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What is This?
It Should Not Only Be about Nationalism: China’s Pluralistic National Identity and Its Implications for Chinese Foreign Relations

Allen Carlson

Abstract
Over the course of the last decade, students of Chinese foreign relations have engaged in an extended, and often rather breathless, debate over the meaning of China’s changing international profile. The question for all those with an interest in Asian security, and the wider international order, has become: what does China want to do with its new-found power? This article rests upon the conviction that national identity, rather than nationalism alone, stands at the centre of such issues. The latter of these two has attracted more attention. However, it tends to lead analysts to only see a narrow bandwidth of identity formation within a country, whereas the former is more inclusive of the potential variety of collective constructs that are in play in a given location. From within such a framework, it is then possible to both examine the production of Chinese collective imaginings and explore the role that they play in framing China’s interaction with the rest of the international system.

Keywords
China, nationalism, national identity, foreign relations, Asian security

Introduction
Over the course of the last decade, students of Chinese foreign relations have engaged in an extended, and often rather breathless, debate over the meaning of

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China’s changing international profile. Much of this writing diverges on a number of basic aspects of this trend. However, virtually all contributors to this literature now agree about one basic fact: since the early 1990s, China has become a much stronger country and is now poised to play a significant role in shaping the current and future direction of international relations in Asia and beyond. The question for all those with an interest in Asian security, and the wider international order, has thus become: what does China want to do with its new-found power?

This article rests upon the conviction that national identity, rather than nationalism alone, stands at the centre of such a question. The latter of these two has attracted more attention. However, it tends to lead analysts to only see a narrow bandwidth of identity formation within a country, whereas the former is more inclusive of the potential variety of collective constructs that are in play in a given location. From within this intellectual framework, it is then possible to both examine the production of Chinese collective imaginings and explore the role that they play in framing China’s interaction with the rest of the international system. Thus, knowing the way those in China are shaping their national identity is then a fundamental component within the study of contemporary Chinese international relations and Asian security.2

The article lends substance to these points through a three-part discussion. Part one begins with a criticism of the overriding emphasis on nationalism in much of the work on identity within Chinese foreign relations and then critically surveys the extant analysis of national identity more specifically. This discussion emphasizes that both of these previous strands of research have not been especially successful. It then not only posits that it is possible to surmount such a limitation through focusing on greater definitional precision in studying national identity, but also pairs such a contention with a focus on the necessity to keep in mind the processes through which identity is created. Part two contains an initial, and suggestive, rather than comprehensive, survey of several major trends within current Chinese national identity construction. On this score, it contends that a high degree of contestation exists in China over basic aspects of national identity. The third, concluding, section briefly considers the implications of such dynamics for China and the rest of the world.

The Flaws in the Study of Nationalism and National Identity in China3

As groundbreaking as the call to bring national identity into the study of Asian security appears to be, it is necessary to call attention to the fact that this is not the first time such a turn has been advocated within the study of Chinese foreign relations and national security. To begin with, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, a handful of analysts placed a particular emphasis in their work on traditional culture and imperial rule in historic East Asia, as well as China’s ‘Century of
Humiliation’ that started in the mid-1800s, and argued that such a past had a lasting imprint on the region. In brief, this early scholarship contended the cultural variables, if not identity per se, played a significant role in China’s interactions with the rest of the world. However, at the same time, it was rather under-theorized and vague. Culture mattered, but how it was conceptualized and empirically studied received rather scant attention. The question of identity, while then hinted at, was left largely unexplored.

This being the case, a partial exception to such oversight could be found in the nascent interest in nationalism within the literature on China from this period. Indeed, even at this early juncture, nationalism was broadly understood as having played a crucial role in shaping the trajectory of modern Chinese history. For example, Chalmers Johnson (1962) developed this strand of argument within his influential and controversial work on the role that Chinese nationalism had on the rise of the Chinese Communist Party in the 1930s and 1940s. Moreover, following in Johnson’s wake, other scholars explored the relationship between nationalism and communist ideology, especially its emphasis on internationalism. In addition, in the post-Maoist era, when the term ‘nationalism’ began to be more openly used within China’s own official statements and media outlets, even more attention was placed within the secondary literature on this term. On this score, Michel Oksenberg’s (1986) piece in Foreign Affairs was, for many years, considered the authoritative text.

