Power, Identity, and Security in Asia:
Views on Regional Cooperation and the U.S. Role

Monday, April 16, 2012
9:00 AM – 5:30 PM
The George Washington University
Lindner Commons
1957 E Street, N.W., 6th Floor
Washington, D.C. 20052
Welcome and Introductory Remarks

Deepa Ollapally (GWU)
Session I: Power and Identity in India

**Chair:** Alyssa Ayres (Department of State)

**Presenters:** Deepa Ollapally (GWU) and Amitabh Mattoo (Jawaharlal Nehru University and University of Melbourne)

**Discussant:** Jonah Blank (RAND Corporation)
India: the Autonomous Power and Identity at Crossroads

Deepa Ollapally (GWU) and Amitabh Mattoo (Jawaharlal Nehru University and University of Melbourne)
## Sources of Identity and Political Orientations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Soft Nationalism</th>
<th>Hard Nationalism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Civilizational</strong></td>
<td>Composite Identity Moral/cultural leadership</td>
<td>Weak acceptance of composite identity with preference for pre-Mughal classical age cultural leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Colonial Humiliation</strong></td>
<td>Third World leadership &amp; nonalignment</td>
<td>Nonalignment but keeping power options open</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Partition Trauma</strong></td>
<td>Inclusive secular nationalism</td>
<td>Inclusive with primacy to Hindu nationalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Values</strong></td>
<td>Democratic pluralism</td>
<td>Democracy with strong “internal security”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Inheritor of British Raj</strong></td>
<td>Undesirable role</td>
<td>Preferred role</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Identity and Level of Domestic Foreign Policy Consensus

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Consensus Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1945-47</td>
<td>Low Consensus (Economic ideology; Global partnerships)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947-62</td>
<td>High Consensus (Nonalignment; Asian solidarity)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963-77</td>
<td>Moderate Consensus (Breakdown of Asianism; Pressure on Nonalignment)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978-1990</td>
<td>Moderate Consensus (Economic ideology weakening; Pressure on Nonalignment)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991-2004</td>
<td>Moderate Consensus (Economic ideology breakdown; Nonalignment weakened but lingers; Re-focus and Re-imagination of Asian relations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005-2012</td>
<td>Low Consensus (Nonalignment identity narrative under strain from realist power arguments; increasing split on global relationships)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
## Foreign Policy Orientations and Policy in Asia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nationalist/Identity Driven</th>
<th>Nationalist/Power Driven</th>
<th>Realist/Power Driven</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democracy promotion</td>
<td>By example</td>
<td>Irrelevant</td>
<td>Strategic use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of force</td>
<td>Taboo</td>
<td>Supports</td>
<td>May support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliances</td>
<td>Taboo</td>
<td>Suspicious</td>
<td>May support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian regionalism</td>
<td>Integrate slowly</td>
<td>Integrate on own terms</td>
<td>Integrate quickly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China ties</td>
<td>Negotiate with hedging</td>
<td>Hard balancing</td>
<td>Soft balancing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian security</td>
<td>May favor cooperative</td>
<td>Hard balancing</td>
<td>Soft balancing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nationalist/Identity Driven</td>
<td>Nationalist/Power Driven</td>
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<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>US Ties</strong></td>
<td>Strong Suspicion</td>
<td>Strong Suspicion</td>
<td>Favors Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>US in Asia</strong></td>
<td>Limited Role</td>
<td>Limited Role</td>
<td>Strong Role</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Asian Regionalism</strong></td>
<td>Integrate without excluding China</td>
<td>Strategic integration excluding China</td>
<td>Integrate with US inclusion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Session II: Power and Identity in Japan

Chair: Edward Lincoln (GWU)

Presenters: Mike Mochizuki (GWU) and Isao Miyaoka (Keio University)

Discussant: Sheila Smith (Council on Foreign Relations)
Japan’s Foreign Policy Debate & Identity
[Drawing on Michishita & Samuels]

