The Sigur Center for Asian Studies is an international research center of the Elliott School of International Affairs at The George Washington University. Its mission is to increase the quality and broaden the scope of scholarly research and publications on Asian affairs, promote U.S.-Asia scholarly interaction and serve as the nexus for educating a new generation of students, scholars, analysts and policymakers.

The Center for a New American Security (CNAS) is an independent and nonpartisan research institution that develops strong, pragmatic and principled national security and defense policies. Building on the expertise and experience of its staff and advisors, CNAS engages policymakers, experts and the public with innovative, fact-based research, ideas and analysis to shape and elevate the national security debate. CNAS leads efforts to help inform and prepare the national security leaders of today and tomorrow.
This Policy Report is based on “India as a Global Power: Contending Views from India,” an international conference held at The George Washington University on January 23, 2012. The event was co-sponsored by the Sigur Center for Asian Studies’ Rising Powers Initiative and the Center for a New American Security (CNAS).

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Diplomatic Transformation

Over the past decade and a half, relations between the United States and India have undergone a rapid and significant transformation. Washington and New Delhi have turned aside decades of mutual distrust and forged a strategic partnership that currently enjoys widespread support in both countries. Could this bilateral partnership become one of the defining relationships of the coming era? What caused this unprecedented change, and what might cause it to change again?

External events played a key role. The end of the Cold War cut India loose from its perceived alignment with the Soviet Union and left the United States by default as the only global superpower. A rising China, persistent regional rivalries, a globalizing world economy and terrorist attacks eventually led both countries to reassess their relationships. They drew closer to one another in a strategic minuet to combat terrorism, boost economic ties and help maintain the future balance of power in Asia.

In a short decade, the United States and India concluded a major civilian nuclear cooperation agreement, initiated regular and significant military (especially naval) exercises, began talks on a bilateral investment treaty and launched a series of bilateral dialogues that at last count numbered 31.¹

Domestic Debates

External events change, however, and they could change again. Alone they are never determinative; they have to be interpreted. And differing interpretations of China and Pakistan, of the extent of terrorist threats and of the evolving nature of the coming world exist in both the United States and India. As vibrant democracies, both countries are awash in domestic debates about foreign policy.

Over the past decade, domestic debates lined up to drive the two countries closer together. The United States surged into South Asia to combat Al Qaeda and the Taliban and became a key player present in the region. While there was always dissent, the domestic debate in the United States supported a second term for George W. Bush, and the newly elected Barack Obama administration underwrote a further military surge in Afghanistan in 2009. Successive US administrations also supported an “engage but hedge” strategy toward Beijing that sought closer economic and diplomatic ties with China while strengthening relations with key Asian powers like India. India, for its part, sought stability in Afghanistan and an approach toward China similar to that of the United States. New Delhi has also been eager to win normalized recognition as a nuclear power and assume a seat on the United Nations Security Council. Again, while dissent existed, the center of gravity of India’s domestic foreign policy debate moved away from the insular and anti-western position of earlier decades and opened up to global challenges and opportunities.

Like external events, however, domestic debates shift. Sometimes they lead; sometimes they follow. Today, United States and Indian foreign policy goals seem largely in alignment. But shifts in domestic sentiments may be occurring. Majorities in the United States approved the return of American forces from Iraq and support a similar withdrawal from Afghanistan. The United States is no longer surging toward South Asia in either sentiment or reality. Along with reducing defense expenditures, the United States is pivoting toward Asia. Among many interpretations, some believe this move will diminish the relevance of South Asia. The United States will not engage in large-scale reconstruction operations in two different regions and is increasingly looking to prioritize one region. East Asia may take precedence over both the Middle East and South Asia. Others argue that the shift will enhance the relevance of the Indian Ocean as the vital transit region for deploying limited American forces between the Middle East and Asia. This shift will make the US-India relationship more relevant as the United States increasingly looks for reliable security partners. The debate suggests that domestic interpretations are in flux. Now is the time to pay attention to them as leading indicators of where domestic sentiments that interpret external events may be tending.

Schools of Thought

This report summarizes a recent conference on domestic foreign policy debates in India and the United States, co-hosted by the Sigur Center for Asian Diplomatic Transformation.