Starting in the late-1990s and through the start of the last decade, though, Oksenberg’s article was overtaken by a veritable flood of scholarship that sought to describe and explain what appeared to be a pronounced rise in nationalist sentiment within China. As a result of the volume of such work, and the generally positive critical reception it has received, the issue of nationalism quickly came to dominate the consideration of identity politics in China. For every stray reference to national identity in the literature from this period, scores of mentions of nationalism could easily be found. In light of how much more was said in China during this same time about both ‘patriotism’ (aiguozhuyi) and ‘nationalism’ (minzuzhuyi), such a surge of interest was not at all surprising. Moreover, it is also clear that these new studies enhanced understanding of contemporary Chinese politics through demonstrating the importance of nationalist rhetoric in bolstering regime legitimacy.

However, this analysis has had a distorting effect on the manner in which identity politics is studied within China. In other words, the task at hand is not to improve how we study Chinese nationalism, but rather to change the manner in which we attempt to come to terms with identity politics in China. This critique stems from the contention that giving unrivaled pride of place to nationalism in studying political identities within China creates intellectual blinders that artificially narrow what scholars examine and how they frame their work.

This obstacle is two-fold in nature. First, as William Callahan (2005, pp. 5–6) observed, tethering the study of identity in China to the intellectual research tradition of nationalism means that regardless of how innovative a scholar’s exploration

of ‘Chineseness’, the consideration of identity ‘is limited to nation and state’; as such, it ‘risks further naturalizing the link between nation, security and identity in the service of the nation’. In other words, scholars’ fixation on nationalism in China has tended to reify the categories of nation, state and identity that they are ostensibly examining. Second, in constantly turning their efforts towards an attempt to define what Chinese nationalism is (and is not), scholarship is disinclined to consider the possibility that identity politics in China are constituted as much (if not more) by process, diversity and plurality as by definitional clarity and monolithic singularity of voice and purpose.

A corrective to these limitations can arguably be found through re-orienting the fascination in the field away from ‘nationalism’ onto the question of national identity formation. The main advantage of such a turn obtains from the fact that while nationalism is almost always understood in terms of exclusionary dichotomies, in the work on national identity, such a divide plays a less significant role in framing analysis. In other words, the study of national identity is less restricted than that of nationalism. This is not to contend that a focus on in-group versus out-group distinctions are unimportant in the study of national identity but rather that within such an intellectual rubric, there is arguably more conceptual space for the consideration of other actors and variables, particularly transnational forces and social movements, ones that depend more on new forms of social media and cyberspace than on conventional, and geographically more constrained, forms of communication to build collective identities. In brief, a shift to concentrating on national identity then has the potential to shed new light on the formation of the collective Chinese sense of self during an era in which it is readily apparent that the Internet and boundary-spanning activities are becoming ever more prominent in the lives of many of those living within the borders of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

Once more, it is important to point out that such a contention is not especially novel within the study of China’s foreign relations; indeed, it quite directly echoes the efforts made almost two decades ago by Lowell Dittmer and Samuel Kim. In 1993, these two top China watchers argued that the development of Chinese national identity had been ‘tumultuous’, characterized by a rotation through a ‘series of roles’, stood at a particularly crucial juncture in the early 1990s, yet had also been largely neglected in the study of China’s foreign relations (Dittmer and Kim, 1993, p. xii). Dittmer and Kim believed that the time was then ripe to explore the national identity dynamic that was at play in China in the 1990s.8

The task for subsequent researchers was then to pick up the thread of discussion begun in the Dittmer and Kim volume. However, over the past decade, each of the four main strands of research on Chinese national identity, as related to foreign policy and national security concerns, have stumbled in their quest to better describe and explain the role this construct plays in China’s foreign relations.

