Assessing Taiwan’s Security Dynamics in a Competitive International Environment: Strategies for Security

Asia Report #62 | November 11, 2023

Introduction

Recent developments on the global stage point to the exceptional military and economic security challenges facing Taiwan. Continuing supply chain disruptions, moves to de-risk or de-couple from China, heightened geopolitical tension in the Taiwan Strait with rising Chinese pressure, all raise questions for Taiwan’s security and economic stability. From strengthening military and security capabilities to cultivating partnerships around the world, there are many questions on how Taiwan will walk the fine line between defending its integrity and maintaining peace across the Taiwan Strait.

These challenges were discussed at the Sigur Center’s Conference on Assessing Taiwan’s Security Dynamics in a Competitive International Environment, with Deputy Representative Johnson Sen Chiang, Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the U.S., giving opening remarks followed by two panels of experts. The full video can be found here. This Asia Report is the first of a two-part series from the Conference and focuses on Strategies for Security, to be followed by another on Building Partnerships for Resiliency. The experts on Strategies for Security include Lonnie Henley, Professional Lecturer at the George Washington University, Bonnie S. Glaser, Managing Director of the Indo-Pacific Program at the German Marshall Fund, and David Sacks, Asian Studies Fellow at The Council on Foreign Relations. Robert Sutter, Professor of Practice of International Affairs, George Washington University moderated the session.

Deputy Representative Johnson Sen Chiang set the stage for the Conference with his opening remarks on the need to foster exchanges between Taiwanese scholars and government officials and institutions such as the Sigur Center for Asian Studies that offer opportunities to engage with top policy experts to help broaden their perspectives on common concerns. He praised the endeavor of Gaston Sigur during his career to strengthen the U.S.-Taiwan relationship even during some challenging times. Addressing the topic of the Conference directly, Deputy Representative Johnson cited the expansion and diversification of security dialogues between Taiwan and the U.S. and other like-minded countries beyond the traditional military sector, to new challenges such as gray zone tactics, building resilience in global supply chains and cyber security threats. He highlighted Taiwan’s efforts to bolster its military capabilities to defend its democracy while also exercising self-restraint in order to prevent a conflict that would have a tremendous global impact. Looking ahead to the January 2024 national elections in Taiwan, Deputy Representative Johnson emphasizes how Taiwan works closely with the U.S. to defend common values of democracy and ensure that another free and fair election may be held without interference or intimidation from Beijing.

 

Defending Taiwan and Deterrence Strategy 

Lonnie Henley’s focus is on preventing China from taking military action to forcibly reunify with Taiwan. He recognizes that the main strategies used by the United States involve deterrence by denial, which aims to convince China that an invasion of Taiwan would not be successful, and deterrence by punishment, aimed at convincing China that the cost and damages resulting from an invasion would be too high. Henley also highlights the ongoing discussion that these efforts are weakening and need strengthening. His main thesis is that American military deterrence is strong, but cannot prevent Chinese action on its own.

The idea that deterrence is weakening has led many to believe that the United States must increase its military preparedness and bolster Taiwan’s defenses to prevent an invasion; Henley, however, points out that American deterrence against military action is the highest it has been. If invading Taiwan was easy then China would have done it already. Beijing is very aware that there is a high likelihood of failure should they invade and, even if they were successful, the costs and damages would be enormous. So while the U.S. must continue to maintain these efforts, in his view, American deterrence is effective at this stage.

Henley then goes on to assert that deterrence alone is not enough to prevent military action. For over sixty years Beijing has believed that a military takeover is not necessary and reunification can be achieved through non-violent approaches. However, if China were to believe that peaceful reunification was not possible, then the use of military force may be inevitable despite deterrence. Therefore, according to him, American policy should be focused on keeping Beijing convinced that a non-violent effort will work, whether it is true or not. A relatively effective deterrence strategy is to dissuade China from invasion by maintaining the belief in a peaceful reunification.

 

Alliance Politics and Taiwan 

Bonnie Glaser discusses how both the change in language used in statements and the growing cooperation with Taiwan add to the previous idea of deterrence and are part of the expansion of the role that alliances play in the Taiwan Strait balance. Prior to the Biden administration, the United States has focused on encouraging its allies to support Taiwan’s involvement in the United Nations and especially in the World Health Organization. Recently, there has been a major shift in the way the U.S. and its allies have been referring to Taiwan. The specific rhetoric being used in U.S. statements and joint statements with allies signifies the issue has transformed from a U.S.-China relations issue to an issue that needs to be addressed by the international community as a whole. Another significant shift is the increase of defense and non-defense related support shown by the United States and its allies.

Recently, the specific language and rhetoric used by the United States and its allies created a clear and unified message to China and Taiwan. Joint statements with the U.S. and countries like Japan, Australia, and South Korea as well as intergovernmental organizations like the European Union and G7 all include an emphasis on preserving peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and encouraging a peaceful resolution to the issue. These statements have demonstrated that many countries, not just the United States, have a stake in Taiwan’s security and signals to Beijing that this is an international issue.

