Japan's Dual Security Identity: A Non-combat Military Role as an Enabler of Coexistence

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Abstract
Since the end of the Cold War, Japan’s acceptance and institutionalization of a non-combat military role to aid the US has led to its new identity as a US ally and has transformed the content of its ‘peace state’ identity. It is this role that has made these two identities more compatible. This article first attempts to measure the long-term shift in Japan’s two identities by conducting a content analysis of Japan’s Defence White Papers and then seeks to trace the formation process of Japan’s dual security identity through which it accepted and institutionalized a non-combat military role. For this analysis, the process is divided into three stages: the Cold War period when its two identities as a ‘peace state’ and a US ally were considered incompatible, the period of the 1990s when Japan started to accept and institutionalized a non-combat military role, and the period after 11 September 2001 when Japan’s dual security identity gradually got established. In the final section, the article discusses the source of a security identity shift in Japan and draws some implications for the future of its security policy.

Keywords
Security identity, peace state, US ally, defence policy, Japan, content analysis

Introduction
During the Cold War, the Japanese government officials often used three identity terms in order to describe Japan’s security policy: a peace-loving nation, an economic power and a member of the West (Miyaoka, 2009).1 First, the identity of

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Japan as a peace-loving nation (*heiwa kokka*) was frequently emphasized in the outline of the basics of its defence policy. Second, the description of Japan as an economic power (*keizai taikoku*) increased since the late 1970s. It seems to have been due to the rise of Japan and the decline of the US in the economic field. Third, the Japanese government officials repeatedly identified Japan as a member of the West (*nishigawa no ichinin*) or a member of the Free World (*jiyushugi shokoku no ichinin*). This seems to have occurred in the context of the second Cold War in the 1980s. The second and third identity terms were used to emphasize the necessity for a defence build-up in Japan.

The end of the Cold War led to the redefinition of Japan’s security identity. The identities of an economic power and a member of the West have become much less frequently used in official discourse due to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the relative decline of the Japanese economy. These trends are beyond dispute. However, whether Japan has remained a ‘peace state’ is being debated. For example, Andrew Oros (2008) argues that Japan’s ‘security identity of domestic antimilitarism’ has not fundamentally changed despite recent changes in Japanese security practice. Yoshihide Soeya (1998, p. 231) claims that a ‘dual identity’ of ‘potential great power’ and ‘self-restraining state’ is stabilized. By contrast, Bhubhindar Singh (2008) makes the argument that Japan’s security identity has shifted from a ‘peace state’ to an international state. I agree with Oros that Japan’s identity based on the peace clause of the Constitution has been stable, with Soeya that Japan’s security identity is dual and with Singh that an identity shift has occurred. All of them, however, overlook Japan’s new identity as an ally of the US (hereafter referred to as a ‘US ally’).

In this article, I argue that since the end of the Cold War, Japan’s acceptance and institutionalization of a non-combat military role in aid of the US has brought forth its new identity as a US ally and has transformed the content of its ‘peace state’ identity. It is this role that has made these two identities more compatible. Arnold Wolfers (1968, p. 268) defines the related term ‘alliance’ as ‘a promise of mutual military assistance between two or more sovereign states’. A norm of mutual military aid forms an ally’s identity; an ally is a country that has an agreement to support another one militarily. With the rise of this new identity, Japan has often sent the Japan Self-Defence Forces (JSDF) abroad mostly to assist global and regional efforts by the US to maintain peace and stability. It appears, however, that a ‘peace state’ has still remained Japan’s strong identity, although its meaning has gradually been shifting from passive peace-loving to active peace-creating nation.

This article first attempts to measure a long-term shift in Japan’s two identities by conducting a content analysis of Japan’s Defence White Papers and then seeks to trace the formation process of Japan’s dual security identity through which it accepted and institutionalized a non-combat military role. For this analysis, the process is divided into three stages. The first stage is the Cold War period when Japan’s identity as a ‘peace state’ was gradually established while its identity as a US ally was politically suppressed. The second stage is the period of the 1990s,
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when Japan accepted and institutionalized a non-combat military role in aid of the US in two areas: United Nations peacekeeping operations and non-combat support to US Forces in unstable situations in areas surrounding Japan. The third stage is the period of establishment of Japan’s dual security identity in the global war on terror and after the change of government in Japan. In the final section, the article discusses the source of the security identity shift in Japan and draws some implications for the future of Japanese security policy.

