Institutions and Worldviews in Indian Foreign Security Policy

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Introduction
This article traces out the core elements in the foreign security policy worldviews of India’s policymaking elites. It argues that while there has been significant heterogeneity across individuals and over time, a strategic “core” has nevertheless emerged and endured that broadly shapes India’s approach to world affairs. This strategic worldview emphasizes autonomy, flexibility, and a desire to avoid dependence on stronger powers. We show that, somewhat surprisingly, important elements of this strategic vision are shared by both the Congress and BJP over time. We also deal with the broader spectrum of Indian political parties, mapping historical variation in strategic worldviews among the Left, Swatantra, the past Janata Dal and its current splinters, and the growing array of regional parties.

While others have also identified Indian strategic worldviews, this article moves this research forward by embedding these ideas within the Indian domestic political context. We argue that the power of the strategic worldview is enhanced by the low electoral salience of foreign policy and the high encapsulation of the central foreign affairs and defense bureaucracies. Though the Left, in particular, has articulated a very different international vision, the regional parties have largely opted out of major foreign policy debates (except as opportunities for political advancement), which further reduces the incentives of elites to intervene. Ideas have more room to operate, for better and worse, in a world of bureaucratic autonomy and minimal political oversight. This article therefore seeks a modest aim: to outline the landscape of India’s leaders’ worldviews with respect to international security affairs over time and across the domestic political spectrum, illuminating the ideas that ultimately manifest themselves in Indian security behavior.

Rather than trying to make India fit into existing theories, we study it to identify new mechanisms, using the words and actions of its key policymaking elites to understand the incentives they perceived and responded to while also studying the actual policies pursued and their outcomes. Domestic politics have been crucial in shaping Indian threat perceptions and India’s acquisition of military power, but not in the ways highlighted in existing theory. Democratic electoral incentives are not the lodestar of foreign policy decision-making. Instead, ideological worldviews have framed how Indian policymakers see international politics in the absence of clear connections.
between foreign policy and electoral patterns. A remarkable continuity runs through the thinking of Indian strategic elites (a small, insulated group), emphasizing autonomy, disinterest in alliance commitments, and demands for respect and recognition even when materially weak.

This set of strategic beliefs has structured how Indian elites have made tradeoffs between domestic arming and international alliances and commitments. Strategic worldviews can play a crucial role in forging grand strategy in an often-indeterminate structural security environment: ideas can become the “switchmen,” in Weber’s famous turn of phrase, directing Indian foreign policy as it chooses between the power to be gained from alliance and engagement and the autonomy to be gained by self-reliance. Domestic self-reliance and attempted indigenous arming has been consistently and systematically preferred to international alliances and engagement. Despite massive changes in international structure, deep continuities have persisted in Indian foreign policy thinking and decision-making. This is not to say that Indian foreign security policy has remained static or marked by unanimity—in the face of unambiguous shocks and crises there has been adaptation and debate—but it does suggest that the basic priorities of Indian elites remain the same.

These findings have clear implications for both international relations theory and contemporary policy. Without dismissing structural considerations, we find a crucial role for domestic ideology and institutions in shaping Indian foreign policy. However, neither of these mechanisms is reducible, or necessarily even linked, to democratic regime type or simple colonial legacies. Institutions provide the forum through which ideas are implemented and protected from electorally-driven political interventions. Future work will need to far more carefully study the complex intersection of ideas, institutions, and international structures that drive Indian foreign security policy.

In terms of policy, our findings suggest skepticism about the likelihood of a deep US-India alliance. Though prominent analysts have heralded India and the US as “natural allies,” we argue that India’s interest in self-reliance and understandable resistance to dependence endures even through the emergence of a strong neoliberal streak within the Congress party with the Manmohan Singh era. The liberal democratic values that supposedly bond India and US are simply not very salient in the formation of Indian foreign policy. Instead, we foresee an alignment of convenience aimed to a limited extent at China and regional stability but lacking deep institutional or domestic-political roots. That should be perfectly acceptable for both India and the United States, which should have a relationship of confident equals.

Domestic Political Context
Although we discuss the electoral and bureaucratic structure of Indian security policy in other work, it is important to sketch out the context within which Indian strategic worldviews operate because that context fundamentally shapes the power of those ideas. The basic structure of Indian politics is driven by calculations of patronage and coalition-building. Politicians win and lose on the basis of their ability to forge coalitions of regional, caste, linguistic, and economic blocs that can aggregate into seats and ultimately governments at the state and national levels. Though much existing work
on the intersection between domestic politics and international relations assumes that the mass citizenry observes and punishes politicians for their foreign policy behavior, there is little evidence that this is the case in India under any but the starkest and most unambiguous situations. Instead, the salient issues in elections center on complex mixes of distribution, dignity, and domestic political alliance that rarely have anything to do with broad grand strategy or security policy issues. Survey evidence clearly shows that foreign policy is an extremely low-salience issue for the electorate, and, consequently, politicians have few incentives to devote much attention to high-level security issues. Even attempts to use Pakistan and terrorism as wedge issues have met with little success compared to the formation of caste alliances, for instance. Indeed, according to Devesh Kapur’s landmark survey, “there is widespread evidence that the mass public is poorly informed about foreign policy issues.” At the state level, foreign policy issues with local implications can be important but are rarely the key influence on victory and defeat. It is important to note that there are public visions about nuclear weapons and foreign policy issues, but it seems clear that they are not of great electoral importance.

At the same time, a powerful defense and foreign affairs bureaucracy was forged in Delhi at independence and largely persists today. Under Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s tutelage, a foreign policy establishment was born imbued with significant autonomy and encapsulation from most electoral pressures. Many of the best indigenous civil servants of British India were brought to Delhi from the states to staff the new institutions of the independent state. Unlike bureaucracies at the local and state level, the central organizations tasked with developing foreign and security policy did not become simple mechanisms of politicized patronage. This was both because of the bureaucratic skill and expertise of the civil servants (and Nehru’s influence over them) and because these issues do not provide significant patronage or political capital that could be used by elected officials in the pursuit of power. Indian politics is an intensely competitive, cut-throat enterprise, but the tools for winning that race are simply not found in foreign policy or security issues, either at the level of mass political appeal or of patronage and distribution.