1. The number of bilateral dialogues is subject to change and may vary. For the latest count, please refer to the most recent official sources.
Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs of the George Washington University and the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). The conference formed part of a larger research project sponsored by the Carnegie Corporation of New York tracking domestic foreign policy debates and their implications for the United States in five aspiring or rising powers—China, India, Iran, Japan and Russia. Such debates are complex and sometimes difficult to access. Any effort to understand them requires a comparative framework to distinguish among differing points of view. The Sigur Center study applies the “schools of thought” approach popularized by Walter Russell Mead’s study of American foreign policy. Mead identifies longstanding American foreign policy schools known by the presidents and periods with which they are associated—Jeffersonians, Jacksonians, Hamiltonians and Wilsonians. In their more generic form, these worldviews exist in all countries—isolationism, nationalism, realism and globalism. Historically, domestic groups tend to cluster in these categories. The groups differ in terms of the scope, objectives and means of foreign policy they prefer and while they consider all possibilities—geography, power, values and institutions—they emphasize some more than others. Nationalists and realists tend to emphasize geography and power, isolationists and globalists stress ideas and institutions. Initial efforts applying this framework resulted in an edited volume, Worldviews of Aspiring Powers: Domestic Foreign Policy Debates in China, India, Iran, Japan and Russia, to be published in September 2012 by Oxford University Press.

The conference featured a debate among Indian representatives of various foreign policy schools of thought followed by reactions from American representatives of various schools of thought. The objective was to identify generic as well as specific differences among the schools of thought in each country, assess their relative weight, and anticipate the future directions of that country’s debates. Are the debates in the United States and India moving in the same or different directions? Do they portend convergence or divergence of foreign relations in the future? This report briefly summarizes the results.

Indian Worldviews

In their study of India in Worldviews of Aspiring Powers, the Sigur Center’s Deepa Ollapally and Rajesh Rajagopalan of Jawaharlal Nehru University identify three major schools of thought.

The first is a nationalist view that insists on Indian autonomy and independence. One variant of this view, which the study calls neo-nationalist (or soft nationalist), identifies with Nehru and India’s post-independence foreign policy of non-alignment, disarmament, and anti-colonialism. Its adherents believe that India is a developing nation with millions of poor people and not ready for world power. India should instead devote most of its attention and resources to development at home. A second variant, which the study labels hyper-nationalist (an assertive Jacksonian perspective—Ollapally and Rajagopalan’s terms are descriptive not prejudicial), also insists on Indian autonomy but from a more self-confident military perspective, concerned about new threats to Indian security particularly from China. It rejects what is seen as India’s historical military self-restraint. Neither nationalist strain is interested in formal alliance or tight alignment with the United States. Although the hyper-nationalist variant may be willing to develop military ties with the United States that serve Indian interests and independence, it is deeply distrustful of US reliability as a military supplier.

A second Indian foreign policy school of thought is a great power realist school. This school seeks a greater role for India on the world scene, international recognition as a nuclear power and a permanent seat on the UNSC. It is comfortable with the idea of strategic partnerships but not a strategic alliance. It prefers partnerships with multiple countries, not exclusively or, at this stage, primarily with the United States. This school still harbors some suspicions of the United States due to perceived past US indifference and indeed hostility toward India. It favors a “position of strength” for India from which to negotiate with the United States and other great powers. It advocates an array of strategic partners around India such as Japan, Australia and potentially Iran, what one Indian participant called a “diamond necklace” to counter China’s “string of pearls” strategy involving ports and possible Chinese naval bases around the Indian Ocean. While seeking a seat on the UNSC, the great power school is uncomfortable with UN interventions to stanch the proliferation of nuclear weapons (as with Iran and
Pakistan is definitely a problem … but to the extent that it is state or quasi-state sponsored, the best answer for India lies in establishing a cooperative relationship with Pakistan in investigating these terrorist incidents.”

Realists, on the other hand, stress the advantage that terrorists have in the use of asymmetric warfare and debate the strategies of counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency strategies. At this stage, no one seems to know the potential impact of America’s gradual shift from a counter-insurgency, boots-on-the-ground strategy to an offshore, drone, missile and quick strike approach. The offshore approach has the potential to exacerbate conflicts with strategic partners, as we observe in the case of America’s raid to kill Osama bin Laden and the tensions this produced in Pakistan. But it also reduces the US footprint in the region, which, at least for some Indian groups, has been a source of resentment in the past.