First, a series of authors have made rather casual use of the term in their descriptive accounts of China’s historical and contemporary foreign relations.9 This strand of writing contains only the most limited consideration of theoretical
and conceptual issues related to identity politics raised by those in other academic disciplines. It is, rather, decidedly Area studies focused in its orientation. The relative value of this approach to national identity then stems from the simple fact that it granted currency to the term ‘national identity’ and kept it within circulation in the study of Chinese foreign relations. However, at the same time, within such work, the distinction between nationalism and national identity was so downplayed that the two terms appeared to be little more than synonyms. This trend led to the watering down of the national identity concept and helped create the impression that the two identity dynamics were not just similar, but rather identical and indistinguishable. Not surprisingly, this conceptual impression resulted in a series of vague assertions about identity, and the production of little coherent and substantive empirical evidence in support of such claims. Such weaknesses then tended to reinforce, rather than overcome, the exclusion of identity concerns within more mainstream accounts of Chinese foreign policy, and were lost within the wave of more prominent work on Chinese nationalism.

In stark contrast to this, a non-theoretically oriented, regional studies oriented cluster of work on Chinese national identity, a second strand of work, was also developed by a handful of China scholars who were steeped in the language of critical theory (see Callahan, 2004, 2005; Krolikowski, 2008; Shih, 1998, 2004). Indeed, while Dittmer and Kim forwarded a generally rationalist and positivist frame for studying Chinese national identity, over the course of the last decade, much of the more developed and sustained scholarship in this vein in the China field has focused primarily on discursive practices and narrative dynamics within the production of the Chinese collective self. Such research has generally been empirically rich, and thought provoking, but has also not been especially accessible to non-specialists as it has been quite theoretically top-heavy and laced with the vague language that more generally plagues this strand of scholarship. In addition, it has lacked much in the way of consideration of basic causal relationships and policy prescriptions.

A prime example of such tendencies can be found in the writing of Shih Chih-yu, one of Taiwan’s leading scholars on Chinese foreign relations. His early work concentrated on the influence that national role conceptions played within the outlook of Chinese leaders and argued that differences on this score had historically led to abrupt changes in China’s foreign policy (see Shih, 1998). Shih’s later publications further developed this theme through an extensive consideration of historical influences, narrative construction and discursive efforts within both Beijing’s approach to the world and Taiwan’s own attempt to position itself on the world stage. Throughout such writing the theme of identity was a prominent one.10

There is little question that this strand of research has generated a series of probing questions about identity formation within China. Nonetheless, such work has also tended to become bogged down in its own theory-laden language and esoteric abstractions. Moreover, the linkage between identity and Chinese foreign relations has remained at best unclear, and at worst, buried under a mountain of...
high-flying theoretical posturing. As a result of such tendencies, national identity research that has emerged out of constructivist, and critical, international relations theory has been of only marginal importance within the broader field of Chinese foreign policy and national security studies.

As scholars outside China struggled to make sense of how ‘identity’ might matter within the Chinese foreign policy-making process, analysts within the PRC also, somewhat belatedly, began to explore the same issue within their own work. Their analysis forms the third strand of writing about Chinese national identity that has emerged in recent years. One early example of this trend can be found in Le Shan’s (2004) book that critiques what the author viewed as the overly narrow manner in which many other Chinese scholars were writing about nationalism in China. However, it is Qin Yaqing, one of China’s top students of International Relations, who has, perhaps, given the most extensive consideration within Chinese intellectual circles to the issue of national identity. For example, in a 2003 article that appeared in *World Economics and Politics* (*Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi*), the China Foreign Affairs University Professor argued that national identity, strategic culture and security interests were three critical variables within China’s relationship with the outside world. He then contended that identity was best understood as related to the roles that nations attribute to themselves and claimed that it was possible to identify the extent to which such roles then placed a state within a positive or negative relationship with the rest of the international system. In more specifically focusing on China, he then noted that in the recent past, Chinese national identity had undergone an important transformation from a negative to a positive referent, or what he dubbed a shift from a revolutionary to a status quo-based role identity (Qin, 2003). Yet, as fascinating as such a theoretical claim was, Qin generally failed to support it with empirical data or trace the processes through which it occurred, and so his work was more suggestive than definitive.11