Deep Integration

- HUG CHINA
- HUG USA
- Deep Isolation

Options:
- Bandwagon (Economic Hedge)
- Autonomy (Self Hedge)
- Integrate (Dual Hedge)
- Balance (Military Hedge)
Japan’s Identity Complexes

• “Peace State” & “Merchant Nation/Trading State”: national identity basis for Yoshida Doctrine and for regional reassurance

• “Ordinary Country,” “Global Civilian Power,” “Middle Power,” “Ally of the U.S.”: relax constraints of pacifism and encourage more proactive foreign policy, but eschew becoming a traditional “great power”

• “Maritime Nation” & “Democracy”: distinguish Japan from China, and develop & deepen links with other democracies & maritime nations in the Asia-Pacific region
Implications for Japan’s Foreign Policy

• Facilitate consensus for a strategy of balance & integration in the Asia-Pacific region (with the United States, China, ASEAN, & various “middle powers”)

• Pursue an Asia policy without Asianism or an Asian identity

• Expand incrementally international security role without aspiring to be a “great power”

• Check inward-looking tendency in foreign policy

• Establish broad strategic parameters, but not determine specific policy choices within broad parameters
Power and Identity in Japan:  
A Content Analysis of  
Japan’s Defense White Papers

The Elliott School of International Affairs
The George Washington University
April 16, 2012

Isao MIYAOKA, D.Phil.
Professor- Department of Political Science, Faculty of Law, Keio University
1. Introduction
A Content Analysis of Japan’s Defense White Papers

- **Basic content analysis**
  - Reporting the frequency of keywords occurring in each Defense White Paper
  - Excluding references and personal statements by SDF members

- **The Search Engine for Defense White Papers at the MoD Website.**
  - Search by keywords
  - Concordance: displaying a searched keyword in context
  - The database has only abridged edition for 1995-1998 (4 years)

  - Edited by the Ministry of Defense
  - Annual official documents approved by the Cabinet
  - A long-term trend of the intersubjective self-description of Japan by Japanese government officials as a whole.
  - Official logics about the sources of Japan’s state identities and their policy implications.
2. Japan as a Peace State
平和国家
A Result of Content Analysis
2. Japan as a Peace State

Key Questions

1. Sources of this identity
   - The miseries of war in World War II, Article 9 of the Constitution
   - The basic philosophy of avoiding the promotion of international conflicts

2. Domestic Policy Process
   - The review of the Three Principles on Arms Exports since 2004
   - Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary on December 27, 2011

3. Implications for Regional Cooperation and U.S. Role
   - “National Identity Gaps” (China, ROK)
   - Participation in the international joint development/production of weapons
3. Japan as an Ally of the U.S.  

A Result of Content Analysis

![Graph showing frequency of mentions of Japan as an Ally of the U.S. and the U.S. as an Ally, from 1992 to 2011. The graph illustrates the trend over time in the frequency of these mentions.](image-url)
2. Japan as an Ally of the U.S.

Key Questions

1. Sources of this identity
   - The Japan-U.S. Security Treaty (1960)
   - How Japan has been treated by the U.S. as the significant Other

2. Domestic Policy Process
   - Is the treaty useful for the peace/security of Japan?
     - Yes: 63.5% (1991), 81.2% (2012); No: 18.2% (1991), 10.8% (2012)

3. Implications for Regional Cooperation and U.S. Role
   - Strengthening defense cooperation with Australia and ROK
   - The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review / extended deterrence
4. Japan as Maritime State 海洋国家

A Result of Content Analysis

[Graph showing the frequency of the term 'Maritime State' from 1992 to 2011.]
2. Japan as a Maritime State

Key Questions

1. Sources of this identity
   - Geography
   - Expanding/intensifying maritime activities by China
   - Acts of piracy

2. Domestic Policy Process
   - The Basic Act on Ocean Policy was put into force in July 2007.
   - The Anti-Piracy Measures Law was enacted in July 2009.

