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THE ELLIOTT SCHOOL
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SIGUR CENTER FOR ASIAN STUDIES

National Identities of Asian Powers and Prospects for Regional Cooperation

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The Sigur Center for Asian Studies is an international research center of the Elliott School of International Affairs at The George Washington University. Its mission is to increase the quality and broaden the scope of scholarly research and publications on Asian affairs, promote U.S.-Asia scholarly interaction, and serve as the nexus for educating a new generation of students, scholars, analysts, and policymakers.

The Rising Powers Initiative at the Sigur Center for Asian Studies has been engaged in a three-year research project on “Power and Identity in Asia: Implications for Regional Cooperation,” supported by the Asia Security Initiative of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. In this project, leading scholars and policy experts from the United States and Asia have examined how national and regional identities shape the foreign relations of India, Japan, South Korea, China, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Their analyses underscore the importance of understanding the role of identity in Asia’s history and politics, so that academics and policymakers alike may better assess whether the region is heading toward cooperation or conflict.

Following two regional conferences in Beijing (May 2010) and New Delhi (February 2011), the Power and Identity project held its third and final research conference on April 16, 2012 at the Elliott School of International Affairs in Washington, D.C. This report highlights the main themes of the conference presentations and discussions in Washington.

The Power and Identity project of the Rising Powers Initiative has examined how the national identities of major powers in Asia have shaped their foreign policies in the past and could affect the region’s prospects for cooperation or conflict in the future. This report characterizes the identities of India, Japan, South Korea, and China and shows how the foreign policy behaviors of these four countries can be attributed to their unique identities. Some of these identities could foster trust between states and promote cooperation. The experience of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations also illustrates the development of regional identities and multilateralism in Asia. This report concludes with suggestions of possible identity changes in the future.

The Identities of Major Asian Powers

To study a country’s identity is to inquire into its history, culture, and institutions, and to determine how they have shaped its normative orientations toward

power and security in its external relations. The identity of a country sets the stage for not only its past behaviors, but also its aspirations for the future. While identity can neither explain nor predict everything, even scholars who usually do not study identity issues can agree that it is theoretically useful. As Charles Glaser of George Washington University pointed out, identity “could influence a state’s goals in a way that is important.”¹ In a similar vein, understanding identity helps us characterize what *kind* or *type* of country we are studying.²

India is characterized by its identity as an “autonomous power,” argued Deepa Ollapally of George Washington University and Amitabh Mattoo of Jawaharlal Nehru University. This derives in large part from India’s historical experience of colonial subjugation under the British, and the desire of Indian independence leaders to transcend their country’s colonial humiliation. Coupled with this “historical meta-narrative” is the belief that India is unique because it is a great civilization, rather than merely a normal nation state. According to Ollapally and Mattoo, this sense of “civilizational entitlement” supports an Indian identity that sees India’s sphere of influence in culture, values and trade, dating back centuries in history. Building on this, modern political India also takes pride in being a pluralistic and secular democracy that has been able to hold together an exceptionally diverse country. Together, these strands of India’s experiences and domestic institutions comprise an identity that proudly and fiercely values autonomy in India’s existence and well-being.³

Japan’s identity needs to be understood in its post-World War II context. Mike Mochizuki of George Washington University and Isao Miyaoka of Keio University contended that Japan’s identity as a “peace state” or “peace-loving nation” has been a salient characteristic of Japan’s postwar foreign policies. While domestic debates sometimes see challenges to this notion of the peace state, such challenges are usually oblique and at the margins. Advocates of revising Japan’s postwar constitution are also restrained by “a culture of anti-militarism that has become so embedded at the popular level and institutionalized in the policymaking process.” In addition to the peace state, another aspect of Japan’s identity is that of the “merchant state” or “trading state,” which has shaped

Japan's postwar focus on economic reconstruction and development. Mochizuki called this multifaceted peace/merchant state identity an "identity complex" that has "converged pacifism and mercantilism into a national foreign policy consensus...[and] enabled the expansion of Japanese public support for the so-called Yoshida doctrine."⁴