While not explicitly framed as a corrective to such shortcomings, in recent years, a small but growing number of junior scholars operating outside China have endeavoured to forward a more concrete intellectual frame for studying Chinese national identity (Reilly, 2011; Stockmann and Johnston, 2006; Weiss, 2008). At the risk of over-generalizing, this work has been designed with an eye towards treating identity as a ‘variable’. Complementing such an underlying theoretical attachment to positivism, this strand of research has been defined by its empirical focus on the growing wealth of newly available public opinion data generated within China. The best of this work has attempted to combine such quantitative data with the use of other sources, including qualitative, open-ended interviews, exhaustive surveys of the Chinese media and official statements. Such studies have yielded rather rich results, especially in regard to tracing the manner in which Beijing has attempted to orchestrate and control how Chinese identity is being framed on the world stage. More specifically, both Jessica Weiss (2008) and James Reilly (2011) find that the Chinese leadership has been quite effective in promoting, channelling, corralling and redirecting nationalist sentiment over time. While their individual analysis is in places at odds with each other, their early
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findings speak to the promise of such a focus on the role of public opinion within Chinese identity politics.

In sum, this strand of research has already produced results that are both conceptually and empirically valuable. On the first front, this scholarship may be understood as constituting a new inroad for the inclusion of identity into the field. It is much closer to the mainstream of American political science than any of the other extant strands of research on Chinese nationalism. Indeed, Weiss’s work has begun to appear in top American international relations and security studies journals. Thus, it is likely that such analysis will force students of Chinese foreign relations to take the issue of identity more seriously as it is no longer the stuff of continental theorizing but rather of positivist social scientific undertakings. On the latter score, the work goes well beyond the simple assertions and proclamations about identity politics in China that are still remarkably common place in both academic and media circles. This is especially true of Rilley’s nuanced description of the role nationalism and public opinion have played in Sino-Japanese relations, but is also evident in Daniela Stockmann and Alastair Iain Johnston’s (2006) consideration of how the use of survey data may illuminate the role of these variables within Sino-American relations. In both cases, these scholars’ writings are carefully documented and methodologically grounded, and as such are more sound and substantive than much of what has so far been written about identity politics within China’s relationship with the outside world.

However, such gains do not come without some costs as well. For example, while greater clarity has been achieved in this strand of research, it also has had a tendency to too easily move towards reducing identity to responses to survey questions. What is added by such a move is, to a certain degree, offset by the fact that such replies may be considered to be somewhat removed from the most fundamental issues of identity politics. For example, even if an ideal survey question could be constructed out of this research framework such as ‘On a scale of 1 to 10, how important is your national identity as Chinese?’, and placed on a national public opinion survey, it is unclear if responses to such a query would be a sufficient vehicle for reaching a comprehensive understanding about how and why collective identity formation in China has developed over the last several decades.

In summary, all four of the main conduits for studying Chinese national identity have had some merit, but each have also been hobbled by a range of conceptual and empirical shortcomings. Thus, if one is of the persuasion that identity does matter, yet dissatisfied with how such a contention has been substantiated to date, it is necessary to consider how identity research could be more effectively operationalized.