A Content Analysis of Japan’s Defence White Papers

This section uses content analysis to attempt to measure the long-term shift in Japan’s security identity as a ‘peace state’ and as a US ally in its Defence White Papers (Boeicho, annual). Content analysis is a measurement method for the objective and quantitative description of word usage in text. The basic methods of content analysis are frequency counts of both key words and categories of terms. Japan’s Defence White Papers are annual official documents edited by the Japan Ministry of Defence and approved by the Cabinet. This document series is useful for finding the long-term trend in Japan’s self-description by government officials as a group. It is also possible to examine the official logic for identity sources and the defence policy implications of Japan’s identities. Since the white papers are published primarily for the general public in Japan, it is plausible to argue that officials instrumentally use identities to justify their policies. But even in this case, such instrumentally used identities need to be accepted by a majority of the general public, at least in Japan.

This content analysis utilized the search engine for Japan’s Defence White Papers at the website of the Japan Ministry of Defence. The searched terms were: ‘heiwa kokka (peace state)’ for the peace state category; ‘beikoku no domei koku (ally of the United States)’, ‘nihon nado no doumei koku (allies such as Japan)’ and ‘waga kuni igai no doumei koku (allies other than Japan)’ for the US ally category. After obtaining the search results for these terms, I manually counted the frequency of the two identity categories, ‘peace state’ and ‘US ally’, but ignored their appearance in references and personal statements by JSDF members. A result of the analysis indicates that the category ‘peace state’ has been used constantly but more frequently at the end of the Cold War and since 2004 and that the category ‘US ally’ has appeared only since 2003 (see Figure 1).

Japan’s identity of a ‘peace state’ is based on the memory of the miseries of World War II and the consequent principle of pacifism enshrined in Japan’s 1946 Constitution. Defence White Papers have used the identity category ‘peace state’ in the context of explaining the basics of Japan’s defence policy, including constitutional issues. The following sentences have repeatedly appeared:

Since the end of World War II, Japan has worked hard to build a peace-loving nation far from the miseries of war. The Japanese people desire lasting peace, and the principle

of pacifism is enshrined in the Constitution, of which Article 9 renounces war, the possession of war potential, and the right of belligerency by the state. (Japan Ministry of Defence, 2011, p. 137; emphasis added)

In the late 1980s, Japan emphasized non-military means of international contribution. The 1988–1990 editions of the Defence White Papers stated:

Japan has come to hold an economic power that ranks second in the free world after the US and has decided to play an appropriate role in international society on its own judgment. As a peace-loving nation, it is necessary to make further international contribution in non-military fields such as politics, economics, and culture. (emphasis added)

The last sentence implies a tension between being a ‘peace state’ and making an international military contribution, which seems to have suppressed the identity of Japan as a US ally.

The recent increase in the frequency of the category ‘peace state’ is due to the governmental review of a de facto ban on arms exports since 2004. In Japan, arms export has been regarded as something fostering international disputes and therefore, as contradicting the identity of a ‘peace state’. Recently white papers have to often reconfirm this identity because they need to explain a slight change in arms export policy. On 27 December 2011, the Chief Cabinet Secretary Osamu Fujimura said in a statement on new guidelines for overseas transfer of defence equipment: ‘Japan, as a peace-loving nation, must engage more proactively and effectively in peace contribution and international co-operation, while maintaining the basic philosophy of avoiding the aggravation of international conflicts’ (Cabinet Secretariat, 2011, p. 2; emphasis added). It appears that a ‘peace state’ identity has gradually been shifting from passive peace-loving towards active peace-creating.

The Defence White Papers published during the Cold War period avoid the use of the term ‘alliance’ (domei). By contrast, the frequency of this term increased in the post-Cold War period (Miyaoka, 2009). On the other hand, the identity category ‘US ally’ has been mentioned since 2003 in the contexts of explaining the alliance system led by the US in East Asia, extended deterrence, and new defence co-operation between Japan and Australia and between Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK). In public relations, the Government of Japan did not mention US ally identity to justify the deployment of the JSDF in the Indian Ocean and Iraq in the global war on terror. Instead, it emphasized Japan’s contribution to international society in both cases. This was partly because the government maintained the constitutional view that Japan cannot exercise the right of collective self-defence and partly because the use of force by the US in Iraq was controversial in international society. It is unquestionable, however, that the government dispatched the JSDF mainly because of a sense of obligation as a US ally, as described in detail in the following.

Incompatible Identities of a ‘Peace State’ and a US Ally

Since the establishment of the JSDF in 1954, the Japanese government has maintained the official interpretation of the Constitution that as a sovereign state, Japan has the inherent right of self-defence, that Japan can possess the minimum necessary level of self-defence capability and that Japan can use the right of self-defence only when the following three conditions are met:

1. when there is an imminent and illegitimate act of aggression against Japan;
2. when there is no appropriate means to deal with such aggression other than by resorting to the right of self-defence; and
3. when the use of armed force is confined to the minimum necessary level (Japan Ministry of Defence, 2011, p. 137).