South Korea's identity is less stable. Gregg Brazinsky of George Washington University and Shin Jong-Dae of the University of North Korean Studies in South Korea argued that contestation over South Korean identity falls along the lines of national identity and state identity: a nation of all Koreans on the Korean Peninsula versus a state identity embodied by the Republic of Korea government in Seoul. The former first began to take shape in the late nineteenth century when the linkage between the Korean Chosun Dynasty and the Sino-centric tributary system began to unravel. The latter state identity developed during and after the Cold War, as the ROK state engaged in new alliances and institutions alongside its rivalry with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the north.⁵ "South Korea presents a particularly complicated case because there has not been congruence between state and nation during the last six decades," said Brazinsky.⁶

China's identity appears to be even less stable, despite some popular depictions to the contrary. Both the paper presented by Allen Carlson of Cornell University, as well as the discussion amongst conference participants, indicated that there is not yet a consensus on what kind of rising power China is and might become. Research by Carlson showed that a considerable range and diversity of viewpoints exist amongst Chinese public intellectuals, and that such viewpoints sometimes even find expression in the *Global Times*, the otherwise fiercely nationalist paper run by the Chinese Communist Party.⁷ China's identity at this point is "far from monolithic," argued Carlson, and as Chinese identity continues to be contested, one will observe reinterpretations of history. "So the question is," said Carlson, "what parts of the past get selected and amplified, and then what those implications are going to be."⁸

Some observers in the U.S. see China's identity in relatively benign terms. Chas Freeman, former U.S.

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, said in his conference keynote speech that "China's rulers are, for the most part, risk adverse, conservative and patient." In contrast with the U.S., "the bullying style of leadership [which Americans] have exhibited compares poorly with the more deferential approach taken by China."⁹ Others are less certain about China's identity, but point out that the key question is, how does China define its identity as a potential superpower? Does China see itself as a regional or global power? As Glaser emphasized, "What China believes a superpower means will be very important in terms of how the relations between the United States and China will play out."¹⁰

Identities Shaping Foreign Policies

The Power and Identity project has sought to bring identity to the foreground of policy analyses, arguing that policy-driven questions about the future of Asia should take into account the unique identities of the region's major powers.¹¹ This emphasis on the social and normative character of a country is a departure from conventional approaches which give primacy to material factors (geography, military capability, size of economy) and analyze international relations through the lens of realism and balance-of-power politics.

Without discounting the importance of material factors, the authors of this project have argued that material factors alone do not determine policy outcomes.¹² Their research shows that identity can shape the orientation and trajectory of a country's foreign policy, by both enabling and constraining that country's plausible range of policy choices. Thus, despite changes in a country's hard power and material capabilities, one can expect a certain degree of policy consistency that is grounded in that country's identity, as seen in the case studies of India and Japan. Conversely, where identities are less stable, the foreign policy behaviors may also be less predictable, as with South Korea and China.

In India, the core value of autonomy in its identity has been expressed in India's longstanding adherence to nonalignment in its foreign policy. In concrete terms, any formal alliance structure, or even the appearance of an alliance, has been a major "taboo" in the practice of Indian foreign policy, argued Ollapally and Mattoo.

This has been consistent over time, despite changes in India's material power. When India was still a relatively weak state after gaining independence, instead of forming military alliances with stronger powers, it chose a path of nonalignment. When the end of the Cold War opened up opportunities for a stronger India to take on a more prominent role in global security and military affairs, it instead chose to stay on the sidelines, and "policy shifts were gradual and unremarkable." India has been keen to avoid entrapment in partnerships; for example, it refused to send troops to support the U.S.-led war in Iraq, pointed out the authors.¹³

