Liao, Kai

Abstract
Chinese officials and analysts regard the US pivot towards the Asia-Pacific as a strategy to contain China, despite Washington’s claim that it does not focus on a particular country. Instead of accepting either Chinese scepticism or US official statements at face value, this article attempts to trace the origins and examine the evolution of the pivot through the lens of the Pentagon’s internal think tank, the Office of Net Assessment (ONA). Drawing on documents produced and sponsored by the office, this article explores trends in its analysis of Asian security and Sino-American relations, the rationale for the pivot and China’s role in the United States’ Asia-Pacific strategy.
Established in 1973, the ONA is directed by Andrew W. Marshall and employs around 15 staff. Most of its projects are outsourced to external academics, think tanks and companies. The US Department of Defense defines net assessment as ‘the comparative analysis of military, technological, political, economic, and other factors governing the relative military capability of nations. Its purpose is to identify problems and opportunities that deserve the attention of senior defense officials.’ The ONA studies issues relevant to national security such as weapons technology and climate change, explores worst-case scenarios and promotes no-regret strategies. Using methods such as war games, simulations, policy analysis and scenario-based planning, the office aims to anticipate strategic developments 20 years in advance.
Marshall was described by former US Vice President Dick Cheney as one of the world’s best strategists, and last year was ranked at number 44 in Foreign Policy’s Top 100 Global Thinkers.4 Like many first-generation RAND scholars, Marshall is often praised for his originality, though he has also been criticised for making exaggerated claims.
This article is based on the study of ONA-related defence department documents and memoranda, the writings of officials and experts associated with the office and work by individuals and organisations it commissioned to carry out research. For brevity, I will not specify every aspect of the ONA’s relationship with the individuals and organisations quoted in this article. Generally, these sources influenced, or were influenced by, Marshall and the ONA. Those associated with the ONA will usually be referred to as net assessors. Although Defense Planning Guidance for the Fiscal Years 1994–1999 seemingly has no connection to the office, Marshall and Albert Wohlstetter were consulted on the drafting of the document. Zalmay Khalilzad and Abram N. Shulsky, major authors of the guidance, both have a background at RAND and are closely associated with Marshall and Wohlstetter. Shulsky also worked for the ONA, and was one of the participants in its 1999 Summer Study. This article examines ONA-related work since the 1980s.
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