In short, the Japanese government has defined Japan’s right of self-defence narrowly in terms of both self-defence capability and the requirements for exercising this right. Japan’s identity as a ‘peace state’ is shaped by these norms.

Within this constitutional framework, in January 1960, Japan and the US concluded and signed the Treaty of Mutual Co-operation and Security (hereafter referred to as the ‘Japan-US Security Treaty’). According to Article 5 of the treaty, it is only in the event of an armed attack on Japan that the two countries will take joint action.

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes. (Japan Defence Agency, 2004, p. 553)
In other words, Japan has no obligation to defend the US when only the latter is attacked by a third party. In return, Article 6 of the Japan-US Security Treaty provides that

For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America is granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan. (Japan Defence Agency, 2004, p. 553)

These two articles resulted from a balance of interest between Japan and the US.

As mentioned earlier, Article 5 of the Japan-US Security Treaty declares joint action in the event of an armed attack against Japan. It was not until the latter half of the 1970s, however, that the two countries started bilateral defence co-operation in earnest. In 1978, they concluded the Guidelines for US-Japan Defence Co-operation (hereafter referred to as the ‘1978 Guidelines’) for the conduct of future studies in such areas as operations, intelligence and logistics. The 1978 Guidelines mainly focused on co-operation for deterring and responding to an armed attack against Japan. During times of peace, the US was responsible for nuclear deterrence and the forward deployment of forces, while Japan assumed responsibilities for defence build-ups and the provision of facilities for US Forces. In case of an armed attack against Japan, the JSDF were expected to play a primary defensive role (including the protection of sea lines of communication), while the US Forces would play the secondary role of supporting and supplementing the JSDF.3 In May 1979, when Masayoshi Ohira delivered a speech at a reception held at the White House, the Japanese Prime Minister officially called the US an ‘ally’ for the first time (Tanaka, 1997, p. 284).

During the Cold War, however, the terms ‘ally’ and ‘alliance’ were politically taboo words in Japan because they were deemed contradictory to its identity as a ‘peace state’. In May 1981, Japanese Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki and US President Ronald Reagan used the term ‘alliance’ in a joint communiqué for the first time as follows: ‘The President and the Prime Minister, recognizing that the alliance between the United States and Japan is built upon their shared values of democracy and liberty, reaffirmed their solidarity, friendship and mutual trust’ (Hosoya, Aruga, Ishii and Sasaki, 1999, p. 1006). When the use of this term attracted the attention of the Japanese media, Prime Minister Suzuki said that the term had nothing to do with a military aspect. This statement created repulsion in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and then led to the resignation of Foreign Minister Ito Masayoshi. This story indicates that even before the end of the Cold War, Foreign Ministry officials seemed to identify Japan as a US ally. So did Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone. Although he used the term ‘international state’ in the 1980s, it was his rhetoric to increase Japan’s ‘responsibility in confronting the communist threat posed by the Soviet Union through greater integration into the US military strategy’, as described by Singh (2008, p. 308). But many politicians and journalists as well as the general public had a sense of aversion to Japan being described as a US ally.
Against this background, in the 1970s and the early 1980s, the government further developed the constitutional interpretation mentioned earlier and clarified its legal view on the geographic boundaries of self-defence and the exercise of the right of collective self-defence. In the case of the former, the government has contended that it is constitutionally impermissible to dispatch the JSDF to the land, sea or airspace of other countries with the aim of using force because it is beyond the minimum necessary level of self-defence. In a similar manner, the government has also held the view that although Japan possesses the right of collective self-defence as a sovereign state under international law, it is constitutionally impermissible for Japan to exercise this right because such exercises go beyond the limits of the minimum necessary level of self-defence. These legal interpretations, which are still valid, had made it difficult for Japan to be a US ally.

Furthermore, the American Cold War strategy of containing communist expansion made it unnecessary for Japan to dispatch the JSDF to other countries. In December 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, which symbolized the end of its détente with the US. In this strategic context, ‘Japan’s strategic location served as a barrier to Soviet aggression’ (US Department of Defence, 1992). Japan’s main strategic role was to block the Soviet forces from advancing into the Pacific Ocean. In other words, the defence of Japan was a critical part of the US global strategy (Armacost, 1996; Green, 2001). As a member of the West and an economic power, Japan was expected by the US to build a modest defence capability and to protect its sea lanes out to 1,000 nautical miles (Miyaoka, 2009). Japan was able to meet these expectations within the exclusively defence-oriented limit of the Constitution.

