities of both countries, especially the al-Qaeda-linked jihadi networks that threaten to permanently turn Pakistan into an ideological state. He also considers Islam’s undeniable influence on the culture of both societies, and, in turn, the influence of these cultures on the tone and expression of Islam. Milam includes an examination of the fear and hostility Pakistan has exhibited toward India, which has resulted in three wars and at least one mini-war.
Abstract
In a security alliance since 2004 and ‘strategic partners’ since 2006, the United States and Pakistan for decades experienced major shifts in the nature and tone of their relations. In the post- 9/11 period, assisting in the creation of a more stable, democratic, and prosperous Pakistan actively combating religious militancy has been among the most important U.S. foreign policy efforts. Vital U.S. interests are seen to be at stake in its engagement with Pakistan related to regional and global terrorism; efforts to stabilize neighboring Afghanistan; nuclear weapons proliferation; links between Pakistan and indigenous American terrorism; Pakistan-India tensions and conflict; democratization and human rights protection; and economic development. As a haven for numerous Islamist extremist and terrorist groups, and as the world’s most rapid proliferator of nuclear weapons, Pakistan presents a combination that places it at the top of many governments’ international security agendas. The May 2011 revelation that Al Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden had enjoyed apparently years-long and relatively comfortable refuge inside Pakistan led to intensive U.S. government scrutiny of the bilateral relationship, and sparked much congressional questioning of the wisdom of providing significant U.S. foreign assistance to a government and nation that may not have the intention and/or capacity to be an effective U.S. partner. Although Obama Administration officials and most senior congressional leaders spent most of 2011 consistently recognizing Pakistan as a crucial ally in U.S.-led counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts, long-held doubts about Islamabad’s commitment to core U.S. interests deepened over the course of the year. The Pakistani military and intelligence services are seen to be too willing to distinguish among Islamist extremist groups, maintaining links to Afghan insurgent and anti-India militant organizations operating from Pakistani territory as a means of forwarding Pakistani’s perceived security interests. U.S.-Pakistan relations are fluid at present, but running a clearly negative course: still based on several national interests shared by both countries, yet marked by levels of mutual distrust and resentment that are likely to catalyze a new set of assumptions for future ties.
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One fifth of the world’s people live in India and Pakistan. Looking back on their first fifty years of independence, leading specialists on South Asia assess their progress and problems, their foreign and defense policies and their relations with the United States. The three coeditors, who compare the achievements of India and Pakistan in a perceptive introductory overview, combine journalistic, diplomatic and academic experience. Selig S. Harrison served as South Asia Bureau Chief of the Washington Post, Paul H. Kreisberg is a former Deputy Chairman of the State Department’s Policy Planning Council, and Dennis Kux is a former Director of the India Desk in the State Department.
Summary
South Asia, which consists of eight states of different sizes and capabilities, is characterized by high levels of insecurity at the inter-state, intra-state, and human level: insecurity that is manifest in both traditional and non-traditional security problems—especially transnational terrorism fuelled by militant religious ideologies. To explain what has caused and contributed to the perpetual insecurity and human suffering in the region, this book engages scholars of international relations, comparative politics, historical sociology, and economic development, among others, to reveal and analyze the key underlying and proximate drivers. It argues that the problems are driven largely by two critical variables: the presence of weak states and weak cooperative interstate norms. Based on this analysis and the conclusions drawn, the book recommends specific policies for making the region secure and for developing the long lasting inter- and intra-state cooperative mechanisms necessary for the perpetuation of that security.
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South Asia is home to a range of extremist groups from the jihadists of Pakistan to the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka. In the popular mind, extremism and terrorism are invariably linked to ethnic and religious factors. Yet the dominant history of South Asia is notable for tolerance and co-existence, despite highly plural societies. Deepa Ollapally examines extremist groups in Kashmir, Afghanistan, Northeast India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka to offer a fresh perspective on the causes of extremism. What accounts for its rise in societies not historically predisposed to extremism? What determines the winners and losers in the identity struggles in South Asia? What tips the balance between more moderate versus extremist outcomes? The book argues that politics, inter-state and international relations often play a more important role in the rise of extremism in South Asia than religious identity, poverty, and state repression.
Abstract
With each passing day, Pakistan becomes an even more crucial player in world affairs. Home of the world’s second-largest Muslim population, epicenter of the global jihad, location of perhaps the planet’s most dangerous borderlands, and armed with nuclear weapons, this South Asian nation will go a long way toward determining what the world looks like ten years from now. The Future of Pakistan presents and evaluates several scenarios for how the country will develop, evolve, and act in the near future, as well as the geopolitical implications of each.