Afghanistan

The switch of US strategies toward combating terrorism has its greatest impact in Afghanistan. What does the drawdown and potential pullout of US and NATO forces mean? Some Indian groups, especially nationalists resentful of foreign interventions in the region, believe that it may be good for India. It might facilitate internal reconciliation in Afghanistan and improve relations with Pakistan. Hyper-nationalists think that a crisis in post-US Afghanistan just might force India to overcome its self-imposed military restraint; they want India to play a more proactive role. Many others, however, fear that it may make matters worse, especially if the Taliban, supported by Pakistan, regains significant influence in Afghanistan. Afghanistan was home to anti-Indian terrorist groups before 9/11; many Indians fear the reversion of that country to a terrorist sanctuary once again. Realists in India therefore are hedging their bets. India’s aid to Afghanistan already exceeds $2 billion, and some of India’s reluctance to punish Iran over nuclear weapons derives from the need to cultivate Iranian cooperation to access Afghanistan after America withdraws, assuming India’s rivalry with Pakistan persists.

Lalit Mansingh (realist): Regarding American policy in Afghanistan: “We are a bit bewildered
Most of the groups have doubts that India can count on the US for a favorable outcome in South Asia despite the serious setbacks in US-Pakistan relations recently, as long as the US reliance on the Pakistani military continues.

**Lalit Mansingh (realist):** Pakistan “threatens India at the conventional level, at the sub-conventional level, which is through terrorism, and at the nuclear level. We need to face it not by mere discussion. We have been having a dialogue with both China and Pakistan for all these years (but) we haven’t come to any particular understanding ... [India] has to be strong economically, politically, militarily, and then discuss with countries like China and Pakistan from a position of strength.”

**Mani Shankar Aiyar (soft nationalist):** “Not until the Ministry of External Affairs stops obsessing about Pakistan and starts thinking about our larger security requirements, will we be able to move in that direction.”

**Pakistan**

The rivalry between India and Pakistan constitutes the crux of strategic instability in South Asia. For some Indians, again principally nationalists resentful of foreign intervention, the United States exacerbated the problem by training terrorists to fight the Soviet Union, then leaving Afghanistan while the Taliban secured its hold, only to return when Taliban-aided terrorists struck the United States, and now destabilizing an already fractious and potentially failed Pakistani state by both massive military aid and cross-border attacks. For more assertive Indian nationalists and realists, the answer lies in modernizing the Indian military to cope with asymmetric warfare, replacing a top-heavy strategy relying on tanks and aircraft to defend traditional borders. Globalists and domestically-oriented nationalists may be most optimistic, believing that interconnections among Pakistani and Indian elites eventually facilitate reconciliation. Continuing conflict with Pakistan, they maintain, only drives Pakistan and China closer together (such as encouraging the prospects of a Chinese naval base at Gwadar).

For realists and many nationalists in India, China is the greatest potential threat to India over the long run. China’s rise is the principal development that has brought the United States into the Indian strategic equation, and the objective now is to hedge against one great power, China, without succumbing to another, the United States. There is concern from time to time that the United States may draw too close to China and exclude India in an attempt to manage power bilaterally through Beijing. That fear at the outset of the Obama administration led India and the United States to initiate the US-India Strategic Dialogue, which meets in summer 2012 for the third time. On the other hand, there is equal fear among many realists and soft nationalists that the United States may become too confrontational with China. Globalists worry most about any stepped up competition with China threatening economic benefits—China is currently India’s number one trade partner. They are wary about the increasing push by realists and hard nationalists to utilize India’s potential leverage over China in bilateral areas like the Tibet issue and relations with Vietnam.
the United States has formally endorsed) and India’s nuclear liability legislation (which has thus far led to the nonparticipation of American companies in the Indian nuclear energy sector).

Nationalists generally oppose any compromise on the nuclear question—neo-nationalists because of their commitment to India’s traditional nuclear disarmament agenda, and hyper-nationalists because they see most arms control measures as constraining India. Realists and globalists are more open minded on arms control, mostly because they want India to be on the managerial side of global governance. As for building up India’s nuclear weapons capability further, hard nationalists and great power realists favor the rapid development of a full-blown nuclear triad to strengthen Indian deterrence. Only hyper-nationalists make the argument that India needs an intercontinental missile capability to achieve credible deterrence. Globalists and soft nationalists are opposed to a bigger arsenal, arguing that India already possesses a minimum credible deterrence. Further build up is seen as unnecessarily provocative and destabilizing.

