Zalfqar, Khan

Abstract
The paper argues that the existence of an ambiguous nuclear deterrence capability since the first half of the 1980s had emphasized the significance of nuclear weapons in South Asian geopolitics. However, lately, the geo-economic and geopolitical developments, and the growing military asymmetry have enhanced Pakistan’s vulnerabilities against India. In such an environment, Pakistan is constrained to induct a host of measures, including induction of short-range nuclear delivery systems and the tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) to counterbalance India’s offensive strategy to enforce its primacy. The pragmatic approach for Pakistan is to move vertically from its posture of a minimum credible deterrence to robustly reinforced offensive-deterrence policy in order to effectively handle the multidimensional threats and challenges to its security. Pakistan’s induction of TNWs would augment its defensive capabilities, thereby considerably reducing the prospects of employment of a proactive strategy by India.