This domestic political context has a number of implications for security policy, but for our purposes in this article it suggests that there is significant space for ideational variables to play an important role in shaping the trajectory of Indian foreign security policy. Ideas can become imbued in bureaucracies and institutions (and the social circles associated with them), and the insulation of these institutions from interference by the bulk of elected politicians allows them more room to actually operate. In contrast to much of Indian political life, these political organizations have not become caught up in the battle for electoral primacy. Unlike other democracies such as the United States, for example, where public opinion and executive bodies such as the State and Defense Departments exert tremendous ideational and bureaucratic gravity on American foreign policy, India’s formulation and execution of formulation is restricted a handful of individuals and, particularly, the Prime Minister, who—with a stable government—has significant freedom to maneuver in international affairs. Thus, the ideas of those individuals ought to matter more to behavioral outcomes in a democracy such as India where electoral politics are distant from foreign policy. It is to the content of these ideas that we now turn.
Strategic Elites and Foreign Policy Priorities: Understanding India’s “Strategic Core”

Insulation from public attention and electoral pressure means that the strategic ideas of India’s key political elites are crucial. As Legro notes, “ideas are not so much mental as symbolic and organizational; they are embedded not only in human brains but also in the ‘collective memories,’ government procedures, educational systems, and the rhetoric of statecraft.” They are necessary to sort through a complex international system, providing causal interpretations that structure how policymakers assess ambiguous information. In India, there has been significant structural flexibility, with choices ranging from autarky to Soviet vassalage to Western ally to leader of a new Asian bloc.

While not monolithic, we argue that a broad, fundamental idea of India’s place in the world has been in place for decades among its foreign policy elites, as once noted by Stephen Cohen: “since so many of these different strands of Indian strategic thought overlap, it is possible to think of a ‘core’ Indian perspective, as long as one is careful to note exceptions and new trends.” Rather than asserting like George Tanham that there is no Indian strategic culture (or that India’s strategic culture is the absence of any strategic thought) or that there are large differences between the two major political parties, we instead agree with Bajpai and others that there has in fact been a consistent strategic core, a “systematic and sustained inquiry into the fundamental principles governing (a) the distribution of military means and (b) the coordination of the nation’s major resources—including the military—towards the aims of policy.”

The most important aspect of this “strategic core” is a strong preference for security via autonomy rather than security via alliance, engagement in international security organizations, or (to the extent possible) dependence on foreign weaponry. This interpretation is in line with other scholars’ assessments, but we embed it in the domestic political context to explain why these ideas had endured even as international structures and domestic coalitions have dramatically shifted.

This is not a trivial core strategic tenet, as many other middle powers—such as Pakistan and Japan—have opted for distinctly different approaches to world affairs, subordinating their strategic flexibility for the sake of a powerful patron. As a result, while other states have pursued other paths in the pursuit of power through tight alignments, Indian policy makers have consistently emphasized the dangers of dependence. Nehru summed up this approach in 1948:

“There is a psychological reason also for our continuing our policy of neutrality at the present juncture in world affairs. Any deviation from it will weaken us and will make us camp-followers of some group. We will not think of relying on our own strength but will progressively place our reliance on some other country which may or may not help us in time of need.”

This strategic orientation emerged from a commonly-held reaction to the dangers of colonial domination. Indians of all political stripes felt a strong need to avoid subordination for fear of a return to the pre-independence period. Nationalist elites examined Indian history and identified dependence and foreign involvement as the route through
which India became colonized and dominated. Moreover, new elites needed new reasons to legitimate their governance, and an ideology of pride and self-reliance was one way of providing a rationale for their rule, linked to a broader domestic agenda of modernization. Therefore, from its earliest years (and even before, in the freedom movement), the consensus was that India must preserve its independence and autonomy from dependence, while building up indigenous military strength that would force the major powers to accept India as an equal.

This worldview has endured for several reasons. Most importantly, because there are such tenuous links between the mass electorate and international affairs, Indian foreign policy is dominated by a small strategic elite concentrated in New Delhi. Crucial nuclear debates, for instance, have been “an elite affair, concentrated around New Delhi; election required appealing to the interests of India’s far-flung, regionally oriented mass who cared about other things.” Combining elected politicians (though not many), bureaucrats trained in the state apparatus, and journalists and analysts drawn from academia and the government, this strategic “enclave” dominates foreign policy. Electoral politics have not forced new ideas and arguments onto the agenda because electoral incentives impel politicians to focus on issues other than foreign policy. For instance, K. Subrahmanyam combined civil service, journalism, government consulting, and think tank analysis to become a hugely influential figure over decades. Second, these worldviews have been socialized and transmitted within the institutions of the bureaucracy, Congress party, and, to a much lesser extent, even Hindu-right parties and organizations. The initial overlap between Congress and the Indian Foreign Service (IFS) was very tight; the creation of the IFS “had ‘made by the prime minister’ stamped all over it.” The military is quite distinct from society, and civilian scientists and civil servants dominate defense policy-making. Frequently characterized by a common educational and class background, the strategic elite are embedded in organizations that have been powerful since 1947 (and even before).

Crucially, these strategic elite have driven actual decision-making, not just opinion-making: “India’s early prime ministers, particularly Nehru and his daughter, Indira Gandhi, thought out and managed foreign policies and strategies on their own, or with a small coterie of advisers.” Rather than having to make crude and totalizing claims about “national” strategic cultures, we can instead focus on a relatively small group of political and bureaucratic elites living in close physical, social, and institutional proximity to one another. Remarkably, this discourse of autonomy and recognition has been advanced by the Congress Party and its main rivals in the BJP (and smaller parties).