India's sense of civilizational entitlement in its identity also gives rise to a preference for status symbols of power. "India has been an extremely status conscious power in the international system, looking for ways to project itself without using military or economic might," suggested Ollapally and Mattoo. For instance, India's achievements in science and technology have been touted as "technology demonstrators" rather than markers of military power. Indeed, besides India's aversion to alliances, a taboo on the use of force to settle disputes is another prominent feature in Indian foreign policy. Thus, rather than forging bilateral alliances, India has preferred policies that support multilateralism and build institutional linkages with regional and international organizations.¹⁴

Japan's foreign policy after WWII has been marked by a "centrist" position that has consistently strove to "expand, integrate and harmonize its U.S. and Asian dimensions." According to Mochizuki and Miyaoka, it is the Japanese peace/merchant state identity complex that has "facilitated and continues to facilitate this quest for strategic balance and integration between the United States and Asia."¹⁵ Hence, what some other scholars define as a "hedging" strategy may actually be better understood as a consistent feature of Japanese foreign policy that has its basis in the country's identity.¹⁶ "At any given moment there may be different voices," said Mochizuki, "but what keeps happening is that Japan's foreign policy stays in this area."¹⁷

Some are more skeptical of the extent to which identity drives Japanese foreign policy. Glaser noted that material factors in the structure of international politics may explain much of the story – Japan does not

have to invest resources in its security because it can rely on the United States.¹⁸ Analytically, it may seem easier to assess policy decisions in terms of cost-benefit calculations instead of identity-driven orientations. However, Mochizuki and Miyaoka pointed out in their paper that Japan's economic rise in the 1970s and 1980s did present it with the opportunity to pursue an independent, hard power-driven strategy. The fact that Japan did not choose this route, they suggested, is attributable to "the resilience and stability of the peace state identity."¹⁹ More recent developments, such as China's military modernization and specific incidents including the 2010 Chinese fishing trawler collision, also have not prompted more aggressive reactions from Japan. Regardless of heated rhetoric in some policy debates, Japan's total defense expenditures have stayed the same. As Mochizuki commented, "The evolution of Japan's national identity complex has allowed Japan to incrementally expand its international security role without aspiring to be a great power."²⁰ In some ways, both Japan and today's rising India are in similar positions – they have the material capabilities to act like a great power in international affairs, but their identities have driven choices that avoid such a role.

With South Korea, its less stable identity can be associated with foreign policy inclinations that are less consistent and depend on interactions with the conservative or liberal-leaning character of the administration. "State and national identity help Koreans to know where they want to go, while political values give them a roadmap for getting there," said Brazinsky.²¹ The Korean national identity engenders an affinity toward North Korea, a historical hostility toward Japan, and an ambiguous attitude toward the U.S. On the other hand, the ROK state identity as a modern economy and democracy that has relied on America for its development and security takes a much more benign view of the U.S. Conservatives tend to support the use of military means, whereas progressives prefer the use of diplomacy. Hence, for example, the conservative-national identity of Syngman Rhee's administration welcomed the alliance with the U.S. but then prioritized forceful national reunification over the alliance's anti-Communist objectives. In the late 1990s, Kim Dae-Jung's Sunshine Policy toward North Korea was an example of progressive-national identity.²² However, from the U.S. perspective, Brazinsky pointed out, "the different varieties of state identity

are generally more conducive to American interests and goals in East Asia than the versions of national identity.”²³

China’s identity may be unclear at this point, but conference participants did agree that trying to understand China’s identity is critical for policymaking. Evan Medeiros, China director at the U.S. National Security Council, made the following observation of his interactions with the Chinese: “It’s very clear that nonmaterial factors like identity play a very important role. China’s traditional association of itself with the developing world, China’s emerging identity as a rising power, as the Chinese define it, are both very prominent features in the way in which China thinks about, defines and pursues its interests globally.”²⁴ In response to Carlson’s argument that China’s identity is in flux, Taylor Fravel from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology noted that the manifestation of an unstable identity might be “less coherence in Chinese foreign policy.” For example, said Fravel, there have been some stark contrasts between assertive Chinese rhetoric on South China Sea disputes on the one hand, and the signing of a Sino-Vietnamese agreement on maritime issues on the other.²⁵

Identities Facilitating Interstate Cooperation

While a country’s own sense of identity shapes the plausible range of policies it pursues, how that country’s identity is perceived by others can have implications for the likelihood of interstate cooperation and peace. This difference between a state’s own identity and others’ assessments of its identity, as Glaser pointed out, is an important analytical distinction in the study and practice of international politics.²⁶ Whether the major aspiring powers in Asia can peacefully coexist will be determined in part by their assessments of and responses to each other’s identities and hence intentions.