In the late 1980s, the US again exerted pressure on Japan to assume a larger share of the defence burden. Its budget deficit had increased due to the tax cuts of ‘Reaganomics’ and the Cold War military build-up. Japan’s rise as an economic superpower intensified the American clamour that Japan play an appropriate role in maintaining and reinforcing world peace and prosperity. In this context, it is natural that ‘As the allies developed strong and competitive economies, the United States encouraged them to assume a greater share of the common defence burden’ (Pagliano, 1991, p. 1). At the eighteenth working-level Security Sub-Committee (SSC) meeting in early May 1988, Assistant Secretary of Defence Richard Armitage suggested five areas in which Japan could make efforts for more equitable burden-sharing with the US: defence build-up, host nation support, technology co-operation, strategic aid and peacekeeping operations (PKOs) (Boeicho, 1988; Sigur, 1988). Among these areas, a new emphasis was placed on PKOs. With the easing of East–West tensions, the United Nations Security Council became functional in dealing with international conflicts. This trend was evidenced by a rise in United Nations PKOs and the fact that the United Nations Peacekeeping Forces was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1988.

In the same month, Japanese Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita announced the ‘International Co-operation Initiative’ in London. This initiative consisted of three
pillars of Japan’s international co-operation: co-operation for peace, international cultural exchange and official development assistance (ODA). The first pillar was presented as ‘a new approach’ that would ‘include positive participation in diplomatic efforts, the dispatch of necessary personnel and the provision of financial co-operation, aiming at the resolution of regional conflicts’ (Takeshita, 1988, p. 297). In 1988, the Government of Japan started to send a small number of civilian officials on PKO and election monitoring missions under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Law (Togo, 2005; Gaimusho). During the Cold War, however, the JSDF was never sent abroad for operational missions, including PKO.

Acceptance and Institutionalization of a Non-combat Military Role

After the end of the Cold War, Japan started to accept and institutionalize a non-combat military role in aid of the US. In the first half of the 1990s, Japan started to dispatch the JSDF abroad for peacekeeping missions in the context of a global partnership with the US. In the latter half of the 1990s, Japan and the US redefined their bilateral security arrangements while Japan accepted and institutionalized the mission of the JSDF to engage in non-combat support to the US Forces in situations in areas surrounding Japan.

Japan–US Global Partnership

Under the George H.W. Bush administration, extensive burden-sharing with Japan was dubbed as ‘global partnership’. In the words of the then Ambassador Michael Armacost (1996, p. 128), the US ‘sought to harness Japan’s growing power to the achievement of those international objectives we [the United States and Japan] shared’. In an address before the Asia Society in New York City on 26 June 1989, Secretary of State James Baker advocated ‘a new and truly global partnership’ with Japan. Special reference was made to environmental protection and international PKO as new agenda items for this partnership (Hosoya, Aruga, Ishii and Sasaki, 1999, pp. 1167–1172). In March 1990, President Bush also called for a global partnership at the Palm Spring summit with Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu (Baker, 1991/1992). Nonetheless, Japan was not ready to deploy the JSDF for PKO. Although MOFA had started a study for a bill to allow large-scale Japanese participation in PKO missions, it faced the Persian Gulf War without completing the study (Kuriyama, 1997, p. 38).

After Iraq invaded Kuwait in the summer of 1990, the Japanese government drafted a United Nations Peace Co-operation Bill, authorizing logistics support activities, including transportation, construction and medical services for the multinational forces. In Diet deliberations, this bill was strongly opposed by opposition parties and eventually abandoned at the end of the extraordinary session in


Pacifist sentiment in general and distrust of the Japanese military in particular remain very strong, even among many so-called ‘conservatives’ in the LDP [ruling Liberal Democratic Party] . . . While public opinion polls revealed growing support among the Japanese public for the multinational forces and for some Japanese physical presence, there was also strong reaffirmation of Japan’s ‘Peace Constitution’ and of continued non-involvement of Japan in military activities abroad.

Consequently, Japan did not send the JSDF for the Persian Gulf War in the winter of 1991, despite strong pressure from the US to do so. By contrast, some thirty countries joined the multinational forces authorized by the United Nations Security Council.