Partisan shifts at home have not involved dramatic foreign policy shifts abroad, while international structural shifts have not caused a deep transformation of foreign policy thinking at home. This Indira Gandhi statement could have been plausibly uttered by any of India’s prime ministers since 1947: “why do Governments of India not wish to make categorical statements sometimes? Because it is not in our interest to be known as being stuck in any given position.”

It is crucial to note that our argument does not imply that Indian leaders, or the Indian state, behaved in an idealistic, non-realpolitik fashion. Indeed, the choice of autonomy and self-help is in fact the hard-core (perhaps the only hard-core) of structural realist theory. However, the particulars of Indian behavior are significantly
underspecified by structural realism. The interplay of ideas about India’s approach to world affairs and domestic politics determined the choices of a highly consistent and steadfast Indian strategic orientation across varying international structural contexts: that it would not be dependent on any state except itself for its security. That consistent choice, even in the face of plausible outside options that could provide more raw material capacity, lies at the heart of Indian strategic thought.

It is also crucial to note that this “strategic core” does not apply to all Indians or all parties. We focus here simply on general trajectories and overall tendencies. The Indian Left and the Swatantra Party both advanced strategies (in opposite directions) that had areas of both overlap and significant difference with the strategic core of Congress and significant parts of the BJP. Coming out of distinct (but quite narrow) political traditions and economic classes, these parties voiced, and in the case of the CPM still voice, challenges to an emphasis on strategic wariness toward China and the US, with the CPM favoring greater wariness toward the latter and Swatantra toward the former.

More recently, the powerful rise of regional and caste-based parties since the late 1960s, but especially since 1989, has introduced a set of new political players that can be very powerful in national politics. Unlike the CPM, however, these parties have almost studiously avoided articulating distinctive foreign policy preferences. Driven by distribution, dignity, and state-level power (and often drawing support from social blocs that do not circulate in South Delhi’s elite), these parties have taken little interest in the world of grand strategy and high politics. They have instead kept a resolute focus on intense electoral competition and political maneuverings that have far more to do with the daily lives of their voters than does speculating about the future of the Straits of Malacca. The fragmentation of the Indian party system, as we discuss in the following section, has in certain ways actually created more room to maneuver for the Indian strategic-bureaucratic elite, which is left to its own devices by many of the country’s most powerful politicians (in sharp contrast to most other major political institutions).

**Worldviews Under Nehru**

We begin with the period between 1947 and 1965, which was dominated in foreign policy by Jawaharlal Nehru. Although Bajpai and others have categorized “Nehruvianism” as a distinct approach to international affairs, here we unpack the various components of Nehru’s world view and which ones have endured and those that have not. During this period, Tanham writes that “Nehru’s primary foreign policy doctrine of nonalignment was intended to steer an independent course between the two superpowers.” From independence in 1947, George Perkovich notes that “India was determined to repudiate all vestiges of colonialism in relations with the leading global powers.” Yet, India was pursued by the US and USSR at various points in the 1950s, both seeing India as an important battleground in the clash between communism and democracy. Despite engaging in security competition with Pakistan and later China, and while being severely underarmed, India ended up not aligning with any power during this period. India also decisively rejected the non-proliferation regime. There are many plausible strategic rationales for strong alliances in pursuit of security and engagement, yet India resolutely avoided commitment. Mattoo concludes that “the
two pillars of Nehru’s grand strategy were Non-Alignment and Self-Reliance, both sharing a close symbiotic relationship.”

What explains this lack of strategic alignment despite clear security needs? We argue that a crucial factor was the strategic worldview of the Congress Party and bureaucratic elites who dominated Indian foreign policy in this period. It is clear that Nehru totally dominated foreign policy-making during his time as prime minister from 1947 to 1962. Cohen argues that the Nehruvian worldview we show (using primary sources) in the section below explains “his reluctance to join with another major power (such as the United States) to develop India’s military potential.” Nehru’s speeches, writings, and instructions to the bureaucracy and Congress party repeatedly emphasized the theme of independence and autonomy. Advanced by the key creator of Indian foreign policy, “these ideas formed the keystone of mental architecture of many generations of the Indian elite, who grew up in the era of national movement and the early decades of independence.”

**Strategic Visions: Nehru, the Congress, and Non-Alignment**

We first discuss the reigning vision of foreign affairs held by Nehru and propagated within his Congress. The Congress’ pre-independence anti-imperialism was one of the dominant frames through which Congressmen looked at the world, and it was transposed into the international system after 1947. “India’s traditional aversion to alliances” emerged due to the clear analogy drawn between colonialism and dependence. Alliances and strong international commitments were seen as tools of the strong to manipulate and control India in an echo of its colonial past.

These discourses can be found in the speeches and writings of the key nationalist leaders who set the course of the Indian state in the 1940s and 1950s as they tried to establish a common ideological thread to bind together a wildly diverse nation in the face of extraordinary poverty and a humiliating legacy of colonial domination. By far the most important member of Congress in foreign affairs, Nehru advanced a vision of India as a non-aligned state that deserved respect for its democratic accomplishments. To achieve its destiny, India needed to be self-sufficient and free of entangling alliances with imperialist powers. Given Nehru’s dominance within the Congress (particularly in matters of foreign policy) followed by that of his daughter Indira Gandhi, this vision was the dominant ideology of the hegemonic Congress, and of the IAS and IFS bureaucracies that served for four nearly-unbroken decades of Congress rule.