Led by renowned South Asia expert Stephen P. Cohen, a team of authoritative contributors looks at several pieces of the Pakistan puzzle. The book begins with Cohen’s broad yet detailed overview of Pakistan, placing it within the context of current-day geopolitics and international economics. Cohen’s piece is then followed by a number of shorter, more tightly focused essays addressing more specific issues of concern. Cohen’s fellow contributors hail from America, Europe, India, and Pakistan itself, giving the book a uniquely international and comparative perspective. They address critical factors such as the role and impact of radical groups and militants, developments in specific key regions such as Punjab and the rugged frontier with Afghanistan, and the influence of —and interactions with —India, Pakistan’s archrival since birth.
The book also breaks down relations with other international powers such as China and the United States. The all-important military and internal security apparatus come under scrutiny, as do rapidly morphing social and gender issues. Political and party developments are examined along with the often amorphous division of power between Islamabad and the nation’s regions and local powers.
Abstract
International safeguards is the system of measures put in place by the International Atomic Energy Agency and states to ensure nuclear programs remain dedicated to peaceful purposes. This international safeguards system consists of agreements, inspections, and evaluations that have never considered the safeguards culture of a state or facility. Neither a common definition nor an understanding of safeguards culture is internationally recognized. This article provides an analysis of the concept of safeguards culture and gauges its value to the international safeguards community. The authors explore distinctions among safeguards culture, safeguards compliance, and safeguards performance, and suggest possible indicators of safeguards culture and methods to promote a strong, positive safeguards culture.
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Conventional wisdom states that the stability-instability paradox does not explain the effect of nuclear proliferation on the conflict propensity of South Asia, and that nuclear weapons have had a different and more dangerous impact in South Asia than Cold War Europe. I argue that the paradox explains nuclear South Asia; that the similarities between nuclear South Asia and Cold War Europe are strong; and that conventional instability does not cause revisionist challenges in the long run. I develop and probe a psychological causal mechanism that explains the impact of nuclear weapons on Cold War Europe and South Asia. Following the ten-month mobilized crisis in 2002, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf may have adopted a more moderate foreign policy toward India after experiencing fear of imminent nuclear war, as Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev did forty years earlier. I argue that the stability-instability paradox explains Cold War Europe and nuclear South Asia and will, conditional on Iranian and North Korean revisionism, predict the impact of nuclear weapon development on these states’ conflict propensities.
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Governments are increasingly recognizing the problem posed by internally weak nuclear-capable states. The problem, however, is under-theorized. This article brings together literature on sovereignty and international order, the nonproliferation regime, and weak states, and introduces new concepts to provide a more structured understanding of this problem. Insight comes from focusing attention on the function and governance of two nuclear estates (termed the production and operational estates), and on their resilience to decay and disorder occurring within the state and society. Drawing on empirical observation, the authors suggest a typology of weakness in nuclear states, involving state fragmentation typified by the former Soviet Union, the “hard weak state” typified by North Korea, and the internally conflicted state typified by Pakistan. Although these types give rise to distinctive difficulties, their alleviation depends heavily on the maintenance of internal authority within the state and estates, the presence or absence of cooperative relations, and the international regulatory framework’s vitality.
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This book examines the puzzle of why some states acquire nuclear weapons, whereas others refrain from trying to do so or even renounce them.
Based on the predominant theoretical thinking in International Relations it is often assumed that nuclear proliferation is inevitable, given the anarchic nature of the international system. Proliferation is thus often explained by vague references to states’ insecurity in an anarchic environment. Yet, elusive generalisations and grand, abstract theories inhibit a more profound and detailed knowledge of the very political processes that lead towards nuclearisation or its reversal.
Drawing upon the philosophical and social-theoretical insights of American pragmatism, The Politics of Nuclear Non-Proliferation provides a theoretically innovative and practically useful framework for the analysis of states’ nuclear proliferation policies. Rather than reccounting a parsimonious, lean account of proliferation, the framework allows for the incorporation of multiple paradigms in order to depict the complex political contestation underlying states’ proliferation decisions. This pragmatist framework of analysis offers ways of overcoming long-standing metatheoretical gridlocks in the IR discipline and encourages scholars to reorient their efforts towards imminent “real-world” challenges.
This book will be of much interest to students of nuclear proliferation, international security and IR theory.
From the Publisher: Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs), often referred to as “battlefield”, “sub-strategic”, or “non-strategic” nuclear weapons, usually have a plutonium core and are typically distinct from strategic nuclear weapons. Therefore, they warrant a separate consideration in the realm of nuclear security. The yield of such weapons is generally lower than that of strategic nuclear weapons and may range from the relatively low 0.1 kiloton to a few kilotons. Pakistan’s quest to acquire tactical nuclear weapons has added a dangerous dimension to the already precarious strategic equation in South Asia. The security discourse in the subcontinent revolves around the perennial apprehension of a conventional or sub-conventional conflict triggering a chain reaction, eventually paving the way for a potential nuclear crisis haunting peace and stability in the region.