In the process of interacting with the US during the Persian Gulf crisis and war, Japan learned that non-military aid alone was not sufficient for its ally. Although Japan contributed US$13 billion to support the allied forces, it was not recognized as a credible alliance partner. It became clear to Japanese policy-makers at least that it was necessary for Japan to dispatch the JSDF overseas for international peace. Koichiro Matsuura (1992), then Director-General of the North American Bureau of MOFA, believes that the US–Japan relationship hit bottom in March and April 1991. It is important to note here that Japan learned this valuable lesson from its interactions with the US rather than from the war itself. As former MOFA official Kazuhiko Togo puts it, ‘the deep sense of crisis, which enveloped Japan after the “defeat in the Gulf”, in turn, became the basis for future development’ (Togo, 2005, p. 77). Immediately following the cessation of hostilities in April 1991, Japan deployed JSDF minesweepers in the Persian Gulf, pursuant to Article 99 of the existing Self-Defence Forces Law. In January 1992, President Bush and Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa tried to expand the arena of global political co-operation by adopting the Tokyo Declaration on the Japan-US Global Partnership.

As a result, an International Peace Co-operation Bill, which was submitted to the Diet in September 1991, was enacted in June 1992. Under this law, the JSDF was permitted to engage in United Nations PKOs and international humanitarian relief operations. The International Peace Co-operation Headquarters was also established within the Cabinet Office. At the same time, Japan also amended the ‘1987 Law Concerning the Dispatch of International Disaster Relief Teams’ in order to enable the JSDF to participate in international relief operations for large-scale disasters overseas. In the 1990s, Japan deployed the JSDF for PKOs in Cambodia (September 1992–September 1993), Mozambique (May 1993–January 1995) and the Golan Heights (February 1996–present). The JSDF were also sent to the former Republic of Zaire (September–December 1994) and East Timor (November 1999–February 2000) for humanitarian relief operations (Japan...
Ministry of Defence, 2011). Japan’s participation in international peace co-operation activities was a forward step towards more equitable burden-sharing with the US. Nevertheless, PKOs are different from direct mutual aid in wartime, which is still the essence of an alliance.

**Redefinition of Japan–US Security Arrangements**

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the regional security environment in East Asia became increasingly uncertain and unpredictable. The loss of Soviet security guarantees and economic assistance led to North Korea’s attempts to develop nuclear weapons. In 1993, North Korea refused to permit a special inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and declared its withdrawal from the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). Although it later promised to suspend its withdrawal in the first round of its consultations with the US, North Korea announced its immediate withdrawal from the IAEA in June 1994. The US drafted a United Nations Security Council resolution calling for economic sanctions and appeared to be on the brink of war with North Korea. The nuclear crisis in the Korean Peninsula cooled after former US President Jimmy Carter visited North Korea and held talks with its President Kim Il Sung (Oberdorfer, 2001; Sigal, 1998). In October 1994, the two countries reached an agreement called the ‘Agreed Framework’ to replace North Korea’s graphite-moderated reactors with light water reactors. In the face of the nuclear crisis in the Korean Peninsula, it became clear that the Japan–US security arrangement was not prepared for a Korean contingency (Akiyama, 2002, p. 50).

In the mid-1990s, Japan and the US held bilateral consultations in order to redefine bilateral security arrangements for the post-Cold War world. Consequently, on 15 April 1996, Japan and the US signed the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) to strengthen prospects of mutual aid in the provisions of goods and services for joint exercises, United Nations PKOs and international humanitarian operations. Two days later, Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto and President William Clinton signed the Japan-US Joint Declaration on Security (hereafter referred to as the ‘1996 Joint Declaration’). It is noteworthy that the term ‘alliance’ appears nine times in this joint document, including its subtitle ‘Alliance for the 21st Century’ and that the document contains an agreement to work out a division of labour for a regional contingency in East Asia—a plan that had been shelved since the 1970s—by revising the 1978 Guidelines.

Unlike its precursor document, the new 1997 Guidelines for US-Japan Defence Co-operation (hereafter referred to as the ‘1997 Guidelines’) squarely addressed co-operation in ‘situations in areas surrounding Japan that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security’ (shuhen jitai). The Annex to the Guidelines specifies the functions and fields of co-operation in the event that these situations should arise: (i) co-operation in activities initiated by either government (including search and rescue and non-combatant evacuation operations);
(ii) Japan’s support for activities of US Forces (use of facilities and rear area support, consisting of supplies, transportation, maintenance, medical services, security, communications and others); and (iii) US–Japan operational co-operation (surveillance, minesweeping and sea- and air-space management).

For the purpose of ensuring the effectiveness of the 1997 Guidelines, Japan enacted or amended four laws in 1999 and 2000, including the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan. The ACSA was also amended to reflect this new division of labour. In February 2000, the JSDF and the US Forces conducted a joint exercise related to rear area support and non-combatant evacuation operations for the first time (Boeicho, 2000). The JSDF were given new roles and missions in the event of a regional contingency adjacent to Japan.