Nehru’s speeches and writings, both before and after independence, clearly reflect the primacy of autonomy over alliances, and the pursuit of self-reliance as the only sure route to security in a world dominated by colonial or neo-colonial powers: “we do not want international cooperation to be just a variation of the imperial theme with some dominant nations controlling international and national policies.” He identified dominance and dependence as lying at the root of international war: “what are the underlying causes of war in the modern world? One of the basic causes is the domination of one country by another or an attempt to dominate.” As a result of this causal diagnosis, powerfully informed by India’s colonial history, Nehru advocated a policy of nonalignment, since “on no account must we reduce ourselves to the position of a satellite of any country... we are too busy with our own country to
desire any entanglements elsewhere.” This position appears less as a moral appeal—but rather as a pragmatic concern: India should develop internal balancing capabilities rather than subordinate its freedom to maneuver to either of the superpower blocs in order to truly retain its hard fought independence.

Nehru believed that isolation was acceptable as long as autonomy was defended: “our proclaimed neutrality apparently has little effect on the cleavage among nations, and sometimes results in our being isolated and gaining the ill will of both sides. That perhaps is to some extent inevitable and need not alarm us.” The idea of tight alignment in the Cold War “is most degrading and humiliating to any self-respecting people or nation. It is an intolerable thought to me that the great countries of Asia and Africa should come out of bondage into freedom only to degrade themselves or humiliate themselves in this way.” He explicitly acknowledged that “we are not only newly independent but are sensitive about such matters, and we have not the mentality of submitting to coercion.”

This pursuit of independence is impossible to miss, as Nehru recommends that “we rely on nobody except on the friendship of others; we rely on ourselves and none others.” Autonomy and independence were more important to Nehru than the pursuit of democracy and liberalism abroad: in his view, India must “endeavor to maintain friendly relations with all countries—even though we may disagree with them in their policies or structure of government.” Ideological sympathies for liberal democracies seem less important than sympathy for other colonized or recently-independent regimes. An autonomy-first worldview is found regarding both the US/USSR competition and entry into the Commonwealth.

Nehru’s worldview is thus fairly unambiguous. Although consistent with a classic arms versus allies tradeoff that privileges indigenous development and autonomy over the security guarantee of an external superpower, Nehru privileged India’s autonomy and diplomatic flexibility to such a degree that he was willing to pursue it even when India was incapable of internally generating military power. It is also important to note that Nehru was not naïve about the use of force, for example, resorting to the use of military power in the 1961 Operation Vijay to forcibly expel the Portuguese from Goa. But his view was that India should not be a target or a participant in someone else’s war unless demanded by India’s interests at that particular time. He prioritized limiting India’s external commitments even at the expense of material power.

A fascinating explanation for the Indian rejection of alliance ties in the two decades after independence can be found in the writing of K. M. Panikkar, both a defense intellectual and the Indian ambassador to China, France, and Egypt in the decade after independence. He thus reflected India’s strategic worldview in both theory and practice. Panikkar explicitly asks “why has India denied herself the benefits of an alliance with more powerful states at a time when even great powers like England have found it necessary to join offensive and defensive alliances in order to safeguard their interests?”

Panikkar’s answer is that “to understand this, one has to go back to Indian history. It was through ‘subordinate alliances’ for the purpose of defending their territories that the rulers of India lost their independence . . . by calling in a stronger power to help you in defending your independence, you subordinate your policies to the advice
of the protecting power and thereby limit your independence.” Ultimately, the fear of India’s leaders was that “the sense of ultimate responsibility for defense, a strong motive force at all times for the development of national unity and hard work, itself becomes weakened by the feeling of dependence on the strength of others.” It is hard to find a clearer representation of the Nehruvian strategic worldview put into practice than Indian policy in the 1940s and 1950s, and the ordering of strategic preferences of autonomy over alliances recurs in the justifications for policy offered by major leaders.

The testable implications of this worldview, which we leave for further research, are that India would even sacrifice material power for the advantages afforded by strategic autonomy and flexibility. The expected behavioral outcome, if ideas are important in producing Indian security policy, is not that India would evince a woolly-headed idealism, but rather that it would avoid becoming entangled as a subordinate partner in any alliance. It would certainly use force when necessary, but would not go out seeking fights that it might not be able to win given its problems of internally generating military power. A cursory glance at the empirical record suggests that Indian behavior largely accords with these expectations in this period, indicating the potential importance of Nehru’s and Panikkar’s ideas.

Strategic Worldviews Under Indira, the Janata, and Rajiv
Indira Gandhi, Nehru’s daughter, rose to power following Shastri’s death. Under her rule, almost continuously from 1965 to 1984, India continued to pursue strategic autonomy and domestic self-reliance. Nevertheless, the 1970s and 1980s are the period in which structural pressures were the most important in determining alignment policy (though not, as we show in the following discussion, the actual creation of indigenous military capacity). Despite these structural pressures and policy adjustments, India remained hostile to international institutions and comfortable only with weak alliance commitments. Even following Nehru’s death, “non-alignment was accepted as national policy across the Indian political spectrum.” Here we follow the same structure as the previous section: outlining first the political thought of the dominant policymaker (in this case, Indira) through speeches and writing, and then briefly tracing out how these ideas were reflected in foreign policy practice. We also more briefly assess the thought and practice of Rajiv Gandhi as prime minister and Atal Bihari Vajpayee, a future PM, as foreign minister in the late 1970s. Throughout, we look for any evidence that liberalism or electoral pressures influenced grand strategy, and find essentially none. We then examine how domestic institutions undermined the creation of indigenous military power.