The emerging consensus in the field is that the best way to accomplish this task is to forward a more precise and empirically operationalizable definition of national identity. This is the primary point of departure for the recently published, and critically well received, *Measuring Identity: A Guide for Social Scientists* by Abdelal et al. (2009). Within such a vein, the primary task for researchers is to disaggregate the constituent parts that make up identity.
Disaggregating identity is, however, no simple task. This is especially true when the aim is to identify variables that can be compared across countries. Yet, efforts in this regard are now being made within the literature. One excellent example of such work can be found in the framing documents for the project for which an early version of this article was developed. More specifically, the conveners of the George Washington University (GWU) project on national identity in Asia contended in a memo they circulated to all contributors to their undertaking that national identity could best be understood with reference to five foundational components (order versus rights; particularistic versus universalistic values: left versus right; hard power versus soft power; open versus inward economics). Such a disaggregation, it was argued, would allow analysts to develop a more comprehensive approach to describing and explaining national identities’ roles within the countries in Asia.¹³

There is much that is laudable in this definitional approach, and it helped inform the research and writing which is being presented in this article. However, at the same time, in developing this article, the author found that it provided an insufficient foundation for a truly granular study of Chinese national identity. To rectify such shortcomings, the research framework proposed here encompasses three significant modifications to the frame initially forwarded in the GWU study.¹⁴

First, some of the categories in the initial memo simply did not apply especially well to China, and had the potential to create more confusion than clarification in the analysis of Chinese national identity. The chief concern here relates to the ‘left versus right’ category, a label that means something quite distinct in the Chinese context, and one that has also been highly politicized during the history of the PRC. While ideological orientation matters in the politics of China, particularly during the tumultuous first decades after the establishment of the PRC, it was often literally a matter of life or death, as garnering a political designation of ‘rightist’ could condemn an individual to years of imprisonment, while the ‘ultra-leftist’ label was subsequently toxic after Deng’s ascendency to power in the late 1970s. This is not to say that the ‘left versus right’ category is irrelevant, as is evident in the strident accusations regarding reformulations of the former term in the context of Bo Xilai’s dramatic fall from grace in the spring of 2012, but rather that it is so explosive and so woven into other areas of debate about identity that it is perhaps best left aside.¹⁵

Second, while the attempt to disaggregate various constituent parts of national identity is clearly a worthwhile endeavour, the categories of identity were presented in largely equivalent terms. This trait can be visibly depicted in Figure 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Order versus Rights</th>
<th>Universal versus Particular Values</th>
<th>Left versus Right</th>
<th>Hard power versus Soft power</th>
<th>Open versus Inward Economies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Figure 1. Categories of National Identity**

Such a framework national identity is simply understood as the amalgamation of these independent and equal parts. In contrast, it may be more accurate to suggest that some of these categories are more foundational to national identity than others. Within such a contention, the appropriate framework for studying national identity in China can be represented by Figure 2.

Within this pyramid shaped depiction, certain facets of identity are seen as being more foundational than others. More specifically, collective identities are framed, at their most basic level, within discussions of fundamental values in China, ones that speak to what the country should look like, what its relationship to other polities should be and who can (and cannot) be categorized as being Chinese. Resting upon such a constitutive frame stands a set of considerations of the rights and obligations that the leaders of the Chinese state must abide by within their approach to governing economic (and political) activity within the boundaries of the PRC. Finally, standing on the shoulders of these deeper constructs resides a plethora of policy choices that reflect their influence, and lend specific substance to the types of identity markers they establish (perhaps, most prominently in recent years, with reference to debates in China over the relative balance that should exist in Chinese foreign policy between the use of hard and soft power).

A third observation is that it is imperative that attention to definition should not override a willingness to consider the multiplicity of sites in which national identity is socially constructed and contested in China. A focus on ‘discovering’ overarching identity markers that may be used to highlight comparative differences between various states in Asia should be done keeping this in mind.
Search for Chinese Identity within Three Separate Frames

When examined via such a framework it quickly becomes apparent that there is a broad repertoire of Chinese national identity markers at play within China today. In other words, the Chinese, far from possessing a singular, overarching, sense of self on the world stage, or at home for that matter, are divided over a wide ranging set of issues related to fundamental questions concerning how to define China and ‘Chineseness’ during a period of rapid economic change and political uncertainty.