**UN Security Council**

The United States, as President Obama announced on his visit to India in November 2010, officially supports India’s permanent membership on the UN Security Council. Realists are the most enthusiastic about India gaining membership—in large part so that the country can have a seat at the high table and signal its arrival as a great power. They tend to see membership as India’s “right.” Hard nationalists too would like a seat for India, but they think India needs to get to the UN Security Council on its own comprehensive power, not because the United States or any other country endorses it. For this group, India has to earn the right, with the metric of admittance being hard power capabilities and international consequence as a global power. In contrast to realists, domestically-oriented soft nationalists feel that chasing a spot at the Security Council is a waste of time and distraction from internal imperatives. Globalists prefer to concentrate on modernization and play a role in international economic institutions as India’s economic power expands.

**Non-Proliferation**

The nuclear issue was a major thorn in the flesh of US-Indian relations before the recent transformation. Under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the United States was barred from cooperating with India’s civilian nuclear energy program because of New Delhi’s anomalous nuclear status. The two countries reached a landmark civilian nuclear cooperation agreement and the United States led the diplomatic push to win exceptions for India at the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Issues persist, however, including India’s membership in the four multilateral non-proliferation regimes (which Bharat Karnad (hard nationalist): India should “use Vietnam just as China has used Pakistan vis-à-vis India. This is a bit controversial, but considering that … China has proliferated deliberately, I think India has been pushed to a point where the government would have to seriously consider whether or not to respond in kind … we really need to pay back the Chinese in their own kind.”

Mani Shankar Aiyar (soft nationalist): “God forbid that we get ourselves into alliances … or entangled into other people’s alliances. It is absolutely essential that we stick to our principle of non-alignment … what happened in Afghanistan [and Iraq] is illustrative of the importance of our keeping away.”

Lalit Mansingh (realist): Referring to Chinese military presence in the Indian Ocean: “An encroachment of the global commons is not acceptable, and we have to be proactive in getting all of the countries together to oppose this… does India have an answer to the string of pearls? I think we have what is called the necklace of diamonds … we have to have a blue water navy, because we have to walk the talk.”

TN Ninan (globalist): “These are catch words,” referring to the “diamond necklace” and blue water navy strategy. “We have neglected our navy; [we] have started ramping up to expand [its] size, but a serious blue water navy is a long way off. I don’t think, even by 2030, you will see us have a blue water navy.”

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Bharat Karnad (hard nationalist): Speaking about a UNSC seat: “We shouldn’t beg for it, as seems to be the case … it hurts the national self-respect. . . . if you’re talking about India as is, then I’m afraid India does not deserve to be in the UNSC. I don’t see a UNSC seat, especially with a veto, as an entitlement. Somehow there is a belief in Delhi that it is a right; and I believe, assuming it’s a right, that it has to be earned.”

Lalit Mansingh (realist): “Why not India? Why do you have France? The UK? ... by all means, we have other forums. We have the G20, and other places where India is welcome, where India is heard and respected. If that’s the kind of world, then I think the UNSC and the UN will be sidelined, and other forums will take their place.”

TN Ninan (globalist): “I don’t believe India will get there [the UNSC], until it is seen by the US as a quasi-ally, at the very least.”

**US-India Defense/Military Cooperation**

India now conducts more military exercises with the United States than with any other country, and military ties have been a leading edge of the strategic relationship. India is aggressively building and deploying a blue water navy, anticipating three aircraft carrier strike forces by 2022 (two as early as 2015), some 31 new surface warships (some 130 overall) and six new submarines. India conducts military exercises with a growing number of strategic partners. Very clearly, this development has strong support from most schools of thought in the two countries. Some lingering nationalist sentiments in India, particularly of the Nehruvian sort, minimize the threat and reject the expansion of armaments. But even those in the United States who favor a lower ground forces profile for the United States in the Indian Ocean support the naval and air force buildup. However, US groups, including nationalist and globalist ones, expect India to buy more US military equipment, while most Indian groups warn against making Indian defense sales a litmus test of the relationship. India, they point out, needs flexible and multiple partners and some Indian observers distrust the United States based on its unsettling history of arms embargoes. The United States will win some sales, as it has in the case of C-17 and C-130 transport aircraft, and lose others, as it did recently in the sale of MMRCA fighter aircraft.