Indira Gandhi’s Strategic Worldview
Indira Gandhi advanced a variant of her father’s strategic vision while continuing to dominate the Congress and the bureaucracy. Cohen evocatively refers to this worldview as “militant Nehruvianism” that placed a greater emphasis on the need for force, yet also maintained an overwhelming focus on autonomy and self-reliance. Indira dominated Indian foreign policy during most of this period (1965–77,
and her ideological statements are tightly in line with both her father and with more leftist Congress ideologues. She says “my idea of freedom is a self-reliant nation,”56 demands “the principles of non-interference by one State in the internal affairs of another, of scrupulous respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political integrity of all States are essential to the principle of political co-existence,”57 and tells her party workers that “we do not wish to be tied to any group or to any country.”58 Indira’s speeches and internal discussions are marked by a pervasive fear of external (especially American) neo-colonialism and subversion, which could be best protected against by economic autarky and strategic autonomy. Indira would make allusions to shared values but she basically distrusted the United States, shared values or not.59

Indira can be found arguing that “in keeping with our heritage, we have followed a policy of peace and friendship with all nations, yet reserved to ourselves the right to independent opinion.”60 She argues that “our whole attitude must be flexible in all these matters” (emphasis added).61 Indira explicitly took on the question of alliance, telling a group of Congress Party members that “there are people in our country who think that we could ally ourselves with some people and perhaps that way we would be safer. I do not think that such borrowed strength can be real strength. . . .the only security is to strengthen our own people and to be confident of ourselves.”62 Regarding support from the USSR, she contends that “we are taking only what help does not cast any shadow on our freedom.”63 Non-alignment served India’s national interests because it means “independence of judgment and action in international affairs, according to the merits of particular issues as they affect our own national interests and world peace.”64 Ultimately, Tharoor argues that “every pronouncement by her [Indira] on the animating principles of her foreign policy stressed the concept of independence”65 and “consistently viewed strength in terms of independence, and vice versa.”66 In terms of core worldview then, there was little daylight between Nehru and Indira Gandhi.

The Janata Interregnum: Foreign Policy Continuity Amid Domestic Turmoil
While the bulk of this period was dominated by Indira and Rajiv, between 1977 and 1980 a government ruled that had formed in opposition to Indira after she ended the authoritarian Emergency. This Janata Party-led government cobbled together the Hindu right, Congress splinters, emerging regional parties, and parts of the left. This is a fascinating test of whether shifts in partisanship would lead to shifts in grand strategy. The answer is clearly “no.” Domestic electoral incentives and battles over the government’s role in the economy had essentially no impact on Indian strategy during these three years despite the government’s efforts to distance itself from Indira in many other ways.

From 1977 to 1979, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, future PM of India, was Foreign Minister. Vajpayee’s speeches in this period are a way of assessing both the strategic thought of the Janata government and his own political views decades prior to becoming PM in 1998. His rhetoric is strikingly similar to his Congress predecessors: “after freeing itself of the clutches of imperialism, a great country like India could not possibly become a camp follower of some great power”67 and instead it pursues “alignment with all.”68 He
argues that Indian foreign policy is drawn “from the principles that guided our national life in the time of the struggle against foreign domination.”

It is important to keep in mind that Vajpayee was operating as part of an unwieldy conglomerate government, and so his rhetoric can be expected to match the general consensus on foreign policy. But that, after all, is our point: electoral competition and partisan turnover, even in a bitterly polarized political environment, had essentially no major effects on Indian grand strategy. Despite attempts to get away from Indira’s policies across the board, Indian grand strategy saw little change, and the key ideas underlying it appeared to endure. Under Vajpayee’s leadership in the MEA, India continued on roughly the same course, though with less visceral suspicion of and accusations against the US. The Janata government essentially did the same as Indira with a more pleasant style. For instance, nothing changed in the Soviet relationship.

**India Under Rajiv**

Indira Gandhi returned to power in 1980, but her focus until her assassination in 1984 was primarily domestic. Her son Rajiv Gandhi was elected PM in 1984 and launched an active foreign policy. Yet, despite his youth and interest in modernization, Rajiv’s foreign policy was marked more by change in rhetoric than in behavior. Rajiv’s speeches relied on a very similar rhetoric to those of his predecessors: pious platitudes about cooperation, disarmament, and non-violence that nevertheless stressed India’s civilizational history, need to maintain its own counsel, and refusal to accept an international order dominated by others. As Rajiv told a group of Yugoslavs in 1988, “every country must be left free to pursue the national destiny which it seeks.” Rajiv Gandhi renewed India’s focus on self-reliance in kickstarting India’s indigenous missile program development in the mid-1980s—continuing what his mother began in 1983—and bringing the nuclear weapons program out of hibernation in the late 1980s. Alongside this return to nuclearization, Rajiv continued to sound themes of disarmament and the UN’s importance that carefully left India free from any binding commitments. Rajiv’s administration also maintained a deeply suspicious stance towards external intervention in the region, with US involvement in Pakistan, Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, and China’s growing power posing an alarming challenge to a state that in 1972 had seemed enduringly secure.

**After the Cold War: Patterns of Political-Ideational Adjustment**

**Strategic Visions: Coalitions, 1989–98**

The rise of a coalition government under VP Singh in 1989 fundamentally altered the electoral context of Indian politics: regional parties began to play a central role in determining who would rule in Delhi. These regional parties like the SP, BSP, DMK, Akali Dal, TDP, and AIADMK have offered no significant grand strategic thinking, showing the limited electoral appeal of foreign policy in India. While sometimes providing region-specific policy demands (especially regarding Sri Lanka in Tamil Nadu and Bangladesh in West Bengal) the regional parties have been absent players, leaving the dominant foreign policy debates in the hands of the Congress and Jana Sangh
(BJS, BJP) parties, with occasional interventions by the CPM/CPI from its West Bengal and Kerala strongholds. The coalition governments of 1989–1991, 1991–1996, and 1996–1998 were all weak collections of regional and national parties. It is impossible to derive any new strategic worldviews from their leaders, who gave remarkably little attention to foreign policy (the Gujral Doctrine outlining India’s stance toward its immediate neighborhood notwithstanding). Instead, they mouthed the same vague platitudes that had animated Indian leaders for decades. Lowest-common denominator strategic thought was the default, and that default was found in the “strategic core.”