“When we look at a country to determine whether that country is threatening or not, it seems that the perceived nature of the state is also taken in to account, rather than just its raw power capability,” said Ollapally.²⁷ As she and Mattoo pointed out in their paper, the differing perceptions are illustrated by the contrasting global reactions to the rise of India

and China. Even though both countries are growing militarily and economically, India’s behavior tends to be viewed as benign while China is seen as threatening. “This view of India is not because of what India is doing but because of the type of power others think India is,” they argued.²⁸ In other words, in India’s case, its unique identity helps to alleviate tensions that may otherwise develop in reaction to its growing power.

At the same time, however, India’s identity also does not lend itself to formal bilateral cooperation with the United States, because that would go against India’s desire for autonomy. American policymakers hope that India will align with the United States and act as a junior partner, but such thinking is “unrealistic,” said Jonah Blank of the RAND Corporation. “Autonomy...is a central value of Indian foreign policymaking and of Indian identity, and it will be with us for a long time,” emphasized Blank. “We’re just beating our heads against a wall if we try to get a country to change an aspect of identity that it considers to be core to its true nature.”²⁹

Misperceiving a country’s identity can also result in even more serious ramifications. Although Carlson made the case in his paper for a Chinese identity in flux, there are also those who “select on the more combative realist and assertive nationalist views,” he said. Besides being “factually wrong,” criticized Carlson, those who do so might be amplifying a “circle of distrust.”³⁰

In contrast, Japan’s postwar experience illustrates the important role of identity in actually building trust amongst nations. Mochizuki and Miyaoka argued that Japan’s peace/merchant state identity “reassured Southeast Asia countries that Japan would not revive its pre-1945 militarism and that it would be a positive partner for their own economic development.”³¹ Sheila Smith of the Council on Foreign Relations underscored the “remedial aspect to Japan’s postwar identity debate,” concurring that “in Japan’s execution of foreign policy, this remedial identity matters a great deal, particularly to its Asian neighbors.” In Japan’s postwar identity, “its ambitions are constrained” and there is “a domestic system of support for Japan as a postwar peaceful nation without the trappings of a great power,” explained Smith.³²

Building Regional Order with Shared Identities

In addition to how identities are perceived, the extent to which certain identities are shared amongst states may also affect the prospects of multilateral cooperation more broadly. Amitav Acharya of American University and Allan Layug of Sophia University argued that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has constructed a regional order based on shared norms of non-intervention and the peaceful settlement of disputes.³³ These norms are the basis of a collective identity that has enabled ASEAN to develop into what Acharya called a “nascent security community,” drawing attention to the successful avoidance of war between Indonesia and Malaysia, and the inclusion of Vietnam into ASEAN after decades of antagonism. “ASEAN has overcome conflict, [and] you don’t have that kind of transformation in many other parts of the world,” pointed out Acharya. Moreover, ASEAN diplomats today will acknowledge that “the experience of building peace [has] become a source of regional pride.”³⁴

Acharya and Layug further argued that ASEAN is central to any ongoing efforts to build multilateral security architecture in Asia. This feature of “ASEAN centrality” means that “ASEAN has become the ‘leader,’ the ‘driver,’ ...the ‘institutional hub,’ ...and the ‘fulcrum’ of regional processes and institutional designs in the Asia Pacific because of its unique style of regionalism that provides a normative framework conducive to regional peace, stability and prosperity.” In short, “ASEAN centrality has been anchored on ASEAN identity as a nascent security community,” and has made possible various multilateral arrangements in trade and security, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, the East Asia Summit, and the ASEAN Free Trade Area, amongst others.³⁵