Bharat Karnad (hard nationalist): “The problem is that there is enormous mistrust in the Indian military and maybe it infects and seeps down to the government. When it comes to supplier transactions, you simply cannot trust America’s contractual obligations. Time and time again, the United States has backed off from treaty agreements, leave alone commercial contracts, like the one on Tarapur fuel. So, this seeds the kind of suspicion and certainly distrust on the Indian side. We don’t trust the Americans as we do perhaps other countries … even if there was a geopolitical element that was defeated by the trust deficit, you couldn’t be certain that tomorrow the US Congress would not write something into law that would retroactively pretty much wipe out obligatory contractual obligations and there is nothing India could do … we have suffered from it and so there was a salutary message from that as to how much India can trust the United States as a supplier of critical military systems.”

**Economy, Energy, Trade and Climate Change**

Globalists in India prefer a focus on economic development and globalization to the threats and great power aspirations emphasized by nationalists and realists. They emphasize visa, resources and economic reforms. India receives almost half of all US H-1B and L-1 intra-company transfer visas and complains of multiple restrictions. India is an energy deficient country that depends on imports for nearly all of its energy. But globalists are relatively weak in India. Nationalists resist liberalization in services (e.g., retail markets) and agricultural sectors. Foreign direct investment in India has declined by 30 percent since 2009 and remains far below that of China. Indian commercial diplomacy reflects this inertia. Differences between India and the United States have stifled the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations, and India-US differences divide climate change talks. India expresses relatively little interest in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which the United States now touts, or the possibility of a bilateral India-US free trade agreement, which some Americans promote.
India has significant democratic roots. As Amartya Sen points out, Buddhist councils under the Asoka dynasty in the third century BCE featured forums for spirited debates among elites not unlike and well before the Roman Senate that the West associates with its own democracies. Today, India enjoys (some say endures) a fractious democratic system that survived both colonialism under British rule and suspension of constitutional law under Indira Gandhi. India is a founding member of the Community of Democracies (established at Warsaw in 2000) and the UN Democracy Fund. It participates in the Asia-Pacific Democracy Partnership and the Bali Democracy Forum. Yet India hesitates to make democracy a centerpiece of US-Indian cooperation. Almost all Indian groups see India’s approach to Burma/Myanmar, for example, as a better example of how to promote human rights – patience and economic cooperation – than America’s approach of sanctions and isolation.

Bharat Karnad (hard nationalist): “Democracy promotion or nation-building should be no part of Indian agenda.” For example, “We lost Myanmar, because we were trying to be politically correct, and followed the American suggestion to boycott the military junta in Myanmar. And we have suffered for it. We let the Chinese into Myanmar, and it’s damn difficult to get those guys out.”

Lalit Mansingh (realist): “India is proud of its democracy, but I don’t think taking on an evangelical role in promoting democracy suits India’s interests. The fact is, there is no model that is available for us to promote democracy without making it seem partisan…” Referring to the example of Burma/Myanmar: “Persuasion rather than sanctions should be the policy, and I think India is right in not making [democracy promotion] a plank of its foreign policy.”

The Question of US Decline

Indian worldviews interact with American worldviews. Some Americans and their related institutes favor a more limited American involvement in world affairs. They emphasize national responsibilities and are delighted to have other countries such as India do more to provide for their own security. A more traditional realist worldview welcomes India as a strategic partner managing regional and global stability. It wishes to see India assume greater burdens in providing security, exercising restraint in its region so as not to draw the United States into further conflicts. A third American school is globalist (or idealist) and sees the confluence of democratic values as the basis of the relationship between India and the United States. India’s success therefore is both congruent and essential to America’s interests, and the US-Indian relationship is a “natural” one that should not be mortgaged to past fears of manipulation or future fears of ill-matched interests. Finally, a fourth school, also globalist, emphasizes institutional ties to the management of the world economy and global commons. It welcomes Indian support in the International Atomic Energy Agency, G-20, global climate talks and the World Trade Organization.

The worldviews in each country cross cut and interact. Historically, nationalist schools dominated in India and globalist schools in the United States. Today, the United States is clearly stepping back from the interventionist surge after 9/11. Do various groups in India perceive America to be in relative decline? Some nationalists in India welcome it. If the United States would “retrench more formally” from South Asia, argued Bharat Karnad, “the ball will then be in the court of the Indian government to make up its mind” on whether to continue as a “habitual free rider in security.” Conference participants generally, however, were optimistic that America is not pulling back significantly. The US drawdown in South Asia is seen at this point as more of a military, not political or economic, readjustment. And the idea that India and Pakistan may have to do more to solve their own problems is regarded as both long overdue and welcomed. Nevertheless, how India responds to the next terrorist attack with Pakistani roots once the United States is out of Afghanistan is an open question. Shifts in domestic sentiments may encourage more isolationist and nationalist responses.