3. Implications for Regional Cooperation and U.S. Role
   - Regional cooperation for maritime safety
Session III: Power and Identity in Korea

**Chair:** Thomas Hubbard (McLarty Associates; Former U.S. Ambassador to Korea)

**Presenters:** Gregg Brazinsky (GWU) and Jong-dae Shin (University of North Korean Studies)

**Discussant:** Ji-Young Lee (American University)
SOURCES OF NATIONAL AND STATE IDENTITY

NATIONAL IDENTITY:
• Historical events of late 19th and early 20th century.
• Resistance to colonialism

STATE IDENTITY:
• The Cold War and national division
• Alliance with the United States
• Participation in international organizations as a sovereign state
QUESTIONS

• Why do the same identities sometimes produce different policy preferences in South Korea?

• If identities tell the state what it wants, how does it decide how to get what it wants?
## NATIONAL IDENTITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Conservative National Identity</th>
<th>Progressive National Identity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attitude towards U.S.</td>
<td>Ambivalent but cooperative on security issues</td>
<td>Ambivalent or Critical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitude towards DPRK</td>
<td>Seeks reunification through force</td>
<td>Seeks reunification through diplomacy, favors aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitude towards Japan</td>
<td>Hostile</td>
<td>Hostile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitude towards Economic Globalization</td>
<td>Suspicious</td>
<td>Suspicious</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# STATE IDENTITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Conservative State Identity</th>
<th>Progressive State Identity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attitude towards U.S.</td>
<td>Generally friendly</td>
<td>Favors cooperation but frictions can emerge with more conservative administrations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitude towards DPRK</td>
<td>Reunification not a priority. Containment through sticks and carrots.</td>
<td>Reunification not a priority but seeks détente</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitude towards Japan</td>
<td>Willing to Cooperate</td>
<td>Cooperative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitude towards Economic Globalization</td>
<td>Very Favorable</td>
<td>Favorable but benefits need to be distributed evenly</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Keynote Address

Chas W. Freeman, Jr., Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
Session IV: Power and Identity in ASEAN

**Chair:** Satu Limaye (East-West Center)  
**Presenters:** Amitav Acharya (American University) and Allan Layug (Sophia University)  
**Discussant:** Alice Ba (University of Delaware)
ASEAN IDENTITY AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF ASIA-PACIFIC REGIONAL ORDER: IMPLICATIONS FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION AND THE US ROLE

Allan Layug, Sophia University
Amitav Acharya, American University
ARGUMENT

**Main Argument:** ASEAN Identity, however nascent and evolving, does matter in shaping security policy, Asia-Pacific regionalism, and international relations.

**Causal Logics:**

1. ASEAN as the *institutional hub of Asia-Pacific and East Asian regionalism*;
2. ASEAN identity as *laying the foundations for normative regionalism*;
3. *ASEAN-led socialization* of great powers as generating counter-*realpolitik* behavior among them.
ANALYTICAL BACKDROP

- **Definitions**: Identity, ASEAN identity, regional identity, regional order, power, regionalism (hard/soft)
- **Levels**: Local, national, regional
- **Layers**: Ethnic, state, transnational/global
- **Forms**: individual-state; individual-nation; society-nation; nation-state; national-regional (collective identity)
- **Types**: Elite-centered, people-centered
- **Dimensions**:
  - Cultural: ethnic, linguistic, religious, regional enculturation/socialization
  - Economic: levels of economic development, liberalization, regional integration
  - Political: regime type, level of political development, level of cooperation in preventing, managing, and resolving regional conflicts
SOURCES OF ASEAN IDENTITY

- **Ideas:** “One Southeast Asia”, “ASEAN Community”
- **Norms:** substantive and procedural; legal-political, socio-cultural (non-interference, pacific settlement of disputes, independence, territorial integrity)
- **Values:** justice, rule of law, sovereignty, freedom, democracy, human rights; regional cooperation, regional autonomy, regional resilience
- **Culture and History:** “Indianisation”, “Sinicisation, Pre-Colonial, Colonial, and Post-Cold War
- **Multilateralism:** diplomatic practice as a nascent security community
- **Diversity:** regional unity, regional identity
IDENTITY AND FOREIGN POLICY

