Kornegay Jr., Francis A

Abstract
Beneath the surface of the Somali piracy threat that preoccupies the international community throughout the vast Indian Ocean maritime zone, there is a broad landscape of economic, commercial and functional potential embracing the states bordering this zone. This analysis focuses on the eastern and southern African littoral of the western quadrant of the Indian Ocean. It is this sub-region of the Ocean, stemming from the Gulf of Aden abutting the Horn of Africa southward through the Mozambique Channel to the Cape sea route around South Africa, which occupies the main focus of attention. The state of affairs in this region tended to naturally shine the spotlight on South Africa as the only African state with the capacity and geographical positioning to take the initiative in combating the piracy threat. South Africa’s initial response to external pressure to join an expanding flotilla against piracy was to demur into a retreat from engagement. However, it was not foreseen when the piracy crisis began to escalate that it would migrate southward as far as the Mozambique Channel, heightening threat perception in Tanzania, a member not only of Southern African Development Community (SADC), but also of the East African Community, and Mozambique. Thus, within the context of the African Union’s fledgling maritime security strategy, SADC has produced its own plan. Although classified, its drafting coincides with South Africa, Mozambique and Tanzania developing a tripartite cooperative approach to meeting the piracy threat. This recent SADC development needs to be seen in a broader geostrategic context of a renewal of South African interest and increased active participation in matters affecting the Indian Ocean. The issue of how the SADC relates to the increasingly salient maritime security agenda for Africa and the South has to be understood within a much broader context of the geostrategic spatial interdependencies impinging on Africa generally and, via the Indian Ocean, on the SADC region in particular. Therefore, South Africa’s broader regional and extra-regional aims in eastern and southern Africa, alongside its unfolding global South and emerging power strategy involving IBSA, in particular, are addressed.
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