Establishment of Japan’s Dual Security Identity

In the global war on terror led by the US, Japan dispatched the JSDF to the Indian Ocean and Iraq for logistical support to foreign forces as well as humanitarian and reconstruction assistance. After the historic change of government in 2009, the new government led by the Democratic Party of Japan temporarily reviewed Japan–US relations but has eventually reconfirmed Japan’s dual security identity of ‘peace state’ and US ally.

The Global War on Terror

The redefinition of the US–Japan alliance in the 1990s prepared the way for a dramatic move towards the deployment of the JSDF in the global war on terror following the terrorist attacks in the US in September 2001. Soon after American and British forces began military operations in Afghanistan in the following month, Japan was able to rapidly pass an Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Bill to enable JSDF to act to provide logistical support, and take part in search and rescue, and humanitarian relief missions in Japan’s territory or in non-combat areas abroad. This quick response was made possible by the two precedents set in the 1990s. One was the 1992 International Peace Co-operation Law, which tasked the JSDF with humanitarian relief in post-conflict situations. The other was the 1999 Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan, which authorized the JSDF to engage in logistical support and search and rescue operations in adjacent conflict situations. The Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law temporarily enabled the JSDF to engage in these non-combat missions under a different circumstance: a remote situation without a ceasefire accord. This holds true of Japan’s co-operation in international efforts to reconstruct Iraq as well. In July 2003, Japan enacted the Iraq Special Measures Law for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance and logistical support to foreign
forces in Iraq. Moreover, ‘in 2007, international peace co-operation activities and activities responding to situations in areas surrounding Japan were stipulated as one of the primary missions of the [J]SDF, alongside the defence of Japan and the maintenance of public order’ (Japan Ministry of Defence, 2011, p. 347). In 2008, Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda repeatedly used the expression ‘peace co-operation nation’ on several occasions, including in his policy speech at the 169th Session of the Diet in January (Asahi Shimbun, 23 August 2008).

The dispatch of the JSDF to the Indian Ocean and Iraq under the Koizumi cabinet can be considered Japan’s exercise of ‘de facto collective self-defence’ (Samuels, 2007, p. 94). A large number of Diet members were in favour of exercising the right of collective self-defence. According to a survey with 418 learned respondents that included Diet members, three-fifths said that Japan should exercise the right of collective self-defence, either by changing the current official interpretation of the Constitution (18.6 per cent) or by amending the Constitution (41.5 per cent) (Yomiuri Shimbun, 3 November 2001).

A good bilateral relationship with the US seemed to be seen as a goal rather than as a means of foreign policy. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi made the following statement in November 2005 in his summit meeting in Kyoto with President George W. Bush.

> There is no such thing as US-Japan relationship too close (sic). Some people maintain that maybe we would pay more attention to other issues, probably it would be better to strengthen the relationship with other countries. I do not side with such views. The US-Japan relationship, the closer, more intimate it is, it is easier for us to behave and establish better relations with China, with South Korea and other nations in Asia. This is my firm conviction on the basis of my thinking. Based upon our past, the importance of our bilateral relationships will not change. (White House, 2005)

Christopher Hughes rightly observes that:

> Japan is gradually losing its fear of entrapment along with its ability to practice elaborate hedging strategies; it is more accepting of the integration of its forces and command-and-control structure with those of the US, a move it has taken pains to avoid during the entire post-war period; and it is willing to specify its support for its ally in certain types of war-fighting situations. (Hughes, 2004, p. 115)

The reduced fear of entrapment enabled Japan to become a more proactive partner of the US in the global security arena.

A Change of Government

In the summer of 2009, there occurred a rare change in government from the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan (LDP) to the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) in Japan.
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(DPJ). The DPJ attaches great importance to Japan’s identity as a peace-loving nation. One of the objectives listed in the DPJ’s Basic Philosophy of April 1998 was to ‘embody the fundamental principles of the Constitution: popular sovereignty, respect for fundamental human rights, and pacifism’ (Democratic Party of Japan, 1998).13

The DPJ’s ‘Proposals for a Constitution’ (October 2005) mention four principles regarding Japan’s security activities. These are (i) to commit oneself to the idea of pacifism that Japan has fostered in the post-war period, (ii) to clarify the restricted right of self-defence embodied in the United Nations Charter, (iii) to specify participation in the United Nations’ collective security activities and (iv) to clarify the idea of democratic control of the JSDF (Minshuto Kenpo Chosakai, 2005). This proposal adds two related conditions—to restrain maximum the use of force and to enact a Basic Security Law (tentative title) as a law attached to the Constitution. It also states that it is very important to turn from ‘Japan that enjoys peace’ towards a ‘new Japan that creates peace’ (heiwa sozo kokka).14