Over 60 years, US strategy deliberately built a world in which open markets and the free exchange of people and ideas enabled other countries to rise and
become part of the global system. In early stages, Europe, Japan, the initial Asian tigers, then the emerging markets of China, Brazil, Mexico and now India—all grew faster than America. America, of course, grew as well, acting self-confidently to encourage other countries to become “responsible stakeholders” in a free and prosperous world.

Is that strategy still in place? The United States’ post-World War II strategy of democratic defense, enlargement and economic liberalization and engagement was supported by a broad coalition of domestic schools of thought—nationalists and realists because it deterred the Soviet Union, isolationists and globalists because it opened up entrepreneurial opportunity and economic freedom. Even after the Cold War, nationalists and globalists continued to support open markets for China—nationalists as long as alliances with Japan and South Korea remained strong and globalists as long as China liberalized internally and played by the rules.

India is coming into the globalization game late. The movement to open global markets, judging from the stalemate in the Doha Round, may have peaked, and India, which is still far behind China in modernizing its economy, is entering these markets as commercial sentiments in both India and the United States may be turning more insular. The globalist school of thought in each country is weakening, and the nationalist and realist schools strengthening. There are specific areas where nationalists and realists in India and the United States can agree to cooperate, such as combating terrorism and soft balancing of China. But the grand postwar strategy, by which the United States and the West expanded markets and provided collective goods of security and liberal institutions to accommodate one rising power after another, may be giving way to a new model, one that now depends on what rising powers like China and India want and do. What sort of global vision will they have, and will that vision accommodate other powers peacefully? There is good reason to pay continued attention to the domestic foreign policy debates of aspiring and rising powers.


4. The identification of individuals with schools of thought was based on the judgement of the conference organizers.


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Participants from India

Mani Shankar Aiyar is a current Member of the Indian Parliament in the Rajya Sabha (Council of States). He was thrice elected to the Lok Sabha (1991-96; 1999-2004; 2004-2009) and served as Minister of Panchayat Raj (2004-09) and Minister of Petroleum and Natural Gas (2004-06), Minister of Youth Affairs and Sports (2006-08) and Minister for Development of North-Eastern Region (2006-09). In 2006, he was conferred “Outstanding Parliamentarian Award” by the President of India. He began his career as a diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service from 1963-89.

He is a widely published columnist with several newspapers and magazines in India and abroad and has authored numerous books including Remembering Rajiv; In Rajiv’s Footsteps: One Year in Parliament; Mani Shankar Aiyar’s Pakistan Papers; Knickerwallabs, Silly-Billies and Other Curious Creatures; Rajiv Gandhi’s India (in 4 volumes) (ed.); Confessions of a Secular Fundamentalist; and A Time of Transition: Rajiv Gandhi to the 21st Century. He is a frequent commentator on poverty alleviation, foreign policy and nuclear disarmament in India and abroad.

Bharat Karnad is a Research Professor in National Security Studies at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, and is the author of numerous publications including India’s Nuclear Policy; Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy; and Future Imperilled: India’s Security in the 1990s and Beyond. Previously, Bharat Karnad was part of the (First) National Security Advisory Board of the National Security Council, Government of India as a member of the Nuclear Doctrine Drafting Group and of the external security and the technology security groups for the Strategic Review. Formerly, he was Advisor on Defence Expenditure to the (Tenth) Finance Commission, India.

Bharat Karnad holds widespread recognition for his expertise in national security and has been consulted by leading government figures including the Indian Prime Minister, Defense Minister Chairman, Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Services, and the Minister for External Affairs. He has also been involved in various Track-II dialogues with the United States of America, China, Taiwan, Pakistan and Israel. Mr. Karnad has a B.A. in Political Science from the University of California, Santa Barbara (1972) and a M.A. in Political Science from the University of California, Los Angeles, 1975.

Lalit Mansingh joined the Indian Foreign Service in 1963 and has more than 40 years of extensive international experience. He is a former foreign secretary and served as Indian ambassador to the United States and the United Arab Emirates and as India’s high commissioner to the United Kingdom and Nigeria. He was also deputy chief of mission at the Indian embassies in Kabul, Brussels and Washington, D.C.