First, at the level of basic worldview and fundamental politics, values differences within China are quite pronounced. For example, although many Chinese hold zero-sum visions of international relations, that view has not yet cornered the market. On the one hand, there are signs within China of a military pushing for more rapid modernization and advocating more forceful policies towards both its neighbours and the US. On the other hand, the Chinese foreign ministry remains actively engaged in a wide array of bilateral and multilateral exchanges. In addition, during recent years, especially in 2004 and 2005, prominent Chinese foreign policy elites forwarded arguments about the need for China to develop more pragmatic, less dogmatic, approaches to Japan. Moreover, even though this ‘new thinking’ about Japan initiated harsh rhetoric from Chinese nationalists, much of its substance came to guide Beijing’s approach towards Tokyo through the later part of the last decade. Furthermore, leading figures in the Chinese foreign policy community (ranging from Ren Xiao, Qin Yaqing, to Yan Xuetong) have recently turned their attention to incorporating re-invented interpretations of China’s historic world order, particularly the role of the tianxia, or ‘all under heaven’, concept, into a new Chinese worldview—one that could be viewed as an attempt to reshape the international system itself, at least in theoretical and normative terms.

While much of this appears to have been shaken over the last two years by yet another surge of Chinese aggressive behaviour within Asia, and rising evidence of Chinese nationalist sentiment within the PRC, it has not, as of yet, extinguished the diversity that was visible on these fronts since the end of the 1990s.

Second, while strongly nationalist voices often are the loudest ones heard from China, it is clear that there is no agreement about just what role nationalism should play in the country’s foreign relations. Assertive nationalism has been on display in its discussions of the 1999 Belgrade embassy bombing and more recently in response to the anti-Chinese protests in Tibet in 2008 and Xinjiang in 2009. Yet it was much less evident following the 2001 spy plane incident or, somewhat more contestably, in discussions about contested territorial claims relating to disputed North Pacific islands and huge chunks of the South China Sea. It also has not dominated recent Chinese discussions about relations with Taiwan. In addition, and quite unexpectedly, some establishment intellectuals have even begun to question the relationships between China’s Han majority and minority groups that live in border regions such as Tibet and Xinjiang. In doing so, they are suggesting

novel, even innovative, approaches to broader questions of Chinese nationalism and what it means to be Chinese.\textsuperscript{18}

Third, there are obvious divisions amongst the Chinese over the basic direction of China’s economy and its relations with the rest of the world. In addition, questions of how to respond to mounting economic inequalities within China and the social dislocations they create have generated intense disagreements within China. For example, as Chris Hughes neatly summarized in his survey of Chinese nationalism, over the last ten years, opponents of economic opening have become increasingly vocal within China. While such a group is nebulous and evolving, it is unified in expressing scepticism about the benefits which export-led growth and marketization have brought to China. Such doubt is a hallmark of Wang Hui’s writings, and central to the virulent brand of nationalism mapped out in the work of public intellectuals like Fang Ning and Wang Xiaodong.\textsuperscript{19} Moreover, at the same time, China’s nascent, yet increasingly visible and economically successful, modern art community has repeatedly satirized what are portrayed as the corrosive effects, which China’s turn to commercialization and attachment to the market has had upon the Chinese sense of self and China’s historical traditions and culture.

\textbf{Conclusion: The Potential Implications of the Fluidity of National Identity for China’s ‘Rise’}\textsuperscript{20}

While this article represents only a preliminary survey of the issue of national identity, it points to the plurality that exists within China over the definition of fundamental aspects of contemporary Chinese culture and values.\textsuperscript{21} Such contestation within China arguably will have broad implications for China’s ‘rise’ on the world stage. To begin with, such trends weigh heavily against the arguments some have recently forwarded in regard to the emergence of a singular Chinese vision of the world. More specifically, it is difficult to see how any new Chinese ‘grand strategy’, ‘mercantile’ agendas or apparent urge to re-establish a Sino-centric order (even if only within China’s immediate orbit) can be squared with the plurality of identity politics discussed earlier. On the contrary, this article might be viewed as suggesting that the Chinese state is still searching for a coherent national identity (as first alluded to in the title of Dittmer and Kim’s (1993) influential volume).