In the meantime, the DPJ has attempted to review Japan–US relations, while recognizing its critical importance for Japan’s national security. The DPJ’s ‘Basic Policies on Security’ of June 1999 refers to ‘the fact that Japan and the United States have broadly shared the values of democracy and market economy’ and ‘recognizes that the Japan-Security Treaty is the most important pillar of Japan’s security policy’ (Democratic Party of Japan, 1999). In a sub-section titled ‘Japan’s More Autonomous Decision-Making’ in the section of US–Japan security arrangements, the policy document states:

Because the current Japan-US Security Arrangements have left the United States to make the major decisions and Japan has been satisfied with simply being a junior partner, the Japan-US relationship cannot be called an alliance in the true sense of the word. The stance that Japan should take from now on is to engage in close dialogue and consultation with the United States, giving full consideration to Japan’s national interests. Obviously, the national interests of Japan and the United States will not always coincide perfectly. Dealing with the situation through frank and high-quality consultations will be the key in such cases. Japan’s more autonomous decision-making is critical in this regard.

This is what is meant by ‘a close and equal Japan-US relationship’, written in the DPJ Manifesto for the Lower House Election held in August 2009 (Democratic Party of Japan, 2009). Basically following the DPJ Okinawa Vision (Minshuto, 2008), the 2009 Manifesto seeks a ‘greater voice’ for Japan in such alliance management issues as the revision of the US-Japan Status of Forces Agreement, the review of the realignment of the US military forces in Japan and the role of US military bases in Japan.

In a sense, this political stance can be regarded as a reaction to the formation of Japan’s identity as a US ally during the period of the LDP-led governments. As
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mentioned earlier, Prime Minister Koizumi in particular tended to consider the alliance as an objective rather than as a means of Japan’s national security and foreign policy. Although many Japanese people recognize the importance of the alliance with the US, some feel that Japan has gone too far in following the US to think about its own national interests and strategy, which has led to loss of sovereignty.

In response to this popular mood, the new DPJ government reviewed Japan–US relations in several ways. For example, Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada promised to disclose secret understandings on security issues between Japan and the US. The DPJ stopped replenishment support activities at sea by the Japan Maritime Self-Defence Force for military vessels of other countries in anti-terrorism maritime interdiction activities in the Indian Ocean, by not renewing the term of the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law, which expired on 15 January 2010 (Japan Ministry of Defence, 2011, pp. 366–367). Besides, as pledged in the DPJ Okinawa Vision (Minshuto, 2008), Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama attempted to find a location outside of Okinawa for the replacement facility of the Marine Corps Air Station Futenma.

Nonetheless, the trend to review Japan–US relations after the change of government quickly faded away. In the joint statement of the Japan-US Security Consultative Committee (SCC) held in May 2010, the Japanese Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence and the US Secretaries of State and Defence ‘confirmed the intention to locate the replacement facility at the Camp Schwab Henoko-saki area and adjacent waters’ (Japan Ministry of Defence, 2011, p. 498) in Okinawa, which was the very location described in the May 2006 Japan-US Roadmap for Realignment Implementation. This straying concerning the Futenma Replacement Facility as well as money scandals led to the resignation of the Hatoyama Cabinet in June 2010. The succeeding cabinets led by Prime Ministers Naoto Kan and then Yoshihiko Noda have worked hard to get the Japan–US alliance back on track.

Now the DPJ government is developing a Japanese security policy on the lines set by the LDP government. For example, as described before, the Government of Japan has reviewed a de facto ban on arms exports since 2004. As a result of this review process, the Chief Cabinet Secretary of the DPJ Noda administration announced a statement to further relax the ban on 27 December 2011.

[T]he Government . . . will take comprehensive exemption measures in overseas transfer of defence equipment, etc. for cases related to peace contribution and international co-operation as well as for cases regarding international joint development and production of defence equipment etc. that contributes to Japan’s security. (Cabinet Secretariat, 2011, pp. 2–3)

The government seems to have strived to strengthen the Japan–US alliance by granting the US government’s request for easing arms export restrictions (Sankei Shimbun, 1 December 2011, p. 1).
Conclusion

Japan’s dual security identity as ‘peace state’ and US ally has been constructed since the end of the Cold War. The latter used to be politically suppressed because it was deemed contradictory to the former in Japanese society at large. In the past two decades, however, Japanese politicians and government officials have gradually become able to identify Japan as a US ally publicly. These two identities have become more compatible because Japan has accepted and institutionalized a non-combat military role to directly and indirectly aid the US.\(^{15}\)