Ambassador Mansingh is diplomatic advisor to the Federation of Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) and chairman for the FICCI India–U.S. Policy Group. In New Delhi, Ambassador Mansingh served as the joint secretary in the Department of Economic Affairs of the Ministry of Finance, the director general of the Indian Council for Cultural Relations, dean of the Foreign Service Institute of India and secretary (west) in the Ministry of External Affairs. Most recently, he has held several positions, including professor emeritus at the Foreign Service Institute of India; executive committee member for the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies in New Delhi; member of the Governing Board of Development Alternatives; member of the India Council for Sustainable Development; and president of the World Cultural Forum, India.

TN Ninan is currently the President of the Editor’s Guild of India and Chairman and Chief Editor of Business Standard, one of India’s leading business newspapers. As the former Executive Editor of India Today, as well as previously the editor of Business World and Economic Times, Mr. Ninan is widely recognized as one of India’s most respected economic commentators. Mr. Ninan is a recipient of the B.D. Goenka Award for Excellence in Journalism and the Sachin Chaudhari Award for Excellence in Financial Journalism.

Mr. Ninan has been Chairman of the Media Committee of the Confederation of Indian Industry; Chairman of the Society for Environmental Communication (which publishes Down to Earth magazine), a member of the Board of Trade, and has served on the Board of the Shri Ram School. He is a member of the Indo-German Consultative Group, and a Trustee of Aspen Institute India. From January 2010, he has moved into non-executive roles while continuing to be a television commentator on economic and business issues. Mr. Ninan received his MA in Economics from the University of Madras.
Conference Agenda

India as a Global Power: Contending Views from India

January 23, 2012

Sigur Center for Asian Studies’ Rising Powers Initiative
Elliott School of International Affairs, The George Washington University
1957 E St. NW, 7th Floor – City View Room, Washington, DC

9:00-9:30 am  Registration and Continental Breakfast

9:30-9:45 am  Welcome and Introductory Remarks
Speakers: Henry R. Nau (GWU) and Nate Fick (CNAS)

9:45-10:45 am  Session I: Indian Views on National Security and Defense
Chair: Deepa Ollapally (GWU)
• Mani Shankar Aiyar - Member of Indian Parliament, Rajya Sabha (Council of States)
• Bharat Karnad - Research Professor in National Security Studies, Centre for Policy Research
• Lalit Mansingh - Former Foreign Secretary of India and Ambassador to the United States
• TN Ninan - Chairman and Chief Editor, Business Standard

10:45-11:00 am  Break

11:00 am-12:00 pm  Session II: Indian Views on Economics, International Institutions, and Transnational Issues
Chair: Richard Fontaine (CNAS)
• Mani Shankar Aiyar - Member of Indian Parliament, Rajya Sabha (Council of States)
• Bharat Karnad - Research Professor in National Security Studies, Centre for Policy Research
• Lalit Mansingh - Former Foreign Secretary of India and Ambassador to the United States
• TN Ninan - Chairman and Chief Editor, Business Standard

12:15-1:00 pm  Luncheon

1:00-1:45 pm  Keynote Address: Nirupama Rao, Ambassador of India to the United States

2:00-3:15 pm  Session III: American Views on US-India Relations
Chair: Henry R. Nau (GWU)
• Doug Bandow - Senior Fellow, Cato Institute
• Sadanand Dhume - Resident Fellow, American Enterprise Institute
• George Perkovich - Vice President for Studies, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
• Dan Twining - Senior Fellow for Asia, German Marshall Fund of the United States

3:15-3:30 pm  Coffee/Tea Break

3:30-4:30 pm  Session IV: Indian Responses to American Views on US-India Relations
Chair: Deepa Ollapally (GWU)
• Mani Shankar Aiyar - Member of Indian Parliament, Rajya Sabha (Council of States)
• Bharat Karnad - Research Professor in National Security Studies, Centre for Policy Research
• Lalit Mansingh - Former Foreign Secretary of India and Ambassador to the United States
• TN Ninan - Chairman and Chief Editor, Business Standard

4:30-4:45 pm  Closing Remarks
Speakers: Deepa Ollapally (GWU) and Richard Fontaine (CNAS)
About the Rising Powers Initiative

Examining the role of domestic identities and viewpoints in shaping the foreign policy outlook of India and other major Asian powers is at the core of the Rising Powers Initiative, a multi-year, cross-national research project hosted by the Sigur Center for Asian Studies. The Rising Powers Initiative consists of three distinct projects:

Carnegie Corporation

**Worldviews of Aspiring Powers: Exploring Foreign Policy Debates Abroad**

**Phase I:** 2009-2011; **Phase II:** 2011-2013

**Phase I:** The first phase of this project focused on identifying and tracking the internal foreign policy debates in five major and rising powers—China, Japan, India, Russia, and Iran. The strategic awakening and reawakening of these countries is leading to domestic debates about their own national security, international economic policymaking, image and power, and U.S. global leadership. The research team developed a “schools of thought” framework useful for comparative analysis. An edited volume entitled *Worldviews of Aspiring Powers* is forthcoming from Oxford University Press in 2012.

