Miller, Paul D

Abstract
In a previous Survival article, I argued that, contrary to widespread belief, the United States has been pursuing at least one pillar of an implicit grand strategy since the end of the Cold War: building the democratic peace.1 The democratic peace has informed most major US foreign-policy initiatives over at least the last two decades, and rightly so: it has many strengths to recommend it, including its harmony with values the American electorate broadly shares. But championing liberalism is only one component of US grand strategy. There are four others: defending the American homeland from attack, maintaining a favourable balance of power among the great powers, punishing rogue actors, and investing in good governance and allied capabilities abroad.2 Like support for democracy, these broad goals are well within the mainstream of US foreign policy; they enjoy bipartisan support, and have been remarkably consistent for decades.
In fact, these five pillars together are a fairly accurate description of US grand strategy since at least the administration of President Theodore Roosevelt, though some have occasionally overshadowed others. Many of the key weaknesses of US foreign policy in the mid-twentieth century, such as its open-ended support of right-wing dictatorships, its failure to understand the nature of the Vietnam War and its blindness to the emerging jihadist movements around the world, can be understood in part as a natural consequence of Washington’s single-minded focus on balancing against the Soviet Union, to the neglect of other goals. By contrast, the strengths of American foreign policy are evident when it pursues the full range of objectives relevant to US national security interests.
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