Klintworth, Gary

Introduction
China has long land and sea borders and a long history. It has a deep sense of vulnerability to attack from the north and from the sea to the east. China also has massive problems, including the degradation of its environment, shortages of water, grain and energy resources, and the problem of tens of millions underemployed and a population that is increasing every year by the equivalent of Australia’s total population. China has to deal with enormous infrastructure bottlenecks, regional disparities, the problems of corruption, rising consumer expectations, a rising crime rate and the erosion of state authority. There are demands for independence by ethnic minorities in Tibet and Xinjiang. There are many millionaires in the coastal provinces of Deng Xiaoping’s market driven China. But for the vast majority of Chinese, the margin between survival and starvation is precarious. Given these considerations, it may be premature to talk about China as a prospective superpower, or even a great power. It might be more appropriate to consider how China might survive as a state. That is one set of reasons why China does not want the distraction of tension or war with the Asia-Pacific community. Conflict would stretch China to the limit and risk losing the source of China’s future salvation, that is, access to the markets, capital and technology of the Asia-Pacific region. That is to say, China has a big stake in regional stability and regional prosperity. It can not afford to waste resources on conflicts with neighbours or spend large sums on building up a large defence force.
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