**Phase II:** Phase 2 of this project aims to apply the framework developed from Phase 1 by exposing the domestic debates in rising powers to a Washington audience. The second phase adds a component on energy, maritime security and nuclear power that examines how schools of thought react to these issues. When concluded, the project will bring domestic perspectives on energy and maritime security together with differing views on nuclear power and nonproliferation in China, India, Japan, and South Korea for the first time. This research produces fortnightly Policy Alerts and will publish an edited book volume entitled, *The Asian Energy Security Complex: Maritime Security, Nuclear Energy and Nonproliferation and U.S. Policy Implications*, along with numerous publications and four major conferences and policy briefings.

**Participants**

**China:** David Shambaugh, GWU; Robert Sutter, GWU; *Ren Xiao, Fudan University; Daojiong Zha, Peking University**

**India:** Deepa Ollapally, GWU; Rajesh Rajagopalan, Jawaharlal Nehru University

**Iran:** *Farideh Farhi, University of Hawaii-Manoa; *Saideh Lotfian, University of Tehran

**Japan:** *Narushige Michishita, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies; Mike Mochizuki, GWU; Richard Samuels, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

**Korea:** Scott Snyder, Council on Foreign Relations

**Russia:** Shoichi Ito, Institute of Energy Economics; Andrew Kuchins, Center for Strategic and International Studies; *Igor Zevelev, MacArthur Foundation, Moscow

**U.S. Foreign Policy:** Charles Glaser, GWU; Henry R. Nau, GWU

*Participation in Phase I only

Co-Principal Investigators: Henry R. Nau & Deepa Ollapally

MacArthur Foundation

**Power and Identity in Asia: Implications for Regional Cooperation**

The Power and Identity project aims to deepen understanding of how identity issues and power transitions affect the international policies of China, India, Japan, Korea and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). This is essential for addressing two issues: first, whether international relations in Asia in the foreseeable future are likely to be characterized by cooperation and regional integration or by security tensions and interstate war; second, assessing the dominant security orientations of the powers studied regarding cooperation with the United States and United States leadership in Asia.

The project will make an important contribution to international relations literature by defining, operationalizing, and examining identity issues across cases. Information about the relationship between identity and power in Asia is made available to policymakers, journalists and analysts through several mechanisms, including holding regional colloquia in Beijing and New Delhi, an international workshop in Washington DC, and through the production of policy briefs and commentaries.

**Participants**

**ASEAN:** Amitav Acharya, American University; Allan Layug, University of the Philippines, Diliman

**China:** Allen Carlson, Cornell University; Song Wei, Peking University

**India:** Deepa Ollapally, GWU; Amitabh Mattoo, Jawaharlal Nehru University

**Japan:** Mike Mochizuki, GWU; Isao Miyaoaka, Osaka University; Daqing Yang, GWU

**Korea:** Gregg Brazinsky, GWU; Jong-dae Shin, University of North Korean Studies in Seoul

**U.S. Foreign Policy:** Charles Glaser, GWU

Co-Principal Investigators: Mike Mochizuki & Deepa Ollapally

GWU: Centers and Institutes Facilitating Fund (CIFF)

**Asian Powers and Economic Challenges**

This project examines the regional and global economic impact and challenges of aspiring Asian powers, with a focus on the economic policies of China, Japan, Indonesia and South Korea. In particular, this project will investigate the growth of resource nationalism and competition for energy; the external impact of China’s economic and financial policies; India’s global investment policies; and the strategic implications of regional economic interdependence.

**Participants**

**Nationalism: Energy Security and Competition for Resources:** Llewelyn Hughes, GWU; Robert J. Weiner, GWU

**China’s Economic and Financial Policies:** Jiawen Yang, GWU

**India’s Global Investment Policies:** Srividya Jandhyala, GWU

**India-China Economic Interdependence and Strategic Implications:** Deepa Ollapally, GWU; Sudha Mahalingam, India’s Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board

Co-Principal Investigators: Edward McCord, Shawn McHale & Deepa Ollapally