Strategic Visions: The Hindu Right

The second major strand in Indian strategic thought would rise dramatically in salience during the 1990s as the BJP rose to power in the 1998–2004 period. What strategic visions animate Hindu nationalism in India? Autonomy, pride, and deep suspicion of the prevailing world order pervade Hindu nationalist writing. We need to briefly trace this out to explore the roots of BJP security policy. This ideology is far more visceral, bigoted, and Hindu than that of the Nehru’s Congress, but, strikingly, the strategic primacy of autonomy find echoes in both discourses. The foundational ideologues of Hindutva devoted some thought to broad questions of foreign policy. For instance, M.S. Golwalkar writes that “the great fact of national life that self-reliance—swavalambana—forms the backbone of a free and prosperous nation has never been so forcefully brought home to us at present”; he argues that “there are no short-cuts for preserving national freedom and honour. Every nation has to plod the hard path of self-reliance and self-sacrifice to reach that goal.” Golwalkar vociferously opposes tight involvement in the United Nations because of its views on the Kashmir issue, and far more so than Nehru castigates China and communism as profound threats to the Hindu way of life. Nevertheless, Golwalkar emphasizes that only self-reliance (around a particular vision of Hindu practice) can forge a truly strong nation. In a phrase that could be plausibly found in Congress political thought, he writes that “naturally, the strong do not desire the friendship of the weak except to exploit the latter.”

This is not to equate Congress’ nationalism with Hindutva, since they are different in profound ways. Jacques Hymans, as well as Narang, have shown that the two wings are motivated by different conceptions of Indian prestige, with Congress more inwardly focused (techno-nationalism) and the BJP more other-focused (opposition nationalism). However, in terms of high-order strategic behavior, the two wings of India’s political spectrum privilege the exact same outcome. Distrust of the international community and demand for recognition of Indian exceptionalism is not restricted to the secular Congress.

The themes that Hindutva ideologues, like Golwalkar, struck have been repeated by smoother and more modernized successor generations of Hindutva foreign policy thinkers like Jaswant Singh and Atal Behari Vajpayee. Vajpayee was Prime Minister from 1998 until 2004, a period of great strategic importance in Indian history, with a test of nuclear weapons, a closer relationship to the US, and accelerated conventional military buildup. We discussed Vajpayee’s rhetoric when in government in the late 1970s, which sounded strangely similar to Indira, and his rhetoric as PM was not dramatically different.
During the post-Cold War period, coalition government has opened space for regional parties to become hugely important in Indian politics. By and large these parties—DMK and AIADMK in Tamil Nadu, BJD in Orissa, BSP, SP, and in Uttar Pradesh, Akali Dal in Punjab, and JD(U) and RJD in Bihar, among others—have not enunciated clear foreign policy positions. They are instead locked in tight electoral contests that place an emphasis on patronage and alliance-building rather than the high politics of grand strategy. The effect of coaliotional politics and regionalization has been, perhaps ironically, to insulate foreign policy from electoral politics because the regional parties are simply not very interested in getting involved in this area. Though cabinet berths have been doled out as tools of coalition building, the dominant foreign policy makers and intellectuals continue to be drawn from the same social and political strata as before the rise of coalitions. As much as the rise of lower castes and of regional parties has reshaped the Indian political landscape, it has had very little influence on the ideational terrain on foreign policy. India’s “silent revolution” and regionalization has yet to make themselves felt in the elite realm of security affairs.

An important exception, dealt with to some extent previously, is India’s Left, which is regionally concentrated in West Bengal and Kerala. As we noted previously, the Left does have a clear foreign policy worldview. In certain areas it overlaps with that of the broader elite strategic consensus, particularly regarding the desirability of autonomy and suspicion of more powerful states. As noted, however, the Left has been far more pro-China than mainstream strategic opinion. Since the end of the Cold War, the Left has indeed pursued its foreign policy agenda, most dramatically in the conflict over the US-India nuclear deal that nearly brought down the UPA government. This is an important exception to our broader claims about elite consensus. But, as in many other ways, the CPM is something of an outlier and its ability to fundamentally influence the trajectory of Indian foreign policy is very limited.

Strategic Visions: Congress and the UPA
Ironically, perhaps the biggest challenge to India’s supposedly enduring strategic orientation has emerged with the Manmohan Singh era in the Congress party and the associated United Progressive Alliance governments from 2004 through this writing. It has been argued that instead of strategic autonomy and self-reliance as India’s core foreign policy beliefs, the Manmohan Singh wing of Congress is perhaps most aptly characterized as neoliberal. Unsurprisingly, the focus of this wing of Congress is accelerating Indian economic growth—both to generate global economic competitiveness and to trigger a trickle-down effect to alleviate the searing poverty still afflicting hundreds of millions of Indians—and the vehicle employed to do so is a deeper integration with the world economy, particularly with the west. In theory, this integration generates precisely the types of exposure and vulnerabilities that Nehru and the Gandhis sought to avoid, and were able to do so with a largely import substitution economic approach.

Nevertheless, even the supposedly neoliberal Manmohan Singh has emphasized long-standing security formulations even as he has pressed for a neoliberal economic agenda. In 2008, in the Lok Sabha, he noted that in response to a question about the
India-US Nuclear deal that: “We have not and we will not accept any outside interference or monitoring or supervision of our strategic programme. Our strategic autonomy will never be compromised.”\textsuperscript{80} In September 2010, the Prime Minister stated the following in a speech to the Combined Commanders’ Conference: “We have always prided ourselves on preserving our strategic autonomy, and this is an article of faith for us. India is too large a country to be boxed into any alliance or regional or sub-regional arrangements, whether trade, economic or political.”\textsuperscript{81} To describe strategic autonomy as an “article of faith” in India’s strategic orientation suggests just how powerful an enduring concept this has been for India’s leaders. And although the Manmohan Singh government has sought to open up India’s economy to the rest of the world, there are still very real limits on capital and goods imports that have insulated India from the financial crisis that ravaged the west in the past several years. In terms of security, the UPA has not budged from the traditional formulation of good relations with everyone; indeed one could argue that the Manmohan Singh government equilibrated relations with the US after decades of hostility, but it has not come at the expense of relations with Russia, France, or Iran, which are still critical bilateral partnerships for India.