Pakistan believes that the successful testing of the 60-km nuclear-capable short-range missile Hatf-9 (Nasr) “adds deterrence value to Pakistan’s strategic weapons development programme at shorter ranges.” In paradox, the fact remains that this step has further lowered Pakistan’s nuclear threshold through the likely use of TNWs. The introduction of TNWs into the tactical battle area further exacerbates credibility of their control. Pakistan has not formally declared a nuclear doctrine, but it is well known that nuclear weapons are its first line of defence. The use of TNWs in the India-Pakistan case will alter the strategic scenario completely as Pakistan would threaten India with the use of TNWs in the event of New Delhi responding against Islamabad with a conventional strike in reaction to a 26/11-style terrorist attack. Pakistan forgets that given its offensive strategic posture and continuing involvement in terror strikes in India, it is New Delhi which is confronted with the problem of developing a strategy to counter Pakistan’s “first-strike” and proxy war in the light of its declared “no-first-use” policy. This edited volume attempts to address and decipher complex issues, including aspects such as China’s WMD collaboration with Pakistan, nuclear command and control dynamics within Pakistan, overall rationale and implications of TNWs, safety and security of nuclear weapons, scenarios for nuclear usage, India’s potential response options and, more specifically, the technical aspects of the Nasr delivery system.
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From the Publisher: India and Pakistan have both never really accepted each other’s existence. Their ties have been characterised by a lingering hostility and a pronounced qualitative and quantitative military imbalance in favour of India. Additionally, India took the lead in developing nuclear weapons while Pakistan only seriously embarked on this endeavour after India had already conducted its “peaceful nuclear explosion” in 1974. Having lost half of their country in 1971, and realising that they could never really hope to match India in conventional military might, Pakistan embarked on nuclear weapons development in the early 1970s more as a necessity rather than as a need. Despite adopting the more difficult route of uranium enrichment, Pakistan proved virtually unstoppable. While China provided some assistance to Pakistan, the United States maintained a marked ambivalence towards her quest for nuclear weapons – it sometimes applied sanctions against Pakistan while at other times, it opted to ignore what was happening by turning a blind eye. The weaponisation of their nuclear capability in 1998 led India and Pakistan to venture into the realm of doctrinal rethinking. Commencing with a revision of the conventional military doctrines, this led to India publishing its draft nuclear doctrine whereas Pakistan preferred ambiguity.
The essential consideration herein was on how the conventional military thinking of both the countries has been influenced by the availability of nuclear weapons in their respective inventories. Along with this process of doctrinal evolution, both countries were required to establish viable and internationally acceptable nuclear weapon control systems. The doctrinal evolution was responsible for inducing several systemic changes in their armed forces, and their entire military system had to undergo significant changes. Simultaneously, these led to a fresh assessment of the comparative nuclear military potential of the two countries and how this could possibly be employed in a future conflict.
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Summary
The 2013-14 Strategic Asia volume examines the role of nuclear weapons in the grand strategies of key Asian states and assesses the impact of these capabilities—both established and latent—on regional and international stability. In each chapter, a leading expert explores the historical, strategic, and political factors that drive a country’s calculations vis-a-vis nuclear weapons and draws implications for American interests.
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Abstract
The paper argues that the existence of an ambiguous nuclear deterrence capability since the first half of the 1980s had emphasized the significance of nuclear weapons in South Asian geopolitics. However, lately, the geo-economic and geopolitical developments, and the growing military asymmetry have enhanced Pakistan’s vulnerabilities against India. In such an environment, Pakistan is constrained to induct a host of measures, including induction of short-range nuclear delivery systems and the tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) to counterbalance India’s offensive strategy to enforce its primacy. The pragmatic approach for Pakistan is to move vertically from its posture of a minimum credible deterrence to robustly reinforced offensive-deterrence policy in order to effectively handle the multidimensional threats and challenges to its security. Pakistan’s induction of TNWs would augment its defensive capabilities, thereby considerably reducing the prospects of employment of a proactive strategy by India.
Abstract
Many experts consider nuclear terrorism the single greatest threat to U.S. security. The fear that a state might transfer nuclear materials to terrorists was a core justification for the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and, more recently, for a strike against Iran’s nuclear program. The logical basis for this concern is sound: if a state could orchestrate an anonymous nuclear terror attack, it could destroy an enemy yet avoid retaliation. But how likely is it that the perpetrators of nuclear terrorism could remain anonymous? Data culled from a decade of terrorist incidents reveal that attribution is very likely after high-casualty terror attacks. Attribution rates are even higher for attacks on the U.S. homeland or the territory of a major U.S. ally—97 percent for incidents in which ten or more people were killed. Moreover, tracing a terrorist group that used a nuclear weapon to its state sponsor would not be difficult, because few countries sponsor terror; few terror groups have multiple sponsors; and only one country that sponsors terrorism, Pakistan, has nuclear weapons or enough material to manufacture them. If leaders understand these facts, they will be as reluctant to give weapons to terrorists as they are to use them directly; both actions would invite devastating retaliation.
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