It Should Not Only Be about Nationalism: China’s Pluralistic National Identity and Its Implications for Chinese Foreign Relations by Allen Carlson in International Studies

Abstract

Over the course of the last decade, students of Chinese foreign relations have engaged in an extended, and often rather breathless, debate over the meaning of China’s changing international profile. The question for all those with an interest in Asian security, and the wider international order, has become: what does China want to do with its new-found power? This article rests upon the conviction that national identity, rather than nationalism alone, stands at the centre of such issues. The latter of these two has attracted more attention. However, it tends to lead analysts to only see a narrow bandwidth of identity formation within a country, whereas the former is more inclusive of the potential variety of collective constructs that are in play in a given location. From within such a framework, it is then possible to both examine the production of Chinese collective imaginings and explore the role that they play in framing China’s interaction with the rest of the international system.

India: The Ambivalent Power in Asia by Deepa Ollapaly in International Studies

Abstract

This article argues that India’s foreign policy preferences cannot be understood without referring to its state identity as it has evolved over time. The ambivalence that is evident throughout much of India’s post-Independence history lies in deep-seated identity sources—a unique mixture of post-colonial nationalism, civilizational exceptionalism and secular democracy. India’s identity has played out in foreign policy to place an inordinate amount of importance to strategic autonomy but with a normative aversion to power politics and use of force. This has led to an ambivalence that many observers find hard to understand. This orientation is now coming under increasing strain, because of the rise of a realist strand of thinking challenging the country’s traditional normatively driven foreign policy outlook. Realist thinking is posing as a distinct alternative that calls for a more proactive and power infused policy stance. The rise of China in India’s neighbourhood is giving greater weight to realist arguments. Although India’s core value of strategic autonomy is still in force in Indian foreign policy, the article suggests that it is taking on a different form that is more nuanced, more flexible and adaptable. As such, India may now be particularly well positioned to play the role of a ‘bridging power’ more effectively, matching its state identity with a new evolving international role. India’s membership in groups ranging from G-20 and Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) to India, Brazil, South Africa (IBSA) and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and its being a serious contender for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, gives India distinct opportunities and status to utilize a greater mix of soft and hard power options than in the past. India may well be at the moment of overcoming its historical ambivalence to power-driven policies and purposeful action.

Introductory Overview : Identity and Asian Powers: What Does it Mean for International Relations of Asia and Beyond? by Mike Mochizuki and Deepa Ollapally in International Studies

Abstract

The prevailing wisdom in International Relations literature that foreign policies of states may be understood without reference to their history, political values or culture, that is, their national identity, has not gone unchallenged. At the same time, arguments based on identity have yet to make significant headway against conventional realist thinking. In our view, this is due to two factors: (i) the continuing attraction of realism as parsimonious and powerful (ability to explain a lot with a little) and conversely (ii) the inability of identity theorists to put forward a shared operationalized and testable theory. However, it may be that we are at a particular historical juncture in which investigations of national identity are going to become inevitable, whether theories are underdeveloped or not.

The current international system is experiencing clear power shifts not seen since the early twentieth century, with the rise of China and India and continued importance of Japan. The importance of Asia to the global order in the foreseeable future is now taken as a given. Both China and India, however, view themselves not just as normal states, but as civilizational entities. They have a surplus of history overlaid with feelings of pride as well as of hurt, resulting from the national humiliation of their slide into colonial control. Their sense of being exceptional states is just one indication of the importance of national identity in their thinking as they consider their international position. One question we, as analysts, need to ask is: Can we fully understand how these rising Asian states are going to engage globally without taking into account the political values, histories and strategic culture of these states? Or to put it another way, can we extrapolate the foreign policies of these countries simply from their rising economic and military profiles?

We do not think so. However, we are not arguing that military capabilities do not matter or that states in general are not security seekers. We are, however, suggesting that states often make their foreign policy choices based on historical memories, long-standing values and on how they perceive themselves vis-à-vis other states. For example, China and India attach enormous importance to non-intervention norms—something that cannot be adequately explained without reference to their colonial humiliation and feelings of external vulnerability. They also continue to hold a good deal of suspicion about the Western liberal economic model—this is particularly surprising of India which is a liberal democracy, but it is even surprising of China, given its huge involvement in the liberal economic order. On the other hand, India’s democracy gives it considerable soft power on the global stage in contrast to China’s authoritarianism, bringing identity features directly into the foreign policy arena of these two states.

Indian Debates on America’s Rebalance to Asia

Despite Washington’s efforts to gain India’s unwavering support for its rebalancing or so-called pivot to the Asia-Pacific, New Delhi’s backing nevertheless remains reluctant. At first glance, China’s growing assertiveness in the region would seem to make a stronger U.S. presence in Asia firmly in India’s interest. Indeed, some Indian diplomats have welcomed the U.S. move, especially in private. There has been no clear endorsement, however, by top political authorities and none is likely to come. The direction of Indo-U.S. relations is greatly dependent on whichever school of thought currently dominates India’s foreign policy landscape. The question of what the U.S. pivot means for India and how New Delhi should respond has sharpened a debate that has now been underway for more than a decade.

The biggest split within this domestic debate is between those who consider America’s rebalancing as a strategic concern and those who see it as a strategic opportunity. To the extent that domestic debates are precursors to shifts in actual policy, mapping various possible trajectories as they are discussed in the domestic space is likely to provide an understanding of future shifts in Indian foreign policy. These debates thus provide important clues to both the current ambivalence and future directions of India’s strategic policy.

Read the rest of the Policy Brief here

By Deepa M. Ollapally, GWU and Yogesh Joshi, Jawaharlal Nehru University