In addition, against the Manmohan Singh ideology driven by neoliberal economics is the largely opaque worldview of Sonia Gandhi, the Congress Party President. There is little publicly available to assess what Sonia Gandhi’s worldview is, but there is anecdotal evidence that she did not initially support the India-US nuclear deal, on the grounds that it represented a significant shift in Indian foreign policy toward aligning with a major power. It is believed that Sonia Gandhi’s worldview is much closer to her former husband’s and that there is presently a battle within the Congress party—which is by no means a monolithic entity—about the appropriate vision for India in world affairs. The Nehruvian view that India should focus internally and develop indigenously is now in a pitched battle with the neoliberal view that the only mechanism to alleviate poverty in India is to integrate with the world’s economic engines, necessarily entailing deeper partnerships and risking vulnerability to states such as the US. As a result, the last six years have witnessed a somewhat schizophrenic approach to international affairs as this battle is waged within the party; given the structure of India’s domestic political institutions, in any such battle the most likely outcome is stagnation or “less” rather than “more” or any radical shift in Indian foreign policy.

Policy Implications
This analysis outlining the landscape of Indian strategic thought among the key formulat-ors of Indian foreign policy is insufficient to provide detailed analysis of likely future Indian security policies. Nevertheless, it is possible to offer some tentative thoughts. First, this empirical record strongly indicates that analysts should avoid focusing on supposed “shared values” and a “natural alliance” between India and the US, which have not delivered alliances or warm relations in the past. The exact same language of values, democracy, and diversity that is identified as a glue of the contemporary US-India relationship can be found in the speeches of Nehru and Indira during periods of estrangement and conflict.\textsuperscript{82} Democracy in India revolves around different issues (from
language policy to caste reservations to regional coalitions) than that in the United States and it lacks the crusading liberalism that scholars often attribute to the US. Adherence to a secret ballot is a thin basis for an international alliance.

While a new wave of optimistic predictions about the US-Indian alignment have grown in prominence in the last decade, the underlying structures of Indian politics and worldviews remain quite similar. We should expect India to continue to go its own way, propelled more by the quest for autonomy than for alliances and more comfortable at home than abroad. Though Ganguly and Pardesi make a number of very important points in arguing for a major shift in Indian foreign policy, we see somewhat more continuity and less radical change in the post-Cold War period than they do.83 It is absolutely the case that there is more cooperation with the US and less anti-American sentiment, but India remains a free agent that will carefully shepherd its autonomy without entering into security or diplomatic agreements that might curtail its freedom of action.

Second, India’s role in South and Southeast Asian regionalism is likely to remain relatively minimal. South Asia is not ripe for regionalism regardless, and more broadly India does not much interest in leading institution-building efforts that could lead to binding constraints. This less true of purely economic institutions like the WTO, but the point of SAARC and ASEAN has been to mix economic and political dynamics together as a form of promoting greater regional stability. India’s aversion to deep institutionalization is likely to endure, and thus policies like the “Look East” to Southeast Asia will remain important but conducted on a bilateral or informal basis.

Third, there is little reason to expect that foreign security policy will become highly salient at the electoral level any time soon. As India globalizes, there will be significantly more economic constituencies influenced by issues of openness and protection; in certain areas and among certain social groupings we should expect foreign policy to begin to intrude more clearly into electoral calculations.84 But for the vast majority of India’s voters, international economic issues are hopelessly distant compared to getting and using a BPL card, dealing with caste and communal hostilities and prejudices, and trying to build some degree of household economic security. These concerns, and how they aggregate into patterns of political power, are the bedrock foundation of Indian politics for the foreseeable future. The question of whether, in the long run, growing mass involvement in Indian security policy will have beneficial or harmful effects (or, more likely, surprising effects) remains to be answered, but that day is far off. Even the questions of Kashmir and Pakistan, while certainly resonant and worrisome to the public, have not become major electoral issues even as Indian parties have found ways to make just about every other topic a wedge issue. Indian security affairs are likely to remain an elite game for quite a long time to come.

Conclusion
This article has offered a preliminary overview of the ideational range of Indian foreign policy over time and across parties. It makes no claims to being comprehensive—there are many prominent politicians and intellectuals who are ignored here85—but instead aims to trace out some basic aspects of the strategic worldview that has constructed
interests, objectives, and strategies. We have argued that there are some key similarities held across most of the key actors in the elite foreign policy-making system—across shifts in international structure and ruling coalition—and that sustained interference and oversight by elected politicians has been fairly rare. Historically, the primacy of Congress and of bureaucratic insulation kept electoral incentives at bay alongside the low salience of foreign policy. More recently and dramatically, the rise of powerful regional parties with no clear interest in foreign security issues has created further room to maneuver for India’s strategic enclave. Ideas have been able to survive patronage and politicization because in this realm they are not useful to coalition-building politicians.

These arguments are obviously preliminary and in many ways raise more questions than they answer. There is enormous room for further research on the making of India’s foreign policy. First, deeper historical studies of the roots of strategic worldviews, whether among the strategic enclave or its critics (as in the CPM), would contribute valuably both to the literature on India and more broadly on ideas in international relations. Second, the intersection between electoral incentives and bureaucratic structures has been studied here only as a background condition but its own dynamics deserve serious attention, particularly in issues of defense procurement and development, alliance formation, and engagement with international institutions. The intersection of politicians, bureaucrats, and Indian foreign policy, within the context of weak electoral incentives for devoting effort to international affairs, is a fascinating area for future work. How is Indian foreign policy ‘produced’ and what has the effect of these ideas been on outcomes over time? Third, there are remarkably few detailed studies of the inner workings of the Indian foreign policy apparatus. Valuable work has been done recently but it remains thin compared to other countries. Though there are reasons for this beyond the control of researchers—especially the government’s reticence about making archives available—entrepreneurial, innovative scholarship may still be possible.