If multilateral cooperation in Asia hinges on the centrality of ASEAN’s identity, some conference participants were more skeptical of ASEAN’s degree of normative influence. Alice Ba from the University of Delaware questioned whether more powerful actors in the region, namely the United States and China, could be socialized into adapting ASEAN’s norms for conflict resolution. While a collective identity may have worked to foster peace amongst ASEAN members,

it is unclear how well that identity will hold up to external pressures.³⁶ Freeman suggested that some form of multilateralism is nevertheless the preferred route. “No Asian country, including China, wants to see a Cold War-style division of the Indo-Pacific region into competing spheres of influence,” said Freeman. “Rather than countering potential Chinese hegemony by re-embracing that of the United States, Asians seek to craft a rule-and-relationship-bound regional order. They hope that this can maximize economic potential and mitigate political risks while enhancing national strategic autonomy.”³⁷

It may be that the kind of regional order that is crafted will be characterized not by ASEAN centrality, but rather shared identities in democratic and liberal values, as several other conference participants suggested. John Ikenberry of Princeton University argued, “The United States believes that there are common identities that cut across the Pacific that are organized around not so much culture or history in the traditional sense, but shared values, interests, experiences; most importantly, of course, liberalism, capitalism, and democracy, which have spread to every corner of the world, and that have increasingly been a part of what we describe as greater Asia.”³⁸ In line with this view, Miyaoka and Mochizuki argued that an additional layer to Japan’s identity complex is “democratic state” identity, which “has steered [Japan] not only to cultivate a sense of security community with the United States, but also to reach out to Australia, India, and even toward the Republic of Korea as diplomatic and security partners while remaining wary of China.”³⁹

Future Shifts in Identity

As the research for this project has shown, identities are shaped by historical circumstances, moments of crisis, domestic political developments, as well as interactions with other countries. At the same time, the uniqueness of each country’s identity does not preclude changes to identity, and it will be important for policymakers to be attentive to whether identities of major Asian countries persist or change in the future.

For example, as multilateral diplomacy becomes increasingly commonplace in global politics, and as nations grow more and more interdependent, it remains to be seen whether India’s core identification

with autonomy is sustainable. Alyssa Ayres, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia, suggested that “there is a fundamental tension between the pursuit of autonomy in and of itself, and an approach internationally that depends on a deepened network of agreements and partnerships, a kind of web of connectivity.” She pointed to India’s recent efforts to negotiate and sign a number of bilateral and regional free trade and economic partnership agreements, which are “elevating India’s international economic diplomacy to the foreground as a fundamental enabling factor for its role in the world.”⁴⁰ If India is to continue on this path of economic growth through economic diplomacy, as a group of former Indian officials, policy analysts, and business leaders seemed to recommend in a recent report entitled *Nonalignment 2.0*, then India may have to seriously reflect on the value and utility of autonomy and nonalignment.

Indeed, it appears that India’s identity may be going through a period of contestation and perhaps re-orientation, highlighted by Ollapally and Mattoo in their paper. Realists who favor a hard power-driven approach are making inroads in some policy debates. For example, the Indian Navy has revised its defensive doctrine from a focus on coastal protection to one striving to project power from the Persian Gulf to the Malacca Straits.⁴¹ At the same time, however, the *Nonalignment 2.0* report is also a “rearguard reaction against what is seen as a more realist thinking seeping in,” said Ollapally. “[The report’s authors] don’t want to let go without a challenge.”⁴²

Whereas India’s identity is coming under pressure as the country becomes more enmeshed in global politics, for South Korea this interconnected multilateral structure is strengthening the South Korean state identity over the national identity. Brazinsky and Shin argued, “State identity in South Korea seems likely to continue to gain in strength as time progresses. As the ROK continues to function as a state in international politics, it will become more deeply embedded in various global institutions and forums. These institutions not only force South Korea to think of itself as an individual, sovereign political entity but will also serve to heighten South Korea’s sense of difference from the North.”⁴³ Furthermore, Ikenberry observed, “Korea is before our very eyes revising its identity, not just as a junior partner or regional player, but as a global player.”⁴⁴

