Knopf, Jeffrey W., Anne I. Harrington, and Miles Pomper

Abstract
Research in the fields such as psychology and neuroscience has shown that human thinking and decision making often fail to match the assumption of rationality. Indeed, people can depart in quite systemic ways from the predictions of a rational actor model. These findings form the basis of behavioral economics, an approach to understanding human behavior that has attracted enormous attention in recent years. In this project, we explored the implications of behavioral economics, and the research that informs it, for policies and strategies designed to deal with the challenges posed by nuclear weapons. Papers commissioned for this project examined topics ranging from deterrence to economic sanctions, the nuclear nonproliferation regime, and U.S. domestic debates about ballistic missile defense.
We find that behavioral research has generated a number of specific insights that it would be useful to be aware of and keep in mind in strategic planning and decision making. At the same time, it proved difficult to integrate these into a single, comprehensive framework. We therefore conclude that behavioral economics does not yet provide a coherent and predictive model that can by itself serve as a basis for designing strategies. While it suggests important insights, behavioral economics does not on its own give us an analytical framework sufficient for identifying policies that will minimize nuclear dangers. For this reason, policymakers and defense planners are likely to still find value in taking into consideration the rational self-interest and strategic cultures of other actors. At the same time, behavioral research reveals important limitations to relying too heavily on assumptions of either rational or cultural determinants of behavior. Predictions that others will behave rationally can often be frustrated. And while human behavior is influenced by culture, it is a product of many other factors as well. Behavioral approaches reinforce long-standing institutions about the importance of understanding other actors, but in ways that go beyond an appreciation for strategic culture.
Behavioral research suggests ways to add new depth to the ancient insight of Sun Tzu about the value of knowing both ourselves and others. In particular, it is vital to learn as much as possible about how others understand their situations. The framing for choice can have a huge impact on the decisions people make. Cultural legacies are often one ingredient in such framings, but the key question is how individuals frame the situation or context in which such framings, but the key question is how individuals frame the situation or context in which they have to make a decision, and this can be affected by their present circumstances and recent diplomatic interactions as well as by historical legacies. Just as it is important to learn as much as possible about how others frame their circumstances and choice options, it is also important to examine ourselves and try to figure out our own biases. The better we know ourselves and know others, the better we can begin to anticipate how some common psychological tendencies might influence the course of our interactions.
Even if behavioral economics does not provide a reliable basis for prediction, the research that informs it suggests several insights that can be valuable to keep in mind. First, emotions can exert a powerful impact on human decisions and behavior. We should not assume that decisions about nuclear weapons will be shaped solely by cool calculations of cost and benefit. Second, people are often motivated more strongly by the desire to avoid or minimize loss than by the pursuit of gain. In situations where we perceive an aggressive actor out to expand its territory or influence, it is worth considering whether in its own thinking that actor views itself as seeking to avoid a future loss or reverse a pas loss. Third, people also tend to care about considerations of justice and fairness, but often in self-serving ways. This makes it important to explore the possibilities for developing common standards of fairness that might pave the way for a successful diplomatic negotiation or a stable deterrent relationship. Fourth, time horizons can change how people think. In particular, longer time horizons may allow space for more deliberative reasoning, which in turn can reduce the risks of rash or hasty decision making. Fifth, and finally, it is not easy to find optimal or permanent solutions to problems. We should not be unduly dismissive of the merits of “muddling through” when such efforts manage to keep problems from becoming much worse. When it comes to dealing with nuclear weapons, there is much to be said for avoiding worst-case outcomes even when the solutions are less than perfect.
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