Such taking note of difference and division is not meant to suggest that rivalries within China are likely to bring about social upheaval and political change in the near future or that identity is so fractured that it no longer possesses any coherent facets that can hold the centre together. However, it does challenge the common perception that a singularity of mission and purpose exists. Those in China, in reality, are more divided about the nature of the existing global order, and the country’s place within it than at any time since the Tiananmen protests of 1989.
Within such a context, national identity could remain a domestic or internal affair, one that will rarely infringe upon the conduct of China’s foreign policy—and national security making. On the other hand, it is also possible to see how more assertive understandings of Chinese national identity, ones that would press the Chinese state to take a more aggressive stand with China’s neighbours in Asia, and the US, could take deeper root within the PRC in the years to come.

If such voices do, indeed, become more pronounced in the coming years, it is easy to envision how Beijing could begin to discard the relatively status quo positions it has upheld in the recent past in favour of more proactive measures that Chinese nationalists would view as being more commensurate with China’s growing national power and international reputation. To date, however, such a trend is not yet especially pronounced within China. On the contrary, much of China’s national identity politics remains quite fluid and indeterminate, thus requiring even greater attention and focus rather than simple generalizations and pat explanations of what such trends are likely to produce in the near future.

Notes

1. This article was developed in consultation with Song Wei, an Associate Professor at Peking University. Professor Song made an important contribution to earlier versions of this article, particularly those papers presented in China and India which formed the initial foundation for the current piece. It should also be noted the article draws on material the author previously wrote for the ‘National Identity in Asia Workshop’, organized by Gilbert Rozman at Princeton University on 25 March 2010. It was further developed as part of The George Washington University’s ‘Power, Identity, and Security in Asia Project’ that has received the generous support of the MacArthur Foundation. Finally, portions of the piece draw directly on previously published work, especially Carlson (2009). Specific overlaps between that publication and this piece are noted throughout the article.
2. See Carlson (2008) for a consideration of this same issue.
3. Please note that much of this section draws directly on Carlson (2009); subsequent notes call attention to the most pronounced overlaps between the discussion here and this earlier work.
5. For an excellent survey of this discussion, see Goldstein (1994).
7. Please note that the following paragraphs draw directly on Carlson (2009).
8. Please note that this paragraph, as well as the four that precede it, draw extensively and directly from text used in Carlson (2009, pp. 24–28). I do not provide specific quotations from the 2009 article, but it should be emphasized that much of the language here is taken from that earlier article.
10. See Shih (2004). For another important voice in this regard, see the work of William Callahan, especially Callahan (2004). Song Wei made an important contribution to this paragraph.
11. Qin (2003). This paragraph in particular benefited from the contributions of Song Wei.
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12. This paragraph draws directly on Carlson (2009).
13. Also note that Gilbert Rozman’s (2012) approach to studying national identity in East Asia follows a somewhat similar pattern in that it too places a strong emphasis on definitional clarity.
14. It should be noted that the GWU study, as with this article, evolved over the course of a series of meetings held in both Asia and the US. Yet, the broader project never replaced the initial framework with a tighter definition of national identity. Instead, it allowed individual contributors to explore their own approaches to the issues at hand. This move had the value of creating space for all those involved in the project to produce.
15. Again, special note should be taken here of the contribution that Song Wei made to the development of this paragraph.
16. Please note that much of the following section draws directly and extensively on Carlson (2012a).
18. See Carlson (2012b) for a thorough discussion of this trend.
19. For a more detailed discussion of this movement, see Hughes (2006, Chapter 3).
20. This conclusion makes direct and extensive use of observations previously made in Carlson (2007, 2009).
21. See Shambaugh (2011) for a somewhat similar argument.

References


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