If the identities of the major powers in Asia are gradually changing, does this bode well for regional peace and cooperation? Will identities foster trust in bilateral relations and a shared sense of normative purpose in multilateral groupings? Although each country has its own unique history and set of domestic institutions which have shaped its identity over time, identity is also a dynamic characteristic that may evolve as circumstances change. There is an argument to be made about “how these realities of interdependence, interest and security aggregate into incentives to recast our identities in broader, more enlightened ways,” said Ikenberry. Ending the conference on an optimistic note, Ikenberry suggested that one could look at changing identities in both the United States and China and see how these identities can be “patrons of a regional order rather than...rivals in a context in which only one can win.”⁴⁵

Report by Amy Hsieh, Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Political Science, George Washington University

1. Charles Glaser, remarks at the conference on “Power, Identity and Security in Asia: Views on Regional Cooperation and the U.S. Role,” Washington, D.C., April 16, 2012.
2. Most of the authors in this project attributed their conceptualization of identity in international relations to works by Alexander Wendt. See Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
3. Deepa Ollapally and Amitabh Mattoo, “India: Autonomous Power and Identity at Crossroads,” paper presented at the conference on “Power, Identity and Security in Asia.”
4. Isao Miyaoka and Mike Mochizuki, “Japan’s Identity Complexes: Quest for Strategic Balance and Integration,” paper presented at the conference on “Power, Identity and Security in Asia.”
5. Gregg Andrew Brazinsky and Shin Jong-Dae, “South Korea: State Identity, National Identity and Security,” paper presented at the conference on “Power, Identity and Security in Asia.”
6. Gregg Andrew Brazinsky, remarks at the conference on “Power, Identity and Security in Asia.”
7. Allen Carlson, “Far from Monolithic: Chinese National Identity in Flux, and its Foreign Policy Implications,” paper presented at the conference on “Power, Identity and Security in Asia.”

8. Allen Carlson, remarks at the conference on "Power, Identity and Security in Asia."
9. Chas W. Freeman Jr., remarks at the conference on "Power, Identity and Security in Asia."
10. Glaser, remarks at the conference on "Power, Identity and Security in Asia."
11. For a study of American identity and U.S. foreign policy, see Henry R. Nau, *At Home Abroad: Identity and Power in American Foreign Policy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002).
12. As the project's co-principal investigator Deepa Ollapally explained at the conference on "Power, Identity and Security in Asia," identity is an intervening or even an independent variable which has causal impact on outcomes of interest. In this project, identity is not a dependent variable, nor is it epiphenomenal.
13. Ollapally and Mattoo, "India: Autonomous Power."
14. Ibid.
15. Miyaoka and Mochizuki, "Japan's Identity Complexes."
16. On Japan's "hedging" strategy, see Richard J. Samuels, "Japan's Goldilocks Strategy," *Washington Quarterly* 29:4 (Autumn 2006): 111-127.
17. Mike Mochizuki, remarks at the conference on "Power, Identity and Security in Asia."
18. Glaser, remarks at the conference on "Power, Identity and Security in Asia."
19. Miyaoka and Mochizuki, "Japan's Identity Complexes."
20. Mochizuki, remarks at the conference on "Power, Identity and Security."
21. Brazinsky, remarks at the conference on "Power, Identity and Security."
22. Brazinsky and Shin, "South Korea: State Identity."
23. Brazinsky, remarks at the conference on "Power, Identity and Security in Asia."
24. Evan Medeiros, remarks at the conference on "Power, Identity and Security in Asia."
25. Taylor Fravel, remarks at the conference on "Power, Identity and Security in Asia."
26. Glaser, remarks at the conference on "Power, Identity and Security in Asia."
27. Deepa Ollapally, remarks at the conference on "Power, Identity and Security in Asia."
28. Ollapally and Mattoo, "India: Autonomous Power." The authors note in their paper that this benign view of India does not necessarily apply to India's immediate neighbors.
29. Jonah Blank, remarks at the conference on "Power, Identity and Security in Asia."
30. Carlson, remarks at the conference on "Power, Identity and Security in Asia."
31. Miyaoka and Mochizuki, "Japan's Identity Complexes."
32. Sheila Smith, remarks at the conference on "Power, Identity and Security in Asia."
33. Allan Layug and Amitav Acharya, "ASEAN Identity and the Construction of the Asia-Pacific Regional Order: Implications for Regional Cooperation and the U.S. Role," paper presented at the conference on "Power, Identity and Security in Asia."
34. Amitav Acharya, remarks at the conference on "Power, Identity and Security in Asia."
35. Layug and Acharya, "ASEAN Identity."
36. Alice Ba, remarks at the conference on "Power, Identity and Security in Asia."
37. Freeman, remarks at the conference on "Power, Identity and Security in Asia."
38. G. John Ikenberry, remarks at the conference on "Power, Identity and Security in Asia."
39. Miyaoka and Mochizuki, "Japan's Identity Complexes."
40. Alyssa Ayres, remarks at the conference on "Power, Identity and Security in Asia."
41. Ollapally and Mattoo, "India: Autonomous Power."
42. Ollapally, remarks at the conference on "Power, Identity and Security in Asia."
43. Brazinsky and Shin, "South Korea: State Identity."
44. Ikenberry, remarks at the conference on "Power, Identity and Security in Asia."
45. Ibid.