- ASEAN as a cornerstone of each member-state foreign policy

“ASEAN will continue to be the cornerstone of our foreign policy and the predominant forum for maintaining regional peace and stability through dialogue and cooperation.” (Malaysia)

“Since then, ASEAN became the cornerstone of Brunei's foreign policies.” (Brunei)

“Philippine foreign policy decisions have to be made in the context of ASEAN.” (Philippines)
LIMITATIONS ON ASEAN IDENTITY

- Intra-regional tensions and conflicts
- Globalization and its impacts on non-traditional issues
- Saliency of Individual Countries’ National Identities
- Political heterogeneity
POLICY IMPLICATIONS

- ASEAN CENTRALITY – Form and substance; setting the normative regional agenda; institutional change; adaptive normative politics; ASEAN cohesion, unity, and purpose; alternative scenarios

- US RE-ENGAGEMENT – Form and function (US hard regionalism and ASEAN soft regionalism); bilateralism and multilateralism; broadening the regional agenda; redefining American identity

- EMERGING POWERS – Institutional socialization; peaceful development; identity and power
Session V: Power and Identity in China

**Chair:** Evan Medeiros (National Security Council)

**Presenter:** Allen Carlson (Cornell University)

**Discussant:** Taylor Fravel (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
Far from Monolithic: Chinese National Identity in Flux, and its Foreign Policy Implications

The George Washington University
Washington D.C.
April 16, 2012

Allen Carlson, Associate Professor, Government Department
Cornell University
Ithaca, NY

With A Contribution From:
Song Wei, Associate Professor, School for International Studies
Peking University
There is a diversity of identity constructs taking shape in China today, ones that go well beyond the prevailing conventional wisdom about what is unfolding there. This being said, such divides are not so great they are poised to tear the country apart. Differences are real, but not nearly that pointed, and few, if any, of those studied showed any interest in overturning the existing order. However, they do not share a singular vision of China.
The Pyramid of Chinese National Identity Construction

- Orientation of Country's Relationship with the Rest of the International System
- Sources of Economic/Political Legitimacy
  - Orientation of Chinese Economy
  - Orientation of Chinese State
- Understanding of Basic Political Structures
  - Internal Groupings
  - International Order
From a 3 Level Pyramid to Four Frames for National Identity Construction

- **Frame One**: On the Structure of International Politics, and China’s Place within Such an Order
  - A Westphalian vs. A Post-Westphalian World?

- **Frame Two**: On the Relationship between Those Living within the Boundaries of the PRC
  - Han Chinese and Others- Thinking Past the Autonomy/Minority Nationality Framework?

- **Frame Three**: Orientation of Chinese State (Collective Order vs. Individual Rights)
  - Still Stability Above All Else, and at What Cost?

- **Frame Four**: How Independent Should the Chinese Economy Be?
  - Indications of Challenges to Deng’s Emphasis on Development and Opening
The Significance of Contested Chinese National Identity

1. It has been quite some time since so much ferment has been visible within China.

2. The conventional wisdom that we are in a period of rising of nationalism and convergence around a singular assertive national identity is incomplete, and as a result quite misleading.

3. There is no singular causal argument or policy implication that can be derived from these findings. As there is no one Chinese national identity, but rather many, it cannot be treated as an overarching explanatory variable. However, the discovery of difference within China over identity is not without its broader implications.

4. There is then quite a bit less to worry about when it comes to Chinese nationalism than first meets the eye. However, it should be added that this argument does not imply that all is quiet on the identity politics front within China.

5. It is exceedingly difficult to predict where Chinese national identity is headed.
Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy: Liberal Internationalist and Realist Views

G. John Ikenberry (Princeton University)

and

Charles Glaser (GWU)
Closing Remarks

Mike Mochizuki (GWU)