NOTES

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2. The best survey research focused on foreign policy is Devesh Kapur, “Public Opinion and Indian Foreign Policy,” India Review, Vol. 8, No. 3 (July-September 2009), pp. 286–305.
3. Ibid., p. 303.
4. In West Bengal and the states of the Northeast, Bangladeshi migration has been an issue, in West Bengal water deals with Bangladesh has been important, and the Sri Lanka situation has at times been salient in Tamil Nadu. But, even in these situations, there is little evidence that the bulk of voting and coalition decisions have been driven by these issues.
14. As Stephen Cohen notes in *India: Emerging Power* (see note 8 above), p. 54: “Many in the Indian strategic elite would rather see their country fail on its own than succeed with the help of others. This attitude is sometimes perplexing to foreigners.”
21. Abraham, “India’s ‘Strategic Enclave’” (see note 5 above).
22. Tanham, *India’s Strategic Thought* (see note 9 above), p. 52.
23. This stands in contrast to Hymans’s argument that the BJP represents a very distinct “oppositional nationalistic” national identity conception. The Congress had long periods of deep oppositionalism (mainly aimed at the colonial powers and the U.S.) and paranoia, particularly under Indira Gandhi and her invocation of the “foreign hand.” The continuities between the 1998–2004 period of BJP-led rule and 2004-present period of Congress-led rule are similarly striking.
25. See Srinath Raghavan, *War and Peace in Modern India: A Strategic History of the Nehru Years* (Delhi: Permanent Black, 2010).
26. Tanham, *India’s Strategic Thought* (see note 9 above), p. 57.
27. Perkovich, *India’s Nuclear Bomb* (see note 17 above), p. 29.
34. On this point, see also Perkovich, *India’s Nuclear Bomb* (see note 17 above), p. 6.
35. The interpretation below is certainly not unique to this article, and instead represents a clear historiographical consensus. For instance, “the drive for self-reliance has become an important element in the Indian strategy for attaining security, true independence, and international stature. Nehru early on came out in favor of strategic self-reliance and independence: ‘in our external and internal domestic policy, in our political policy, or economic policy, we do not propose to accept anything that involves in the slightest degree dependence on any other authority.’” Tanham, *India’s Strategic Thought* (see note 9 above), p. 57.
37. Ibid., p. 543.
38. “It is a terribly difficult business to wipe out this past of bitterness and conflict, yet it can be done if there is a complete break from it, and the present is made entirely different.” Ibid., p. 501.
43. Ibid., p. 563.
44. Ibid., p. 586.
45. “Each has not only the right to freedom, but also to decide its own policy and way of life. Only thus can true freedom flourish and a people grow according to their own genius” (Ibid., p. 586).
46. He writes that “such contacts [India with West] should not lead to any political or military subservience or commitments” and “we are not getting tied up in any way with its [USSR’s] world policies” (Ibid., p. 523).
47. “No commitments of any kind, limiting our sovereignty or our internal or external policy, have been made, whether in the political or economic or military spheres” (Ibid., p. 538).
48. “We have repeatedly stated that India should not ally herself with any of the power blocs. . . the idea that we can gain some immediate end by alignment with one of the power blocs is essentially wrong. If once we do so, we will even lose our bargaining power, though we may gain some petty temporary advantage” (Ibid., p. 521).
49. Panikkar, India and the Indian Ocean (see note 15 above), is one of the only good early works on Indian maritime strategy.
51. Ibid., p. 125.
52. Ibid., p. 126.
53. Ibid., p. 129.
55. “The dominant perspective for the next twenty-five years could be characterized as “militant Nehruvian” and was best exemplified by Mrs. Indira Gandhi” (Cohen, India: Emerging Power [see note 8 above], p. 41).
56. Gandhi, India (see note 24 above), pp. 18–19.
57. Ibid., p. 52.
58. Ibid., p. 66.
59. For example, “We have learnt a lot from the West but we are determined not to become mere imitators of the West. We want to find our own direction and our own path.” (Indira Gandhi, India Speaks: Selected Speeches of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi on her Tour Abroad, September-November 1971 (Delhi: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1972), p. 98).
60. Gandhi, India (see note 24 above), p. 53.
61. Ibid., p. 137.
62. Ibid., p. 136.
63. Gandhi, India Speaks (see note 59 above), p. 52.
64. Gandhi, India Speaks (see note 59 above), pp. 18–19.
65. Tharoor, Reasons of State (see note 54 above), p. 66.
66. Ibid., p. 73.
67. Atal Bihari Vajpayee, India’s Foreign Policy: New Dimensions (New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, External Publicity Division, 1977), p. 38. Similarly, “India is too mature and proud a country to want to tilt this way or the other,” p. 65.
68. Ibid., p. 73.
69. Ibid., p. 80.
70. Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon (see note 32 above), p. 35.
73. Ibid., p. 317.
74. Ibid., p. 308.
76. Cohen, India: Emergence Power (see note 8 above), on realists and Hindutva: “India must be militarily strong” (p. 46); “if one individual represents the successful synthesis of Indian realist perceptions and the more ideologically driven views of the RSS and its sister organizations, he is Atal Behari Vajpayee” (p. 47). It should be noted that Jaswant Singh is not an RSS person, and had his political roots in the Swatantra party.
82. For instance, Indira said to Richard Nixon “Mr. President, we are with you in your faith in freedom and democracy.” Gandhi, *India Speaks* (see note 59 above), p. 65.
83. Ganguly and Pardesi, “Explaining sixty years” (see note 13 above).
85. Perkovich, *India’s Nuclear Bomb* (see note 17 above), provides an excellent introduction to a number of key figures.