Conference Agenda

Power, Identity, and Security in Asia: Views on Regional Cooperation and the U.S. Role

April 16, 2012

Sigur Center for Asian Studies' Rising Powers Initiative
Elliott School of International Affairs, The George Washington University
1957 E St. NW, 6th Floor – Lindner Commons, Washington, DC

9:00 AM - 9:20 AM	Registration and Continental Breakfast
9:20 AM - 9:30 AM	Welcome and Introductory Remarks <u>Speaker:</u> Deepa Ollapally (GWU)
9:30 AM - 10:30 AM	Session I: Power and Identity in India <u>Chair:</u> Alyssa Ayres (Department of State) <u>Presenters:</u> Deepa Ollapally (GWU) and Amitabh Mattoo (Jawaharlal Nehru University and University of Melbourne) <u>Discussant:</u> Jonah Blank (RAND Corporation)
10:30 AM - 11:30 AM	Session II: Power and Identity in Japan <u>Chair:</u> Edward Lincoln (GWU) <u>Presenters:</u> Mike Mochizuki (GWU) and Isao Miyaoka (Keio University) <u>Discussant:</u> Sheila Smith (Council on Foreign Relations)
11:30 AM - 12:30 PM	Session III: Power and Identity in Korea <u>Chair:</u> Thomas Hubbard (McLarty Associates; Former United States Ambassador to Korea) <u>Presenters:</u> Gregg Brazinsky (GWU) and Jong-dae Shin (University of North Korean Studies) <u>Discussant:</u> Ji-Young Lee (American University)
12:30 PM - 1:45 PM	Lunch and Keynote Address Chas W. Freeman, Jr., Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
2:00 PM - 3:00 PM	Session IV: Power and Identity in ASEAN <u>Chair:</u> Satu Limaye (East-West Center) <u>Presenters:</u> Amitav Acharya (American) and Allan Layug (Sophia University) <u>Discussant:</u> Alice Ba (University of Delaware)
3:00 PM - 4:00 PM	Session V: Power and Identity in China <u>Chair:</u> Evan Medeiros (National Security Council) <u>Presenter:</u> Allen Carlson (Cornell University) <u>Discussant:</u> Taylor Fravel (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
4:00 PM - 4:15 PM	Coffee/Tea Break
4:15 PM - 5:00 PM	Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy: Liberal Internationalist and Realist Views <u>Keynote Speakers:</u> G. John Ikenberry (Princeton University) and Charles Glaser (GWU)
5:00 PM - 5:05 PM	Closing Remarks <u>Speaker:</u> Mike Mochizuki (GWU)
5:05 PM - 5:30 PM	Conference Reception