In this process, it is American expectations that have strongly affected the construction of Japan’s dual security identity.\(^ {16}\) The end of the Cold War brought about a significant change in the international security environment and transformed the US’ global security strategy. The US emphasized its expectation that Japan should engage in mutual military aid by dispatching the JSDF for missions beyond homeland defence. The relative importance of defending Japan diminished in the post-Cold War security environment. Judging from asymmetrical power and dependency relations, the US has been what social psychologists call the ‘significant other’ for Japan. Of course, the US did not and could not unilaterally impose its ideas on Japan. Rather, the two countries worked together to readjust the alliance to meet their needs in the post-Cold War world by firmly embedding Japanese security policy within the context of a new US global strategy.

The findings of this research have several implications for the future of Japanese security policy. First, Japan is likely to place its alliance with the US at the core of its security policy. In the words of Alexander Wendt, ‘friendship is a preference over an outcome, not just a preference over a strategy’ (Wendt, 1999, p. 305). Second, Japan is not likely to use force in the land, sea or airspace of other countries or use force to stop an armed attack on an ally or a close partner if Japan is not under direct attack. It is still unconstitutional for the JSDF to use force in such situations. Japan’s identity of a ‘peace state’ is still powerful, although its meaning is changing from passive peace-loving to active peace-creating nation. It is expected that Japan’s security policy will evolve incrementally within the normative constraints posed by its dual security identity.

Notes

1. The author analyzed the changing perception held by Japanese policy-makers regarding Japan’s state identities by conducting a computer-assisted content analysis of the Defence White Papers published annually between 1976 and 2006.
2. This search engine, which is located at the website of the Japan Ministry of Defence (www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_web/), can be used not only for search by keywords but also for concordance, that is, a function of displaying a searched keyword in context. Its database covers the whole Japanese texts of all the Defence White Papers, published in 1970 and from 1976 through 2011, although it has only abridgements for the editions during this period between 1995 and 1998.
3. The 1978 Guidelines established a basic division of roles for the JSDF and the US Forces as follows: ‘The JSDF will primarily conduct defensive operations in Japanese territory and its surrounding waters and airspace. U.S. Forces will support JSDF operations. U.S. Forces will also conduct operations to supplement functional areas which exceed the capacity of the JSDF’ (Japan-US Subcommittee for Defence Co-operation, 1978).

4. The Japanese government defines the right of collective self-defence narrowly as ‘the right to use actual force to stop an armed attack on a foreign country with which it has close relations, even if the state itself is not under direct attack’ (Japan Ministry of Defence, 2011, p. 138).

5. It should be noted that ‘The use of minimum necessary force to defend Japan in the exercise of the right of self-defence is not necessarily confined to the geographic boundaries of Japanese territorial land, sea, and airspace’ (Japan Ministry of Defence, 2011, p. 137).

6. In 1950, before the restoration of sovereignty, Japan secretly sent minesweepers of the Japan Coast Guard in order to assist the United Nations Forces in the Korean War (Agawa, 2001).

7. At the eighteenth working-level SSC meeting of early May 1988, the US stated that it would be useful to the US-Japan alliance to have something similar to the mechanism of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to provide goods and services on occasions such as joint exercises (Asahi Shimbun, 19 December 2005, p. 2; Boeicho, 1988).


10. The 1999 amendment added co-operation in activities conducted in response to unstable situations in areas surrounding Japan while the 2004 amendment newly covered operations in armed attack situations and operations to further the efforts of the international community to contribute to international peace and security and to cope with large-scale disasters.


12. It also allowed the JSDF to support not only the US Forces but also other foreign forces in the high seas and airspace above or in foreign territories, and relaxed the conditions for the use of weapons for protecting persons under the JSDF personnel’s control as well (Japan Defence Agency, 2004).

13. In the ‘Basic Policies on Security’ of June 1999, the DPJ announced the belief that ‘Article 9 of the Constitution does not allow Japan’s participation in multinational forces where this entails the exercise of armed forces’ and that ‘the pros and cons of exercising the right to collective self-defence should not be determined by interpretation of the Constitution’ (Democratic Party of Japan, 1999).


15. It should also be noted that the institutionalization of this role is still incomplete. Japan sent the JSDF to the Indian Ocean and Iraq under temporary laws.

16. Daniel Kliman (2006) also pays attention to US policy, but he argues that Japan has learned the cost of disappointing the US and the benefit of meeting its expectations.

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