Many countries have also been increasing their defense and non-defense related cooperation with Taiwan. Some examples of the United States and its allies working towards defense goals include: U.S. and Japan creating a plans to establish temporary military bases along the Nansei island chain in the event of an invasion, Australia’s cooperation with the UK and US to create longer range submarines is partly motivated by the Taiwan Strait tensions, and the U.S. and Canada sailing warships through the strait on a regular basis now. Other non-defense actions include countries like South Korea, Australia, and Germany sending parliamentary delegations or other high level government officials to Taiwan.

Glaser then goes on to explain that the reason many other countries have joined the United States in supporting Taiwan is due to the recognition that an invasion by China would be catastrophic to the economic interests of countries around the world. A report released by the Rhodian group estimated that a blockade of Taiwan would cost 2.5 trillion dollars to the global economy. As for European countries specifically, many have been negatively impacted by the war in Ukraine which has cost far less. While she has noted a significant increase in the cooperation between governments, Glaser points out that the public does not have enough understanding of the issue to support Taiwan. She emphasizes the need to bring the public along if the United States and its allies are to be able to fully support Taiwan and suggests using the lessons learned from Russia’s war in Ukraine to help spread awareness.

 

Strategic Signaling and U.S. Posture 

David Sacks explains his criticisms of the United States’ ambiguity towards Taiwan and instead urges strategic clarity in order for the U.S. to fully cooperate with allies in the defense of the island. The current position of the U.S. on coming to Taiwan’s aid in the event of military action from China is purposely ambiguous in order to simultaneously prevent Chinese aggression and discourage a Taiwanese declaration of independence. Sacks, however, believes that creating a clear policy around defending Taiwan will not add to the independence movement. While public polling has shown a rise in Taiwanese identity, it also reveals that the majority of people in Taiwan would rather maintain the status quo than declaring independence. He argues that the focus should be on preventing an invasion of Taiwan through strategic clarity and bolstering deterrence.

Sacks believes that China has become far more assertive and risk-accepting over the last decade citing examples of the militarization in the South China Sea, border clashes with India, and conflicts with Japan near the Senkaku islands. This combined with concerns about U.S. resolve and commitment as a result of the withdrawal from Afghanistan, the debates about giving aid to Ukraine, and a broader sense that the United States is becoming more isolationist could cause allies in the region to doubt Washington’s support. This doubt could lead to countries like Japan and South Korea pursuing their own strategic autonomy or other countries in Southeast Asia to cut deals with China. Strategic clarity would enable better cooperation between the U.S. and its allies because it would remove this doubt. Sacks also goes on to address some criticisms of this tactic. He explains that strategic clarity would not violate the U.S.’s one China policy as it has nothing to do with the diplomatic recognition of Taiwan. While some say that this would push China towards invasion, Sacks points out that President Biden has adopted strategic clarity four times without escalation.

In terms of U.S. force posture and bolstering deterrence, Sacks lists the Biden administration’s progress in identifying Taiwan as a major defense challenge, gaining access to bases in the region like Japan and the Philippines, and the submarine program with Australia. Creating bases and placing troops in allied countries while enormously important for bolstering deterrence, almost always creates questions around sovereignty and the role of the United States in the region. Despite these challenges, the Biden administration is making strides towards setting up these bases which in turn signals to Taiwan and other allies in the region that the U.S. is committed to their defense.

Sacks concludes by discussing steps the United States and its allies can take in order to further deter Chinese aggression. These steps include: increasing Taiwan’s defense budget from 2.5% of their total GDP to 4-5%, using Taiwan’s defense budget to invest in both smaller and cheaper items like mines, missiles, and radars as well as larger projects like the indigenous submarine program, furthering U.S.-Japan cooperation, and investing in American assets and force posture. He calls the current conflict in Ukraine a wake up call for the United States as it revealed significant gaps in the defense industrial base and encourages re-energizing the focus to these areas as they are not currently adequate to meet a potential invasion of Taiwan.

 

By Mark Sheehan, B.A.Candidate in International Affairs and Events Assistant, The Sigur Center for Asian Studies.

Assessing Taiwan’s New Military Security: Cross Strait, Defense and US-Taiwan Relations

Asia Report #59 | November 21, 2022

A high-tension visit by U.S. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan in early August 2022 led to the People’s Liberation Army Navy holding exercises near Taiwan and firing live missiles near the island. Chinese military escalation and stern diplomatic warnings to the U.S. came in the midst of final deliberations of the Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors and Science Act of 2022 (CHIPS act) in Washington. A week after Speaker Pelosi’s visit, President Biden signed the measure into law, providing over $50 billion to help develop and produce semiconductors while encouraging U.S. companies to cut China out of their semiconductor supply chains.

To explore these issues and how heightened tensions are likely to affect Taiwan and its economy and security, the Sigur Center for Asian Studies hosted a conference on Taiwan’s New Security Challenges: Economic Security and Military Security. The Asia Report from the first panel on economic and high-tech security may be found here. This Asia Report focuses on Taiwan’s changing military security challenges and assesses how cross strait, defense and US-Taiwan relations factor into possible responses. The video of the entire conference may be found here.

The speakers included Elbridge Colby, Co-Founder and Principal of the Marathon Initiative, Robert Sutter, Professor of Practice of International Affairs at the Elliott School of George Washington University, and Jacob Stokes, Fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). The panel was moderated by Deepa Ollapally, Associate Director of the Sigur Center for Asian Studies at George Washington University.

Read the full Asia Report here.