About the Rising Powers Initiative

The Rising Powers Initiative is a multi-year, cross-national research effort that examines the role of domestic identities and foreign policy debates of aspiring powers in Asia. The Rising Powers Initiative consists of three distinct projects:

Carnegie Corporation of New York

WORLDVIEWS OF ASPIRING POWERS: EXPLORING FOREIGN POLICY DEBATES ABROAD

PHASE I: 2009-2011; PHASE II: 2011-2013

PHASE I: The first phase of this project focused on identifying and tracking the internal foreign policy debates in five major and rising powers—China, Japan, India, Russia and Iran. The strategic awakening and reawakening of these countries is leading to domestic debates about their own national security, international economic policymaking, image and power, and US global leadership. The research team developed a “schools of thought” framework useful for comparative analysis. An edited volume entitled *Worldviews of Aspiring Powers* is forthcoming from Oxford University Press in 2012.

PHASE II: Phase 2 of this project aims to apply the framework developed from Phase 1 by exposing the domestic debates in rising powers to a Washington audience. The second phase adds a component on energy, maritime security and nuclear power that examines how different schools of thought react to these issues. The project will bring domestic perspectives on energy and maritime security together with differing views on nuclear power and nonproliferation in China, India, Japan, and Korea for the first time. This research produces fortnightly Policy Alerts and will publish an edited book volume entitled, *The Asian Energy Security Complex: Maritime Security, Nuclear Energy and Nonproliferation and U.S. Policy Implications*, along with numerous publications and major conferences and policy briefings in the United States and Asia.

PARTICIPANTS

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JAPAN: Narushige Michishita, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies; Mike Mochizuki, GWU; Richard Samuels, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

KOREA: Scott Snyder, Council on Foreign Relations

RUSSIA: Shoichi Ito, Institute of Energy Economics; Andrew Kuchins, Center for Strategic and International Studies; Igor Zevelev, MacArthur Foundation, Moscow

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John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation

POWER AND IDENTITY IN ASIA: IMPLICATIONS FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION

The Power and Identity project aims to deepen understanding of how identity issues and power transitions affect the international policies of China, India, Japan, Korea and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). This is essential for addressing two issues: first, whether international relations in Asia in the foreseeable future are likely to be characterized by cooperation and regional integration or by security tensions and interstate war; second, assessing the dominant security orientations of the powers studied regarding cooperation with the United States and United States leadership in Asia.

The project will make an important contribution to international relations literature by defining, operationalizing, and examining identity issues across cases. Information about the relationship between identity and power in Asia is made available to policymakers, journalists and analysts through several mechanisms, including holding regional colloquia in Beijing and New Delhi, an international workshop in Washington DC, and through the production of policy briefs and commentaries.

PARTICIPANTS

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GWU Office of the Vice President for Research

ASIAN POWERS AND ECONOMIC CHALLENGES

No in-depth analysis of Asia's rising and major powers is complete without a thorough study of the many dynamic economic issues in the region. A team of five GWU experts working with scholars in Asia and GWU student research assistants examines the regional and global economic impact and challenges of aspiring Asian powers, with a focus on the economic policies of China, India, Japan, and Korea. In particular, this project investigates the rise of green industrial policy; trade, finance, and economic policy in China, Japan, and Korea; China's monetary policy coordination with the United States; international economic relationships in India; and India's economic relations with China. Under this project, the Sigur Center has launched an Asian Economic Events series which brings leading experts from Asia and around the United States to GWU for public lectures. The Asian Powers and Economic Challenges project culminates in spring 2014 with a major international research conference at the Sigur Center at which the project participants present their research.

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